

June 30, 1967

THE CONTROL OF LOCAL CONFLICT

A DESIGN STUDY ON
ARMS CONTROL AND LIMITED WAR
IN THE DEVELOPING AREAS

STUDIES OF CONFLICT


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VOLUME III

Prepared for

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Amelia C. Leiss and Lincoln P. Bloomfield

with

Col. Laurence J. Legere, USA (Ret.)	Janet Fraser
Robert A. Bates	Lewis A. Frank
Irirangi C. Bloomfield	Stanley J. Heginbotham
Priscilla A. Clapp	Jane K. Holland
R. Lucas Fischer	Philip M. Raup

**CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY**

The judgments expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other Agency of the United States Government.

CONTENTS

Foreword	v
CONTROLLING LOCAL CONFLICT: LEARNING THE LESSONS OF HISTORY	1
THE INDONESIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE: 1945 - 1949	27
THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY: 1948 - 1960	107
THE INDONESIAN - MALAYSIAN CONFRONTATION: 1963 - 1965	153
THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: 1947 - 1965	205
THE INDIA - CHINA BORDER CONFLICT: 1954 - 1962	347
THE BAY OF PIGS: 1960 - 1961	391
THE SOMALIAN - ETHIOPIAN - KENYAN CONFLICT: 1960 - 1964	457
✓ THE ALGERIAN - MOROCCAN CONFLICT: 1962 - 1963	507
THE ANGOLA CONFLICT: 1950 - 1961	535
✓ THE SOVIET - IRANIAN CONFLICT: 1941 - 1947	581
✓ THE SUEZ - SINAI CONFLICTS: 1956	633
THE GREEK INSURGENCY: 1944 - 1949	727
✓ THE CONFLICT ON CYPRUS: 1952 - 1964	777

F O R E W O R D

This volume is a companion to the main report of a Design Study on The Control of Local Conflict prepared under contract WEC-98 with the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The present volume consists of studies of fifteen contemporary cases of low-level conflict.*

These episodes have been subjected to what we believe is a unique analytical method, one we have christened "historic-analytic." The technique, which is explained in detail in the introduction that follows, was largely the inspiration of Miss Amelia C. Leiss. Having conceived of the basic approach, she then gave continuous direction both to its formulation and execution, as well as personally drafting the crucial second part of each case study where the analysis of factors is made to generate relevant conflict-control policies.

The narrative initial sections of the cases were drafted in the first instance by the following individuals: Mr. R. Lucas Fischer, the Indonesian War of Independence, the Malayan Emergency, the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, and the India-China Border Conflict; Mr. Stanley J. Heginbotham, Kashmir 1947-1949 and 1965; Miss Priscilla A. Clapp, the Bay of Pigs; Miss Janet Fraser, the Somalian-Ethiopian-Kenyan Conflict,

* A sixteenth case, the Venezuelan Insurgency, does not appear in this volume as a case study, although sufficient research was done on the case by Mr. Edward W. Gude to enable us to derive major findings from it which are reflected in the main report on this study, WEC-98 II.

Cyprus (Enosis), and Cyprus (Communal); Mr. Robert H. Bates, the Algerian-Moroccan Conflict and the Angola Conflict; Mrs. Jane K. Holland, the Soviet-Iranian Conflict; and Mr. Philip M. Raup, the Sinai-Suez Conflicts.

The third portion of each case describing and analyzing the weapons used was initially prepared by Miss Clapp and Mr. Lewis A. Frank, with assistance from Mrs. Judith H. Young, at the Browne & Shaw Research Corporation, where Mr. John H. Hoagland directed their research.

The undersigned drafted the fourth sections entitled "Lessons for Conflict Control."

Col. Laurence J. Legere, USA (Ret.), was extremely helpful with substantive advice and editorial assistance at all stages of preparation of these case studies. Miss Fraser served with high competence and dedication as technical editor and production manager. Mrs. Irirangi C. Bloomfield collaborated with Miss Leiss in the historical editing of the narrative portions.

Mrs. Eileen Smith rendered invaluable service, both with her extraordinary typing speed and skill and with her unfailing calm good humor. Indispensable typing and clerical services were performed by Miss Ulrike H. Hochreiter, Mrs. Sandra L. Lenard, Mrs. Diane G. Cook, Miss Sally A. Lewis, Miss Kathleen A. Gallery, and Miss Barbara H. Abramson.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Director, Arms Control Project

CONTROLLING LOCAL CONFLICT

LEARNING THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

The case studies in this volume were prepared as part of a Design Study on the control of local conflict outside Europe. We define "control" as meaning the prevention, moderation,* or termination of organized violence at the intranational or international level. By "local" we mean the small interstate wars, the bitter civil wars, the proxy conflicts behind which the superpowers hide, and the insurgencies and guerrilla warfare in the backwaters of the developing world. Our focus is on the continents and regions outside Europe--Latin America Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. What we mean by "conflict" is a dispute that is being or is likely to be dealt with by predominantly military means.

Many facets of the developing world have been intensively studied. The military problem of "winning" against insurgency movements has been vigorously pursued. A large effort has been directed to understanding how insurgencies can be prevented from developing in the first place. Controlling violence at the superpower, nuclear level has produced the most imaginative body of strategic literature in this century. But singularly little attention has been focused on control of the conflicts that do occur in the developing world. This broad field con-

*We have used the words "intensification" and "moderation" in place of the more common "escalation" and "de-escalation." The latter are open to quarrel as to whether or not they are applicable to any but the most egregious situations. Our language is no more precise but, as yet, carries less semantic freight.

stitutes the subject matter of this Design Study.

Our purpose is both a research and a policy one: to generate hypotheses about local conflict and its control; to test them to the extent possible; and to structure the problem in such a way that additional research and analytic tasks will emerge. This tentative and experimental nature of our study set the limits of our research strategy. If the field had been more fully cultivated before our research effort began, we could with some degree of confidence have selected policy measures that seemed most likely to be relevant, and concentrated our analysis exclusively on developing and elaborating them. If our only interest were to advance theoretical understanding of the conflict process, we could have chosen a level of theoretical abstraction far removed from the uncertainties and needs of the policy-maker. But the fact that this was a Design Study in a relatively new field of inquiry with a policy purpose precluded all these simplifications of the task.

A DYNAMIC MODEL OF LOCAL CONFLICT

At a very early stage in our thinking, we postulated that there might be within conflicts factors that at crucial pressure points could be subjected to conflict-controlling measures. From the concept of pressure points developed the further notion that within conflicts there were phases that differed from each other in ways that were relevant to the problem of conflict control. To examine the extent to which such pressure points and phases might exist required some way in which the dynamic structure of the conflict process itself could be exposed for analysis.

From these relatively uncomplicated notions developed a model

of the structure of conflict and its control. The model is both the organizing theme of a large part of our research, and the product of it. In the course of seeking to apply the model to historic conflicts, the characteristics of the separate phases, and of the transitions between phases, became more clearly differentiated. And as the content of the phases emerged, the nature of the control objectives that were relevant to each of them was seen with greater precision.


We start with a dynamic image of conflict as a process that moves along in time and space. It is divided into identifiable stages or phases. In each phase, factors are at work that generate pressures. Some tend toward increased violence, and some tend away from violence. Within each phase the factors interact to push the conflict across a series of thresholds toward or away from violence. The transition across thresholds is a function of the combined interaction of the factors during the previous phase. Their relative strength during the phase determines whether or not the conflict worsens.

Our picture of the process envisages conflict arising out of a substantive dispute, whether over territory, borders, legitimacy, ideology, power, race, or whatever. This quarrel (dispute) is not necessarily perceived in military terms by either party. If one or more parties introduces a military option, a threshold has been crossed to a new phase in which hostilities are potentially likely or at least plausible. A conflict has been generated. (It may be that only one party perceives the dispute in military terms; surprise attack is the classic example of one side being considerably more disposed to violence than the other.) The introduction of a military option does not mean that hostilities have actually occurred, just that they are likely or possible. The conflict is still in a pre-hostilities stage.

If hostilities break out, a new phase is entered. Intensifi-

cation may take place during this phase. If hostilities are terminated, another threshold is crossed to a phase in which the conflict continues without fighting necessarily being resumed, but with at least one party continuing to view the dispute in potentially military terms. It ceases to be a conflict when it is no longer perceived chiefly in military terms, real or potential. It then may enter a phase in which the military option is discarded but the issues remain unsettled, in which case it can be said that the conflict, but not the dispute, is ended.

If the dispute is settled, a final threshold is happily crossed. If not, and conflict remains, it can flare up again in hostilities. Even if only the dispute remains, and a military build-up resumes, the situation can revert to the earlier pre-hostilities conflict situation. Stated this way, conflict is a part of the larger context of dispute between parties over an issue or issues; and actual fighting is a part of the context of conflict. Stated more formally, with names and numbers given the various phases, the preceding paragraphs may be summarized as follows:



Needless to say, all these phases do not necessarily occur in all conflicts, nor in any invariable order. As a model, this representation

will rarely be followed to perfection in real life.


One of our basic assumptions was that it is possible to identify, isolate, and classify the salient factors, singly or in combination, that, in their existence or absence, coincided with the extent to which a conflict was controlled or not (or that, in terms of the analysis based on our model of conflict, were tending to favor or operate against the transition from one phase to another). We postulated in accordance with the model that there were factors or patterns of variables that tended to make control easier or more difficult. But we made no assumption either about what those factors or patterns were, or whether and under what circumstances they would promote or inhibit control.

The figure on the following page brings together our definitions of phases and transitions, the notion of conflict-promoting and conflict-inhibiting factors, and the resultant control objectives applying in each phase.

We should stress here that the coexistence of a factor with a given degree of controllability or uncontrollability does not necessarily support the conclusion that there is a cause-and-effect relationship. For one thing, our sample is much too small to justify such an assertion. We do however assert what might be called an "existence-effect" relationship: Where a given factor or group of factors has existed in the past, a given effect has occurred. The most we would be prepared to assert beyond this--and that only about some of the most persistent patterns--is the probability that the existence of the same combination in the future might be associated with the same or similar effect.

STRUCTURE OF LOCAL CONFLICT CONTROL

PHASE OF CONFLICT	THRESHOLD OF TRANSITION BETWEEN PHASES	DESCRIPTION OF PHASE OR TRANSITION	CRUCIAL FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITION		CONFLICT - CONTROL POLICY OBJECTIVES
			TOWARD CONFLICT CONTROL (AWAY FROM VIOLENCE)	AWAY FROM CONFLICT CONTROL (TOWARD VIOLENCE)	
P-I		DISPUTE, NOT PERCEIVED IN MILITARY TERMS BY EITHER PARTY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TENDING TO KEEP DISPUTE NON-MILITARY TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TENDING TO INTRODUCE MILITARY OPTION TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY SETTLING THE DISPUTE
	I - II	INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY OPTION BY ONE OR BOTH PARTIES	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PHASE I HAVE COMBINED TO PUSH THE DISPUTE ACROSS THE THRESHOLD TO PHASE II, MAKING IT A CONFLICT)		
P-II		CONFLICT, PERCEIVED IN MILITARY TERMS BY ONE OR BOTH PARTIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> INHIBITING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES RESTRICTING THE SCALE / SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PROMOTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES EXPANDING THE SCALE / SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PREVENTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES RESTRICTING THE SCALE / SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES SETTLING THE DISPUTE
	II - III	OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PHASE II HAVE COMBINED TO PUSH CONFLICT ACROSS THE THRESHOLD OF PHASE III, GENERATING HOSTILITIES)		
P-III		HOSTILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MODERATING HOSTILITIES TERMINATING HOSTILITIES TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> INTENSIFYING HOSTILITIES CONTINUING HOSTILITIES TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MODERATING HOSTILITIES TERMINATING HOSTILITIES SETTLING THE DISPUTE
	III - IV	TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PHASE III HAVE COMBINED TO PUSH CONFLICT ACROSS THRESHOLD TO PHASE IV, TERMINATING ACTUAL FIGHTING)		
P-IV		POST-HOSTILITIES BUT CONFLICT STILL PERCEIVED IN POTENTIALLY MILITARY TERMS BY AT LEAST ONE PARTY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> INHIBITING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES RESTRICTING THE SCALE / SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PROMOTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES EXPANDING THE SCALE / SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PREVENTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES RESTRICTING THE SCALE / SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES SETTLING THE DISPUTE
	IV - V	END OF CONFLICT	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PREVIOUS PHASES HAVE COMBINED TO REMOVE THE MILITARY OPTION OF BOTH ADVERSARIES, BUT THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE REMAINS)		
P-V		DISPUTE, NOT PERCEIVED IN MILITARY TERMS BY EITHER PARTY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TENDING TO KEEP DISPUTE NON-MILITARY TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TENDING TO INTRODUCE MILITARY OPTION TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY SETTLING THE DISPUTE
	S	SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PREVIOUS PHASES-OR FACTORS UNRELATED TO CONFLICT ITSELF - HAVE COMBINED TO BRING UNDERLYING DISPUTE TO SETTLEMENT)		



THE DECISION TO LOOK TO HISTORY

The model of conflict and conflict control was based on our general assumptions about historic conflicts. But if the model was to be anything but an abstraction, it had to be compared to real-world conflicts. For this Design Study, the model had two tests to meet: Could it be used as a device to structure real conflict data without distorting reality? Would the data so structured reveal the factors at work within each phase that were tending toward or away from conflict-control objectives?

It is not necessarily true that the only source of knowledge about conflict and its control is to be found in actual human experience. We could have simulated conflict situations on the basis of hypotheses generated from known conflicts. But none of the analogies or models of conflict that might have been simulated approaches in complexity the real world of conflict within and between states. For this reason, and as a matter of our own preferences, we chose instead to examine in this design stage some actual historic examples of the kind of local conflict phenomenon under study.

But while our chief source of knowledge about conflict comes from the past, the dangers involved in extracting its lessons are obvious. By confining ourselves to a small slice of history, we were working with a statistically small sample. We were aware of general admonitions to be suspicious of making inferences about the future from the past. As Carl Becker once wrote, "In human affairs nothing is pre-determined until after it has occurred." But as another wise diplomatic historian wrote, "I have observed that politicians, unlike diplomats, have no time to learn the lessons of history."* We think those

*Sir Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London, Constable, 1954), p. 71.

lessons worth trying to learn.

To decide what period of history to concentrate upon was a difficult matter. Limitations of time and the priorities appropriate to a design effort dictated that only a small sample of cases be selected for any detailed study. Several practical as well as theoretical reasons led to the decision to confine the selection to the post-1945 period. Data of the sort required were more likely to be available. And we believe that, in general, the motive forces that characterize this period are likely to be prime movers for many years to come.

The post-World War II period may of course be unique in its conjunction of ideological cleavage, rapid technological change, and decolonization (this point is cogently argued by our consultant Alastair Buchan). With some notable exceptions that are high on any list of potential conflict areas, the decolonization process has been completed. But the sensitivities of new-found independence and the assertive nationalism to which the decolonization process gave rise are bound to color the perceptions of present and future leaders of the new states. The pace of rapid technological change may slacken, but the impact of that change as it is transferred to the developing world has surely not yet run its course. And while the character of the ideological split may be changing with the rapid decentralization of both Cold War camps, the perceptions of the earlier era, right or wrong, will doubtless linger among both political leaders and their publics. The post-1945 period, then, is not only a source of many examples of the phenomenon of local conflict but of local conflicts with a character that seems likely to project into the next decades.

THE SELECTION OF CASES

Drawing on our own admittedly imperfect memories of the past two decades, and after perusing the lists compiled by others, we have settled on a list of 52 postwar cases^{*} of local conflict that fit our definition and geographic scope. (The identity of these 52 may be found in Typology A on the following page.) We are not prepared to argue that this number settles definitely the question of how many postwar conflicts there have been.^{**} But these 52 fit our definition of local conflict.

Any case used to apply the model would have to be examined in considerable detail. We could realistically employ only a smaller sample than the 52 postwar cases under consideration. Ultimately, sixteen cases were selected, with the following characteristics:

The Indonesian War of Independence: Asia, colonial; continued hostilities without intensification

The Malayan Emergency: Asia; internal with significant external involvement; continued hostilities without intensification

The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation: Asia; unconventional interstate; continued hostilities with intensification

[#]The Kashmir Conflict (1947-1949): Asia; conventional interstate; continued hostilities with intensification

^{*}One of these, the Greek Insurgency, took place in Europe. We nonetheless decided to include it because of the uncanny way in which it resembles the conflict in Vietnam.

^{**}Numbers arrived at by different students of recent events vary widely--from the mid-thirties to the several hundreds. The wide range seems to be a matter of definition. Unlike some lists, ours excludes coups, riots, and unorganized low-order violence. Furthermore, we define as single conflicts series of events that others count separately.

[#]See note at end of list.

TYPOLOGY A GROSS NATURE OF CONFLICT

	CONVENTIONAL INTERSTATE	UNCONVENTIONAL INTERSTATE	INTERNAL WITH SIGNIFICANT EXTER- NAL INVOLVEMENT	PRIMARILY INTERNAL	COLONIAL
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITH INTENSIFICATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Kashmir 1947-49</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Korea 1950-53</u> US-Ch-SU _I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Indonesia-Malaysia</u> <u>1963-65</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Vietnam 1959 -US-SU_I-Ch_I</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Congo (Katanga)</u> <u>1961-64</u> <u>Greece 1944-49 US_I</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Congo 1960-64 US_I</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Chinese Civil War_I</u> <u>1945-49 Ch-US_I</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>India 1945-48</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Indochina 1945-54</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Algeria 1954-62</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Cyprus 1952-59</u>
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58</u> US _I <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Palestine 1945-48</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Aden-Yemen 1954-59</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>India-China 1954-62 Ch</u>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Yemen 1962-</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Laos 1959- US_I-SU_I-Ch_I</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Tibet 1955-59 Ch</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Burma-Nationalist</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>China 1950-54</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Malaya 1948-60</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Burmese Civil War</u> <u>1948-54</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Venezuela 1960-63</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Iraq (Kurds): 1959-63</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Dominican Republic</u> <u>1961-62 US_I</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Cuba 1958-59</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Philippines 1948-54</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Colombia 1960-</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Angola 1961-</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Indonesia 1945-49</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>French Morocco</u> <u>1952-56</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Kenya 1952-58</u>
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY AFTER INTENSIFICATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Kashmir 1965 -Ch_I</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Suez 1956</u>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Dominican Republic</u> <u>1965 US</u>		
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Soviet-Iran 1941-47 SU</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Somalia-Ethiopia-</u> <u>Kenya 1960-64</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Algeria-Morocco</u> <u>1962-63</u>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Bay of Pigs 1960-61</u> <u>US_I</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Guatemala 1954 US_I</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Cyprus 1963-</u>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Goa 1961-62</u>
NO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Morocco - Spanish</u> <u>Morocco 1957-58</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Honduras-Nicaragua</u> <u>1957</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Kuwait-Iraq 1961</u>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Costa Rica 1955</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Costa Rica 1947</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Lebanon 1958 US</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>French Cameroon</u> <u>1955-60</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Madagascar 1947</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>Muscat-Oman 1956-58</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>West Irian 1962-63</u>

Note: Conflicts underlined have been subjects of case studies. In the hostilities index, the order of the control objectives of termination and moderation does not imply a judgment as to their respective value.

Legend: ☒ Middle East
☒ Africa
☒ Latin America
☒ Asia

US: Direct
 SU: Direct
 Ch: Direct

US_I: Indirect
 SU_I: Indirect
 Ch_I: Indirect

HOSTILITIES INDEX

WEC-98 III

- # The Kashmir Conflict (1965): Asia; conventional interstate;
hostilities terminated quickly after intensification;
indirect Chinese involvement
- The India-China Border Conflict: Asia; conventional interstate;
continued hostilities without intensification; direct
Chinese involvement
- The Bay of Pigs: Latin America; internal with significant
external involvement; hostilities terminated quickly with-
out intensification; indirect U.S. involvement
- The Venezuelan Insurgency: Latin America; internal with sig-
nificant external involvement; hostilities continued with-
out intensification
- The Somalian-Ethiopian-Kenyan Conflict: Africa; conventional
interstate; hostilities terminated quickly without inten-
sification
- The Algerian-Moroccan Conflict: Africa; conventional inter-
state; hostilities terminated quickly without intensification
- The Angola Conflict: Africa; colonial; continued hostilities
without intensification
- The Soviet-Iranian Conflict: Middle East; conventional inter-
state; hostilities terminated quickly without intensification;
direct Soviet involvement
- The Suez-Sinai Conflicts: Middle East; conventional interstate;
hostilities terminated quickly after intensification
- The Greek Insurgency: eastern Mediterranean; internal with
significant external involvement; continued hostilities
with intensification; indirect U.S. involvement
- # The Conflict on Cyprus (Enosis): eastern Mediterranean; colonial;
continued hostilities with intensification

See note at end of list.

[#]The Conflict on Cyprus (Communal): eastern Mediterranean;
internal with significant external involvement; hostilities
terminated quickly without intensification

These sixteen conflicts of course differ along many dimensions besides those that underlay their selection. It was not assumed that the criteria used to select cases were necessarily going to prove the most important distinctions in terms of structure or control.

THE CASE STUDIES

Our objective in examining the historical record needs constant emphasis: We were not seeking to develop new information about the cases, nor to write exhaustive histories of them. We were trying, rather, to identify the phase structure of each case and to indicate what features, before and after the transition from one phase to another, tended to verify that a transition had indeed taken place. In some of the cases it was possible to refine the process further by dividing phases into sub-phases in which the conflict moved perceptibly toward transition. And in the hostilities phase (Phase III), an effort was made to indicate intensifications and moderations of the hostilities--that is, points at which there were changes in the "rules of the game" governing the conduct and limitations of hostilities.

Individual researchers performed the basic research on these

[#]The conflicts marked with this symbol were selected separately because of their differing characteristics in terms of the criteria used in this initial selection. In subsequent analysis, the two Kashmir conflicts were combined, as were the two Cyprus conflicts. Indeed, in terms of our model, they are both single conflicts.

cases, using primarily library materials and secondary sources, although in a few instances we were able to talk with individuals who had been intimately connected with one or another aspect of the case.* Beyond instructions to determine and verify the phase structure of the conflict, the researchers were not given a set list of topics, questions, or pieces of information that their research was to produce or answer.

Some guidelines were, however, developed to assist the researchers in recognizing features of the cases under examination that were likely to prove important in establishing the phase structure. While these guidelines were not intended to provide the format for the case studies, and did not represent an exhaustive list of relevant questions, they do suggest a number of hypotheses about the moving forces within conflicts. In all, 23 questions were formulated, drawn from our general knowledge about conflict and about events in the past two decades:

1. Identify the adversaries. In some cases each "side" may in fact be a coalition of several groups; if so, identify the major elements and their relationships.
2. Describe briefly the past relationships among the adversaries. Are they long-time enemies? Have they engaged in wars with each other in the past?
3. Has the subject of the particular conflict been a matter of dispute or conflict in the past?

*It was deliberately decided not to attempt research into primary materials, nor to seek access to classified records, although either might have produced a greater abundance of detail and more precise dates and figures. Either course would have meant devoting substantially more time to an individual case, and consequently would have greatly reduced the number of cases that could have been studied. The purposes of this Design Study were, we feel, better served by undertaking the largest possible number of case studies.

4. What features of geography, climate, terrain, etc., affect the nature and conduct of the conflict--e.g., long, mountainous border, inaccessible jungles and swamps, monsoons, etc.
5. In addition to the subject of the present conflict, along what other dimensions do the adversaries differ--ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, ideological, etc.?
6. What formal external security ties do the adversaries maintain?: U.N. membership? Regional organization (OAS, OAU, Arab League)? Bilateral or multilateral security alliance (NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS Treaty, Warsaw Pact, special relationships with the United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain, etc.)?
7. Has either of the adversaries had previous recourse to the United Nations or any regional security arrangement in connection with this or another conflict? If so, describe briefly and indicate whether it led to the achievement of the adversary's claim, the loss of his claim or of opportunity to press it, or had no effect. In other words, would past experience suggest that the adversary has been frustrated or gratified in seeking to use available machinery for peaceful settlement?
8. The same questions apply to previous attempts to invoke bilateral or multilateral security arrangements.
9. How far is the locus of the conflict from the United States? Soviet Union? Communist China? A Soviet or Chinese satellite or a U.S. ally? An area generally regarded as of strategic importance by one of the above: e.g., the Suez or Panama Canals, important oil fields or other

economic resources, major military bases? If there are third-power military bases in the area, describe them briefly (i.e., are they missile bases comprising part of Western defenses against the Soviet Union, airfields, naval bases, home ports of major fleets, etc.?). In addition to fixed bases, are the waters of the area regularly patrolled by a major fleet?

10. What are the relative sizes of the opposing military forces of the adversaries? How do they compare qualitatively--in terms of training, morale, organization, mobilization procedures? How do they compare in terms of equipment, both qualitatively and quantitatively? How would you estimate the over-all military "balance" between the forces? Define the character of the "deterrent situation" between the adversaries.
11. What is the political role of the military forces in the adversary state or states? Are they or have they recently engaged in political activities? Alone or in alliance with other interest groups? In coups or attempted coups? Do they at present control the government? If so, how did they come to power? By election or other constitutional process? By a coup led by the military leadership? By a coup by younger officers against both the military commanders and the political leadership?
12. Where does the military materiel come from? Is there local production of arms and ammunition? How much and of what? Is local arms production dependent on external suppliers of raw materials, machinery, or technicians? Whose? Are local factories locally owned or are they subsidiaries of foreign firms? Whose? Whether weapons are produced

locally or imported, are there local facilities for their repair and maintenance? What portion and what types of weapons are imported? Openly or clandestinely? By purchase, long-term assistance, gift? From whom? How long ago? As part of a long-term modernization of the armed forces? Are the forces trained in their use and the commanders in appropriate strategies and tactics to employ them?

13. Does either of the adversaries have a nuclear capability? Is it thought to be seeking to develop one? Is there evidence or speculation that it may have received or be about to receive nuclear weapons from an ally? For use at its discretion or controlled by the ally?
14. The same questions apply to chemical and bacteriological weapons and to delivery systems for CBR weapons.
15. If hostilities broke out in the conflict, in what way? Large-scale surprise attack? A gradually intensifying series of small skirmishes? An attempted surprise that was anticipated and met with adequate counterforce?
16. What are the relationships between the adversaries and the United States, Soviet Union, Communist China, or a major ally of one of the above? Do they maintain diplomatic relations with the United States? Soviet Union? Communist China? Are they receiving economic development assistance from one or more of these or from major allies of one or more of them? At what general level?
17. In cases of interstate conflicts, are the adversary countries united behind their governments' pursuit of the conflict? Or is the conflict a matter of domestic political difference? Does either adversary have a potential ally within the territory of the other--e.g., a local Communist party;

- racial, linguistic, religious, ethnic, or other minority?
Are there significant émigré or refugee groups that are important factors in the conflict?
18. How do the adversaries describe their aims and objectives? Independence (including secession)? Control of the government? Autonomy? Redress of special grievances? Territory? Procedural concessions opening the door to future gains (e.g., free elections, representation in government, etc.)? Do these stated aims change in the course of the conflict (e.g., does a stated goal of independence become a stated goal of local autonomy, or does a stated claim to territory become a stated goal of plebiscite)? In terms of conflicts that have been ended and disputes that have been settled, how do the terms of settlement compare with the initially stated goals? In your judgment, how deeply committed are the adversaries to the achievement of their goals? Are the governments (or insurgent leaders) in a position vis-à-vis their own constituents to accept a lesser solution?
19. In terms of the territory or territories of the adversaries, how widespread or restricted is the conflict? For example, does it involve only points on the border or the entire border? Only certain provinces or the entire country? Only urban or only rural areas?
20. What proportion of available military force is committed in the conflict? Does either adversary feel it necessary to station part of its forces elsewhere--e.g., to maintain internal order or protect against encroachments by another neighbor?
21. What size and calibre police force exists? Are the armed forces being used for police-type functions? Why? Because

they are regarded as politically more reliable?

22. In terms of the numbers and equipment of the armed forces available, is the adversary's conduct of the conflict "limited"--e.g., is it pursuing a more modest strategy than it is capable of pursuing? Are there classes of targets capable of being hit that are not attacked? Destructive weapons available that are not used? Vulnerable borders that are not crossed? Supply ports or routes that are not hit?
23. Does either adversary enjoy on its own or another's territory a sanctuary in which its forces can rest, regroup, train, amass supplies, add recruits, etc.?

Each researcher produced a roughly chronological narrative account of the conflict he was assigned, organized in terms of phases and sub-phases.* Theoretically, it should not be necessary to present in formal, written form the "identification of phases" section of the case studies. But at this stage of experimentation, it seemed preferable to present the work in all its parts so that the analytic soundness of the approach could be judged. Experimentally, one case, the Greek Insurgency, is presented without this initial section. This was possible in part because an excellent account of the Insurgency was available that treated military and political events with equal thoroughness. (The fact that most historic accounts of the conflicts we have examined do not meet this standard may suggest some useful lessons for future historians seeking to prepare a complete historic record of a given conflict.)

*These accounts appear as Section I entitled "Identification of Phases" in each of the following case studies.

WEAPONS DATA

Data on the weapons used in a conflict--and on those available but not used--are of great relevance to arms-control policy activities that may help control local conflicts. The task of acquiring such data, even about recent conflicts, is difficult. Historians generally are much more concerned with the political and diplomatic aspects of conflict and deal inadequately, almost casually, with the military aspects. Sales or transfers of big, expensive, sophisticated weapons systems, such as jet aircraft, are usually well reported. But many of the conflicts we are examining were armor wars, or artillery wars, or even rifle wars--categories of weapons that scarcely attract the attention of the newspaper reporter, let alone the historian.

It was clear, in short, that to develop data on weapons required a type of research effort very different from that employed in preparing the narrative case studies. Under a sub-contract, Browne & Shaw Research Corporation undertook the task of building up, from widely scattered bits of information, inventories of the weapons of all types that were available in each of the conflicts. From its own files and from libraries in Cambridge and Washington and abroad, Browne & Shaw screened several thousands of documentary sources, including books, newspapers, military journals, and technical and trade publications.* From this variety of sources, an approximate picture began to emerge of the numbers and types of weapons available to each side in the various conflicts. In general, the

* The sources used in this effort are cited in footnotes to the text. The detailed tables showing inventories were derived from these sources and also reflect the most reasonable judgments of the researchers.

completeness and reliability of the data diminish with the size of the weapons. Data on jet aircraft, for example, were found to be nearly complete. Data on small arms were fragmentary and occasionally inaccurate. Although the nomenclature of the small arms present in a conflict was usually available, the numbers of weapons present could only be estimated. For all types of weapons, however, it was usually possible to establish the source and circumstances of supply, a topic we consider of paramount importance.

Despite attendant difficulties, we decided to attempt to amass weapons data for a number of conflicts representing to a large extent the conflicts that had been selected for the narrative case studies. In some cases, as the following list indicates, we selected a longer time period for the weapons analysis than for the rest of the case study due to our interest in, for example, the effects that past hostilities might have on states' weapons procurements. The cases for which weapons analyses were performed were:

The Sinai Conflict, 1956; and the Israeli-Egyptian Arms
Race, 1956-1966

The Ethiopian-Somalian Conflict, 1960-1966

The Kashmir Conflict, 1965; and the Indian-Pakistani
Military Build-up, 1955-1965

The Bay of Pigs, 1961

The Greek Insurgency, 1946-1949

The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, 1963-1965

The Conflict on Cyprus (Enosis), 1955-1959

The Conflict on Cyprus (Communal), 1963-1965

The Venezuelan Insurgency, 1960-1966

The Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949

The Soviet-Iranian Conflict, 1941-1946

For each case, data were assembled on the types and quantities of weapons available to the adversaries in the conflict, and the sources from and methods by which they were procured.* As was noted earlier, the amount and degree of detail of data varied with weapons type. It also differed widely from case to case.

The weapons analyses differ from the narrative case studies in another way. Ideally, one would hope for a detailed description of weapons acquisitions over time in order to determine in what ways arms acquisitions decisions are related to the phase structure. Only rarely has this been possible--e.g., in such highly publicized "arms races" as India-Pakistan or Egypt-Israel. In other cases, specific weapons acquisitions constitute significant political events and turn up in the narrative case studies as well as the weapons analyses. Examples here would be the arrival of Soviet arms in Cuba in mid-1960 or in Somalia in 1964. But in most cases, arms appear to have been acquired more slowly and with less observable immediate impact on the course of the conflict.

THE HISTORIC-ANALYTIC APPROACH

The case studies produced a large body of data structured in terms of the model of conflict. These data were enriched by the findings of the weapons analyses. There remained the task of analyzing this organized but as yet unrefined store of information.

The temptation of the policy analyst faced with a single case of conflict and asked to discuss how it might have been more effectively controlled is to second-guess history--to adopt a

*The case-by-case data appear as Section III labeled "Weapons Analysis" under each of the following case studies for which such data were collected.

"what if" approach to the problem that yields statements such as:
 "If this had been done earlier (or better, or later, or not at all),
 the impact on the conflict would have been. . . ."

Our model provided the framework for a form of analysis that looked more deeply into the dynamics of conflict and enabled us to do several things that most other analyses cannot do. In the first place, we were able to go beyond a generalized abstraction of "conflict" labeled "Suez"--or "Kashmir" or "Malaya"--and talk instead, for example, about the nature of pressures being generated across a spectrum of historic situations as tensions built up eventually to the outbreak of hostilities. In the common vocabulary of our model,^{*} this means we could examine for a number of conflicts the factors in Phase II that tended to promote or inhibit the transitions to Phase III. Our model also enabled us to examine the factors related to differing control objectives within a single phase; for example, we could also examine in Phase II factors bearing on the scale and scope of potential hostilities.

It would be misleading to create the impression that the statements our model enabled us to make are strikingly less of the "what if. . ." variety than that noted above. But by forcing ourselves to concentrate separately on single factors, and by identifying as large as possible a range and number of factors, we sought to neutralize the temptation to see the entire conflict as the product of a limited number of "causes," and all control as achievable through a small range of instruments. We focused analytic attention on as many discrete factors as could reasonably be identified within each phase and sub-phase of the conflict. Finally, by making no assump-

*One very real value of our model is that it has provided us with a simple, common vocabulary that facilitates comparisons between the same phase of different conflicts. The formal statements that make up our model also require a rigor of definition that compels analytic precision and consistency.

tions at the outset that some measures were conflict-controlling in all cases and at all points in their life cycle, we sought to develop a richer, less prejudged view of the meaning of control. We kept rigidly to the assumed overriding policy criterion--despite its frequent historic inaccuracy--of controlling the conflict in the sense of minimizing violence. The purpose was to prevent the blurring of competing control goals, or of the broader clash between the goal of control and other policy objectives at stake in the conflict.

It was to be anticipated that there would be variation in the quality and depth of detail of the case studies. More data were available on some cases than others; researchers differed in approach and perception; and in some instances only a segment of the conflict rather than the conflict as a whole had been selected for study. But all of the cases lent themselves to analysis by the method described as "historic-analytic."

The first task in that approach was to develop as elaborate as possible a list of control objectives by phases. These appear on the model of conflict reproduced on page 6. The second task was to identify within each phase of each conflict as complete as possible a list of factors that tended to support or to make more difficult the achievement of the relevant control objectives. We made no judgment as to their relative importance in determining the course the conflict in fact took. As identified on a case-by-case and phase-by-phase basis, the factors took the form, not of abstractions about conflict, but of economic, political, military, or social events, facts, or perceptions.. Every factor was recorded that was found to have existed or occurred during that phase and that was deemed to have exerted a pressure however minor on the course of the conflict.

In some cases, particularly in Phases II, III, IV, multiple control objectives tended to be definable in combinations--although these differed from phase to phase and conflict to conflict. In the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, for instance, our judgment was that intensifying the hostilities made them more difficult to terminate. Or, put differently, the factors tending to intensify hostilities coincided with or complemented those tending away from termination. In the Greek Insurgency and the Malayan Emergency, on the contrary, speedy termination of hostilities tended to be antithetical to the goal of moderating them. The analytic headings thus became "factors tending to moderate and continue hostilities" vs. "factors tending to intensify and terminate hostilities."

The most complex analytic problems--and, it develops, equally vexing control problems--came from what are frequently incompatible control objectives, within phases as well as among them. Thus within Phases II and IV the control objective of preventing the outbreak (or resumption) of hostilities may conflict with the control objective of keeping future hostilities moderate if they nonetheless occur. This dilemma is particularly evident where arms levels have been raised in Phases II and IV in an effort to maintain "peace" by some sort of military "balance" or "deterrent" posture. The same sort of dilemma spills over into Phase III where, as said above, the goal of keeping hostilities moderate may run directly counter to the goal of bringing hostilities to a rapid end.

The time perspective in which one views control creates additional complications. In a conflict such as that in Angola, for example, one set of measures (e.g., efficient and ruthless suppression) may seem effective in reducing the immediate threat, while a completely different set (e.g., accommodation to demands for liberalization and eventual independence) may be far more appropriate to the

longer-run goal of settling the dispute. The policy dilemma becomes even more acute when the likelihood is recognized that this latter course may itself be conflict-promoting in the short run, while the former is surely, in context, one the United States would not wish to advocate.

The purpose of our research would have been disserved if we had sought to gloss over these dilemmas and ambiguities, either in our model or in the analysis of data collected in terms of it. Indeed, making the dilemmas clear was one of our central purposes. We did, however, define at the opening of the analysis of each phase the particular control objective (or combination of objectives) that was being discussed. And we pointed out ambiguities and inconsistencies wherever they occurred.

This second stage of our analysis produced a list, at times quite long, of factors that were present within a phase or sub-phase. We then classified those factors in terms of the relationship of each to a control objective.* The next task was to identify policy activities and policy measures designed to offset those factors deemed to be conflict-producing and to reinforce those deemed conflict-controlling.** The goal, in short, was a conflict-controlling policy response for every factor identified.

Anyone reading this section of one of our case studies without careful attention to the function it performs in the research may be misled. Because the only objective considered is control,

* These lists are to be found in the left-hand column of Section II entitled "Factors Bearing on Transitions" in each case study in this volume.

** These measures and activities appear in the right-hand column of Section II referred to above.

other policy objectives appear to be ignored. Because factors are considered in isolation from each other, inconsistent policy measures may be suggested side by side. Rather than seeking to discuss control of the whole conflict, we focused only on measures reinforcing or offsetting a particular factor. Thus the individual policy activities or measures identified as relevant may have been unachievable in the larger political context of the conflict, or may have been achievable only within a time span that made them unlikely to have the desired effect quickly enough. But our over-all purpose was to develop as imaginative insight as possible into the potentials as well as the problems and dilemmas of controlling local conflict.

While some specific measures suggested may thus appear bizarre in isolation, developing them in this manner was not wholly unrealistic. In reality goals often do conflict, steps taken to achieve one objective often do have undesired side consequences, and things that might have been righted a generation ago often turn out to be generators of today's troubles.

The next step in the historic-analytic approach was to ask what lessons for conflict control could be derived from the analysis of each case.*

And a final step--the one that was the object of this entire exercise--was to look at the analyses of the individual cases to see what control measures they suggested for future conflict-control efforts. The outcome of this over-all analysis is reflected in the conclusions in WEC-98 II, The Control of Local Conflict, to which this volume is annexed.

*This portion of the analysis, entitled "Lessons for Conflict Control," appears as Section IV in each case study in this volume.

WEC-98 III

THE INDONESIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE :
1945 - 1949

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases	31
A.	Background of the Conflict	31
B.	Phase II: August 17, 1945 -- Late October 1945.	34
C.	Phase III ₁ : Late October 1945 -- October 14, 1946	38
D.	Phase IV ₁ : October 14, 1946 -- July 21, 1947.	42
E.	Phase III ₂ : July 21, 1947 -- January 19, 1948	46
F.	Phase IV ₂ : January 19, 1948 -- December 19, 1948.	50
G.	Phase III ₃ : December 19, 1948 -- August 1, 1949	57
H.	Phase IV ₃ : August 1, 1949 -- December 27, 1949.	62
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.	63
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option.	63
B.	Phase II to Phase III ₁ : The Outbreak of Hostilities	65
C.	Phase III ₁ to Phase IV ₁ : The Termination of Hostilities	66
D.	Phase IV ₁ to Phase III ₂ : The Resumption of Hostilities.	70
E.	Phase III ₂ to Phase IV ₂ : The Termination of Hostilities	71
F.	Phase IV ₂ to Phase III ₃ : The Resumption of Hostilities.	73
G.	Phase III ₃ to Phase IV ₃ : The Termination of Hostilities	75
H.	Phase IV ₃ to S: Settlement of the Dispute	76
III.	Weapons Analysis.	77
A.	Netherlands Forces' Weapons Acquisition.	77
B.	Indonesian Nationalist Forces' Weapons Acquisition	89
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control	98

THE INDONESIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE :
1945 - 1949

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES

A. Background of the Conflict

The islands of the East Indies archipelago fell under Dutch control in the 17th century. Despite stirrings of nationalist sentiment since the early 1900s, the islands achieved their independence only in 1949 after more than four years of intermittent warfare. This analysis of that conflict will deal primarily with developments on the island of Java, for it was there and to a lesser extent on Sumatra that the Republic of Indonesia had effective power. In any event, such political and military movements as developed on other islands were not so significant in determining the large course of the conflict or its eventual outcome.

1. Geographic and Physical Factors. The physical features of Indonesia had a profound effect on the manner in which the conflict unfolded. In the first place, the centers of power and decision-making of the adversaries were separated from each other by nearly half a world. Indonesia lacked resources to carry the war outside its borders; and for the Netherlands to bring its power to bear in an area many thousands of miles away added greatly to the cost of the conflict. The island nature of the Indies isolated the Indonesian nationalists from easy assistance by potential Asian friends. And, given Dutch control of the seas in the archipelago, it was difficult for efforts against

the Dutch on the several islands to be coordinated or for one group to render effective assistance to the others.

The terrain and climate of Java and Sumatra were favorable to guerrilla warfare. The mountainous jungle, extreme heat, and November-to-January rainy season facilitated Republican control of pockets of territory away from the Dutch-controlled roads.

The strategic location of the Indies at the junction of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and their rich wealth in people, oil, and rubber made them valuable assets to the Dutch. The rivalries among the United States, Soviet Union, and Communist China that color current perceptions of the areas were not so central at the time of the Indonesian struggle for independence. But even then no great power with colonial, commercial, or security interests in the South Pacific, Oceania, or South and Southeast Asia could be indifferent to developments in the region.

2. Wartime Experience. For both the Dutch and the Indonesians, World War II brought invasion and occupation by Axis powers. But the experiences were totally different. While Nazi occupation of the Netherlands was brutally repressive and those few who collaborated with the occupying powers were reviled by the vast majority of Dutchmen, Japanese occupation of the Indies removed Dutch power and created an opportunity for the nascent Indonesian nationalism to develop. There were oppressive features to the Japanese occupation, and some Indonesian nationalists led anti-Japanese underground movements. But many of the men who were to become leaders of the postwar independence struggle participated in the Japanese-sponsored administration.

By the end of World War II a number of Indonesian political parties emerged, many of which had their origins in the prewar period. The largest and most important of these were the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the Masjumi, the Socialist Party, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and a strong group of followers of Tan Malaka, an independent Marxist. These parties differed in political and social philosophy,

but they were united in demanding Indonesian independence.

During the occupation, the Japanese created and trained Indonesian military forces. The Corps for the Defense of the Fatherland (PETA) included about 35,000 Indonesians trained and equipped by the Japanese as an auxiliary to their own forces. It served as a militia and was intended, in the event of Allied invasion of the Indies, to fight a rear-guard holding operation against the Allies while the Japanese, if necessary, withdrew.¹ There was also a variety of paramilitary organizations, for example labor battalions, that received some degree of military instruction. Other Indonesians acquired experience in guerrilla warfare as members of the anti-Japanese underground.

Although the Netherlands itself was occupied and control of the Indies was seized by Japan, Dutch forces continued to play an active part in both the European and Asian theaters. Operating both in Dutch units under the authority of the Dutch government-in-exile in London and integrated into other Allied units, the Dutch received from Britain, Australia, and the United States military materiel and training comparable to that given other Allied forces. In the immediate area of Indonesia in the closing days of the war, a battalion of the Dutch army (KNIL) participated with Australian forces in recapturing the East Indian islands of Tarakan and Balikpapan; and an estimated 10,000 Dutch troops were being trained, at the end of the war, by the British in Singapore.

As the end of the war approached, several events occurred that had profound effects on the subsequent course of the 1945-1949 conflict. Early in 1945 the Japanese occupation authorities in Java promised early independence to the Indonesian leaders and in March created a committee of Indonesians to consider constitutional questions concerning the future independent state. A similar committee but with more restricted powers was created on Sumatra in July. Political developments in the

¹Guy Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," RAND Memorandum RM-2637-PC (Santa Monica, Calif., RAND, September 1, 1960), p. 7.

other islands had been more restricted by the Japanese during the occupation, but on August 7, 1945, the Japanese set up an all-Indonesian preparatory committee to lay the foundations for independence.

On the Allied side, developments concerning the future of Indonesia were also taking place. The strategy of the war against Japan had placed relatively low priority on the liberation of the Indies, and only a few of the lesser islands had been reconquered at the time of the Japanese surrender.

Since 1942 the Indonesian archipelago had been divided between British and U.S. areas of operational military responsibility. The South East Asia Command (SEAC) under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten included Sumatra and adjacent dependent islands. The rest of Indonesia was part of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) under General Douglas MacArthur.¹ As early as 1944 the British had pressed for the assignment of more of the Indies to SEAC in order to facilitate operations against Singapore. After initial resistance from SWPA, the reassignment was approved in July 1945. The transfer was reportedly favored by the U.S. State Department, which feared U.S. involvement in postwar colonial problems in the area.² At Mountbatten's request, the formal transfer of authority was delayed, pending the collection of adequate intelligence on his new command.

B. Phase II: August 17, 1945 -- Mid-October 1945

The Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, found Allied responsibility for the liberation of the Indies still divided between Britain and the United States, the Indonesian nationalists rapidly consolidating their position, and no Allied force in major islands of the Indies. Furthermore, there was little or no first-hand information available to SEAC about the situation on the islands. The response of

¹Idrus N. Djajadiningrat, The Beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe Talks (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958), p. 8. At the time of this study, the author was a member of the Indonesian Foreign Office.

²Ibid., p. 15n.

the Allies to the Japanese surrender was to order Mountbatten to assume immediate command of that portion of the Indies that had been under SWPA, thus placing all of the Indies in the British area of operations. The Indonesian nationalists' reaction was to proclaim, on August 17, 1945, the independence of the Indonesian Republic.

The Dutch had not objected to the consolidation of all of the Indies under British command. But Hubertus Van Mook, then Lieutenant-Governor of the Netherlands East Indies, and Charles van der Plas, Dutch representative to SEAC, objected vigorously to the proclamation of the Republic and asked that orders be issued to the Japanese to restore the status quo as of the date of their surrender, August 15. Such an order was in fact issued by Mountbatten, but the Japanese commanders in Indonesia refused to accept responsibility for events after August 15. The transfer of the whole of the Indies to British command appears to have been a disappointment to the Indonesians, who felt that the United States was more likely to be sympathetic to the independence movement. Upon learning of the transfer, the Republican authorities communicated to SEAC their determination to resist militarily any Dutch effort to re-establish control in Indonesia.¹

There were, as was noted earlier, military resources available to the new Republic. Although the Japanese formally disbanded the PETA following the surrender, the organization remained essentially intact and retained the small arms that had been issued by the Japanese. In early October the Indonesian Republican army was formed, drawn primarily from former PETA forces. There were also irregular forces of uncertain numbers growing out of the paramilitary groups sponsored by the Japanese occupation authorities and the anti-Japanese underground. In addition to the light arms originally provided by the Japanese, these forces captured, seized, and in some cases were given additional Japanese

¹From a personal conversation with Colonel Thomas Fisher, II, USAF, U.S. Army liaison officer with the British 15th Corps in Java, October to December 1945. The message may have been in the form of a radio broadcast.

equipment. (See Section III for details.)

The first Allied personnel to land in the main Indonesian islands was a small group parachuted into Djakarta on September 8, 1945, to obtain a first-hand assessment of the situation and prepare for a larger Allied military mission. This group found the nationalists organized for recognition as the legitimate civilian authority in Indonesia. Although later developments suggest that the Allied group underestimated the magnitude of the problem, they did recommend to SEAC that the first Allied troops landed in Java be composed largely of British rather than Dutch forces in order to avoid immediate violence. On September 16 the military mission itself landed, and at the end of September the first British force of fewer than 1,000 men arrived. Further landings continued thereafter, including in their numbers some small Dutch contingents.¹ These Dutch units were supplemented by liberated Dutch internees and prisoners of war, rearmed possibly with Dutch arms hidden in Java before the Japanese invasion and undiscovered during the occupation.² By early October they were estimated to number 1,700.³ No U.S. forces participated in the Allied landings, although a small U.S. liaison mission was with the first forces to arrive.

The situation that had developed in Indonesia posed delicate political problems for the British. The mission of the troops under their command was to accept the surrender of local Japanese forces and prepare them for return to Japan, to liberate Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, and to prepare to turn the country over to civilian authorities. There were, however, two competing groups claiming to be the legitimate civilian authority to whom power should be transferred. By the time of the British landings, a tentative policy had evolved. Mountbatten told van der Plas during meetings on September 27 and 28 that the British forces would not be used to impose

¹Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 27.

²From a personal conversation with Colonel Fisher.

³Christian Science Monitor, October 2, 1945.

Dutch authority on the nationalists.¹ The new commander of the Allied forces in the Netherlands East Indies, General Sir Philip Christison, is reported to have characterized this policy as cooperation with and implicit de facto recognition of the Republican government.²

The Dutch government found the British policy highly unsatisfactory, charging that it implied recognition of a Japanese-inspired regime headed by collaborators.³ On the other hand, the Republicans protested the entry of Dutch troops into Java and either threatened or warned the British of violent action by the armed irregular groups. For their part, KNIL troops and rearmed liberated prisoners of war and civilians were becoming engaged in provocative shooting incidents.⁴

As a result, the British began to take a more active role, encouraging the Dutch and the Indonesians to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the political question. During meetings on October 10 and 11 in Singapore, Mountbatten reportedly promised Van Mook and van der Plas additional British forces to speed up the tasks of freeing Allied prisoners and internees and disarming the Japanese if the Dutch would agree to talks with the Republican leaders.⁵ Van Mook met with the nationalist leader Sukarno twice in late October, but the meetings were repudiated by the Dutch government.

By late October 1945, clashes involving Indonesian forces,

¹Djajadiningrat, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

²David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 42. The author was reportedly the chief intelligence officer at Mountbatten's headquarters.

³Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 27.

⁴Frederick E. Crockett, "How the Trouble Began in Java," Harper's Magazine, April 1946, p. 281. The author was a U.S. Army liaison officer in Java from September 16 to mid-October 1945.

⁵Djajadiningrat, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

regular and irregular, Dutch and British patrols,¹ and European civilians² reached the level at which Phase III₁ may be said to have begun.

C. Phase III₁: Late October 1945 -- October 14, 1946

1. Sub-Phase A: Late October 1945 -- Mid-November 1945. The first major military clash, the battle of Surabaya, involved British-Indian troops which had landed at Surabaya on October 25. In early November a division and a brigade of the British-Indian troops were engaged in heavy fighting against Indonesian armed youth organizations. The fighting lasted until the end of November with heavy casualties.

After Surabaya, British operations were cautiously limited to avoid another battle of that scale.³ Nevertheless, British forces engaged in the task of bringing Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees from camps in the hinterland were involved in serious fighting with the Indonesians, who particularly resented the fact that liberated Dutch prisoners and internees were being armed and were involved in actions against the nationalists. These developments delayed the disarming of the Japanese troops and in several instances the Japanese were used by the British in combat against the Indonesian forces and to guard Allied personnel.⁴ Toward the end of October the Allied command announced the suspension of further landing of Dutch forces in Java and Sumatra.

Until November 1945, Dutch attention in the Indies had focused

¹George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 144. This study is drawn from first-hand observation in Indonesia.

²Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story (New York, John Day, 1948), p. 22. Wolf was a U.S. Vice-Consul at Batavia from February 1946 to June 1947.

³Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 48.

⁴In January 1946 the Ukraine asked the U.N. Security Council to condemn the actions of British forces in Indonesia, particularly the use of Japanese troops. No action was taken by the Council.

on Java and Sumatra. At that point in the period during which Allied forces were re-entering Indonesia, Dutch attention was turned to the Australian-controlled islands on the northern and eastern portions of the archipelago.¹ Republican sentiment was not strong in these areas and the nationalists exercised almost no control there.

2. Sub-Phase B: Mid-November 1945 -- April 24, 1946. Efforts to induce the Dutch and the nationalists to negotiate continued, and in December the U.S. State Department issued a statement expressing the hope that Dutch-Republican talks would take place. Finally, in meetings between British and Dutch officials in London on December 25, 1945, the Dutch government agreed to talks with the Indonesian Republican leaders. The idea of negotiations was opposed by important groups in both the Netherlands and Indonesia. Dutch conservatives were critical of Van Mook's policy and urged the restoration of prewar Dutch authority.² The first postwar elections in the Netherlands were scheduled to be held in May 1946. Dutch governments since liberation had been, for the most part, uneasy coalitions of parties that differed on Dutch policy in the Indies and on many other issues. Both the delicate balance of the successive coalitions and the impending elections made domestic dissent on a major foreign policy issue a very serious matter. At the time negotiations were undertaken, the Dutch government was headed by the Schermerhorn-Drees cabinet, a Labor government with general Catholic support.³ In Indonesia, where in a November governmental reorganization Sjahrir (a former leader of the anti-Japanese underground) had become Prime Minister, there was opposition to any negotiations with the Dutch.

¹Mountbatten had responsibility for all the Indies but had turned over to Australia responsibility for the islands north and east of Java, Sumatra, Bali, and Lombok. Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 19.

²Ibid., pp. 51-53.

³Ibid., pp. 91-93. Also Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 19-24. Mr. Taylor, a Canadian, was a member of the U.N. Secretariat's field machinery in Indonesia during the later phases of the revolution and attended the Round Table Conference at The Hague.

Tan Malaka was one of the leaders of this group.

Despite opposition, negotiations opened in Djakarta in February 1946 between Van Mook and Sjahir, with the assistance of a prominent British diplomat, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr. The Dutch proposed an interim period in which the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia should be based on "democratic partnership" within the Kingdom of the Netherlands; after this transition period the partners would independently decide on the nature of their relations.¹ On the other hand, the Republic initially demanded immediate recognition of its sovereignty over the whole of the Netherlands East Indies. By the end of March the negotiators reached preliminary agreement. The Republic would be recognized as having de facto authority in Java and Sumatra and would cooperate in forming an Indonesian federation as a partner with the Netherlands for an interim period. The core of the preliminary agreement, the status of the Republic as a constituent part of an Indonesian federation in union with the Netherlands, was suggested by Van Mook acting on his own initiative.² The negotiators in Djakarta were optimistic about the success of formal negotiations in the Netherlands.

However, the talks in the Netherlands, the so-called Hoge Veluwe negotiations, failed. The Dutch government sought to dilute the formula agreed to in Djakarta and, in particular, to restrict the Republic's de facto authority to Java. The Indonesian delegation was unprepared and unauthorized to make concessions that would, in their stated view, reduce the status of the Republic to a provincial administration for Java.³

While these futile negotiations were underway, the military situation in the Indies was changing. The scale of hostilities in Java had greatly lessened in early 1946 as the Republic gained greater control

¹Djajadiningrat, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

²Taylor, op. cit., pp. 20-21; Djajadiningrat, op. cit., pp. 55-59.

³Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 68.

over the activities of the various armed organizations. The British contingents were being withdrawn, with the last scheduled to leave by November 30, 1946. The Dutch had been successfully reoccupying the islands other than Java and Sumatra, thus limiting the Republic's de facto authority to these two islands. Finally, large numbers of Dutch troops were being landed in Java. By early March 1946 there were an estimated 21,000 Dutch troops in the Indies, 10,000 on Java and 11,000 on the remaining islands. A further reserve force of 13,000 was in Malaya.¹ These numbers were, however, still fewer than the Indonesian forces, which numbered around 37,500, not including paramilitary groups of from 200,000 to 250,000. The Indonesian forces had adequate supplies of Japanese arms and ammunition at this stage of the conflict, although most of the heavier equipment and artillery had been lost at Surabaya or abandoned. U.S. materiel supplies to the Dutch forces had ended with the Japanese surrender, but no shortages had as yet developed. However, the Dutch at this stage had to rely on the British for logistic support and transport. The World War II-type equipment of the Dutch forces was both more plentiful, diverse, and powerful than that available to the Indonesians. (See Section III for details.)

3. Sub-Phase C: April 24, 1946 -- October 14, 1946. Following the failure of the Hoge Veluwe negotiations, the Dutch took another political initiative. The elections in May had put a Catholic-Labor coalition party in power and, while conservative opposition to concessions in the Indies persisted, the new Beel government operated from a more solid base of support than the pre-election coalitions. In July, Van Mook convened a conference at Malindo on Celebes with representatives from the islands under Dutch control (the so-called Outer Islands). The conference agenda consisted of the Dutch proposal for a federated United States of Indonesia composed of Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East, each with a high degree of autonomy. The Republic of Indonesia regarded the conference as a fraud since the participants had been

¹Captain Edwin Klein, "The Dutch Marines and the Indonesian Problem," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1946, p. 15.

selected by the Dutch to consider a Dutch proposal.

In September 1946 the Dutch government appointed a high-level commission (including former Prime Minister Schermerhorn, Van Poll, the head of the Catholic Party, and Van Mook) to prepare a new political structure for the Indies and gave it almost plenary power to negotiate with the Republic. Negotiations began on October 7 under the chairmanship of a British representative. On October 14 the parties concluded a cease-fire agreement, calling for immediate stabilization of existing military positions and limiting the number of Allied forces (Dutch and British) in the Indies to 92,000.¹

D. Phase IV₁: October 14, 1946 -- July 21, 1947

The Linggadjati Agreement, initialed on November 15, was closely related to the cease-fire negotiations. The principal provisions of the Agreement were: recognition of the de facto authority of the Republic over Java, Madura, and Sumatra; cooperation of the Netherlands and the Republic in setting up a sovereign federal state, the United States of Indonesia, consisting of the Republic, Borneo, and the Great Eastern State; and cooperation of the Netherlands and the Republic in forming a Netherlands-Indonesian Union composed of two basic units--the Kingdom of the Netherlands (which was made up of the Netherlands, Surinam, and Curaçao) and the United States of Indonesia. The Agreement represented Dutch concessions in two important respects: (a) Republican control was recognized as extending to Sumatra as well as Java; (b) the United States of Indonesia would be a sovereign state in partnership with the Kingdom rather than only one part of the Kingdom. Despite considerable opposition from groups in the Netherlands who regarded the Agreement as capitulation, it was formally signed on March 25, 1947.

While the Linggadjati Agreement resolved some basic issues, it either did not deal with others or dealt with them ambiguously. These

¹Wolf, op. cit., p. 25. By this time there were 55,000 Dutch troops in Java, according to Wehl, op. cit., p. 134.

omissions and ambiguities formed the basis for subsequent controversy. For example, the Agreement recognized the de facto authority of the Republic in Java and Sumatra but did not specify where de jure authority lay. The nature of the Agreement itself was unclear: the Indonesians were later to contend that it was a treaty between sovereign states while the Dutch regarded it as a statement of principles. The relationship between the Republic and the other states in the United States of Indonesia and the nature of the cooperation called for between the Netherlands and the Republic in forming it were ambiguous. The Agreement was silent on the nature of the interim government of the Indies while the United States of Indonesia was being set up; in particular, the Agreement did not deal with the important matter of where responsibility lay for internal order.

Even before the Agreement was formally signed, political controversy was renewed. The Dutch created states in East Indonesia in December 1946 and in West Borneo in May 1947. In both cases, important governmental powers continued to be under Dutch control, and in neither case was the Republic allowed to cooperate, as it claimed the Linggadjati Agreement required. Furthermore, the creation of a state of West Borneo, excluding eastern and southern Borneo where the Republic claimed support, did not follow the Indonesian interpretation of the Agreement.

In addition, the Indonesians charged that elements of the Dutch civil service and army fostered a short-lived and highly artificial Sundanese separatist movement in West Java.¹ Also, the Dutch navy refused to allow the Republic to export any goods that could be considered as having originated on European-owned estates before the war; imports of military equipment by the Republic were forbidden as well.

The Dutch maintained that the foreign diplomatic activity of the Republic violated the Linggadjati Agreement. The Dutch held that

¹Wolf, op. cit., pp. 108-109.

the Agreement had granted only de facto recognition to the Republic, and that de jure recognition as a sovereign state was to be accorded only to the United States of Indonesia. In addition, the Dutch accused the Republic of numerous violations of the cease-fire agreement.¹

In both the Netherlands and the Republic, groups favoring extreme policies gained in strength as the mutual trust and confidence that the Linggadjati Agreement envisioned rapidly moved further away. In the Netherlands, conservative pressure on the Catholic-Labor coalition government was increasing. Indeed, the parliamentary wing of the Catholic Party was openly supporting the use of force, and even the Labor Party, while still opposing force, wanted a speedy solution to the impasse.² There had been no appreciable resumption of trade and especially of Indonesian exports since the reoccupation. Exports of oil were at a standstill, and exports of rubber were running at less than 15 per cent of the 1940 figure, while maintenance of the Dutch armed forces in the Indies was costing roughly \$1 million a day.³

On May 27, 1947, the Dutch presented a set of proposals to the Republicans with a demand for acceptance that amounted to an ultimatum. The proposals called for an interim federal government to have power until January 1, 1949, when the United States of Indonesia would be established. This interim government would consist of representatives from "the various political entities in Indonesia" as well as a Representative of the Crown, who would be "in a special position with power of decision"; the government would form and direct the federal organs and departments that eventually would be part of the United States of Indonesia. The proposals also called for a joint Indonesian-Dutch gendarmerie (not Republican-Dutch) under the interim government, empowered to enforce law and order anywhere in the archipelago. Furthermore, a joint economic administrative council was to be set up

¹Ibid., pp. 113-114.

²Ibid., p. 115.

³Ibid., p. 117.

under the interim government, with representatives from the Netherlands, the Republic, West Borneo, and East Indonesia, and the president of the Netherlands-owned Java Bank. Decisions of the council were to be arrived at unanimously; if this could not be done, the interim government was to decide. A reply to the proposals was required from the Republic within fourteen days.¹

Sjahir responded with concessions and counterproposals, but in so doing he went beyond his weakened support in the Republican legislature and was forced to resign on June 27. On the same day the United States sent an aide-mémoire to the Republic and to the Netherlands Indies Administration urging cooperation by the Republic in the formation of an interim government and promising economic aid after such an interim government would be established. The new Prime Minister of the Republic, Amir Sjarifuddin, stood by the concessions that Sjahir had offered, but refused to agree to the joint Indonesian-Dutch gendarmerie.

On July 21 the Dutch government informed the U.N. Secretary-General that, since the Republic was incapable of maintaining law and order in its territory, the Dutch were impelled to take police measures "of a strictly limited character."² The Dutch initiated their first police action on the same day,³ attacking with three divisions in Java and three brigades in Sumatra. The Dutch land, sea, and air force numbered 109,000 men.⁴ Indonesian forces at the time were about 200,000

¹Ibid., pp. 118-120.

²The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1948), p. 93.

³One source reports a statement by Van Mook to the effect that Dutch troops had begun to move on June 24 and that the U.S. aide-mémoire caused a hasty postponement of the attack. See Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia (New York, Harper, 1959), pp. 198-199; also Justus M. Van der Kroef, "The Indonesian Revolution in Retrospect," World Politics, April 1951, p. 388.

⁴Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts (Washington, D.C., Special Operations Research Office, 1962), p. 58.

regular troops¹ and approximately the same number in irregular units.²
(See Section III for details.)

E. Phase III₂: July 21, 1947 -- January 19, 1948

1. Sub-Phase A: July 21, 1947 -- August 5, 1947. The Dutch attack met with little resistance. On July 25, for example, Van Mook reported that Dutch casualties were still under 100 and that Indonesian casualties were not much higher. Within two weeks the Dutch had control of most of the cities and major towns of West and East Java, all remaining Republican deep-water ports in Java, and partial control over the roads in these areas. In Sumatra the Dutch concentrated on the rich estate area on the east coast, the oil fields in the south, and the chief ports on the west.³ They were not, however, able to destroy the Republic's armed forces, which refused to engage in frontal combat and withdrew from the flat country and the roads to hilly and mountainous "pockets." As they withdrew, the Republicans adopted a scorched-earth policy. Guerrilla attacks were launched from the Republican-held areas until the January 1948 truce. But their scale decreased as arms and ammunition shortages developed, both because of losses in the police action and because of the tight Dutch blockade.⁴

India and Australia both brought the conflict to the U.N. Security Council in July 1947. The Australian submission implied strong condemnation of the Netherlands, for it asked that the matter be handled by the Council under Article 39 of the Charter, which dealt with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression and which could have led to Council consideration of collective measures against the Netherlands. India, on the other hand, invoked the authority

¹Ibid., p. 58.

²Fischer, op. cit., pp. 108-109.

³Kahin, op. cit., p. 213.

⁴Ibid., p. 228.

of Article 34, under which the Council's action, however severe, could only be recommendatory. Also at issue in the distinction was the question of whether the Republic had been recognized by the Dutch as a state, as the Republic maintained, or not, as the Dutch argued. The Council declined to commit itself on these serious issues. On August 1 it adopted a U.S. compromise resolution that, without mentioning the specific Charter article under which action was being taken, called for a cease-fire and settlement of the dispute by arbitration or other peaceful means.

Both the Netherlands and the Republic issued instructions to their forces to carry out the cease-fire at midnight August 4-5.

2. Sub-Phase B: August 5, 1947 -- January 19, 1948. The cease-fire was ineffective, however. While generally halting its forward advance,¹ the Dutch army began mopping-up operations in the huge tracts of territory bypassed by its armored columns.

In the U.N. Security Council, France vetoed creation of a commission to observe and supervise the truce; but a motion was approved to have a commission made up of governments with consuls at Djakarta report to the Council on the situation in Indonesia, including the implementation of the cease-fire. The Council also created the Good Offices Committee to assist the parties to arrive at a stable cease-fire and negotiate their differences. The Security Council thus equipped itself with a source of information on events in Indonesia independent of the parties directly involved and made its auspices available on the scene to encourage and hasten a settlement. The Good Offices Committee, of which the United States, Australia, and Belgium were selected members, arrived in Indonesia on October 27.²

¹Though territory beyond the farthest advance at the time of the cease-fire was captured by the Dutch as late as November 1947--the eastern half of the island of Madura, off the coast of Java.

²For a useful summary of U.N. action on the Indonesian question, see David W. Wainhouse *et al.*, International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast (Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 293-323.

During the period between the abortive cease-fire and the arrival of the Committee, the Dutch continued their mopping-up operations. On August 29 they unilaterally proclaimed the Van Mook Line, which connected the points of farthest Dutch advance into Republican territory¹ and announced that the areas within the Line were under Dutch control, although in fact they included substantial areas of Republican resistance. The Van Mook Line had the effect of restricting the Republic, especially in Java, to poor agricultural land. In addition, the Dutch threw a nearly absolute economic blockade around the Republic.

During October, debate at the United Nations centered on the demand of the Republic that the Dutch withdraw their forces to the positions of July 20. This demand received support from the Soviet Union and Australia, but was opposed by the United States, Britain, and France as prejudgment of the issue.

On November 1 a U.S. motion was adopted, calling upon the parties to consult with each other directly or through the Good Offices Committee on means to put the cease-fire resolution into effect, and advising the parties that an interpretation of the cease-fire that allowed the use of armed forces to extend control over territory not occupied as of August 4 was inconsistent with the original cease-fire resolution. On November 14, special committees of the two parties began preliminary meetings with staff members of the Good Offices Committee.

The Good Offices Committee had its first formal session with Dutch and Republican delegations on December 8, 1947, on the USS Renville, a U.S. naval transport anchored in the harbor of Djakarta to provide a neutral meeting ground. The Committee took an active role in the talks, submitting proposals to the parties for approval. However, the Dutch refused to give ground on the question of the withdrawal of Dutch forces and the restoration of the Republican civil authority in the

¹At best. The Consular Commission found in many areas that the Van Mook Line lay beyond the points of farthest advance reached at the time of the cease-fire. See U.N. Security Council, Document S/586/Rev.1.

territory occupied by the Dutch since the beginning of the police action on July 21.

The Dutch put forth a set of twelve political principles as a basis for negotiation. Their statement accepted the continued participation of the Good Offices Committee in the negotiations. However, it at no point mentioned the Republic by name, and it hinted that further states might be set up in the newly occupied territory.¹ This hint was, in fact, substantiated while the truce negotiations were still in progress--on December 29, Van Mook announced the establishment of East Sumatra in territory captured from the Republic.

The Dutch applied strong pressure for the acceptance of their principles. On January 9, 1948, they submitted an ultimatum demanding the Republic's acceptance of their proposals within three days--later extended to five days. It was made clear that if the proposals were not accepted, the Dutch might resume their freedom of action. The Good Offices Committee attempted to find a solution by suggesting six supplementary principles. The most important of these called for: (a) plebiscites under U.N. supervision in the various parts of Java and Sumatra "within a period of not less than six months . . . after the signing of this agreement"² to determine whether each territory wanted to be part of the Republic or a separate state within the United States of Indonesia; and (b) after the plebiscites, convening of a convention to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia in which states would be given representation proportional to their population. Since the population of Java and Sumatra was a large majority of the total population of the Indies, this meant that if the Republic regained control

¹Wolf, op. cit., p. 187. The significance of the creation of such additional states was that it implied both a permanent diminution of the Republic's territory and also additional units in the projected federated United States of Indonesia, lessening the chances that the Republic would dominate the federation.

²The Dutch later interpreted this to mean six months after agreement to a final political settlement whereas the Indonesians contended that it meant six months from the signing of the Renville Agreement. Kahin, op. cit., p. 241.

over all of Java and Sumatra (which it felt plebiscites would ensure), it would have a dominant position in the United States of Indonesia.

The Dutch accepted the additional six principles on condition that the Republic accept all eighteen within the five-day time limit. Under strong pressure from the Good Offices Committee (especially from the U.S. member, Dr. Frank Graham) and with an unofficial Committee interpretation of the meaning of the twelve Dutch principles, the Republic agreed, though not without the opposition of Sjahir, the Masjumi, and the PNI. On January 17 and 19, 1948, the Netherlands and the Republic signed the Renville Agreement, including a military truce based on the Van Mook Line, the twelve principles of the Dutch, and the six additional principles of the Good Offices Committee.

F. Phase IV₂: January 19, 1948 -- December 19, 1948


The Renville Agreement did not clarify many of the issues that had led to the breakdown of the Linggadjati Agreement. The nature or extent of the Republic's authority prior to the creation of the United States of Indonesia was not mentioned, nor was the question of the Republic's relations with foreign states. While the Netherlands was to create a provisional federal government prior to the establishment of the sovereign United States of Indonesia, its structure and functions were not defined and the power of the Representative of the Crown during this period was not specified.¹

The specifically military aspects of the Renville Agreement were implemented fairly smoothly. The approximately 35,000 Republican troops remaining behind the Van Mook Line--now called the Status Quo Line--were evacuated to Republican-held territory.² The Line itself was delineated, demilitarized zones were established along the boundary, and prisoners of war were exchanged.

After the signing of the Renville Agreement, the parties and

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 95.

²Ibid., p. 104.



Adapted from Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (London, Stevens & Sons, 1960), with permission of the publisher.

the Good Offices Committee set up the Renville Conference. The Conference had the immediate tasks of implementing the military truce and overseeing the resumption of trade and commerce between Republican and Dutch areas. It also faced the complex of problems related to the construction of the United States of Indonesia and the definition of the role and powers of the interim federal government to operate prior to the transfer of sovereignty.

At this time a new government took power in the Republic. Because of their opposition to the Renville Agreement, the Masjumi and the PNI (the two largest parties of the Republic) withdrew their support and forced Sjarifuddin to resign. A cabinet was formed that would be responsible to President Sukarno rather than to the legislature. The new Prime Minister was Hatta, formerly the Republic's Vice-President, and the Masjumi and PNI dominated the cabinet.

Since the Dutch refused to lift their tight blockade, the Republican-controlled areas were short of food, fuel, raw materials, and medicines. Hatta tried to control expenditures and stabilize the economy, for example by reducing the number of people employed in the government and the larger factories and transferring them to the farms and small industrial units.

In part as an economy move, in part as an effort to increase military efficiency, and in part as a consolidation of political control, Prime Minister Hatta also began a reorganization and restructuring of the Indonesian army, which had been renamed the National Indonesian Army in May 1947. Under Hatta's direction, numbers were reduced to 160,000, with the eventual goal to be a force of 57,000.¹ (See Section III for details.) Only the first stage of the reduction was actually carried out, however, because the reductions brought Hatta growing opposition from the People's Democratic Front (FDR), a coalition including the Labor Party, the Communist Party, and Sjarifuddin's

¹Pauker, op. cit., p. 29; Kahin, op. cit., p. 262.

Socialist Party.¹ The FDR possessed a strong political base in the army, and the discontent of the demobilized troops proved a fruitful issue for the FDR to exploit. Several times in 1948, troops had to be used against units that refused to disband.

Meanwhile, the negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic were breaking down over conflicting interpretations of the Renville Agreement. The Dutch were continuing their policy of creating states in the regions they had occupied. The state of Madura was created on January 21, 1948, on the basis of an unsupervised plebiscite,² and the state of West Java was created in late February. The Dutch position was that the states were only provisional and thus not in contravention of the Renville Agreement.

In March 1948, Van Mook announced the establishment of an interim federal government, to function until the creation of the United States of Indonesia. The Republic, the Dutch contended, could not participate in the interim government until a final political agreement was signed. In May the Dutch held a conference with the Dutch-created states, now thirteen in number with five on Borneo alone, to consult on various federal matters. Again the Republic was excluded. At the same time, the Dutch protested the Republic's continued expansion of its foreign relations and accused the Republic of being responsible for the small-scale clashes that occurred along the Status Quo Line.

The Dutch encountered some opposition from the Dutch-created states as well as from the Republic. In July 1948 the Prime Ministers of the states of East Indonesia, Timur, and Pasundan convened a meeting of the Dutch-created states which took the name Federal Consultative Assembly. The members of this Assembly, who came to be known as Federalists, wanted more direct control over the interim government than the Dutch had provided for. They proposed that the interim government be

¹Sjahir had left the Socialist Party in protest against its increasingly Marxist tendencies and formed his own Indonesian Socialist Party.

²Kahin, op. cit., pp. 235-238.

composed of Indonesians chosen by representatives of the states and be given full control over the administrative departments. This proposal differed from the interim government the Dutch had created, in which the states were represented by the heads of administrative departments selected by the Dutch rather than elected and frequently Dutchmen rather than Indonesians. The Assembly's plan, furthermore, interposed Indonesian, elected ministers between the administrative departments and the Netherlands government.

In an effort to prevent the breakdown of the Renville accord, the U.S. and Australian members of the Good Offices Committee produced the so-called DuBois-Critchley Plan, calling for an indirectly-elected constituent assembly representing all Indonesia that would delineate the boundaries of the states of the United States of Indonesia, elect a President who would in turn appoint a Prime Minister responsible to the assembly, and have a large measure of self-government. The Plan provided for a Netherlands High Commissioner with veto powers and the power to declare an emergency and assume command of the armed forces. The Republic accepted the proposal, but the Dutch refused to consider it.

In July 1948 the Netherlands held general elections. The result was to increase conservative strength; Labor lost 2 of its 29 seats in the parliament. The new government, with Drees (Labor) replacing Beel as Prime Minister, was a coalition of Catholic, Labor, and VVD (a new centrist party). Beel of the Catholic Party replaced Van Mook and took the title of High Representative. The Ministry of Overseas Territories also passed from the Labor Party to the Catholic Party's Sassen.

In September the Republic went through a severe crisis. The FDR was dominated by Communists.¹ They denounced the Renville Agreement, demanded that negotiations with the Dutch cease until the Dutch withdrew

¹Sjarifuddin himself later claimed that he had been a secret Communist during this period and during his six months as Prime Minister. Fischer, op. cit., p. 108.

from Indonesia, and called for nationalization of Dutch and other foreign properties without compensation. At the end of August 1948, Labor and the Socialists merged with the Communist Party; the head of the new party was Musso, just returned from twelve years in the Soviet Union and just appointed general secretary and leader of the PKI.

In late September 1948 an insurrection was begun in Madiun and Surakarta by local army officers, members of the PKI, who were under orders from the Republican government to demobilize their units. The revolt was unsuccessful. Musso's calls for general popular risings had no response, and the area under the control of the troops supporting Musso was quickly subdued by some of the Republic's best military units. The last large rebel military unit was captured October 28, and Musso was killed in a skirmish three days later.

The extent of Communist-led opposition within the ranks of the Indonesian nationalists became manifest at a time when the United States and other Western powers were becoming increasingly alarmed over the postwar policies of the Soviet bloc. In China, Greece, Western Europe, Malaya, and elsewhere, Communist efforts to exploit the chaos left by the war and legitimate nationalist and liberal aspirations were causes of grave concern.

In September the new U.S. member of the Good Offices Committee, Merle Cochran, attempted again to break the deadlock in negotiations. The Cochran Plan was similar to the DuBois-Critchley Plan but provided increased safeguards against Republican domination of the United States of Indonesia. The Netherlands agreed to discuss the Cochran Plan but proposed extensive modifications. While the proposal was under consideration, the new Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, arrived in Java to negotiate directly with Hatta.

The Dutch position emphasized that organs of the interim government should be selected rather than elected and that the Representative of the Crown should have ultimate discretionary control in the most important areas of government. The Republic maintained that the

Cochran Plan required it to give up control of its armed forces with no safeguards against unilateral use of federal troops against it. The Republic also saw in the proposed Dutch modifications of the Cochran Plan ways in which the Dutch could further increase the number of states in the federation at the expense both of the territorial size of the Republic and of its voice in the federal government.

Despite these problems, the Stikker-Hatta negotiations made some progress. Hatta accepted the principle that the organs of the interim government be selected rather than elected. He also accepted the states that had been formed after the Dutch police action. And he agreed that the High Commissioner should have emergency powers and veto rights in some cases.

A second series of talks began in November 1948, with the Dutch represented by Stikker, Sassen, and a group of members of the parliament. The Dutch put much emphasis on the growing number of truce violations and asked for a binding political commitment from Hatta. Not receiving it, the Dutch informed Cochran that agreement was impossible to reach, that further negotiations were futile, but that the possibility of including Republican areas in the federal system must remain open.¹ There was no longer any suggestion in the Dutch position that the Republic should participate as a government in the federal scheme.

Hatta's position continued to be conciliatory. He stated that the Republic was willing to admit that de jure sovereignty rested with the Netherlands, that the Representative of the Crown should be given emergency powers, and even that the Representative should himself be the judge of the propriety of the use of these powers in given circumstances. The Republic asked only that definite standards be laid down for the Representative's decision.

The Dutch reply on December 17 amounted to another ultimatum,

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 158.

demanding complete Republican acceptance of the Dutch plan within eighteen hours. At 11:30 p.m. on December 18, Cochran was informed that the Dutch were terminating the Renville Truce. Cochran was in Djakarta and was refused use of telegraph facilities to notify the rest of the Committee, which was at Kaliurang in Republican territory.

G. Phase III₃: December 19, 1948 -- August 1, 1949

Early in the morning of December 19, a Dutch parachute force captured the airport at the Republican capital of Jogjakarta. By mid-afternoon, Sukarno, Hatta, and half the cabinet were captured by Dutch marines and KNIL troops brought in by air. Between December 19 and 22, Dutch attacks were begun in other parts of Java and Sumatra.

Militarily the second Dutch police action started off well. The Dutch army of 130,000 raced forward with few casualties and quickly occupied most of the major cities in the Republic's territory. (See Section III for details.) However, an emergency Republican government had begun operating in Sumatra, and Republican military units were infiltrating through Dutch lines to reach assigned areas from which guerrilla operations could be begun.¹

Politically, however, events went differently. On December 20 the Prime Ministers and cabinets of East Indonesia and Pasundan, two of the states that had previously cooperated in large measure with Dutch plans, resigned in protest against the Dutch military action; other states of the Indies followed the same course. The reaction of nations throughout the world was almost unanimous in condemning the Dutch action. On December 22 the United States suspended Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands East Indies Administration. On December 24 the U.N. Security Council met in emergency session and called for a cease-fire and the immediate release of Sukarno and other political

¹Abdul H. Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (New York, Praeger, 1965), pp. 179-180.

prisoners.¹ The Dutch informed the Council that hostilities on Java would cease by December 31 and shortly thereafter on Sumatra. The Republic's representative said that his government could not respond while its leaders were held captive.² On January 10 the Dutch informed the captured political leaders that the Republic was no longer recognized as a political entity with a territory of its own.³

Upon learning from the Good Offices Committee that compliance with the December resolution was not satisfactory, the Security Council on January 28 adopted a further resolution. In addition to reaffirming its demand for a cease-fire and prisoner release, the Council transformed the Good Offices Committee into the U.N. Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) with greatly expanded powers. UNCI was authorized to reach decisions by majority vote (with the effect of placing authority in U.S. and Australian hands, bypassing the Belgian member who tended to be more sympathetic to the Dutch view than were his colleagues), to assist the parties to carry out the Security Council's resolutions, to recommend the extent to which areas should be progressively returned to the Republic, and to recommend to the Security Council the conditions necessary to ensure free and democratic elections under U.N. observation.⁴

Direct action against the Netherlands was threatened when, on February 7, the Brewster Resolution was introduced in the U.S. Senate urging that all Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands be stopped until the

¹The initial draft resolution included a demand that troops be drawn back to the Renville Truce lines. See United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1949), p. 88. Without this clause, Dutch compliance with the cease-fire would have left the Netherlands in control of substantially more Republican territory than before the policy action.

²Ibid.

³Kahin, op. cit., p. 343.

⁴United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1949 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1950), p. 30.

Dutch ceased hostilities, withdrew their troops, released the Republican leaders, and opened genuine negotiations. This strong U.S. opposition to Dutch policy, evidenced both by its position in U.N. debates and by its apparent willingness to apply sanctions, created a serious problem for the Dutch cabinet. Negotiations were underway for what was to become NATO, and the Dutch shared the general Western European perception that U.S. power must be brought to bear to prevent a Soviet take-over of all Europe. There were some who would have made an effort to explain the Dutch view to Washington and try to persuade the United States to reverse its policy. Sassen, for example, proposed that the cabinet appeal to the United States for cooperation against UNCI, with the warning that the Dutch would otherwise have to abandon Indonesia. The cabinet refused to take this approach and Sassen resigned to be replaced by a liberal member of the Catholic Party.¹

The Dutch finally offered an alternative to the plan of action proposed by the United Nations. It represented a substantial departure from their former position that the Republic had ceased to exist. The plan called for an accelerated transfer of sovereignty to a United States of Indonesia. The transfer would be arranged by a Round Table Conference, to be convened at The Hague, which would at the same time establish the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and an interim government for a brief period. The Republic would participate in the Conference. But the Dutch proposal made no provision for the return of the Republican leaders to Jogjakarta. Sukarno refused to consider the new Dutch proposal for this reason. At first the Federalists approved the proposal and accepted the invitation to the Round Table Conference.² Later they reversed themselves and made acceptance conditional on the

¹Kahin, op. cit., p. 144. Dutch Communists in the Netherlands parliament were caught in a dilemma. While the Soviet and other Communist parties were assailing the Dutch government for its actions in Indonesia, the Dutch Communists charged that the government was "sacrificing national interest to the Marshall Plan and 'Pax Americana'." Taylor, op. cit., p. 198.

²Wolf, op. cit., p. 22.

restoration of Republican leadership. The United Nations found the proposal acceptable but held that no progress could be made unless the Dutch first restored the Republican government to Jogjakarta.

During this period the Republican guerrilla campaign, which had been carefully prepared and organized, had significant success. By the end of February, one source states, less than half of Pasundan and East Java were under Dutch control and the Republican forces had nearly recaptured Jogjakarta.¹

At the end of March, Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker visited Washington for talks with Secretary of State Acheson, where it was made clear that U.S. aid would be cut off if the Dutch did not agree to a cease-fire, the return of the Republican leaders and government to Jogjakarta, and the inclusion of the Republic in the projected federal structure.² On April 1, Senator Vandenberg offered an amendment to the economic aid bill, obligating the United States to withdraw assistance from any government against which U.N. enforcement actions were proceeding. Vandenberg's amendment was adopted on April 6, instead of a more drastic amendment by Senator Brewster, which would have withdrawn aid if the orders and requests of the Security Council were not being carried out.

On April 14 the preliminary conference between Republican and Dutch officials began, with UNCI taking an active part in the negotiations. Progress was made despite the mutual suspicions of the two parties. The Netherlands wanted an early Republican commitment to a cease-fire, saying that continuing guerrilla warfare might force Dutch military responses. The Republicans, on the other hand, insisted on a commitment that the Dutch would not continue their policy of dividing captured territory while the Republic was paralyzed by a cease-

¹Kahin, op. cit., pp. 410-412.

²This is Kahin's view; other sources are less definite about the detailed requirements.

fire agreement. After some days of private discussions,¹ the Van Royen-Roem Statements were produced. The Republican government did not formally agree to order a halt to guerrilla warfare, promise to cooperate in restoring peace and maintaining law and order, or promise to participate in the Round Table Conference; but Sukarno and Hatta gave their personal assurances that they favored these steps in conformity with the Security Council resolution of January 28 and would undertake to urge the adoption of such a policy by the Republic as soon as possible after its restoration to Jogjakarta.

For the Dutch, Van Royen announced that in view of the undertaking of Sukarno and Hatta, the Republican government would be returned to Jogjakarta and freed to govern in that Residency; that all Dutch military operations would be discontinued; that the Dutch would refrain from recognizing states on soil controlled by the Republic prior to the second police action; that the Dutch favored the existence of the Republic as a state in the United States of Indonesia, with one-third of the total membership in the federal representative body; that in all areas (outside the Residency of Jogjakarta) where Republican civil, police, and other officials were still operating, these would remain in operation; and that the Round Table Conference would discuss accelerating the unconditional transfer of complete sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.

The Van Royen-Roem Statements were not unanimously endorsed by all groups in the Netherlands or the Republic. Beel resigned from the Dutch cabinet in protest, but the Labor Party fully supported the government. In the Republic, opposition centered around Sukarno's and Hatta's apparent acceptance of the states that had been formed by the Dutch between the first and second police actions and the one-third limit on the Republic's representation in the United States of Indonesia. It is also possible, as one source suggests, that the increase of

¹Kahin, op. cit., pp. 421-422, states that Cochran applied heavy pressure on the Republicans to make concessions, promising that the United States would stand behind a transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch.

guerrilla activity in June reflected Communist dissatisfaction with the terms.¹

The Dutch evacuation from the Residency of Jogjakarta began on June 24, 1949, and was completed on June 30; Sukarno and Hatta returned on July 5.

In July also, an inter-Indonesian conference was held between Republican and Federalist representatives to consider the structure of the United States of Indonesia. They agreed that the state would be federal, with a President not responsible for policy who would appoint three individuals to form a government. The Republic was to have the territory it occupied at the time of the Renville Truce, and would hold one-third of the seats in the House of Representatives, with a Senate of two members from each state or area. The Republican army would form the nucleus of the federal army.

On August 1, final agreement on a cease-fire was reached by the Dutch and the Republicans, to take effect August 11 on Java and August 15 on Sumatra. With that accomplished, Republican and Federalist delegations left for The Hague for the Round Table Conference.

H. Phase IV₃: August 2, 1949 -- December 27, 1949

The five months following the end of Phase III₃ were not marked by military moves or military preparation. Negotiations were concerned primarily with setting up the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, settling a variety of economic questions (principally that of who would pay the debt of the Netherlands East Indies), and taking up the West Irian (Dutch New Guinea) question. With the settlement of those issues--or agreement to postpone the most intractable--the conflict proceeded to Settlement with the formal transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia on December 27, 1949.

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 221 and note.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

- a. During the Japanese occupation of World War II, many Indonesian nationalists had been able for the first time to organize and to participate in government; the return of the Dutch seemed to the nationalists to threaten a setback to their aspirations.
- b. At the end of World War II, the only political and military force on the major islands was that created by the Japanese and, upon their surrender, dominated by the nationalists.
- c. For the nearly three and a half years that the Indies were occupied, very little information was available to the West on development there.
- d. The humiliation of defeat, at home and in the Indies, created in the Dutch a strong psychological need to reassert their strength and pride.

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Pre-World War II enlightened Dutch colonial policy that would have taken responsible Indonesian nationalism into account.
 - b. Anticipation by Allies of extent of postwar colonial problems and consequent adjustment of wartime military priorities to take account of objectives beyond the fighting (all this suggesting a thought-out plan for introduction of appropriate Allied forces into the islands).
 - c. Adequate wartime intelligence effort focused on the Indies, plus prompt and effective post-war fact-finding machinery--bilateral, third-party, or international organization.
 - d. Creation and development of alternative goals for Dutch postwar assertiveness and pride--e.g., an imaginative program of European integration and a positive Dutch role in technical

assistance to the developing world.

- e. Measures suggested above to create alternate bases of prestige, plus Dutch development of industries placing a high premium on value added by skilled labor.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. More effective articulation of Dutch promises; communication of these intentions to Indonesian nationalists; moral pressure on Dutch by wartime allies (especially the United States and Britain) to give substance to their promises.
- b. Policy agreement between the United States and Britain, if necessary by U.S. pressure on Britain, to keep Dutch forces out of the area.
- c. Withholding of U.S.-British logistic support from any Dutch activities directed against the Indonesians.
- d. Use, especially by the United States, of potential economic assistance as a lever to influence Dutch policy away from concern with recovering the Indies by force.

- e. The rich Indies were a key element in Dutch commercial and economic strength; indeed, the Dutch feared that without them they would become just another small, third-class power.

2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

- a. During World War II, the Dutch had promised that after the war they would work toward a future for the Indies as equal partners with the Netherlands in some form of commonwealth.
- b. Immediately after the Japanese surrender, the Dutch did not have many forces in the area of the Indies.
- c. Such Dutch forces as were in the area were heavily dependent on Britain and the United States for logistic support of all kinds.
- d. In general, the Netherlands right after the war was, and was going to continue to be, heavily dependent on external assistance for economic reconstruction.

e. The United States and Britain, perhaps especially the former, did feel generally that stark reimposition of Dutch overlordship in the Indies was wrong.

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III₁: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[The factors that had operated to move the conflict from Phase I to Phase II continued to operate and to contribute toward the movement from Phase II to Phase III₁. The factors covered in this section represent the new elements introduced during Phase II.]

1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. The liberated Dutch internees and prisoners of war were even more hostile toward the Indonesian Republic than was the Netherlands government. Many of them had personal economic stakes in restoration of Dutch sovereignty and thus were frequently the instigators or targets of inflammatory incidents.
- b. On the other side of the coin, the government of the proclaimed Indonesian Republic was able to exercise only limited control over its military and paramilitary forces, which sometimes undertook actions against the British and Dutch that forced the hand of their government.

e. As mentioned above, prompt creation of effective fact-finding machinery--bilateral, third-party, or international--to help focus and strengthen U.S. and British commitment to objectives.

B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Isolation of liberated internees and prisoners of war; denying them access to arms.
- b. Enhancement of the internal stability and political authority of the Republic.

c. Dutch official authority, at home and in the Indies, was divided on the question of how unyielding or moderate to be toward the Republic. Hence, from time to time, the extremists were able to prevail.

d. The Indonesian nationalists, especially those over whom the Republican government had only limited control, made little distinction between Dutch and British forces, believing that the latter were merely a cover for the return of the former.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities

a. The British did not want to allow their forces to act as a cover for the reintroduction of Dutch authority into the Indies; in fact, they so informed the Dutch.

C. PHASE III₁ TO PHASE IV₁: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[The transition from Sub-Phase A to Sub-Phase B represented a moderation in the hostilities, with the conventional warfare of Surabaya being followed by guerrilla warfare. Sub-Phase C is not an intensification or moderation of hostilities, but rather a shift from an

c. Enhancing the political consensus in the Netherlands government, in part by educating it and the Dutch public on the issues at stake and on the costs of prolonged conflict.

d. More explicit articulation of British stated refusal to use their forces to reinstate the Dutch; effective communication of the resolve to the Republican government and its forces.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. More rigorous action by the British in their stated principle; specifically, use of British forces to prevent fighting between Dutch and nationalists; request by British for introduction of other forces--U.S., other third-party, or international--to effect cease-fire between conflict adversaries or in other peacekeeping roles.

C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO MODERATE/TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

unsuccessful effort at negotiation to one that succeeded in terminating hostilities. Major operative factors are included below, but are not analyzed separately by sub-phase.]

1. Factors Tending To Intensify/Continue Hostilities

[All of the factors noted above that favored the outbreak of hostilities plus the following:]

- a. From time to time, extremist political elements in both the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic gained control over policy; also, in the case of the Republic, relatively uncontrollable military and paramilitary units acted rashly on their own initiative.
- b. The British military presence, which had been on the whole a force favoring moderation and peaceful settlement, began to diminish and phase out.
- c. Dutch military strength increased in the Indies, both in absolute numbers and relatively as the British withdrew.
- d. The Indonesians' resort to guerrilla warfare after their defeat in conventional combat at

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Improving internal stability and public education; plus introduction of international pressures to bring about the effecting of those measures.
- b. Continuation of moderating British presence until some other neutral force, preferably institutionally international, could be substituted for it.
- c. U.S., British pressure to keep Dutch forces out; plus introduction of international presence, preferably institutionalized, directed toward same end of excluding Dutch military forces.
- d. Vigorous British-Indian-Dutch follow-up of their victory at

the battle of Surabaya had the short-run effect of precluding a termination of hostilities through decisive victory by the British-Indian-Dutch forces.

e. Surabaya actually made the Dutch forces overconfident of eventual military victory, thus encouraging them to continue seeking a military solution.

f. Soviet diplomatic support of the Indonesian Republic encouraged it to continue the struggle.

Surabaya, so as to compel the Republican government to capitulate prior to its being able to organize for effective guerrilla activity.

e. Encourage test of respective military strengths to dispel illusory perceptions of adversary's strength, or at least provide for sounder assessment of adversary's capabilities.

f. Discourage Soviet diplomatic support of Republic, or counter it with strong U.S. support of Dutch, or remove the conflict from the arena of nascent East-West rivalry.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities

a. Despite their victory at Surabaya in November 1945, the British were unwilling to follow it up with an attempt to impose a definitive military solution.

b. This unwillingness of the British was reinforced by Commonwealth pressure brought to bear on them, particularly by the Indians, whose troops had taken part in the battle of Surabaya.

c. The Dutch elections in the spring of 1946 indicated that Dutch public opinion favored a negotiated settlement with the Indonesian nationalists.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Interposition of British or, preferably, neutral, third-party forces.

b. Increased perhaps institutionalized pressures on both adversaries to end the fighting.

c. Earlier and better reading of Dutch public opinion by the government.

- d. During the latter part of Phase III₁, the Dutch were achieving substantial success in rallying the support of the non-Republican portions of the Indies to their concept of an Indonesian federation in union with the Netherlands.
- e. The initial debate in the U.N. Security Council on the situation in Indonesia provided an opportunity for many states to register their interest in a peaceful settlement.
- f. As one result of the initial U.N. Security Council debate, the Soviet Union emerged as the champion of Asian nationalism and general anticolonialism. This pricked the conscience of the Western powers, especially the United States, and intensified their interest in a peaceful settlement that would recognize Indonesian nationalist aspirations.
- g. After the battle of Surabaya, the Indonesian Republicans avoided conventional military engagements and resorted to guerrilla warfare. This was far harder for the British (who were phasing out) and Dutch to cope with, and could have suggested an unattractive prospect for long, debilitating hostilities [though, in fact, it may not have done so; see (1e) of Section C above].
- d. Earlier and more effective communication of this goal of federation to the nationalists; enhanced Dutch conciliatory approach.
- e. More vigorous introduction of early U.N. interest in and action on the Indonesian situation.
- f. More vigorous Soviet champion-ship of emerging nations in order to energize interest of West, especially the United States, in the problem.
- g. Earlier nationalist resort to guerrilla warfare, thus hopefully in the longer run discouraging Dutch hopes of decisive victory. [This same factor of nationalist resort to guerrilla warfare could have had the short-run effect of tending to prolong hostilities; it is so treated above, as (1d) of Section C.]

D. PHASE IV TO PHASE III₂: THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

1. Factors Promoting the Resumption of Hostilities

- a. Differing interpretations of the Linggadjati Agreement of November 1946 led to a deterioration of confidence of each side in the other.
- b. The costs of carrying on the war, added to the costs of reconstruction at home, were becoming increasingly onerous to the Dutch, who therefore felt a short-run time-pressure to achieve a quick and decisive military victory.
- c. Dutch impatience and anticipation of victory were whetted by the large build-up of Dutch military strength during the truce period since the Linggadjati Agreement.
- d. The Dutch believed, wrongly, that the Republic was politically and especially militarily weak, regardless of the large numbers in its armed forces.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Resumption of Hostilities

- a. The very fact that a truce existed

D. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. International or mutually acceptable third-party "umpire" arrangement to rule on interpretations of the Linggadjati Agreement.
- b. Enhancement of domestic development and other goals; plus impressing upon the Dutch the more serious economic consequences of a prolonged conflict they could not be at all certain of winning; raising possibility of adverse effects on foreign economic assistance.
- c. Effective joint, third-party, or international supervision of truce so as to prevent the illegal Dutch military build-up.
- d. Clarification, perhaps by fact-finding initiative, of actual military balance between adversaries; appreciation by the Dutch of unfavorable balance that guerrillas can accept and still win.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Continuation of truce through

constituted a factor disfavoring an onus-creating resumption of hostilities.

- b. Negotiations between the adversaries did continue off and on, with varying success.
- c. The U.S. note of June 27, 1947, urged the Dutch and Indonesians to continue negotiating and promised economic assistance to the future United States of Indonesia.
- d. The Dutch realized that, in the longer run, they could not afford the costs of continuing the conflict.

E. PHASE III₂ TO PHASE IV₂: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[As in Phase III₁, the resumed hostilities had two distinct sub-phases: the first was a major conventional police action by the Dutch; the second, a guerrilla response by the Indonesians. The two sub-phases were separated by a cease-fire in early August 1947 that responded to a resolution of the U.N. Security Council. However, its practical influence on the conflict proved slight. The operative factors below are not analyzed by sub-phases.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify/Continue Hostilities

- a. The United Nations made no provision to insure or observe compliance with the

international or third-party presence as "trip-wire" or interposed force.

- b. Strong pressure to keep negotiations going; good offices, arbitration, threats.
- c. Dispatch of a stronger U.S. note, one that would have threatened both parties instead of trying to cajole the party that at the time was in the weaker position.
- d. Enhancing domestic development and other goals; threatening to suspend or cut back economic assistance.

E. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Creation and operation by the United Nations of adequate truce

cease-fire that followed its resolution in August 1947.

- b. The Dutch continued to believe that they were so militarily superior to the Republican forces that they could end the expensive hostilities with a decisive victory in the field.
- c. The definitive recourse to guerrilla tactics by the nationalists more than compensated for their numerical inferiority to the Dutch.
- d. The U.N. Security Council's refusal to agree to the Republican demand--that a Dutch withdrawal to positions obtaining before the police action of July 1947 be made a part of the conditions for a resumption of negotiations--meant that different pressures were placed on the two adversaries.
- e. No matter how thoroughly the United Nations or other instrumentalities had tried to police the cease-fire, the nationalists' resort to guerrilla warfare would still have posed new and difficult problems of peacekeeping.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities

- a. The U.N. Security Council resolution of August 1, 1947, that called for a cease-fire actually resulted in agreement by the conflict adversaries on a cease-fire--which, however, the Dutch promptly began to

observation and supervision machinery.

- b. Tests of military strengths; sounder assessment of relative strengths; sounder counter-insurgency doctrine.
- c. Measures listed above to increase Dutch understanding of guerrilla warfare; or tricking or forcing the Republicans into accepting conventional engagements they were certain to lose.
- d. Careful formulation of U.N. cease-fire proposals to insure fairness to both sides.
- e. Recognition and study of special problems unresolved in guerrilla-warfare contests when no "front lines" or "lines of farthest advance" exist.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Earlier and/or stronger U.N. action focused on the conflict--specifically provision for U.N. sanctions against cease-fire violation.

circumvent.

- b. The U.N. Security Council later created a consular commission to send it information directly, unfiltered by either adversary, and dispatched to the scene a Good Offices Committee (GOC) to facilitate a resumption of negotiations with a view to termination and settlement.
 - c. The great prestige and influence of the United States were perceived as being committed to settlement because of the presence of a U.S. national on the GOC and because the USS Renville was used in December 1947-January 1948 as the site for Dutch-Indonesian negotiations.
 - d. Prolongation of the conflict continued to eat up the Dutch resources.
- F. PHASE IV₂ TO PHASE III₃: THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES
- 1. Factors Promoting the Resumption of Hostilities
 [Many of the factors that contributed to this resumption of hostilities had been operative in corresponding earlier occasions. The measures cited earlier thus retained appropriateness in the new circumstances. Listed below are the new factors that appeared.]
 - a. The Dutch economic blockade was partly responsible for a reduction in the size of the
- b. Greater power for the GOC.
 - c. Additional, more explicit ways of indicating U.S. desire that conflict end.
 - d. Measures mentioned earlier to increase economic costs and enhance other goals.
- F. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES
- 1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Measures mentioned earlier to increase Dutch knowledge of

Republic's army that added to the feeling of the Dutch that they could now win military victory.

- b. A serious Communist-led insurrection, while successfully suppressed, demonstrated the deep split within the Republican political structure and also added to the feeling of the Dutch that they could now win military victory.

- c. The non-Republican states of the Indies, which had generally supported Dutch policies, were growing impatient for their promised autonomy in the proposed federation; this created more pressure on the Dutch to end the conflict with a decisive victory so that they could get on with organizing the federation.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Resumption of Hostilities

[Many of the factors that inhibited this resumption of hostilities had been operative earlier, and the measures suggested retained their general appropriateness in the new circumstances. Listed below are the new factors that appeared.]

- a. The evacuation of nationalist guerrilla groups from the Dutch side of the truce line and the creation of a demilitarized zone decreased incidents between the two adversaries.

guerrilla warfare and produce a more accurate assessment of military balances.

- b. Increasing the stability and internal cohesion of the Republican government. [As an influence on Dutch perceptions, this would have inhibited resumption of hostilities, but its actual effect on the political-military balance could have been to prolong hostilities.]
- c. All previously mentioned measures for impressing on the Dutch the prohibitive costs of prolonged conflict and the likelihood that conflict would in fact be prolonged, given the nationalists' guerrilla strategy.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. International or disinterested third-party supervision and patrol of demilitarized zone; interposition of international or

third-power peacekeeping force.

- b. More vigorous Soviet support of the nationalists, so as to intensify U.S. interest in ending the conflict; also increasing U.S. perception that time as well as justice was on the side of the nationalists.
- c. More emphasis on focusing Dutch attention on European problems, opportunities, and obligations.

G. MEASURES DESIGNED TO MODERATE/ TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Continued application of all foregoing measures designed to reinforce factors tending to terminate hostilities.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. All measures mentioned above that would impress upon the Dutch the futility of continuing to fight.

- b. Encouragement of divisiveness represented by dissatisfaction of non-Republican Indonesians

- b. The United States and Britain began to fear that failure to end the conflict quickly might increase the strength of the radicals in the Republic, thus extending Soviet influence into this strategic part of the world.

- c. In Europe, the Netherlands was becoming involved in the mutual security arrangements of the Marshall Plan and the nascent NATO.

G. PHASE III₂ TO PHASE IV₃: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. Factors Tending to Intensify/Continue Hostilities

- a. In both the Dutch and Republican camps, the extremists continued to press for continuation of hostilities until their maximum demands were met.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities

- a. When hostilities resumed, the Republic's guerrilla efforts proved even more effective than they had in the past, thus helping discourage the Dutch from believing they could win a military victory.
- b. The non-Republican states of the Indies began turning against the Dutch, especially when it appeared that the latter really intended to

crush the Republic and its leaders.

- c. The United Nations began to assert itself very strongly, transforming its Good Offices Committee into the U.N. Commission for Indonesia, which virtually assumed the role of neutral arbitrator.
- d. The United States came down hard on the Dutch with serious and meaningful threats to cut off economic assistance from any government against which U.N. enforcement actions were proceeding (Vandenberg Amendment, April 1949).

with Dutch policy.

- c. Impressing on both adversaries the strength of world opinion behind the U.N. action.
- d. U.S. threat to withdraw aid from the Dutch unless orders and requests of U.N. Security Council were being faithfully carried out (Brewster Amendment, April 1949).

H. PHASE IV₃ TO S: THE SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE

[The resumed negotiations led relatively quickly to the settlement of most of the outstanding issues between the Netherlands and the Republic. One issue--the status of Dutch New Guinea (West Irian)--remained unresolved and became the focus of a new conflict a decade later.]

III. WEAPONS ANALYSISA. Netherlands Forces' Weapons Acquisition1. Build-up, 1940 -- Fall 1945.

a. Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL)

After the fall of the Netherlands to Germany in May 1940, the only Dutch army contingent of significant size was stationed in the Netherlands East Indies. In May 1940, KNIL consisted of 1,345 officers and 37,583 troops including some German mercenaries, Eurasians, and a few Indonesian officers trained by the Dutch.¹ Their standard squad support and police weapons were the Belgian-made, German-designed Schmeisser (or Schmeisser-Bayard) MP Model 34 9mm parabellum SMG.² These were purchased in quantity from Belgium during the mid-1930s. Also used at the infantry squad level at this time was the Danish Madsen 6.5mm LMG, purchased in 1939.³ The basic infantry rifle was the Dutch-made Mannlicher 6.5mm bolt-action rifle, officially adopted in 1895 by the Dutch military. The loss of many of the Schmeissers and Madsens after the German blitzkrieg resulted in the Dutch purchase from the United States of about 10,000 Johnson .30-.60 semi-automatic rifles and the Model 1941 Johnson .30 cal. LMG for supply to KNIL.⁴

After the Japanese conquest of the East Indies in early 1942, some KNIL units in the eastern part of the islands managed to escape with some of the above weapons to Australia. These units were reorganized and re-equipped in Australia as a KNIL battalion, which fought alongside Commonwealth troops in May and July 1945 in the recapture of the East

¹Pauker, op. cit., p. 5.

²George B. Johnson and Hans Bert Lockhoven, International Armament, 2 volumes (Cologne, International Small Arms Publishers, 1965), Vol. I, p. 10.

³Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 257, 264-265.

⁴Joseph Smith, Small Arms of the World, 8th edition (Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Books, 1966), pp. 520-521.

Indian islands of Tarakan and Balikpapan.¹ By the end of the war, the British were also assisting and training two Dutch volunteer groups; and by October 1945, one account estimates, about 10,000 Dutch land troops were in training status with the British at Singapore.²

By the fall of 1945, the KNIL and Dutch army units sent from Europe were largely trained and equipped along British lines. The following arms were available and probably supplied to the Dutch forces:

Pistols: The British had adopted the Canadian FN Browning 9mm automatic³ and a quantity of these were probably supplied to the Dutch for special-forces and paratroop usage. Shortly thereafter, the FN Browning was officially adopted by the Dutch military.⁴ The .38 Enfield revolver was a standard British weapon for close-in fighting, and it is likely the Dutch received some from Britain.⁵

Rifles: Some of the Johnson semi-automatics procured earlier were still in service.⁶ The lightweight U.S. M1 .30 cal. carbine was supplied to the Dutch.⁷ The British supplied the less accurate Mark V jungle carbine, which was actually a short-barrel .303 Enfield. It was intended for use by airborne units and probably supplied to some Dutch army paratroop units in formation at this time in Singapore. The jungle carbine was made in Britain and also under license in Canada and Australia, and the weapons supplied could have come from any or all of these countries.⁸ Finally, large quantities of the bolt-action Dutch Mannlicher 6.5mm rifle, adopted in 1895, were reportedly still in service with the army.⁹

¹Pauker, op. cit., p. 5.

²I. Chaudry, The Indonesian Struggle (Lahore, n.p., 1950), pp. 108, 109.

³Smith, op. cit., p. 520.

⁴Ibid.

⁵John Kirk and Robert Young, Great Weapons of World War II (New York, Walker, 1961), p. 320.

⁶Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 183-184.

⁷Smith, op. cit., p. 521.

⁸Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 55.

⁹Smith, op. cit., p. 520.

SMGs: The Sten 9mm SMG, made in wartime Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, was standard in British and other Commonwealth forces. The British had issued this to tank and vehicle crews, commando units, and regular troops as a special-purpose arm. They also issued it to the Dutch army where it was in limited-standard status at that time.¹

Machine Guns: The Bren LMG Marks I-IV, adopted by Britain in 1935, was the standard infantry squad support weapon of the British and Australians and most Commonwealth countries of World War II. It was supplied to the Dutch from either British or Australian stocks and was rated as a "first class, reliable and effective weapon."² The U.S. Browning .30 cal. M1919 A4/A6 machine gun was also supplied to the Dutch army by the United States during World War II.³ There is no indication that the Madsen LMG was in first-line service by the fall of 1945. It is possible that a few British- or Australian-manufactured Vickers water-cooled .303 HMGs were supplied to the Dutch, this being the standard HMG of both countries in the Southeast Asia theater.⁴

Artillery: It is likely that the Dutch army was supplied with a quantity of the widely-used British 25-pounder gun-howitzer, the British-made 3.7" howitzer, the all-purpose 4.5" gun, and, for expected antiaircraft use against the Japanese, some British 3.7" guns, all of which were standard battalion or regimental-level weapons in Britain at that time.⁵

Armored Vehicles: U.S.-made Sherman tanks.

b. Royal Netherlands Navy

There was no significant build-up of Dutch naval strength during World War II, aside from some ex-British patrol vessels. These were later used, like most of the later vessels acquired from Britain, Australia, and the United States, to enforce a blockade against the Indonesian nationalists. Practically all of the Dutch naval build-up

¹Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 55, 60.

²Ibid., pp. 339, 347.

³Smith, op. cit., p. 521.

⁴Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 405.

⁵Kirk and Young, op. cit., pp. 244, 247, 263.

⁶Christian Science Monitor, July 30, 1947.

in the Netherlands East Indies coincided with the hostilities that began after the fall of 1945.

c. Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (NKM)

By September 1945 a total of 4,848 NKM marines had been trained and equipped by the U.S. Marine Corps and prepared for assignment to the Pacific theater. Patterned on U.S. lines, this unit consisted of: one headquarters and service battalion, three rifle battalions, one artillery battalion, one motor transport battalion, one engineer battalion, one service and supply company, one tank company, one AmTrac company, and one medical company, plus special intelligence units. The war against Japan ended before this unit left the United States. However, in November 1945, over 4,000 members of this regiment sailed for the Netherlands East Indies, the rest returning home.¹

The weapons provided the NKM marines were as up-to-date or as nearly up-to-date as those used by their counterparts in the United States. Most of the weapons were types still in at least limited-standard use by the U.S. forces. By the fall of 1945, the following weapons were available to and probably supplied to the NKM by the United States:

Pistols: There is no evidence that pistols were widely used by the NKM. However, the U.S. Colt .45 M1911 automatic was available for distribution and a few may have been supplied to the NKM by the United States.

Rifles: The NKM rifle battalions were probably outfitted with both the U.S. Springfield Model 1903 cal.30/60 bolt-action rifle² and the more recent U.S. M1.30 cal. carbine.³ The Springfield was widely used by the USMC as a sniper rifle and was a highly accurate weapon.⁴ The Springfield was widely distributed to Allies through the lend-lease program during the war and was standard with the U.S. military until

¹Lt. Col. H.W. Edwards, "Netherlands Korps Mariniers," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1953, p. 52.

²Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 410, 417, 419.

³Ibid., Vol. II, p. 24.

⁴Kirk and Young, op. cit., p. 319.

early in World War II, when it was replaced by the U.S. M1 Garand .30 cal. SLR. It was capable of firing antipersonnel or antitank rifle grenades. At this time, the U.S. M1 .30 cal. carbine, originally adopted by the U.S. Army in 1941, was being phased out of first-line service by the newer M2, and it was probably available in limited quantities to the NKM, including the T3 sniperscope model.¹

SMGs: The NKM was probably outfitted with the U.S. Thompson M1 .45 cal. SMG which was standard with the U.S. military until April 1945, when it was replaced by the lighter M3 SMG.²

Machine Guns: The NKM was supplied with the U.S. Browning automatic rifle (BAR) .30 cal. M1918 A2 which was standard with the USMC as the basic squad LMG.³ This weapon served with NKM rifle battalions.

Mortars, Recoilless Rifles, Rocket Launchers: The standard U.S. 60mm portable mortar, which was widely distributed under lend-lease to U.S. allies, was available to the NKM. The weapon's weight of 45 pounds could be cut in half by using a smaller base-plate, making it a hand-held weapon desirable for marine operations. The mortar fired a three-pound shell, either HE or smoke, from 1,600 to 2,000 yards. Smoke was used to set up a screen for advancing tank-supported infantry. The U.S. 4.2" medium mortar was also available at this time and was utilized chiefly to neutralize enemy fortifications. Since operations of the NKM were originally intended to be directed against the Japanese, who had built many networks of pillboxes in the East Indies, there were probably several dozen of these medium mortars in the NKM inventory. In anticipation of use against Japanese armor, the Dutch marines may have been supplied with some 2.36" RLs by the United States, probably at HQ level.⁴

Artillery: The NKM artillery battalion was probably outfitted with the U.S. 75mm howitzer.⁵

Armored Vehicles: U.S.-made APCs served with the AmTrac company, and the tank company used the U.S.-made Sherman M4

¹Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 410, 417, 419; ibid., Vol. II, pp. 106, 112.

²Ibid., Vol. II, p. 104.

³Ibid., pp. 285, 290.

⁴Kirk and Young, op. cit., pp. 267, 271, 287.

⁵Ibid., p. 183.

medium tank and perhaps the M5 or M24 light tanks, then available from the United States.¹

Other Ordnance: The standard antiaircraft weapon of U.S. forces for use against the Japanese was the Swedish-made Bofors 40mm gun. It is likely that a quantity of these were supplied to the NKM at HQ level. The representative U.S. antitank mine was the U.S. M1A1, which weighed 10.67 pounds and contained 5.7 pounds of TNT. This was probably supplied to the NKM for use against Japanese armor, but found no use against the Indonesian nationalists who were not trained in and did not engage in armored warfare. Hand grenades and flame throwers were also standard U.S. Marine issue in the Pacific and were probably used in outfitting the NKM.²

d. Royal Netherlands Army Air Corps

After the fall of the Netherlands in 1940, the major bases for the air force were located in Canada and in the Netherlands East Indies. At these bases, Dutch pilots were trained to operate the piston-engined Supermarine Spitfire fighters. After the fall of the East Indies to the Japanese in 1942, the remaining Netherlands Army Air Corps units were incorporated into the RAF. On June 12, 1943, a Spitfire squadron was formed in England that was entirely manned by Dutch personnel, most of whom were trained by the RAF in England after 1942. Some units were transferred to the Netherlands East Indies in the summer of 1945 following the end of operations in the European theater.³

The United States had supplied most of the equipment and training for the Dutch bomber crews. The original B-25 medium bombers acquired by the Dutch in early 1943 were assigned to Naval Squadron 320 in England, which at the time was using British-trained Dutch army flying personnel who had been serving with the RAF since 1940. Subsequently the B-25s were initially attached to RAF coastal command and then transferred to the 2nd ATAF, where full-trained Dutch maintenance crews were

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., pp. 256, 335, 343.

³Janes All the Worlds Aircraft, 1945-1946 edition (London, Sampson Low, Marston, and Co., 1946), p. 56a.

used on the aircraft for the first time.¹ The bomber crews and ground crews were trained at Jackson Army Air Force Base, Mississippi. By the end of 1943, another medium-bomber squadron had been formed alongside a fighter squadron, probably equipped with the U.S. P-40 Hawk, which was then phasing out of front-line service. The fighter squadron was transferred for service in Australia, where the aircraft was maintained by Australian ground crews. The Jackson Air Base served as the temporary wartime headquarters of the Royal Netherlands Military Flying School, directly under the command of the Chief of the Netherlands East Indies Air Corps.² The P-40 squadron served in the Netherlands East Indies throughout the conflict and was still in NEIAAC inventory in 1949.³

In addition to the above aircraft, the Army Air Corps was equipped with and trained in the use of the British-made Avro Anson multipurpose trainer-bomber-transport and the U.S.- and Canadian-made AT-6 Harvard advanced trainer in Britain, Canada, and the United States.⁴ All were capable of conversion to a limited combat role. By the fall of 1945, the Army Air Corps in the Far East was being equipped with the advanced Spitfire IX fighter by Britain.⁵

2. Combat, 1945 -- 1949.

a. Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL)

It has been estimated that by early 1946 the personnel strength of the Dutch army in the Far East totalled about 15,000 fully-trained men, organized into several infantry battalions along British lines,⁶ indicating a rapid build-up in staging bases in Malaya near Singapore. These forces participated in the joint army-marine amphibious landing

¹Ibid., pp. 11a, 56a.

²Ibid., p. 57a.

³Ibid., 1949-1950 edition, p. 14a.

⁴Ibid., 1948 edition, p. 15a.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Fischer, op. cit., p. 81.

in Java on March 9, 1946, in which the army used 5,000 troops. Aside from this landing force, the Dutch had 11,000 army regulars stationed on islands other than Java and 13,000 in reserve status in Malaya, including 7,000 partially-trained British colonials.¹

The KNIL also engaged in the first police action on Java, from July 21, 1947, to August 4, 1947, as part of a land, air, and sea force totalling some 109,000 men over-all.² All available weapons were seemingly used in the attack. KNIL units took part in landings on Sumatra and Madura in addition to Java.³

The KNIL role in the police action was significant and probably amounted to a force of over 70,000 by July 1947. According to one report, while well-trained and equipped, it lacked sufficient reserves, replacements, and, by implication, ammunition to wage a long campaign.⁴

On December 18, 1948, the Dutch took a second police action. Dutch forces had grown to a total of 130,000 by this time, and the KNIL probably had no less than 100,000 troops in this campaign. Army paratroops, armed with British .303 jungle carbines and Canadian-made FN Browning 9mm automatic pistols, were used in the initial move to capture and secure the airfield at Jogjakarta for the use of the Army Air Corps on December 18, 1948.⁵ This second police action, again using massed mobility against large numbers of well-dispersed nationalist forces, continued until August 1, 1947, and took a considerable toll of the opposition. This was the last major use of the KNIL in the Netherlands East Indies, and after Indonesian independence in 1950, the KNIL was disbanded (June 26, 1950), at a final strength of 65,000.⁶

¹Klein, op. cit., p. 15.

²H.M. Bro, Indonesia: Land of Challenge (New York, Harper, 1954), p. 65.

³Fischer, op. cit., pp. 98, 102.

⁴Time, August 4, 1947, p. 20.

⁵Fischer, op. cit., p. 119.

⁶Pauker, op. cit., p. 6.

Many of the KNIL's small arms were turned over to the Indonesians, including "considerable quantities" of Dutch 6.5mm Mannlicher rifles plus Enfield .303 rifles and carbines.¹ Many of the Johnson .30 cal. semi-automatic rifles and the Johnson .30 cal. LMGs were repatriated to the Netherlands and sold as surplus in 1953.²

b. Royal Netherlands Navy

The main role of the navy was to impose and maintain a sea blockade of all supplies to the Indonesian nationalists that could be of use to them in their war effort. This also meant restricting Indonesian exports, which thus deprived the nationalists of vital foreign exchange. Despite the presence of blockade-running with a variety of small craft, the Dutch navy kept the blockade in force throughout the campaign. Among the items subject to seizure were weapons, machinery, surgical instruments, transportation equipment, communications equipment, railway spare parts, oxygen, sulphur, steel, copper wire, medicine, and clothing.³

In 1946 the Dutch fleet in the East Indies, including its auxiliary, the Netherlands East Indies Marine (DVS), consisted of: 12 46-ton armed motor launches acquired from Britain in 1946;⁴ 8 corvettes of 560 tons each, converted to minesweeping, made in Australia and sold to the Netherlands in 1946; 31 ex-U.S. and ex-British landing craft (LCT/LCM) used in the Java landing in March 1946 and stationed in the Netherlands East Indies;⁵ and 1 escort carrier on loan from the Royal Navy (ex-HMS Nairana). Its complement of several dozen purchased aircraft included the British-made Fairey F.1 Firefly shipboard fighter and

¹Smith, op. cit., p. 461.

²Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 184.

³Joseph P. Lyford, "The Dutch Take Aim in Java," New Republic, February 16, 1948, p. 24.

⁴Janes Fighting Ships, 1946-1947 edition (London, Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1946), p. 239.

⁵Ibid., pp. 237, 239.

the newer Hawker F.B.11 Sea Fury fighter-bomber.¹ The crews were trained in carrier operating techniques either in England or at Singapore.

Units of the Dutch fleet supported the army-marine landings on Java in March 1946 and the first police action in July 1947.² To help support these landings, some 100 additional landing craft in reserve status were serving with the DVS. The number of landing craft available to the Dutch army and marines remained constant throughout the campaign, with about 30 in first-line service.³

By 1948, several destroyers joined in enforcing the blockade, including the 1,760-ton Tjerk Heddies purchased from Britain in 1941.⁴ On April 4, 1948, the Dutch purchased a fleet aircraft carrier, the HMS Venerable, from the Royal Navy. The ship, weighing 13,190 tons standard and 18,000 tons fully loaded, carried a normal load of 19 aircraft with a capacity of between 39 and 44 aircraft of the Firefly/Sea Fury type.⁵ It was tropicalized and refitted in Britain for active service and on May 28, 1948, was commissioned the Karel Doorman in Dutch service. The ship then took up station off Java, replacing the ex-HMS Nairana, which returned to Britain after a two-year loan period.⁶ During 1948-1949, the DVS purchased over 100 surplus PT-boats from the United States and Britain for patrol duty, and received 8 patrol minesweepers formerly attached to the navy.⁷ The navy was used sparingly in the second police action.

By 1949 the Dutch navy was using at least 25 seaward-defense motor launches of both Dutch and British origin. Three of these were

¹Janes All the Worlds Aircraft, 1948 edition, p. 15a.

²Bro, op. cit., p. 65.

³Janes Fighting Ships, 1946-1947 edition, p. 233; ibid., 1949-1950 edition, p. 238.

⁴Ibid., 1951-1952 edition, p. 265.

⁵Ibid., 1947-1948 edition, p. 225.

⁶Ibid., 1951-1952 edition, p. 298.

⁷Ibid., 1949-1950 edition, p. 238.

converted later in the year to shallow-draught minesweepers at Surabaya.¹ With the end of the conflict, several ships and landing craft were turned over to the newly-formed Indonesian navy, including 4 patrol minesweepers formerly serving with the DVS,² all 25 seaward-defense motor launches,³ 1 converted shallow-draught minesweeper,⁴ 16 landing craft of the DVS,⁵ and nearly all 100 PT-boats serving with the DVS.⁶ All of the transfers were made between late December 1949 and early 1951. Total naval and DVS personnel strength was estimated at 5,000 by March 1946,⁷ and there is no evidence of any significant increase over this figure during the remainder of the campaign.

c. Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (NKM)

By January 1946, 2,000 marines were reported in Java, evidently aggressively attempting to engage the nationalist forces. The British, at this time attempting to pacify the island, ordered 1,200 to leave in January 1946,⁸ leaving one battalion of 800 NKM on Java. Assisting them were 2,000 British colonial troops. On March 3, 1946, 5,000 marines out of a total landing force of 10,000 invaded Java in the first massive Dutch assault of the campaign, and reformed into one battalion after the landing.⁹ The NKM brigade participated in the two police actions of 1947 and 1948-1949.

d. Royal Netherlands Army Air Corps

The Army Air Corps had maintained unquestioned air superiority throughout the campaign and, by July 1947, had effectively neutralized

¹Ibid., 1951-1952 edition, p. 266.

²Ibid., p. 265.

³Ibid., p. 266.

⁴Ibid., p. 306.

⁵Ibid., p. 308.

⁶Ibid., 1949-1950 edition, p. 238.

⁷Fischer, op. cit., p. 85.

⁸Time, January 21, 1946, p. 32.

⁹Klein, op. cit., p. 15.

the ineffective and poorly-manned nationalist air force.¹ The U.S.-supplied B-25s and P-40s and the Spitfires supplied by the British were operating primarily from bases at Bandung, Semplak, Padang, Medan, and Semarang from 1946 through the remainder of the campaign.² The crews were experienced and well-trained and provided effective air cover and ground support, using machine guns, HVARs, and bombs. In 1946-1947 the Dutch purchased some war-surplus P-51 Mustang fighter-bombers from the United States, and these were introduced during the July 20, 1947, police action, where they effectively destroyed the remainder of the nationalist air force.³ About this time, a quantity of surplus late-model Spitfire XIVs may have been purchased from Britain.⁴ Both Spitfires and Mustangs were used in the initial attack of the second police action on December 18, 1948, during which they bombed and strafed a previously nationalist-held air base at Djodjakarta, after which C-47 transports acquired from either the United States or Britain shuttled in 900 army paratroopers to secure the field.⁵ By 1948 the Netherlands had purchased a quantity of British-built Gloster Meteor IV jet fighters, but these were introduced into service too late to be used in the campaign.⁶ Very few of the combat types were transferred to Indonesia, most of them remaining in inventory until phase-out in the early 1950s. However, the inventory of Harvards, C-47s, and Piper Cubs was transferred, along with all Dutch air bases (excluding West Irian), to the Indonesian air force (AURI).⁷

¹Time, July 28, 1947, p. 19.

²Janes All The Worlds Aircraft, 1950-1951 edition, p. 12a.

³Theodore H. White, "So the Dutch Are at War," New Republic, August 4, 1947, p. 8.

⁴Janes All The Worlds Aircraft, 1948, edition, p. 15a.

⁵Fischer, op. cit., p. 119.

⁶Janes All The Worlds Aircraft, 1948 edition, p. 15a.

⁷Ibid., 1950-1951 edition, p. 12a.

WEC-98 III

Weapons Used by the Netherlands from 1945 to 1949

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
FN Browning 9mm automatic	5,000-7,000	U.K./Canada
Enfield .38 revolver	15,000	U.K.
pistols, other types	3,000-5,000	U.K./U.S./ Netherlands
Enfield SMLE .303, and other marks, rifle	about 90,000	U.K./Australia
Johnson .30 SLR	6,000	Netherlands
Springfield 1903 .30/06 rifle	about 2,500	U.S.
U.S. M1 Carbine .30	1,500	U.S.
Dutch 6.5mm Mannlicher rifle	about 4,000	Netherlands
Thompson M1 .45 SMG	500-1,000	U.S.
Sten 9mm SMG	5,000-6,000	U.K.
Bren .303 LMG	2,500-3,000	U.K.
Browning .50 HMG	2,500-3,000	U.S.
machine guns, other types incl. Vickers .303/BAR	1,200-1,500	U.K./U.S.
25-pounder gun-howitzer	1,600-2,400	U.K.
mortar, 60mm	8,000	U.S.
mortar, 4.2"	6,000	U.S.
75mm howitzer	about 80	U.S.
Sherman/M24 tank	400-600	U.S.
armored personnel carriers and other vehicles	400	U.S./U.K.

B. Indonesian Nationalist Forces' Weapons Acquisition

1. Build-up, 1943 -- 1945. The core of the Indonesian Republican army (TKR) was the Japanese-organized and equipped PETA. By the time of the Japanese surrender, PETA consisted of 66 battalions on Java formed along lines of the Japanese infantry daidan of 522 officers and men each.¹ In addition, 1,626 PETA were active on the

¹Pauker, op. cit., p. 7.

island of Bali.¹

A small Indonesian officer corps had been trained by the Japanese advisors to PETA,² and after the disbandment of the Imperial army, there were trained officers sufficient to regroup the forces and utilize in battalion strength all Japanese arms below heavy artillery, armor, and combat aircraft with reasonable efficiency.³ The training received by the Indonesians was especially intended for the waging of rear-guard actions against an invading force.

PETA was formally disbanded following the Japanese surrender, but this organization, along with the Japanese weapons supplied to it, was carried over into the TKR after October 1945 and remained the main nationalist armed force opposing the Dutch.⁴

The TKR was the best equipped and organized of several Indonesian nationalist groups that varied in their political objectives and in the quality of their organization. When Allied (British, Australian, and Dutch) forces landed on Java in September 1945, in addition to PETA, which was basically military in character, there were several nationalist paramilitary organizations created by the Japanese, numbering about 230,000. The paramilitary organizations received military drill, but reportedly were given only bamboo spears instead of firearms.⁵

The following Japanese-designed and manufactured arms were probably in the possession of the TKR, having been furnished by the Japanese to PETA or captured after the Japanese surrender:

¹Ibid. Another estimate sets this figure at 80,000 but probably includes some paramilitary; see Fischer, op. cit., p. 81.

²Pauker, op. cit., p. 81.

³Ibid., pp. 12-13.

⁴Ibid., p. 12.

⁵Ibid., p. 10.

Pistols: The Nambu Model 1925 8mm automatic pistol was the official pistol of the Japanese forces for twenty years prior to their surrender,¹ and it is likely that TKR was well supplied with these.

Rifles: The Japanese Arisaka 6.5mm bolt-action rifle Type 38, developed in 1903² was co-standard with the new Japanese Type 99 7.7mm bolt-action short rifle³ at the time of surrender. Many thousands were available and used by TKR after September 1945. The Type 99 was first used against U.S. forces at Guadalcanal, utilizing the more powerful 7.7mm cartridge. Japan was unable to replace the Type 38 fully due to war-induced shortages of material. The Type 99 was also made in a sniper version with telescopic mount⁴ and was probably used extensively by the TKR, although late wartime models were poorly constructed.⁵ A total of over ten million of the Type 38 Arisaka were made, making it one of the world's most widely used weapons.⁶ It was not very accurate but quite reliable and easy to maintain. The construction was very loose-fitting, and its rattling sound made it undesirable for night missions or maneuvers where a great deal of silence was required.⁷ This characteristic probably restricted the usefulness of this weapon to TKR, since most of their actions were carried out at night.⁸

SMGs: The Japanese forces also used the Japanese Type HE 7.63mm SMG, which was a Swiss license-made version of the German Schmeisser SMG, developed in 1918. This gun was known in Switzerland as the "Bergmann," and the BE version was made especially for the Japanese

¹Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 111.

²Ibid., p. 422.

³Ibid., p. 424.

⁴Ibid., pp. 425, 431.

⁵Ibid., p. 430.

⁶Ibid., p. 431.

⁷Kirk and Young, op. cit., p. 316.

⁸Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 60.

military, chambered for the 7.63mm Mauser cartridge, the first models being produced in 1928.¹ During the 1930s, Japan bought this weapon and the MP 18, also license-made in Switzerland from German design. The MP 18 was in active service at the end of World War II as a special-purpose arm and probably was acquired by TKR forces.

Machine Guns: At the time of surrender, the Japanese Type 96 6.5mm LMG, developed in 1936, was in limited-standard service as the basic infantry squad support weapon.² During World War II, it was partially replaced by the more powerful Type 99 7.7mm LMG developed in 1939.³ Less than 100,000 of the latter were made,⁴ and thus it is likely that most of the LMGs used by the TKR were the Type 96. It was rated highly and considered by some to be the best Japanese small arm in World War II.⁵ The Type 92 7.7mm HMG was standard in the Japanese army since 1932,⁶ and its design was based on the French Hotchkiss HMG Model 1914 of World War I vintage. Improved versions, such as the Type 01, were introduced late in World War II⁷ and both types were probably available to the TKR.

Artillery: The Japanese army favored mobility in its ordnance and thus used mostly light weapons such as its 70mm howitzer and 75mm field gun.⁸ A number of these were taken over by TKR, and used in the early stages of the campaign, then abandoned.

Armored Vehicles: A few Japanese light tanks were acquired by TKR.⁹

¹ Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 11.

² Ibid., p. 351.

³ Ibid., p. 352.

⁴ Ibid., p. 356.

⁵ Kirk and Young, op. cit., p. 316.

⁶ Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 447.

⁷ Ibid., p. 451.

⁸ Kirk and Young, op. cit., p. 247.

⁹ Fischer, op. cit., p. 84.

Other Ordnance: The Japanese army used a land-based version of the navy's copy of the British Oerlikon anti-aircraft cannon in 25mm twin mountings.¹ Judging by the unchallenged Dutch air superiority in the campaign, it is not likely that TKR forces were either trained in its use or equipped with it. One of the most maneuverable and effective weapons possessed by the Japanese and supplied to the PETA units was a small, lightweight 50mm grenade launcher, firing smoke grenades or demolition bombs weighing two pounds a maximum distance of 700 yards, at a rate of 18 to 20 rounds per minute maximum fire. It was used by the Japanese mainly in close combat at distances of less than 100 yards against advancing infantry, and these tactics were likely adopted by TKR against the Dutch. The basic Japanese antitank weapon was a 20mm automatic gun that was shoulder-fired off a bipod, using an eight-round clip.² There is no evidence that PETA was trained in its use or that these were in TKR inventory by fall 1945.

Combat Aircraft: The nationalist air force (AURI) was originally attached to TKR units, becoming a separate arm in 1946.³ It acquired captured Japanese combat, reconnaissance, and training aircraft after the Japanese surrender in 1945, although there was a shortage of trained crews and maintenance equipment for these aircraft at all times. The standard Japanese army fighters were the Nakajima Ki. 84 and the Kawasaki Ki. 61. The latter mounted two 20mm cannon and two MGs. Its most advanced variant had a top speed of 373 mph. A few of these types probably were acquired by AURI, which was, however, in no position to use them. The Mitsubishi G4M was the most numerous and versatile of the Japanese medium bombers and served in all theaters of war in Asia. The best Japanese bomber was the Mitsubishi Ki. 67, but few of these were on hand by the end of the war. The Japanese also possessed the Mitsubishi Ki. 21, which was slow and vulnerable to ground fire.⁴ Since the Japanese continued to use the G4M in large numbers through surrender,

¹Kirk and Young, op. cit., p. 254.

²Ibid., pp. 264, 267, 291.

³Pauker, op. cit., p. 56.

⁴Kirk and Young, op. cit., pp. 35, 64, 67.

a few of these may have come into TKR/AURI possession. It was estimated that AURI had no more than 40 aircraft and about 20 trained pilots throughout the conflict.¹

Surface Vessels: The nationalist navy consisted of some ex-Japanese and ex-Dutch armed launches and torpedo boats, used for counter-blockade duty and gunrunning during the conflict.²

2. Combat, Fall 1945 --December 1949. Prior to the massive Dutch landings in March 1946, the TKR had used artillery and tanks as well as small arms against the British at Surabaya, on November 9, 1945.³ Again, in early December 1945, TKR units had massed against the British and used some of the ex-Japanese 75mm howitzers against them.⁴ After these battles, much of the heavy equipment was abandoned because TKR lacked road transport for it, and most of it was captured by the British.⁵ From then on, the TKR used no weapons larger than mortars, and homemade mines sometimes substituted for antitank or antipersonnel weapons. Hand grenades, probably ex-Japanese, were also used to a large extent.⁶

For the most part during the rest of the campaign, the TKR fought rear-guard actions and attacked Dutch communications, patrols, and transport, mostly at night.⁷ The two Dutch police actions attempted to engage the nationalists in force but did not succeed in breaking their organization. Personnel mounted to upwards of 400,000 by mid-1947, including some paramilitary detachments;⁸ however, the fighting core

¹Bro, op. cit., p. 65.

²Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 56.

³Fischer, op. cit., p. 84.

⁴Time, December 17, 1945, p. 36.

⁵Pauker, op. cit., p. 13.

⁶Bro, op. cit., p. 65.

⁷Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 55.

⁸Time, July 28, 1947, p. 19.

strength totalled slightly over 200,000 from mid-1947 on.¹

In May 1947 the nationalists added some less-experienced, semi-armed paramilitary units to the existing TKR force and they named this organization the National Indonesian Army (TNI).² The auxiliaries possibly provided communications or relief for the regular units, and the purpose of the merger was probably to coordinate anti-Dutch activities rather than to improve weaponry. By July 1947, at the time of the first Dutch police action, the TNI had 150,000 rifles, other small arms including machine guns, and many homemade land mines and hand grenades.³ The diminutive AURI, poorly trained and randomly equipped, was neutralized on the ground by Dutch air strikes in the first police action.⁴

The nationalist navy during the campaign was confined to running munitions and arms through the Dutch blockade in order to set up caches in mountain areas in anticipation of greater Dutch military action.⁵ Since there were no alternative sources of arms available to the nationalists at that time, it is possible that the TNI was reinforced on Java by re-allocating current weapons stocks from the other islands and shipping them by sea to Java. The nationalists also used many small wooden vessels as blockade-runners to and from Singapore, exchanging produce for imports, and possibly black-market arms.

After the Renville Agreement of early 1948, the Republican government considered a force reduction to consolidate its existing weaponry and provide more firepower and mobility. This reorganization plan of February 1948, called the Hatta Plan, consisted of restructuring regular and irregular units of the TNI and scaling down force levels to about 160,000 during the first stage, out of which a further reduction would be made to a planned level of 57,000. While the Hatta Plan was

¹Pauker, op. cit., p. 3.

²Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 55.

³Bro, op. cit., p. 65.

⁴Time, July 28, 1947, p. 19.

⁵Lyford, op. cit., p. 24.

being implemented in its first stage, the pro-Communist FDR objected to having its units demobilized and rebelled against the Republican government in Central Java in September 1948. Troops of the Siliwangi Division of West Java and the Sungkono Division of East Java were called in to crush the rebellion.¹

Evidently the FDR had partisans in the nationalist navy, as its role was considerably reduced after the uprising, perhaps for political reasons or because of the loss of many personnel sympathetic to the FDR. Many of its members were transferred to TNI.²

Weapons Used by the Indonesian Nationalists from 1945 to 1949

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
Nambu 8mm automatic	about 10,000	Japan/captured stocks
Arisaka Type 38 6.5mm rifle	about 100,000	Japan/captured stocks
Arisaka Type 99 7.7mm rifle	about 40,000	Japan/captured stocks
Dutch Mannlicher 6.5mm rifle	about 10,000	Japan/captured stocks
Japanese Type BE 7.63mm SMG	35,000	Japan/captured stocks
MP 18	few	Japan/captured stocks
Japanese Type 96 6.5mm LMG	18,000-20,000*	Japan/captured stocks
70mm howitzer	about 50**	Japan/captured stocks
75mm field gun	about 50**	Japan/captured stocks

*mostly abandoned in early stages of the conflict

**abandoned

¹ Pauker, op. cit., pp. 29, 30.

² Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 56.

WEC-98 III

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
light 50mm grenade/all-purpose launcher	30,000-50,000	Japan/captured stocks
combat aircraft including Nakagima/Kawasaki fighters and Mitsubishi bombers	40***	Japan/captured stocks
patrol craft and armed motor launch	less than 100	left over from Dutch and Japanese

***mostly destroyed on the ground by Dutch air force

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL"Controlling" the Conflict

Controlling the Indonesian war of independence, i.e., avoiding or minimizing violence in the archipelago, in simple-minded terms meant preventing World War II, which provided the preconditions for it, or avoiding Dutch colonialism and the subsequent independence impulse. This is obviously unrealistic, but it illustrates how fundamental were the roots of this conflict. In more realistic terms, controlling the conflict meant: first, discouraging the Dutch from believing they could in fact take over again after having been evicted by the Japanese; second, enabling the Indonesians to win their independence quickly once fighting broke out or, alternately, enabling the Dutch to carry out a quick and successful police action (in any event, stopping the fighting once it started); and finally, keeping the parties from fighting again through diplomatic and military means of pressure. At all stages, controlling this particular conflict meant making clear to all sides, but particularly the Dutch, the eventual grounds for settling the dispute, namely, independence for the former Netherlands East Indies.

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. The key element in the Indonesian war lies in colonialism and its obverse--anticolonialism. In our vocabulary, a dispute was inevitable. But the transition from dispute to conflict might have been avoided if the approaching end of European colonialism had been more visible in 1945 than it was. With adequate foresight, conflict-preventive policy measures might have afforded constructive outlets for Dutch status-seeking impulses, i.e., surrogates for the Netherlands' dying empire. In 1967 a widespread understanding exists about the inevitability of decolonization. But there is still a need for economic and spiritual alternatives to the colonialist and imperialist

impulse. Ironically, in the years ahead, the chief would-be imperialists may be found outside the white Western world. One has already had glimpses of an imperialist urge, however unrealistic, in contemporary China, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Ghana, and the UAR. Remedial policy prescriptions might take such forms as: first, deterrence and the courage to stop expansionism; second, the encouragement of regional associations, common-market schemes, and cooperation in economic and social development, in a kind of neo-William Jamesian substitute for neo-empire. Unbridled nationalism is still--as it was--the prime enemy. As for such "imperialism" as is found in some investment and trade policies of developed countries, answers may be found in enlightened governmental aid and trade philosophies, plus support for more rational mechanisms to resolve fundamental problems of foreign investment, commodity marketing, and balance of payment. Seemingly remote from conflict control, these are in fact central to it.

2. The most operational conflict-control lesson to be derived from the Indonesian war turns on the problem of serious misconceptions that may lead parties to blunder into conflict. In the Indonesian case, the need was for reliable information about the situation to be conveyed to both parties. Given the dispute, a third-party presence able to undertake this sort of fact-finding could have been of great value, above all preventively if put in place before fighting broke out.

3. Part of postwar planning ought to deal with the matter of collecting arms suddenly in surplus. The presence and availability of arms in large quantities may have made the difference in turning the Indonesian dispute into a militarily-flavored conflict situation. In this case, Japanese arms were available in quantity to the Indonesian nationalists. (Note also that the Chinese Communists took over Japanese arms left in Manchuria in 1945, with epochal results.) And the other side of the coin was the use by returning Dutch colonial masters of Allied-supplied military materiel intended for use against the Japanese. The history of military assistance programs has often

been one of misuse by metropolitan countries against their colonies, and by neighbors against each other. The United States should continually re-examine its military assistance program in the light of what use has in fact been made of the arms supplied.

4. Above all else, machinery for peaceful change should have played a crucial role in this case. Peaceful change in a still fundamental form involves the relatively bloodless and equitable disposition of the legal and political status of territories.* In the postwar years, the Italian colonies, some French and British colonies, Trieste, and Austria represent about the only major examples of peaceful change. The Palestine experience was a mixed one, and there has been no real effort to deal with Kashmir equitably. It might be helpful, as suggested by a number of observers, for an equity tribunal to deal in a semi-juridical fashion, yet within the context of the U.N. political machinery, with thorny territorial issues.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

5. Here, as in other cases, internal cohesion and stability on the part of governmental authorities were preconditions for asserting sufficient control over a local situation to prevent the actual outbreak of hostilities in a tense period. Historically, it would only have postponed inevitable conflict if the Dutch had been adequately strong; the realistic conflict-controlling need was for a strong Indonesian authority. But Dutch or Indonesian, such an authority was necessary if the conflict were to be kept isolated, and dissident groups disarmed. The point is underscored by the widely varying experiences of newly-independent governments. The Congo in 1960 was an extreme example of insufficiency on the part of such a government; the case of Israel in 1948 represented the other extreme.

* See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Evolution or Revolution? The United Nations and the Problem of Peaceful Territorial Change (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957).

6. History is full of situations in which a legitimate authority seeks to apply or restore its writ in a territory and encounters serious opposition. Consequences for peace arise out of efforts by the authority to suppress such opposition, or efforts by outsiders to help either the government or rebels. Examples are Burma, Iran, or Indonesia in 1945, Hungary in 1956, the Congo in 1960, the Bay of Pigs in 1961, and the Dominican Republic in 1965. The best policy instrument to keep such an explosive situation from producing open hostilities takes the form of preventive interposition by neutral or third-party forces between the parties. This has, in fact, never been done preventively but only after some bloodshed and the threat of major military action. Next best would be pre-hostilities fact-finding on the spot; it is sobering to consider what political and even strategic value a more viable international presence of this sort in Vietnam, reporting to the entire world community, might have had during the years of infiltration from the north. The essential element for this sort of pacificatory strategy is of course neutrality as between the parties. In the Indonesian situation, the mediatory instruments and agents introduced into the scene were not always perceived as completely neutral. (A parallel of this in more recent times was found in the behavior of the members of the Casablanca bloc of African states who put troops in the U.N. Congo operation but then acted disruptively and non-neutrally.)

7. Once fighting is terminated, to prevent it from breaking out again, the cease-fire that has been achieved must be made firm, with guarantees that it will not be easily breached. Diplomatic recognition as a form of legitimization and stabilization of the de facto situation can be a useful means toward this end, particularly if accompanied with time-stretching diplomatic devices. A UNEF kind of buffer force put on the ground to monitor a cease-fire could have been very helpful in Indonesia, along with continuous pressures to negotiate. Per contra, unsupervised truces can be positive sources of tension by creating incidents that can lead to resumed hostilities. One of the most serious problems

of the times is the stubborn refusal of the Communists in Laos, Vietnam, and Korea to accept adequate truce supervision on their territories. The same thing can be said of Israel.

8. During a pause in long-standing conflict situations (such as Kashmir on two occasions), the parties often use the time to replenish their military stocks in order to arm for the next round. There is room in such a pause for redressing military imbalances, either through arming and training of the weaker side, or through mutual arms-control agreements. The effect of arming the weaker side can be either conflict-controlling or not, depending on such factors as the rate of arming, the possibility of surprise attack, or the availability of "breakthrough" weapons.

This represents a complex problem. For deterrence purposes, arms balances are desirable. However, if hostilities do break out in balanced situations, they may be prolonged to the extent that neither side can win a quick victory. Another defect of the parity policy is that if it does not rest on agreement among suppliers, it can lead to the introduction of major sophisticated weapons systems. Such systems will raise the level of violence and risk of intensification if deterrence fails. In addition to keeping the local balance at low levels, external guarantees with sanctions are needed to reinsure deterrence in seeing that the arms are not in fact used. The ideal would be a general agreement keeping arms levels substantially low. As long as this is not possible, one might consider imposing quarantines against the importation of destabilizing arms into the general area of a given conflict when it is acute in order to insulate it from possible exacerbation. (Paragraph 3 of the Suez cease-fire resolution of 1956* aimed at precisely this.) In this general connection, the very notion of mutual deterrence means that information about the arms balance is in many ways as important as the arms themselves, and perhaps more important. This is another major reason why the United Nations should be required to publish information

* U.N. General Assembly Resolution 997 (ES-1).

on world-wide military establishments and inventories, arms transfers, and arms trade. *

Moderating/Terminating the Conflict

9. It was only after the fighting broke out again in Indonesia, in July 1947, that U.N. pressure began to become positively strong, vigorously backed by the United States. Two very important instruments for both moderating and eventually terminating the conflict were adequate machinery on the ground and influential great-power involvement carrying the implied threat of meaningful sanction. It hardly seems necessary to reiterate the need to strengthen the United Nations' capacity to back up its peacekeeping capabilities with peaceful-change mechanisms, emphasis on arbitration measures regarding alleged violations, and the threat of sanctions. These were by no means perfect in 1947, for a third round of fighting was yet to break out. They seem if anything less perfect in 1967.

10. The pressures for terminating the fighting might have been reinforced with sterner economic measures on the part of external powers in a position so to influence matters.

11. The Indonesian second round particularly suggested the desirability of having available specialized truce-supervision machinery for situations of guerrilla warfare. This problem has never been thoroughly analyzed, but Vietnam could be a crucial customer one day for this sort of capability, as might also parts of the Arab-Israeli confrontation. This special problem surely belongs on the agenda of needed operational research in the realm of peacekeeping.

12. The involvement of U.S. citizens in the peacemaking machinery that was available during the Indonesian fighting implied the involvement of the prestige of the United States, and its implicit commitment to control of the conflict. Moscow was similarly involved in late

* As recommended in Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas, Report for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Center for International Studies, September 1964).

1965 in the Kashmir conflict. This can be only healthy, since international-organization machinery itself is meaningful only with substantial great-power support. It is not an argument for the presence of superpower military units in multilateral peacekeeping exercises (although changing U.S.-Soviet relations may make that contingency less undesirable), but for the lending of their prestige to peacemaking efforts through their service as guarantors and influential brokers.

13. It should not escape notice that if superpower stand-off tends to allow lesser conflicts to flourish, a brooding cold war or other global-level threat can have the reverse effect of suppressing local conflict. Ironically, it can be speculated that an even more aggressive Soviet foreign policy in December 1948 might have stayed the Dutch hand from the second round in Indonesia by requiring it to focus on Europe. Similarly, it might have intensified the desire of the Allies to see early control of a dangerous situation where the great powers might potentially become entangled. The interaction between superpower relations and local conflicts represents one of the major sets of trade-offs in conflict control. But while the last argument is a serious one, an optimum conflict-control policy would call for superpower cooperation above all other policy considerations. Not only would this bring maximum pressure for settlement on local parties, control the flow of arms to both sides, and ensure the mobilization of U.N. machinery, but also, above all, it would remove that which makes failure in conflict control so potentially disastrous--the possibility of intensification to the great-power nuclear arena.

14. Key conflict-control measures would be:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Avoidance of colonialism

Constructive outlets (e.g., regionalism) for colonialist impulses

Third-party fact-finding

Restricted availability of surplus arms

Tightened controls on use of military assistance

Equity tribunal for peaceful change

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Governmental cohesion and stability

Preventive interposition by neutral or third-party forces

International fact-finding

Diplomatic recognition as legitimation and stabilization
of de facto situation

Time-stretching diplomatic devices

Quarantine of arms importation into crisis areas

Local arms balances at relatively low levels, guaranteed
by potential sanctions

U.N. publication of arms inventories and trade

MODERATING HOSTILITIES

Multilateral machinery on ground*

Influential great-power involvement*

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

U.N. peacekeeping capability

Peaceful-change mechanism*

Arbitration of alleged violations*

Stern economic pressures

Superior cooperation

PREVENTING RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

Truce supervisory machinery geared to guerrilla warfare

Involvement of great power*
supporting

U.N. peacekeeping

Superpower cooperation

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY :
1948 - 1960

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.	111
A.	Background of the Conflict	111
B.	Phase II: March 1948 -- June 1948	124
C.	Phase III: June 1948 -- July 31, 1960	125
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.	139
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option	139
B.	Phase II to Phase III: The Outbreak of Hostilities.	142
C.	Phase III to Phase IV: The Termination of Hostilities	143
D.	Phase IV	145
III.	Weapons Analysis (not prepared for this case)	146
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.	147

T H E M A L A Y A N E M E R G E N C Y : 1 9 4 8 - 1 9 6 0


I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES

A. Background of the Conflict

1. Geographic and Physical Factors. Malaya is located on the southern end of a peninsula projecting from the mainland of Southeast Asia into the South China Sea. Its only land boundary is with Thailand in the north; the Strait of Malacca lies on the west, the Strait of Johore on the south, and the China Sea on the east. The area of Malaya is about 50,000 square miles, four-fifths of it jungle. A mountain range runs north-south down the middle of the country. The climate is tropical, with an average annual rainfall varying from 50 to 250 inches, depending on locality.

The north-south mountain range aligns the transportation system north-south as well, the best road and railway network being in western Malaya. In 1948 the eastern portion of Malaya had virtually no modern roads, though the east and west coasts were connected by two main roads. There was also a relatively good rail system in the west, and a number of airports and smaller air strips throughout the country. Most sea transport went through Singapore, which occupies an island just off the southern tip of Malaya.

Malaya had strategic importance because of its value as a source of rubber and tin, its position at the juncture of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the location of British military



Adapted from Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare (Washington, D.C., Special Operations Research Office, 1962).

and naval bases in Singapore.

2. The People of Malaya. The principal racial groups in Malaya included the Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians. Among other smaller groups were the aboriginal tribes inhabiting the deep jungle and the British community. In 1947 there were in Malaya 2.4 million Malays, 1.9 million Chinese, and .6 million Indians and Ceylonese.¹ However, if the population of Singapore (which was governed separately after 1945) were included, the Chinese would be the largest single ethnic group.

The population was relatively highly concentrated in urban areas and in cleared and developed agricultural and rubber-producing areas. The Chinese formed the bulk of the urban population, dominating business and commerce in Malaya, as well as the mining industry. However, about 500,000 Chinese were so-called squatters--small farmers living on the edge of the jungle after having been forced from the cities and mines because of unemployment during the depression of the 1930s and the Japanese wartime occupation. They had no title to the land they farmed, or only annual occupation license. After the war, the men of squatter families provided much of the labor for the rubber plantations and tin mines, while their wives, aged parents, and children tended their plots.

Much of the Chinese population was made up of immigrants or the children of immigrants whose basic allegiance was still to China and who remained as detached as possible from Malayan government and politics. They had a complicated set of informal associations and personal ties within their community. In general, they looked for security and gain in their own secret societies, benevolent associations, and guilds, rather than by seeking out and cooperating with the government.

¹Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts (Washington, D.C., Special Operations Research Office, 1962), p. 66.

The Malays were mostly farmers, but members of the educated Malay elite made up the great bulk of the non-British governmental bureaucracy. The police were almost entirely Malay.

The Indians were primarily laborers. Indian immigration had begun somewhat later than the Chinese, which dated back to the opening of the tin mines in the middle of the 19th century and continued up to the depression of the 1950s.

The three main ethnic groups--Malay, Chinese, and Indian--remained socially quite distinct, each with its own internal structure and each with its own rural and urban components.

3. Political Background.

a. The Chinese Community

Specifically political organizations were slow to develop in both the Chinese and Malay communities. The most important Chinese political organization in Malaya was the Kuomintang (KMT), which tended to produce a sense of solidarity with the Chinese homeland, at least among the middle-class Chinese who were sources of contributions to be sent back to China. KMT intimidation led to a British banning of its branches in Malaya, though the Malayan Chinese as individuals could belong. The Straits Chinese, long-settled in the trading ports, had a Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA), which sought recognition of their permanent commitment to Malaya.

The first Communist activity in Malaya was sparked by Indonesian Communists during the mid-1920s. They apparently made some efforts to recruit among the Malays, with little success.¹ At about the same time, Chinese Communist agents were being placed in the Malayan operations of the Kuomintang. After the 1927 split in China between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, a South Seas

¹Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954), p. 6.

Communist Party was set up by the Comintern with full jurisdiction over Malaya and Siam and a voice in party activities in Indochina, Indonesia, and Burma. After a number of setbacks, the South Seas Communist Party was replaced in 1930 by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) under the operational control of the Comintern.

The principal emphasis in MCP activities in the 1930s was labor agitation among the Chinese. Malaya was suffering from the lowered demand and reduced prices of its two major exports, rubber and tin, due to the world-wide depression of the early 1930s. And when, after the depression, the prices for rubber and tin began to rise in 1936 and 1937, the MCP, operating through a front organization, was able to trigger a series of strikes for higher wages. While few concrete results were obtained, the Chinese workers became accustomed to collective action. Since no non-Communist labor movement existed, the MCP had a clear field. But since the MCP-led unions won so few economic benefits for their members, the MCP was unsuccessful in using this channel to penetrate the Chinese community as a whole.

After the Japanese attack on China, the MCP shifted its emphasis to fund-raising for the motherland. The appeal to Chinese patriotism gave the Communists some new acceptability in the Chinese community in Malaya and also strengthened the ties between the MCP and the Chinese Communist Party.

With the Japanese invasion of Malaya in December 1941, the MCP's position in the Chinese community and in Malaya as a whole changed sharply. Only the MCP was able to plan and carry out resistance operations against the Japanese; only the MCP could offer any security to the Chinese. The British recognized the new situation and reached an agreement with the MCP to provide training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare for MCP-nominated Chinese. This took place during the short period before the Japanese occupied Malaya completely. As groups were trained, they were organized by the MCP

into the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The auxiliary civilian organization that handled supply, recruitment, propaganda, and funds was the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU).

Beginning in the spring of 1943, British liaison groups made contact with the MCP-organized guerrillas, who agreed to accept the orders of the Allies during the war and during the following period of military occupation. No questions of politics or of postwar policy were discussed.

The MPAJA was in difficulty for the first eighteen months of its life, until mid-1943. Both its officers and men lacked training, the MPAJU was not yet supplying enough food, and the guerrillas were cut off from British assistance. In addition, Malaya was still occupied by front-line Japanese units, who inflicted some heavy losses on the guerrilla forces. By the end of 1943, however, Malaya was occupied by second-rate troops, and the decrease in military pressure made possible a period of nearly a year in which the MPAJA could concentrate on training and on building up a mass base in the civilian population. By the end of 1944, the MPAJA had increased in size about four times, to a peak of about 4,000 men.¹ It, like the MCP, had remained almost entirely Chinese in membership. There were, however, a few small Malay guerrilla units unconnected with the MPAJU or the MCP.

Large amounts of British supplies and funds and 500 Allied personnel were air-dropped to assist the guerrillas, particularly after November 1944. But in fact the success of the British attempt to establish a working relationship with the MPAJA was limited. British contacts with the guerrillas were kept restricted, and only a little intelligence was supplied by the MPAJA.

¹Hanrahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37; see also Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London, Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 310; and Lucian W. Pye, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 69. Purcell lists MPAJA strength in 1944 as 3,000 to 4,000 and in 1945 as 6,000 to 7,000; Pye gives a figure of 7,000 at the end of the war.

In military terms the MPAJA never achieved anything of significance.¹ Total Japanese casualties in Malaya during World War II, including the fighting with the British during the invasion of Malaya and Singapore, amounted to 2,300, and one source estimates that the MPAJA accounted for only a few hundred of these.² In contrast, 2,500 "traitors" were killed by the guerrillas. Apparently, genuine military operations against the Japanese were secondary to the task of convincing the Chinese community in Malaya of the power and importance of the MPAJA.

The Japanese surrender occurred much more quickly than the Allies anticipated. After some delay, British forces landed on Penang September 3, 1945, on Singapore September 5, and in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of the Federated States, on September 12; and some isolated areas were not reoccupied until the end of the month. In the interim between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of the British, the MPAJA took the role of liberator, acting in some areas like a military government and killing suspected Malay informers. The Malay police were helpless to restore order, the more so since they had been used by the Japanese to control the Chinese population during the occupation; after the Japanese surrender, there was a general collapse in police morale and effectiveness until they were reorganized and retrained. The killings of Malays produced Malay reprisals, then Chinese counter-reprisals, until the British military administration restored order.

In December 1945 the MPAJA was purportedly disbanded, with each man turning in his weapon to the British authorities and receiving a gratuity. In fact, however, substantial numbers of weapons, probably several thousand, were not surrendered; and it is reported that many veteran guerrillas were not exposed to identification

¹Though it was scheduled to assist an amphibious Allied landing on the west coast of Malaya, plans for which were almost completed when the war ended.

²Pye, op. cit., p. 69.

by the British, new recruits being used instead to collect the gratuity.¹ In all, about 6,800 guerrillas appeared before the British authorities.

The strategy adopted by the MCP after the war and the disbanding of the MPAJA was one of political rather than military conflict. The party started an energetic campaign to profit from the political, economic, and social disorganization of Malaya and its Chinese community. The most significant MCP effort was in labor organization. Here the Communist-controlled General Labor Union--later called the Pan-Malayan Federation of Labor Unions--dominated the labor movement in the key tin, rubber, and longshoremen's unions.

As early as January 1946 the Communist-controlled labor movement was strong enough to call a general strike that lasted for two days, protesting police arrests of 30 ex-MPAJA members on criminal charges. It was officially estimated that 150,000 workers were on strike.² In the ensuing two years, the MCP's labor campaign, aided by the economic dislocation caused by the war, produced numerous strikes.

b. The Malay Community

The Malays tended to be conservative and aristocratic in their outlook. And any existing sense of Malay unity was the result of the increasing contact of the aristocrats of each Malayan state with their counterparts in other states through the federal administration, the federal civil service, and Malay College, an institution built on the lines of an English public school. The aristocracy had a common interest in resisting federal encroachment on the rights of the states. But all Malays were united in opposition to Chinese economic domination and in fear of Chinese political domination. Communism had little attraction for the Malays. Reasons for this included their attachment to their tradition; the large number of urban

¹Ibid., p. 72.

²Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 57.

Malays, including most of the educated elite, in government positions of one kind or another; and the relative acceptability of the British presence in Malaya.

The first Malay political organization was the Singapore Malay Union, founded in 1926, which supported the appointed Malay member of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council. Not until 1937 did similar organizations, concerned with the legislative councils of their particular states, begin to appear in the Federated Malay States. The Union of Young Malays (KMM) was also founded in the prewar period, partly under the influence of exiled Indonesian nationalists and supporting the idea of unifying Malaya and Indonesia in a Pan-Malaysian state, free of colonial rule. The KMM leaders were arrested by the British in 1940, but collaborated with the Japanese occupation regime for a period.

c. Constitutional Developments

Malaya was formed as such by the gradual penetration of the British into the Malay Peninsula from 1786 to 1914. The basis of British administration was the treaty relationship between the British government and each individual state, which relationship provided for a British Resident, or Adviser, "whose advice must be asked and acted upon in all questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom."¹

Although the Malay states were formally a group of British protectorates, in fact British control was more unified and extensive. The states themselves had only primitive administrative machinery, so in fact the Residency controlled developing civil services in each state. Also, in 1896, the four states then under British protection formed the Federated Malay States, with a federal executive and very considerable administrative centralization. The five other states that were eventually made protectorates did not enter this federated administration, and the distinction between federated

¹J. M. Gullick, Malaya (New York, Praeger, 1963), p. 38.

and unfederated states, as well as that between the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements, lasted until the Japanese occupation. The unfederated states retained substantially more Malay administrative control. Four of them, along the Malayan-Siamese border, also had very small non-Malay populations.

In October 1945 the British government proposed a new structure for Malaya. The nine Malay states and the two Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca were to be merged in a unitary Malayan Union, with Singapore remaining a separate colony with its own governor. Within the Union, the government was to be in the name of the British Crown. Thus, instead of the Malay state rulers being the embodiment of sovereignty and the Malay people a privileged community, Malaya was to become a multiracial colonial regime headed toward self-government under a system of equal rights. Each of the Malay rulers--his state council mostly inoperative due to the recent occupation, with British military government still in effect, and under threat of a review of his relations with the Japanese occupation authorities--signed a treaty ceding his sovereignty.

Nevertheless, Malay public opinion and some former British administrators were opposed to the new plan. And almost immediately a Malay political organization, the United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO), was formed by the fusion of some local Malay associations. The weight of opposition caused the British to begin talks with both the Malay rulers and UMNO, out of which came the plan for a Federation of Malaya.

Under the revised British plan, the Federation would be comprised of the nine Malayan states and the two British Settlements of Penang and Malacca, Singapore being a separate Crown Colony. Sovereignty would be held by the British Crown in Penang and Malacca, but by the Malay rulers in their respective states. The Federation's central government was to be headed by the British High Commissioner. The Federal Legislative Council of 76 official and nominated

unofficial members would become the dominant legislative body and forum of political discussion in the Federation. The central government would have substantial power, especially in the area of finance. The governments of the nine Malay states would be under substantially more Malay control than they were in the prewar Residency system. Under the Malay ruler would be a chief executive who had to be Malay. The British representative was to be called Adviser and would hold limited power.

d. Political Ferment, 1946-1948

Protests against the restoration of the superior position of the Malays in the proposed Federation united for a short while the middle-class, moderate Chinese and Indians with the left wing, including the MCP. A Chinese-dominated coalition of organizations opposing the Federation--the MCP-controlled All Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA)--and a Malay coalition--PUTERA--were the principal organizations that appeared; the relationship between the two was unclear but probably fairly close.¹ The most effective action taken was a one-day stoppage of work on October 20, 1947, organized by AMCJA with the aid of the largely Communist-controlled trade unions. But on the whole the opposition to the Federation was ineffective, and the Federation came into being in February 1948. Furthermore, the MCP had not permanently gained ground with the middle-class Chinese and their organizations because, while opposed to the Federation, they were not willing to make their positions or politics radical.

In 1948 the MCP was just emerging from a dramatic leadership crisis. Loi Tek, Secretary-General of the MCP since 1939, had fled Malaya with a large amount of party funds. Some charges of collaboration with the Japanese had been levelled against him immediately after the war but had been dismissed on the basis of his tremendous

¹Purcell, op. cit., pp. 338-339 and note 13.

prestige as the leader of the anti-Japanese resistance and also because the charges came from Malaysians who had collaborated with the Japanese. But by the middle of 1946, persistent reports forced a party investigation led by Chen Peng, Loi Tek's chief assistant during the war. By March 1947, sufficient evidence had been gathered of Loi Tek's activity to prepare a confrontation. However, evidently having learned of this, Loi Tek did not appear at the meeting called to present the accusations and then disappeared. He was formally expelled from the MCP in May 1947 and Chen Peng named as the new Secretary-General. A report on Loi Tek was issued by the party for internal circulation more than a year later. Among other charges, Loi Tek was accused of pressing for traitorously moderate policies. It is difficult to determine the degree of responsibility he in fact bore, however, since the moderate line remained in force for a year after his disappearance. To some extent he was probably being used as a scapegoat after moderation had been abandoned.¹

By early 1948 the united-front policy had proven unsuccessful. The Communist labor movement had passed the peak of its power and was beginning to decline as its tactics, which produced little in the way of tangible benefits for the workers, were causing considerable antagonism in the union memberships; also, the British Labor government was undercutting much of the Communist position by introducing a popular labor program in Malaya. In addition, the anti-Federation coalition of AMCJA had failed and was breaking up.

At the same time, the current line of Soviet policy and of international Communism had changed. The new view had been first outlined in September 1947: the world since the war had become increasingly divided into imperialist and anti-imperialist camps; the actions of the West made it necessary for all Communist parties

¹Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 313.

to unite their efforts; Moscow was once more speaking as the leader of the world's Communist parties. The new line was directly conveyed to Southeast Asian parties, including the MCP, at the Southeast Asia Youth Conference in Calcutta in February 1948.

The records of the Youth Conference show that the new militancy was being applied to Asian situations.¹ While armed struggle was not given a general endorsement, the specific examples of the armed revolutions in China, Indochina, and Indonesia were praised. Whether or not anything approximating an actual command to move to open revolt was transmitted from the Soviet party to the Asians, it seems reasonable to suppose that the change in ideological and political emphasis reaching the Asian parties at the Youth Conference might have been sufficient to influence the Asians toward more aggressive policies.

In the case of the MCP, at least as influential as the Youth Conference itself may have been the report of it given by the Australian Communist Lawrence Sharkey at the Fourth Plenum of the MCP in March 1948. The one or two Malayan delegates to the Calcutta Conference may not yet have returned at this point; in any case, Sharkey is said to have criticized the MCP's policies severely, especially the decision to dissolve the MPAJA after the war, and to have passed on the significance of the new international line and the resolutions taken at Calcutta. Sharkey's opinions at this time were reported to be more radical than those of Moscow, so the MCP may well have received a particularly aggressive and uncompromising view of the requirements of the current situation in Malaya and the rest of the colonial world.² Sharkey's report may have even been in the nature of an imperative, either a personal interpretation of the proper application of the current line or a transmission of an

¹Ibid., p. 358.

²Ibid., pp. 385-386.

authoritative decision.

B. Phase II: March 1948 -- June 1948

Phase II of the conflict lasted only three months--from the MCP's Fourth Plenum in March 1948 to the British declaration of a state of emergency on June 16.

The Fourth Plenum passed several resolutions reversing the MCP's "popular front" policy.¹ This postwar policy had reportedly been encouraged by both the Chinese and British Communist parties--which had advised the MCP to avoid armed revolt, limit its demands to self-government for Malaya rather than independence, and work for social and economic goals.² The Fourth Plenum attacked this as a policy of "surrenderism" and condemned the dissolution of the MPAJA and the lack of insistence on full independence for Malaya. The masses were to be prepared for a struggle for independence that would ignore considerations of legality and eventually take the form of a revolutionary war. While the projected uprising was not given a fixed date, the program was one of preparing for rebellion. Party organs soon began to go underground, posters began to appear calling for violence, and incidents of arson and murder began to increase.

Detailed information on these months is scarce. According to one source, the MCP mobilization--under the direction of officers from the old MPAJA--proceeded slowly and was not completed until early 1950.³ It was presumably in this 1948 period that the large jungle camps later used by the insurgents in the early stages of the Emergency were being prepared. One source reports that the MCP planned to initiate large-scale armed violence in early June, but

¹Ibid., p. 386.

²Ibid., pp. 313-314.

³Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 65-67.

that this was to be preceded by labor unrest in April, including the local use of arms and destruction of factories.¹

It appears that labor unrest was mitigated during this period by the action of the Malayan government.² Many Chinese aliens who were suspected Communists were deported to China; and at the end of May the government prohibited any federation of labor unions of more than one trade, required most union officials to have three years' experience in the trade concerned, and prohibited persons convicted of extortion or intimidation from holding office in unions. This made the Communist-dominated Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions illegal and restricted the role Communist agents could play in individual unions. At the same time, the Malayan government with the encouragement of the British Labour government was trying to foster non-Communist trade unions.

C. Phase III: June 1948 -- July 31, 1960

As the government acted against Communists in the labor unions, terror and violence began to increase sharply. On June 16, 1948, the British High Commissioner declared that an Emergency existed in certain districts in the states of Perak and Johore; then the Emergency was extended to the rest of the Federation on June 18.

1. Organization for Conflict.

a. The Government

The legal governmental structure of Malaya during most of the Emergency was the Federation of Malaya, which existed from February 1, 1948, to August 31, 1957.

Federation forces in June 1948 amounted to eleven infantry battalions (three British, six Gurkha, and two Malay), a British

¹Purcell, op. cit., p. 329.

²McLane, op. cit., pp. 387-388.

artillery regiment, and a police force of 10,000.¹ The army units were all below strength. There were also British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy units based at Singapore.

During the Emergency, action against the insurgents was directed by a pyramidal structure of committees. On the Federation level was the War Council, consisting of the Chief Secretary of the Federation, the Commissioner of Police, and the army and air force commanders, presided over by the Director of Operations as the executive agent of the High Commissioner. On the state level, State War Executive Committees (SWECS) were set up. The chairman of each was the state Prime Minister or his executive secretary, and the state's chief police officer and the local army brigade commander were the other full members. However, other officials, such as the head of the police Special Branch, the state's information officer, and the head of the state's home guard were often present. Each principal administrative section of a state, a district, had a District War Executive Committee (DWECS), composed analogously of the district officer, the district's police commander, and the local battalion commander, with supplementary officials attending. Later, unofficial members were added to the SWECS and DWECS--including leaders of the major local industries and the major racial and religious groups, chosen by the committee chairmen. This expanded membership helped the committees to minimize bad public reaction to the restrictions imposed.²

b. The MCP

The MCP was hierarchically organized, with a Central Committee of about a dozen members--including a Politburo of three--and state committees, district committees, branch committees, and cells on successive lower layers. Senior members or secretaries of lower

¹Ibid., pp. 357-360; Pye, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

²Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War (New York, Praeger, 1966), pp. 59-60.

committees served as members of the next higher committees. Regimental commanders of the Malayan People's Anti-British Army, retitled the Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA) at the end of 1949, were usually state committee members.

The MCP controlled the MRLA and the Min Yuen, a civilian organization that carried on such auxiliary duties as furnishing the MRLA with supplies and intelligence and functioning as a courier network. Membership of the Min Yuen is difficult to estimate, since many Chinese were intimidated or coerced into donating money or supplies to the terrorists. The formal members of the Min Yuen, defined as those who operated under fairly strict Communist control, reached about 11,000 in 1952; but if active sympathizers--for example, donors of money--are included, the Min Yuen can be said to have numbered about 500,000.¹

Many of the rank and file of the MRLA and the Min Yuen were not full party members (the MCP never had more than 3,000 members); but command positions were held by Communists. Members of the MRLA and those members of the Min Yuen living in jungle camps received political indoctrination.

The MCP, the MRLA, and the Min Yuen were almost exclusively Chinese organizations. The Malay community, as indicated earlier, was not attracted to Communism. And the Indian immigrant laborers, under numerous legal safeguards due to the Indian government's interest in their welfare, had a far more favorable attitude toward the government as a source of security and welfare than did the Chinese, who traditionally tended to avoid contact with government. Also, the lack of early interest in Communism among the Malays and Indians meant that the MCP was considered a Chinese party and that therefore few non-Chinese were interested in joining.

¹Harry Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya (New York, Praeger, 1954), p. 104.

However, the MCP apparently did control or influence the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), founded in November 1945. The MNP advocated an independent Malaya with the support of the new Republic of Indonesia; and some elements of the party moved to advocating a Malayan-Indonesian union, which had special appeal to those Malays conscious of ethnic ties with Indonesia. Some members of the MNP joined the MRLA,¹ and there was later a Malay "regiment" operating as part of the MRLA in a strongly Malay area in eastern Malaya.² One source suggests that those Malays involved in the insurgency were principally of Indonesian descent;³ it is not known from available information whether this is also true of the make-up of the MNP. One source, in a history of Indonesian Communism, states that the MCP had been infiltrated by Indonesian intelligence.⁴ This same source and one other mention reports that the MCP had a base of operations in Sumatra during part of the Emergency.⁵ It therefore appears that there may have been relations of significance with the Indonesian Communist party, though solid evidence is mostly lacking.

There is also not much information about the relations of the MCP with other Communist parties, except through the previously-mentioned Communist-front Southeast Asia Youth Conference in Calcutta in February 1948.⁶ The MCP's strategy at the opening of hostilities in 1948 was modelled explicitly on the Communist campaigns in China, and several sources indicate that the MCP had close operational connections with the Chinese Communists, though this is disputed.⁷

¹Pye, op. cit., p. 91.

²Miller, op. cit., p. 104.

³Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 51.

⁴Arnold Brackman, Indonesian Communism, (New York, Praeger, 1963), p. 76.

⁵Pye, op. cit., p. 91; Brackman, op. cit., p. 76.

⁶McLane, op. cit., pp. 400-401; Pye, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

⁷McLane, op. cit., pp. 400-401; Pye, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

One source states that trained cadres were brought from China to serve in the guerrilla command¹ and mentions an unauthenticated report that the revolt was directed by a department of the Chinese Communist Party.² Nevertheless, the relationship of the two parties must be considered uncertain.

2. Military Strength of the Insurgents. There have been rather widely differing estimates of the armed strength of the Communist insurgents. Figures for the maximum armed strength of the MRLA during the Emergency include "never more than 12,000," 5,000 to 11,000, 3,000 to 5,000, "approximately 5,000," and 8,000.³ The most authoritative estimate appears to be the highest of these-- i.e., "never more than 12,000." This was the number of armed and equipped insurgents at the outset in 1948; thereafter their numbers steadily declined, reaching about 2,000 in 1957 and only a few hundred by 1960.

The MRLA had arms from several sources. It possessed British equipment that had been abandoned in 1942 at the time of the Japanese capture of Malaya, Japanese arms acquired during and immediately after the war by the MCP-controlled guerrilla force (MPAJA), and more British arms that had been supplied to the MPAJA during 1944 and 1945 for use against the Japanese. While the British had demanded and obtained the return after the war of all equipment that had been acknowledged by the MPAJA as received, there were a substantial number of air-dropped weapons that the MPAJA claimed had been lost in the jungle. Thus, the number of weapons acquired and retained secretly after World War II was in the thousands.⁴

¹Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 67, 77.

²Ibid., p. 80.

³Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New York, Praeger, 1963), p. 174; Purcell, op. cit., p. 341; Clutterbuck, op. cit., p. 43.

⁴Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 51; Miller, op. cit., p. 173.

There was little supplying of arms from outside Malaya to the MRLA after hostilities began, but some arms were captured in raids. The MRLA was organized at the peak of its strength into twelve independent forces or "regiments" of several hundred men each.¹

3. The Insurgency. The insurgents intended a protracted war, emphasizing a steady growth of Communist armed strength coupled with the crippling of the Malayan economy. As this would progress, the insurgent forces were to be transformed from guerrilla units to regular combat troops.²

In the first months of the revolt, the insurgents concentrated their raids on estates and mines. The government responded by giving special powers to the police, issuing arms to planters and miners, and forming a special constabulary to protect outlying rubber estates and tin mines. The British army units in Malaya were assigned to aid the police, and more troops, including a brigade of the Guards, were brought in.

At the end of 1948, the Communist insurgents drew up a policy paper outlining their strategy. It envisaged three phases. First, the Malayan economic system was to be crippled through harassment and raids on estates, mines, police stations, etc. Next, the government was to be made ineffective in outlying areas and forced back to holding only strategic points and communication lines. Finally, the regions controlled by the insurgents were to be established as liberated areas which would be expanded to control all Malaya.³

In fact, however, the Communists were unable to move the revolt beyond its first stage. The gradual increase of terrorism in the spring of 1948 had dissipated the advantage of a surprise

¹Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 68; Brackman, op. cit., p. 76.

²Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 64.

³Ibid., p. 63.

revolt, and the government was able to react relatively quickly to large-scale insurgency when it came.

The guerrillas were never able to mount significant attacks on any sizeable military or police units. No guerrilla forces were strong enough to tie down the Malayan-British forces to the extent that other guerrilla units could operate elsewhere freely. Considered as military opponents of the Malayan-British army and police units (together known as the security forces), the MRLA was always ineffective, able neither to cause the dispersal of enemy forces to a level where given units might be defeated nor seriously to disrupt military supply lines.

The MRLA lacked radio equipment and depended on couriers and prearranged meetings. These ineffective communications combined with the hierarchical structure of the MCP to ensure that coordination of MRLA activities was indirect and ineffective. The formal structure of the MRLA and the Min Yuen was essentially inoperative: their units operated under the orders of the parallel MCP units, and up to one year's time was required for Politburo decisions to reach MCP cells and MRLA sections. The MCP, partly because of its communications problems, drew up its operational plans mostly in terms of assigned quotas of given categories of operations to be performed, with the Politburo assigning quotas to each state committee, each state committee to its district committees, and so on. This system failed to provide for unified action on the part of adjacent MRLA units and for any systematic strategic patterning of military action. Instead, guerrilla attacks became random terrorism, with little military effect.

The independent forces of the MRLA could rarely operate as a unit, especially after the first two years of hostilities. By 1952, even platoons were breaking apart into smaller operating sections.¹ This reduction in the size of the guerrilla units was

¹Pye, op. cit., p. 91; Brackman, op. cit., p. 76; Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 80.

dictated by the operations of the British-Malayan security forces and by the government's success in interfering with the logistic operations of the Min Yuen. The successively smaller sizes of the functional guerrilla units in turn greatly complicated the problems of communication and control.

The relative isolation of Malaya from the rest of the Asian mainland meant a minimum amount of external support for the guerrillas. They repeatedly did use areas of southern Thailand as a refuge, in spite of an agreement between the British and the Thais permitting police of the Federation of Malaya to cross the frontier in pursuit of terrorists and to go three miles into Thai territory, if accompanied by a Thai police officer. By the end of the Emergency in 1960, the remaining armed terrorists, estimated to number about 600, had taken refuge in Thailand. But there was little supplying of men or arms to the Communist terrorists from outside Malaya while hostilities were underway (though some trained cadres may have come across the Thai border or by sea from Hainan Island).

The primary problem for the insurgents was that of logistics, and it was in this area that the government took drastic and generally successful action. The MRLA units had been formed in and operated from the jungle areas that make up four-fifths of Malaya. Therefore, for its supplies the MRLA depended on the Min Yuen organization. Food, clothing, medical supplies, and other necessities had to be gathered in the populated areas of the country and transported into the jungle. Arms and ammunition came from the hidden stores of the MPAJA, or from raids on police stations. But the rest was obtained--principally by the use of coercion--from civilians, mostly Chinese. The clumsiness of this system was at once a constant restriction on the MRLA's mobility and size and an available weak point for government action.

Most of the supplies were gathered not in the cities but in squatter villages at the edge of the jungle. The Chinese in these

villages, isolated and without permanent title to the land they farmed, were unprotected from Communist threats and apathetic in any case toward the government. In the early stages of the Emergency, the authorities tried to handle the squatter problem by interning and deporting whole villages. But it was soon apparent that this technique, apart from the question of its humanity, was impractical as a way of dealing with a problem of this size. The eventual policy adopted was the Briggs Plan.

The Briggs Plan provided for the regrouping of squatter hamlets in a single defensible village in an area, or for moving the squatters to newly-built villages. Half a million squatters were resettled from 1951 to 1953, protected from intimidation, brought under effective government administration, and cut off from contact with the Communist terrorists. By far the most important military consequence of the Briggs Plan was the tight control thereafter exercised over the food received and consumed by the squatters. By 1953 this control had grown so effective that, as "food denial" to the rebels, it became the government's main counterinsurgent operation.

While there was sometimes insufficient attention given to the economic and social acceptability of the settlements to the ex-squatters, on the whole the program was a long-range political success as well as a short-range military one. Not only were the Communist insurgents cut off from their supply base and from the only substantial population group over which they might establish regular control, but the Chinese squatters were brought closer into Malayan society, reducing their susceptibility to Communist political persuasion and military recruiting.

Also effective, though not so dramatic as the squatter resettlement program, were the tightened government controls over about 650,000 workers of the tin mines and rubber estates. Some of them, especially those who worked in isolated enterprises that were near rebel areas and not closely supervised by the employers,

were formally resettled into enclosed areas after the fashion of the squatter program. Most, however, were allowed to stay where they were but compelled to submit to government controls over their movements and, above all, their food.

The military inadequacy of the MRLA meant that it could not hope to destroy or greatly weaken the military strength of the Malayan government. As this became clear, the struggle began in 1949 to shift from guerrilla warfare proper to terrorism. It was, however, a change in emphasis only: terrorism had been an important part of MCP tactics from the opening of hostilities.

The almost exclusive emphasis on terrorist tactics on the part of the MRLA meant that it was now concerned primarily with the political behavior and attitudes of the civilian population. The objective of Communist terrorism was in some cases to coerce the provision of supplies or other assistance for the insurgents; more generally, however, the MCP wished to prevent the development of civilian, especially Chinese, participation in Malayan political activities.¹ The government still retained a substantial military component in its objectives: it was attempting to destroy the MCP as an organization. Nevertheless, it also greatly increased the attention it paid to the civilian population. In the beginning, the government attempted to get public cooperation in matters directly related to the insurgency. Later, the government began to press for a more general development of public involvement of the Chinese community in Malayan society and politics. The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was founded in late 1948 with government encouragement. It was supported at first mostly by the wealthy Chinese business class but gained increasingly greater influence with the poorer Chinese in the following years. Encouragement of increased involvement of the Chinese community in Malayan society was typical of the government's information and psychological warfare

¹Pye, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

programs, in that it focused on the desirable features of a post-hostilities independent Malaya. The government programs sought, with marked success, to divide the Communists and the other anti-colonialists and to convince the latter that the government was not fighting merely to enforce the status quo ante bellum.

Communist terrorism, combined with the traditionally isolated stance of the Chinese community, made the growth of political commitment to the Malayan government slow. But because terrorism was proving ineffective in enforcing the neutrality of the Malayan Chinese and was tending instead to push the Chinese into cooperation with the government, in October 1951 a halt was ordered to terrorist attacks against civilians.¹ At the same time, orders went out that more attention be given to political work in the cities in a positive effort to prevent Chinese entry into Malayan society and participation in the government's activities.

These orders did not filter down to the operational level for nearly a year, and as soon as they had done so, MCP policy was again reversed. In October 1952 an increase in terrorism was ordered to support infiltration and subversion. But by this time, the security forces had severely weakened the MRLA and its capacity for a new wave of terrorist attacks.

At the same time, a more vigorous political life was developing in Malaya. Beginning in 1952, elections to town councils were held. Also in 1952, in campaigning for seats in the municipal council of Kuala Lumpur, UMNO (Malay) and MCA (Chinese) formed an Alliance, which was decisively victorious. The Alliance was a coalition of communal parties with an agreed-upon limited program. Most Malays and Chinese were not prepared to move to the point of

¹This year-long moratorium might have been treated as a moderation in the hostilities. However, too little information is available to analyze it in that fashion, particularly to deal with the intensification represented by the resumption of terrorism in 1952.

a non-communal unified party, but the limited relationship of the Alliance proved acceptable and was extended to all local council elections.

In 1954 the British government, with the Malay rulers, announced that the Federal Legislative Council would have 52 elected members out of a total of 98, with the elections to be first held in 1955. This roughly followed Alliance proposals, against conservative Malay and Chinese opposition. In both the federal elections and in elections to state councils, the Alliance was successful; at the federal level, the Alliance won 51 out of the 52 elected seats, forming a government with Tunku Abdul Rahman, head of UMNO, as Chief Minister. In January 1956, negotiations between Abdul Rahman and the British government produced agreement for complete independence for Malaya in August 1957.

Since the early months of hostilities, the conflict had been, from the point of view of the Malayan government, a war of attrition combined with a program for the political isolation of the MCP from the Chinese community and Malayan nationalists. The resettlement campaign, food control, psychological warfare, intensive use of surrendered enemy personnel, and intelligence work (that collected a file on almost every individual terrorist) were combined with imaginative use of military and police forces. While the police were responsible for local security and the police Special Branch handled much of the intelligence work, the army was used for offensive operations. At the peak of hostilities in 1951-1952, there was a commitment of about 20,000 regular combat troops, 6,500 service troops, about 25,000 police regulars and 140,000 auxiliary police, and air, artillery, and naval units. A variety of unconventional military methods were utilized, including the use of helicopters to transport troops into the jungle and "deep penetration" units that stayed in the jungle for weeks, supplied by air.

It was found that best results were obtained by concentrating military action, intelligence, food control, psychological warfare,

etc., in unison in given areas in order to wear down and eventually eliminate the terrorist band operating in that region. Once permanently cleared, the area could be declared "white" and many of the control regulations lifted, improving morale in the area and giving additional incentive for civilian cooperation in other areas.

In 1955, after the Alliance government had taken power, events moved toward Malayan-MCP negotiations on the terms to end the struggle. In September 1955 an offer of amnesty was made, promising that individual insurgents could surrender and be free of prosecution for acts predating the offer. This offer was ineffective, and the government attempted to make it more compelling by combining it with an announcement of larger-scale military operations. After a news leak that December 25 would be set as the deadline for the amnesty offer, Chen Peng agreed to negotiate.

The negotiations took place at the end of December 1955. As the price for an end to the fighting, Chen Peng demanded legal recognition of the MCP, immediate freedom for all Communists upon surrender, and freedom to form new political organizations. But Tunku Abdul Rahman refused to recognize the MCP after its history of terrorism, and the negotiations broke down. Chen Peng said his forces would surrender only when Malaya became independent.

After independence was in fact gained in 1957, the Malayan government again invited the MCP to cease fighting and again made an amnesty offer. The MCP claimed that the British-Malayan defense treaty meant that Malaya was not in fact independent and refused to surrender. The offer of amnesty, however, did have some success.

By 1954 the number of incidents had been cut to 20 per cent of the 1951 peak.¹ By 1957 most of the country was "white." By 1959 all but two hard-core areas had been cleared of terrorists; and

¹Clutterbuck, op. cit., p. 187.

on July 31, 1960, the Emergency was officially declared at an end. The MRLA had shrunk to about 600 men, astride or over the Thai-Malayan border. The MCP in Malaya--though not in Singapore--was contained and fairly ineffective. The Emergency ended with the conflict still in Phase III, but with hostilities at such a low level as to be neither militarily nor politically significant.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option
 - a. Malaya, with its economic wealth in rubber and tin and its strategic location, was a valued prize in the developing Cold War. Its military value was evidenced by the British bases at Singapore.
 - b. The population was racially mixed but poorly integrated, with the Chinese dominating the country's economic life and the Malays the governmental bureaucracy. A particularly disfavored group were the Chinese squatters who were forbidden to own the land they farmed.
 - c. A large part of the Chinese population was made up of first- and second-generation immigrants whose allegiance was to China. The political turmoil of China was transferred to the Chinese in Malaya, including the growth of a strong Communist movement.
 - d. During the Japanese wartime occupation, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) mounted the largest resistance movement. Larger strategic considerations of World War II led the British to furnish this group with money, arms, and other supplies.

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. International measures to ensure access to vital raw materials; development of long-range air-lift and sea-based alternatives to land military bases.
 - b. Development of a more fully integrated, just society with racial tolerance and equality; or deportation of minority groups; or physical separation within Malaya and perhaps eventual partition.
 - c. Development of a Malayan allegiance, which would have required the social justice mentioned in (1b) above; or deportation, immigration restrictions, physical separation, and partition.
 - d. Avoidance of great-power conflict; measures by great-power suppliers to exert some control over the disposition of arms furnished to resistance groups.

- e. At the time of the Japanese surrender, Malaya had not yet been reoccupied by Allied forces. In the interim between the Japanese surrender and the British return, the MCP-led guerrillas were the only effective force in large parts of Malaya. They utilized the period to punish their enemies and to acquire large stocks of Japanese arms and ammunition.
- f. After the reoccupation, the resistance group turned in large numbers of weapons but secreted weapons and ammunition stocks and prevented identification to the British of many veteran guerrillas.
- g. An abrupt shift in Communist tactics occurred and directives went out to local parties to abandon their popular-front approach and seize revolutionary initiative.
2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military
- a. Racial divisions within Malaya's society tended to restrict membership in the MCP to Chinese. This fact, in turn, reduced the appeal of the MCP for the Malays and other non-Chinese.
- b. The MCP's main vehicle of action was the labor movement which was unsuccessful during pre-World War II years in gaining material benefits for its members, and
- e. Quicker and more effective measures to prevent dispersion of weapons left over from great-power conflict; avoidance of great-power conflict.
- f. Measures listed in (1d) and (1e) above to prevent dispersion of weapons; more efficient disarmament of potentially hostile civilians.
- g. Encouraging the Communists to keep their competition for power on the political-economic rather than military level.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Encouraging Malay-Chinese disunity. [Note, however, (1b) above. In a tactical sense, encouraging disunity limited the appeal of Communism; in a longer-range strategic sense, it created a dissatisfied group to which radical ideologies appealed.]
- b. Reducing the effectiveness of local Communists by suppression and by reforms aimed at

during post-World War II years was undercut by labor reforms.

c. While many Malay leaders cooperated with Japanese occupation forces during the war, the period did not produce a strong nationalist liberation movement (as it had in Indonesia), in part because the main role of the Malay collaborators was to help the Japanese control the Chinese community.

d. The largely Chinese MCP-led anti-Japanese resistance movement devoted a large part of its efforts to trying to intimidate the rest of the Chinese community to support the MCP. Its tactics alienated the middle-class urban Chinese.

e. The British moved, after the war, toward a greater degree of self-government for Malaya in which the privileged position of the Malays was preserved.

f. The unity of the MCP leadership was badly shaken by a leadership crisis which, while later defined in terms of ideological zeal, appears to have involved a problem of personal integrity.

g. The tactics adopted by the MCP in the immediate postwar period envisioned political action and a "popular front" approach, but not large-scale violence.

grievances they can exploit.

c. Encouraging and building up the Malay-Chinese split. [See, however, (2a) above.]

d. Encouraging ideological splits within the Chinese community; providing protection for non-Communist Chinese against intimidation.

e. More rapid progress toward self-government, with assistance in developing internal security capabilities.

f. Encourage and exploit divisions within dissident groups. [See, however, caveat in (2a) above.]

g. Encouraging the Communists to pursue their goals by political-economic rather than violent means.

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[The MCP adopted the new Communist line calling for an end to the "popular front" and the beginning of armed struggle, and began to prepare for hostilities.]

1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. The MCP accepted the directives of the international Communist movement, which at the time was unified under Soviet leadership, and prepared to wage the war it decreed.
- b. The recent wartime resistance provided the structure, experience, and materiel means to open hostilities.
- c. The successful efforts of the Chinese Communists in China provided a model and a theory for similar efforts elsewhere.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. The British-Malayan government deported to China the Chinese suspected of being Communists.

B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Encouraging local Communist parties to be more nationalistic; encouraging disunity in the international Communist movement.
- b. Measures mentioned above to avoid great-power conflict and minimize degree to which it provides potential for local conflict [see (1d), (1e), and (1f) of Section A above].
- c. Ideally, avoiding conflicts that stimulate imitators; or at least preventing such conflicts from succeeding.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. More radical measures against Malaya's Chinese community: mass arrests, mass deportations, etc. [Note, however, that this might have increased support for the MCP among the Chinese.]

- b. The British-Malayan government took steps to break up the Communist-controlled labor federation and to encourage non-Communist unions.

C. PHASE III TO PHASE IV: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[Incidents of violence were few in number at the time the British-Malayan government declared a state of emergency. Initial strong police measures and a show of massive British strength failed to intimidate the MCP guerrillas. The hostilities were prolonged twelve years but never at a high level of intensity. This analysis is not concerned with the details of the counter-insurgency tactics and strategy of the British-Malayan government, in either its military or political aspects. Attention here will focus on the control objectives of terminating hostilities quickly and keeping them moderate. In this case, perhaps more than in any other in this study, the possible incompatibility between goals is clear.]

1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

- a. As a military force, the guerrillas never succeeded in moving beyond terrorism and isolated guerrilla "pockets." The hierarchical organization of the MCP-dominated movement inhibited local initiative, while lack of an adequate communication system made coordination virtually impossible.

- b. Repression of local dissidents.

C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Either strengthening the guerrillas to the point at which they could achieve a military victory; or strong British-Malayan counteraction to crush and eliminate the guerrillas.

- b. Measures suggested above to encourage nationalism among Communist parties and disunity in the Communist movement [see (1a) of Section B above].
- c. An overwhelming British military response that disregarded the future political implications of draconic measures against the Chinese, Communist and non-Communist. [Note, however, that there is no assurance such measures would have ended the hostilities more quickly, although they surely would have intensified hostilities.]

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Strengthening the guerrillas or draconic British reaction [see (1a) and (1c) of Section C above, especially, however, caveat in (1c)].
- b. Third-party, perhaps U.N., border control.

- b. Ideologically, the MCP was committed to prolonging the fight as long as the international Communist line dictated or until the insurgency was totally destroyed.

- c. While the British-Malayan government initially reacted vigorously on a political and military level, and while their forces continued to engage the guerrillas where they found them and attempted to create and expand cleared areas free of guerrilla threat, the main thrust of British policy was to isolate the guerrillas from their sources of manpower, money, and food and other supply by resettlement of Chinese squatters, political wooing of the non-Communist Chinese, and satisfaction of Malayan aspirations for independence.

2. Factors Tending to Terminate Hostilities

- a. Two factors mentioned above as tending to continue hostilities tended also to favor their eventual, if not early, termination: MCP weakness and British political and military strategy.
- b. The geographic isolation of Malaya from sources of potential sanctuary and support for the guerrillas and the cooperation of Thailand with the British-Malayan authorities in destroying limited bases there compelled the Malayan Communists to conduct hostilities at the relatively low level that they were capable of supporting by themselves.

3. Factors Tending to Moderate Hostilities

- a. All the factors listed above that tended toward the eventual but distant termination of hostilities were the same factors that kept hostilities at a moderate level.

D. PHASE IV

[This analysis is not concerned with Phase IV of this conflict. No clear-cut "victory" or "surrender" or "cease-fire" occurred.]

3. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Keeping guerrilla forces weak; tolerating a degree of violence while gradually destroying the foundations of its support; a strategy of slow attrition rather than quick termination.

III. WEAPONS ANALYSIS

[This case is not among those selected for weapons analysis.]

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL

"Controlling" the Conflict

To avoid violence meant removing or disarming potential Chinese dissidents, keeping them from moving into guerrilla warfare, and either permitting their quick victory or--obviously preferably--suppressing them with a minimum of violence or danger of the conflict spreading.

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. The root cause of much postwar conflict was the Western colonial relationship with Asian countries. The trigger for many instances of conflict was World War II itself. And the explosive mixture was completed when the Cold War that followed converted many of the countries into bitterly contested prizes. If the Malay Peninsula had not mattered so much, perhaps the Malays and Chinese could have worked out their own salvation. Rich strategic areas in Asia and the Middle East can perhaps be made to matter less by assuring access to raw materials, preferably through international agreements, by developing synthetic alternatives in fuel and materials, and by developing strategic alternatives such as floating bases and long-range air-lifts.

2. Where ethnic and/or minority tensions generate conflict, there may be some short-term conflict-control value in encouraging internal division in order either to rule or to split potential dissidents. But this policy has no real future, particularly where (as in this case) a prospective superpower (China) exerts an influential external magnetism. The prescription here (as in Cyprus and Ethiopia-Somalia) was either to develop a common allegiance for the whole population-- or at least a significant part of the Chinese residents; physically to separate the inassimilable dissidents by self-determined partition; or to remove them by deportation while restricting new immigration. International auspices and aid would of course make such measures more humane.

3. A third key ingredient in this case as in Indonesia (not to mention China in 1946-1949, the Huk campaign in the Philippines, and the Burmese Civil War) was the ready availability of the means to fight. Military debris was left behind all over the Pacific area at the end of World War II. The dispersion of war surplus arms should be controlled, and potentially hostile domestic groups should be promptly disarmed.

4. How to cope preventively with low-level warfare in the regions outside Europe remains the most serious missing ingredient in Western policy. The Vietnam experience should increase U.S. military tactical skill. If all goes well, some enduring lessons about rural pacification will be mastered. But it is the Maoist Stage I of insurgency (and, a fortiori, Mao's Stage Zero) where the United States still fumbles. In Malaya (as well as the Philippines, Colombia, and even contemporary Guatemala), when insurgency was limited essentially to terrorist tactics, successful counter-tactics were found possible. But in what this study has called Phase I, preventive remedies take the shape of reforms aimed at constructing a reconciled, durable, and secure political, economic, and social fabric (reforms that Britain eventually had to make during Phase III in Malaya). If significant developmental progress takes place, the likelihood of ever having to go the distance to our Phase III (or Mao's Stage II) is low (e.g., Venezuela, Tunisia, Kuwait, southern Italy, et al.). If, despite reforms, an inchoate dispute (i.e., residual alienation and discontent, accelerated by Communist take-over planning) still becomes predominantly military (i.e., our Phase II and Phase III) the "sea" in which the Communist "fish" find shelter should at least have begun to evaporate.

5. A real lesson was learned by the United States in the Philippines and by the British in Malaya (though unfortunately not by the French in Indochina). It was that promoting rapid progress toward self-determination and independence can help to deprive insurgency

movements of the one element guaranteed to predispose in their favor the vitally important but politically apathetic majority. Portugal--and perhaps the Soviet Union and China--may one day learn this the hard way.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

6. More of the same measures were in order to achieve this objective. In particular, it was important to isolate and, if necessary, expel the Chinese Communists, while controlling other internal dissidents.

7. To the extent that the insurgency was the product of decisions by a monolithic international Communist conspiracy, one should obviously have made efforts to encourage disunity and diversity. (Remember, however, what Ho Chi Minh was able to accomplish by playing the two Communist giants off against each other.)

Terminating Hostilities

8. The Malayan Emergency vividly illustrates one of the central dilemmas of conflict-control doctrine. To moderate those hostilities meant to prolong them for twelve years. But in the circumstances the cost of a quick victory (if indeed such could have been achieved by intensified hostilities) was either a Communist success or a British success at the possible cost of decimating or alienating the population. In the calculus of violence-minimizing--our fundamental criterion of conflict here--it would seem that in cases such as Malaya a protracted low-level conflict is preferable to an all-out attempt at quick victory. The indicated strategy was in fact followed by the British-Malayan government: attrition, and the toleration of a degree of violence while destroying the foundations for its support, especially by denying regular supplies of food to the insurgents. (According to our policy hypothesis, quick termination is still to be preferred even at high

political cost if a genuine danger exists of intensification to direct super-power involvement.)

9. A crucial determinant of policy is the likelihood of intensification to undesirable scope and levels. Korea and Vietnam both abutted Communist China; the Philippines and Malaya did not. Where isolation from external support cannot easily be achieved unilaterally, U.N. or other third-party border controls may be helpful.

10. In sum, relevant conflict-control measures were:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Avoidance of great-power war

Avoidance of colonialism

Self-determination leading to self-rule*

Lessening of area's strategic and economic importance

International assurances of access to raw materials

Development of synthetic fuels and materials

Floating bases and long-range air-lift

Development of common allegiance of people, including minorities

Reforms aimed at a reconciled, durable, secure political, economic, and social fabric

or

Partition

Internationally-assisted deportation and restrictions on immigration

Control of disposition of surplus arms

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Isolation and if necessary expulsion of Communists*

and

Control of internal dissidence*

Encouragement of disunity and diversity in Communism

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Strategy of attrition, tolerating a degree of violence*
while

Destruction of the foundations of support of the in-
surgency, through denial of food supplies, etc.*

Isolation from external support

U.N. or other third-party border controls

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

THE INDONESIAN - MALAYSIAN CONFRONTATION :
1963 - 1965

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases	157
A.	Background of the Conflict.	157
B.	Phase II: January 1963 -- April 12, 1963	167
C.	Phase III: April 12, 1963 -- October 1, 1965	169
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions	177
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option	177
B.	Phase II to Phase III: The Outbreak of Hostilities	180
C.	Phase III to Phase IV: The Termination of Hostilities.	181
III.	Weapons Analysis	188
A.	The Course of Military Operations	188
B.	Indonesian Weapons Employed in the Conflict	191
C.	Malaysian and Commonwealth Weapons Acquisitions	195
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control	200

THE INDONESIAN - MALAYSIAN CONFRONTATION :
1963 - 1965

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES


A. Background of the Conflict

1. Geographic and Physical Factors. Prior to the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the island of Borneo was divided into the Indonesian province of Kalimantan, the British colonies of Sarawak and Sabah, and Brunei, a British protectorate. The two colonies were to become the chief focus of Indonesian pressure. They are separated from the Malay Peninsula and the island of Singapore by some 500 miles of open water.

The border areas on Borneo are heavily forested, enabling infiltrating troops to operate with relative freedom. The 1964-1965 Indonesian landings on the Malay Peninsula, however, took place along a well-populated coast.

2. Economic and Strategic Factors. There appears to have been no rational economic basis for the Indonesian decision to confront Malaysia in 1963: 27 per cent of Indonesian exports went to Malaysia, whereas the Indonesian trade represented only 15 per cent of Malaysia's exports.

Strategically, it was Indonesia's concern to share land borders with non-hostile neighbors. While the new Federation of Malaysia would pose no discernible threat, the fact that a major British base would remain in Malaysia indicated to Indonesian President Sukarno and his



Adapted from Willard A. Hanna, Sequel to Colonialism (New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1965), with permission of the publisher.

anticolonialist supporters that the British were in fact still the dominant power in the area.

With the gradual decline of British power in the Pacific and Southeast Asia after World War II and the emergence of new Asian states, many of them potentially anti-Western, Australia and New Zealand increasingly came to perceive their interests in terms of specifically Asian rather than European security. In the context of this particular conflict, Australia was well aware of the land border that it was about to acquire on New Guinea when West Irian would come under Indonesian control in May 1963; and it was concerned to restrain Indonesian militance from either attack or subversion wherever either one might be likely.

For Britain, the Federation of Malaya and subsequently of Malaysia represented an unusually successful and gratifying transformation from colony to cordial ally. Additionally, the shared experience of the Malayan Emergency (see below) was too recent for any British government even to consider not assisting Malaysia if it came under attack. Britain was also under U.S. pressure to maintain a presence in Southeast Asia at least until the situations in Laos and Vietnam could be stabilized.

3. The Malayan Emergency. From 1948 to 1960, Malaya had been engaged in suppressing a guerrilla-type revolt instigated by the predominantly-Chinese Malayan Communist Party. At their peak, the insurgents deployed up to 12,000 armed men, serviced by another 11,000 or so under fairly strict Communist control, and assisted in varying degrees by at most 500,000 sympathizers.¹

By 1963, therefore, the Federation of Malaya was extremely sensitive to racial divisiveness among the population and to efforts at subversion. It was also vastly experienced at handling them.

4. The Issue of a Federation of Malaysia. During an informal speech on May 27, 1961, the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman,

¹See the preceding study of the Malayan Emergency, Section I.

suggested that thought be given to the formation of a federation embracing Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei. At the time, Malaya was a federation of nine states, headed by native rulers, and two settlements (former Crown Colonies). Its politics were dominated by relations between Malays and Chinese, but the ruling coalition since independence in 1957 had been the Alliance, made up of the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the relatively conservative Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and a small Indian party. Other parties included the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, the left-wing Labor Party, and Party Rakyat, the latter two being members of the Socialist Front. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) operated underground.

Singapore, a self-governing British colony with British control over defense and foreign affairs, was dominated by the moderate-left People's Action Party (PAP). To the radical left was the Barisan Sosialis, presumed to have connections with the underground MCP. With a heavily Chinese population, politics in Singapore centered around the incipient radicalism of the Chinese workers.

Sarawak had been a British protectorate, ruled by the so-called White Rajahs, the Brooke family. After World War II, it was ceded to Britain as a Crown Colony. Of the three principal racial groups (Chinese, Land and Sea Dyaks, and Malays), the Chinese in Sarawak, as elsewhere, dominated the economy, but were barred from substantial land holdings. Parties included PANAS and BARJASA, Malay parties; SNAP and PAPAS, Sea Dyak parties; SCA, an anti-Communist Chinese party; the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), a left-wing, predominantly Chinese party with apparent Communist infiltration; and the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO), the underground Communist party.

Sabah, also known as the Crown Colony of North Borneo, had technically been ruled by a chartered company until 1946, when it formally became a British colony; but in fact the British had always done the governing. The British North Borneo Company had bought the area at several removes from the Sultans of Brunei and of Sulu, both of whom

had claims to the territory. The claim of the latter was the basis of the later Philippine claim to the area. The principal indigenous racial groups in Sabah were the Kadazans, the Bajaus, the Malays, and the Muruts; the Chinese were the largest single group, but had assimilated on a wide scale. (No Chinese in Sabah defected during the confrontation with Indonesia, in contrast to the Chinese in Sarawak.) The principal party in a country not strongly interested in politics was the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO). The United Sabah National Organization (USNO) represented the Moslem Bajaus and Malays. The Chinese had the Sabah National Party (SANAP).

The Sultanate of Brunei was a British protectorate. The Sultanate had once encompassed all of northern Borneo, but it had shrunk to an enclave of 84,000 living on its substantial oil fields. Its first political party was A. M. Azahari's Party Ra'ayat, which appealed successfully to nationalist memories of Brunei's past power.

While Rahman's first formulation of the concept of Malaysia was informal, it soon became clear that the broader federation represented a solid proposal for dealing with the problem of Malaya-Singapore relations. In such a federation, the overwhelmingly Chinese population of Singapore, which had led Malaya to reject previous bids by Singapore for merger, would be balanced by the Malay and other peoples of the Borneo territories.

Singapore's governing PAP was a ready supporter of the plan for federation, seeing it as the best alternative to a direct merger with Malaya. The British considered the proposal as not only pointing the way to the creation of a multiracial state of considerable importance but providing a satisfactory future for the two colonies and one protectorate of British Borneo. In fact, the British seem to have been desirous of a Malaysia solution even before Rahman's proposal.¹

Important opposition to the plan, however, came from left-wing parties in Singapore, notably the Barisan Sosialis and the underground

¹Arnold Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front (New York, Praeger, 1966), p. 168.

MCP, and from the SUPP in Sarawak. Another source of opposition was the Party Ra'ayat of Brunei. There was, in fact, widespread misgiving in the Borneo territories about the plan, based on the judgment that these territories, being politically much more primitive than Malaya or Singapore, would find themselves controlled by them, and dominated internally by their relatively advanced Chinese minorities.¹

However, promises of political safeguards and of federal funds for economic development overcame the reluctance of Sarawak and Sabah, so that a British-Malay commission of inquiry, the Cobbold Commission, found in its June 1962 report that two-thirds of the populations of Sarawak and Sabah would favor Malaysia with constitutional safeguards for the Borneo territories. The Sultan of Brunei accepted the idea of the federation only grudgingly and under British pressure, being reluctant to lose any of his extensive oil revenues to a federal government. Sarawak's SUPP and Brunei's Party Ra'ayat remained firmly in opposition.

5. Indonesian Politics.

a. External

In the years since independence, Indonesia had tried to remain on good terms with both Communist camps and with the West, at least to the extent that some support would be forthcoming from all of them, as indeed it was. The Soviet Union supplied much military hardware; the United States, various kinds of economic and technical assistance; and China, support for Sukarno's efforts to eclipse Nehru of India as the leader of the "third world."² As the policy of confronting Malaysia became specific in 1963, it was possible to detect signs of Indonesian coolness toward the Soviet Union and a warming trend in relations with China.

At the time that Malaysia was first proposed, Indonesia was

¹George Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Fall 1964), pp. 255-256.

²For example, Sukarno was encouraged by China in such schemes as holding a rival to the Olympic Games for the "new emerging forces."

still embroiled in the West Irian conflict. Since July 1960, Indonesia had had a policy of confrontation with the Dutch on this problem, which had been exacerbating Indonesian-Dutch relations since the independence agreement of 1949. In the 1949 settlement, the Dutch had retained control of West Irian until its future should be decided by mutual Dutch-Indonesian agreement. Beginning in January 1961, small armed Indonesian units were landed in West Irian; though they met with no military success, they exerted a steady political force. Finally, in August 1962, the Dutch, under heavy U.S. pressure, agreed to turn West Irian over to the U.N. Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). UNTEA would, after May 1, 1963, transfer West Irian to Indonesia. Almost immediately after the August 1962 agreement on West Irian, Indonesian officials began to make vague statements that Indonesia "could not remain indifferent" to Malaysia's formation.¹ By late 1962, there were common rumors of Indonesian agents in northern Borneo.²

Many Indonesian nationalists had been attracted by the concept of an Indonesia predominant in Southeast Asia. Linguistic ties with many of the peoples of Malaysia offered a basis for the extension of Indonesia beyond the artificial boundaries of the old Dutch East Indies. This was reinforced by the nationalist sense of moral superiority over the new Malaysia. The long and bitter struggle with the Dutch had created the assumption in Indonesia that independence attained without revolt must be spurious, a facade erected by colonialists to hide the imperialist reality. The British defense arrangements with Malaya, Singapore, and the new federation, which permitted the use of the Singapore base not only for the defense of Malaysia but for that of Southeast Asia as a whole, could be viewed as a continuation of an imperial military presence; the large number of British military officers seconded to the Malayan and Malaysian forces was open to similar interpretation. In addition, the separatist rebellions of 1958-1961 in Indonesia may have given rise to the fear that a successful

¹Brackman, op. cit., p. 129.

²Ibid., p. 130.

Malaysia would be dangerously attractive to disaffected Indonesian Malay-speakers in Sumatra, the Celebes, and Kalimantan.

The foregoing might be thought of as the radical-nationalist Indonesian motives for opposition to Malaysia. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), however, had a different set. Besides motives based on the internal politics of Indonesia, the PKI had clear reason to oppose the appearance of a powerful new state unfriendly to Communism. The PKI had links with the MCP in Malaya, the CCO of Sarawak, and the left-wing Malay parties of the Socialist Front, as well as the Barisan Sosialis of Singapore, Brunei's Party Ra'ayat, and Sarawak's SUPP.¹ Indonesia held an attraction for radical Malays, and the PKI was in a position to take advantage of Malay distrust of the essentially Chinese MCP. Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo territories might all be influenced by the PKI, working on their politics directly as well as through the medium of the Indonesian government. The PKI thus had an incentive to work for the break-up of Malaysia and for an increase of instability in the internal politics of its constituent parts.

b. Internal

The internal politics of Indonesia generated another set of pressures. For Sukarno personally, Malaysia represented another West Irian, another situation that could be built into crisis and manipulated into a source of the political prestige necessary to maintain his position. Certainly his experience with West Irian had given him confidence that Western powers could be pushed into repeated concessions by alternating negotiation and threats, and that Indonesia might be successful against states far more powerful than itself.

But Malaysia represented a necessity as well as an opportunity to Sukarno. The PKI had declared itself opposed to the formation of Malaysia as early as the end of 1961;² and Sukarno, if he wished to avoid a clash with the PKI, may have felt a need to move against Malaysia as

¹Ibid., pp. 64, 86, 89.

²Ibid., p. 88; Justus van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Winter 1964-1965), p. 360.

soon as possible. In a more general sense, conflict with Malaysia would provide a crisis by which Sukarno's leadership could escape the challenges that relative peace would bring--the problems of army-PKI rivalry and the economic stagnation of the country. Only continuing crisis and continuing success could give Sukarno security.

There were relatively few opposing pressures on Sukarno. The economic chaos of Indonesia and the need for economic development were not yet effective: the radical-nationalist ethos made assertive independence more important than economic development; the PKI opposed economic stability and growth; and it was politically impossible for Sukarno to shift the direction of his government for a serious attack on his country's internal problems. The fear of firm opposition by the West was negated by the West Irian experience, in which Sukarno successfully prevented any coalition from forming against him by threats of war, offers to negotiate, hints that he was under overwhelming PKI and nationalist pressure, and token paratroop drops. The army did not oppose the venture against Malaysia because of its own nationalism, its dislike of having to demobilize after West Irian, and its unwillingness to challenge both Sukarno and the PKI once the confrontation issue had been presented to the propaganda organs and the mass organizations.

Factual evidence is slim, and the understanding of personality is inadequate. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible that Sukarno would have been attracted to a confrontation with Malaysia wholly apart from the necessity of appeasing the PKI or the army. It may be unfair to blame Sukarno's anti-Westernism, adventurism, contempt for economic progress, and distaste for rational administration on the PKI. Running an underdeveloped country according to Western ideals and goals offered little scope for the sort of satisfaction Sukarno evidently derived from the grand symbol, or goal, or campaign. The psychological element is very difficult to balance properly against the rational factors of power; but in this conflict at least, it should not be neglected.

6. The Military Balance. On paper, Indonesian forces were

vastly superior to Malaysian. In 1962, Indonesia had some 500,000 men under arms, close to 200 Soviet-supplied combat aircraft, 2 cruisers and 2 frigates equipped with missiles, plus about 20 submarines, 7 destroyers, and numbers of smaller craft. This establishment accounted for 60 per cent of the 1961-1962 budget. On the other hand, the Malayan army numbered only about 32,000 in all. The navy and air force were small, but Commonwealth troops were stationed in the area for defense purposes. (See Section III for details on the Malaysian-Commonwealth forces and arms.)

The disparity between the forces was more apparent than real. Indonesian forces were plagued by inadequate maintenance and inefficiency, a lack of technical competence at every level. Malaysia had a defense treaty with Britain, and at the birth of the new Federation received public assurances from both Australia and New Zealand that military support would be forthcoming if Malaysia were attacked. In a clear case of aggression, as this turned out to be, the amount and efficiency of force available from the Commonwealth tipped the over-all balance with Indonesia conclusively in favor of Malaysia.¹

7. The Brunei Revolt. On December 8, 1962, a revolt occurred in Brunei led by Azahari of the Party Ra'ayat. It claimed to set up the state of North Borneo, to include Sarawak, Brunei, and Sabah, with the Sultan of Brunei as constitutional monarch--a direct appeal to Brunei revanchism. Every town in Brunei was occupied by the rebels, as were several towns in Sarawak and Sabah. But the Sultan refused to treat with them and the police force remained loyal. By the end of the day on December 8, British emergency forces were landing from Singapore at the request of the Sultan,² and by the next day the revolt was practically over, with most of the rebels surrendering. Azahari formed a government-in-exile, first in Manila, then in Djakarta, but did not gain recognition, even by Indonesia.

¹In fact, however, Indonesia committed only a fraction of its arms and forces militarily in the conflict. See Section III for details on the actual forces engaged by Indonesia, or activated for potential use.

²Brackman, op. cit., p. 141.

In other respects, however, Indonesia moved to support the rebellion and to oppose Malaysia. Indeed, Malayan Prime Minister Rahman stated that certain Indonesian political parties (implicitly the PKI) had aided the rebels and provided a base for them in Indonesian Borneo.¹ And one source states that 400 men from Brunei had received military training there.²

Whether or not Rahman's charge was true, and whether in any case the Indonesian government supported the PKI actions,³ the government-controlled Indonesian press and radio gave major importance to the Brunei revolt, there were parades and demonstrations calling for Borneo's liberation, and the PKI and the Partindo (a Communist-oriented group that had split from the PNI) declared their support for the rebels. By December 10, Sukarno was expressing himself in favor of the revolt. On December 23, a public rally was held in support of Azahari, and the appointed Indonesian Parliament passed a resolution of encouragement.

B. Phase II: January 1963 -- April 12, 1963

On January 21, 1963, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio called Malaysia the "henchman of neocolonialism and neo-imperialists" and claimed it was hostile to Indonesia.⁴ The Indonesian press agency

¹Ibid., p. 145; also Willard A. Hanna, The Formation of Malaysia (New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1964), pp. 143-144.

²Kahin, op. cit., p. 262.

³It may be, if indeed the Brunei rebels received training in late 1962 from the Indonesian government and not the PKI, that Phase II should be dated from that point. Conclusive evidence is lacking on this. But it should at least be noted that the typical signs of a Sukarno political offensive were absent until after the Brunei revolt began; there were no speeches, no demonstrations, no steady drumfire of political assault on the Brunei regime or on the plans for Malaysia. Perhaps, then, Rahman's hint that it was the PKI and not the Indonesian government that was supporting the Brunei rebels was correct. And supporting this to some extent is the report of one source that Sukarno was under heavy PKI pressure to recognize the Azahari regime. On this point, see Brackman, op. cit., p. 143.

⁴Ibid., p. 149.

Antara reported that two divisions in Indonesian Borneo had "volunteered" to assist the rebels in British Borneo.¹ On February 11, Subandrio said a physical conflict between Indonesia and Malaya might become unavoidable. And on February 14, Sukarno "declare[d] officially that Indonesia opposes Malaysia."² In March the Indonesian army began formally to train "volunteers" in Borneo,³ while an expansion of Malaya's armed forces was announced on February 13 because of Indonesia's attitude.⁴

No major event took place in the months of Phase II that could plausibly be interpreted by Indonesia as a casus belli. There is no evidence that Malaya gave any consideration at any time to offensive action against Indonesia. The goal of Malaya, with or without confrontation, was so to minimize political conflicts as to enable the Malaysian Federation to come into being, and then to maintain its integrity.

At this time, President Macapagal of the Philippines proposed a conference among the heads of the three states of Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The Philippines as well as Indonesia had close ethnic ties to Malaya. The Philippines also objected to the formation of Malaysia, since Manila had a claim to North Borneo. But at the same time, it proposed a Greater Malay Confederation including the Philippines, Indonesia, and the components of Malaysia. In early April, representatives of the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia met to prepare for a Foreign Ministers' conference that would in turn be the prelude to a summit meeting. It was in this context that hostilities were opened.

¹Ibid., p. 156; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 16-23, 1963, p. 19747.

²Brackman, op. cit., p. 149.

³Ibid., p. 150.

⁴Keesing's, February 23-March 2, 1963, p. 19263.

C. Phase III: April 12, 1963 -- October 1, 1965

On April 12, in Tebedu, Sarawak, three miles from the Indonesian border, an armed band of Indonesians and members of the Sarawak CCO attacked the local police station.¹ Thereafter, until the attempted coup in Indonesia on October 1, 1965 (which is the limit of this study), Indonesian strategy consisted of violent propaganda attacks, off-again on-again negotiations, and militarily ineffective but threatening and disrupting raids by groups of 100 or less, with some attempts at stirring up insurgent support.

1. Sub-Phase A: April 12, 1963 -- August 17, 1964. For the first four months of hostilities, actions were confined to Indonesian incursions into Sarawak and Brunei. After the attack on Tebedu, similar raids continued at a low level until August, when their number and scope increased. During this period, however, rather complicated political events occurred.

Representatives of Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines met as planned to prepare for a Foreign Ministers' conference to be followed by a summit meeting of heads of state. In late May, Rahman and then Sukarno met separately with Macapagal. On May 31 and June 1, Rahman and Sukarno met in Tokyo with apparent success; the talks were amicable, and Sukarno appeared to have abandoned his attitude of enmity. In this atmosphere, a successful Foreign Ministers' conference was held at Manila from June 7 to 11, producing the Manila Accord, which endorsed Macapagal's proposal for a confederation of the three sovereign states and announced that Indonesia and the Philippines would welcome the creation of Malaysia if the support of the population of the Borneo territories were ascertained by the United Nations. Indonesia pressed for a U.N.-conducted plebiscite. At the same time, Sukarno appeared to be making some internal economic and political reforms, and he reached agreement with the United States on the status of American oil companies in Indonesia. The United States began to receive encouraging

¹Ibid.

hints that Sukarno was finally beginning to respond to U.S. overtures for amicable relations.

In this context, a final agreement on the formation of Malaysia was reached in London on July 9 between Malaya and Britain (on behalf of Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah). The agreement provided for the establishment of Malaysia on August 31, 1963. Brunei objected to the terms of entry, especially concerning the Sultan's rank relative to the rulers of the Malayan states and on the disposition of Brunei's oil revenues. It did not therefore join the Malaysian Federation.

Sukarno reacted strongly to the agreement in London, charging that a fait accompli was being attempted before the planned summit meeting. Nevertheless, the summit meeting took place at Manila from July 30 to August 5, and the Manila Accord was formally signed in an atmosphere of Pan-Malay friendship. A joint statement was also issued endorsing a U.N. investigation of the opinions of the peoples of the Borneo territories in compliance with the principle of self-determination, and stating that the inclusion of Sabah in Malaysia would not prejudice the claim of the Philippines. Finally, a Manila Declaration endorsed the concept of Maphilindo, Macapagal's Malay Confederation, and called for joint vigilance against a resurgence of "colonialism and imperialism."¹

U.N. Secretary-General U Thant agreed to arrange a U.N. survey team for Sarawak and Sabah provided that Britain agreed and on condition that his conclusions would be accepted as final and binding. To allow a requested four weeks for the survey, the date for the establishment of Malaysia was tentatively postponed until mid-September. Because of the limitations of time, a formal plebiscite was impossible; therefore, the team was to ascertain whether Malaysia had been a principal issue of the recent elections in Borneo and whether those elections had been freely conducted. If it were found that the elections had not been free or had not posed the issue of Malaysia, a plebiscite would be

¹New York Times, August 5, 1963.

insisted upon by Indonesia and the Philippines.

In late August before the U.N. survey had been completed, Malaya, Britain, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah jointly agreed that Malaysia would come into being on September 16, two days after Thant's target date for the completion of his report. The storm of protest in the Philippines and Indonesia over this prejudgment of the U.N. report was increased when the soon-to-be Chief Minister of Sabah, Donald Stevens, declared Malaysia would be formed regardless of the U.N. findings. On August 31, Singapore proclaimed control over its foreign relations and defense--which the British had previously held--until Malaysia should be established. On September 11, the Malayan state of Kelantan, dominated by the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, filed suit and attempted to get an injunction blocking the new federation.

On September 14, U Thant stated his conclusion, based on the findings of the U.N. Malaysia survey, that "there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these territories to join in the Federation of Malaysia."¹ The appearance of the favorable U.N. report quieted internal Malaysian dissension. But Indonesia announced it would not recognize the new state. Mobs looted the Malayan and British Embassies in Djakarta, and British property valued at \$400 million was seized.² The Philippines requested permission to convert its Embassy in Kuala Lumpur to a consulate. On September 17, the day after the Federation of Malaysia was formally established, the new state broke diplomatic relations with Indonesia and the Philippines. On September 25, Sukarno reaffirmed his intention to "crush Malaysia," having broken trade relations three days before. During August, the number and scale of military incidents in northern Borneo had begun to rise. By November 20, there had been 69 armed incursions from Indonesia.³

¹The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1963 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1964), p. 99.

²Brackman, op. cit., p. 202.

³Keesing's, November 11-16, 1963, p. 19747.

In response, the British had moved 6,000 troops into Borneo by mid-September.¹ On September 18 the Malaysia Defense Council was set up, and it was decided to call up reserves and raise the strength of the army and police.² Australia declared that its defense arrangements with Malaya would apply to Malaysia, and New Zealand said it would respond to any request for assistance. (See Section III for details on the Malaysian-Commonwealth build-up and the forces being used by Indonesia.)

In January 1964 the United States attempted to assist in a diplomatic solution to the conflict.³ U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy met with Sukarno from January 17 to 18 in Tokyo, with Rahman on January 21--following a visit to Macapagal--then with Sukarno again in Djakarta from January 22 to 23. On January 23, before Kennedy's departure, it was announced in Djakarta that Sukarno had ordered a cease-fire and that a summit meeting of the Maphilindo countries would be held after a Foreign Ministers' meeting. But after Kennedy's departure, Sukarno made it clear that the confrontation would continue, even with the cease-fire.

The cease-fire in fact was ineffective. At the time, Indonesian irregulars and CCO members were attempting to create an occupied "pocket" in a jungle area in Sarawak; Malaysia demanded that these troops surrender and be repatriated, but Sukarno refused. A Foreign Ministers' conference of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia in Bangkok in early February produced an agreement to have Thailand supervise the cease-fire and mediate the question of the "pockets." Nevertheless, during the rest of February, there were twenty new armed raids into Malaysian Borneo.⁴

The cease-fire finally collapsed after a second conference in Bangkok in early March. Indonesia agreed to a formula for withdrawal

¹Brackman, op. cit., p. 202.

²Keesing's, November 11-16, 1963, p. 19748.

³Brackman, op. cit., p. 215.

⁴Ibid., p. 219.

on June 1, after mediation by Macapagal, but at the same time "volunteers" were leaving Java for Borneo.¹ A second Maphilindo summit meeting in Tokyo on June 20 produced a proposal by the Philippines for a conciliation commission that was accepted by Indonesia and in principle by Malaysia; but, at the same time, there continued to be many incidents, and nothing came of the proposal.

2. Sub-Phase B: August 17, 1964 -- June 1, 1965. After the second summit meeting, Indonesian military action expanded to mainland Malaya. On August 17, 1964, a force of about 100 Indonesian regulars and Malaysian defectors landed by sampan on the coast of Johore, 50 miles northwest of Singapore.² About 60 were captured or surrendered, and the rest killed. Their purpose was to set up a training camp for Malayan rebels.

During the same month, some of the less powerful parties of Indonesia--the Murba, the Moslem NU, and other religious parties--joined with the army and navy and former members of two parties banned by Sukarno in 1960,³ to form the Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism (BPS). The purpose was to counter growing PKI influence over Sukarno. Sukarno dissolved the BPS, however, and "temporarily" the Murba also.

Raids on the Malay Peninsula continued. During a race riot in Singapore on September 2, possibly set off by underground Communists and Indonesian agents, two separate groups of Indonesian paratroops dropped in the Labis area, 100 miles north of Singapore. By the end of September, not more than a dozen remained at large. Further seaborne landings on the mainland occurred through the next nine months. The landings were all militarily ineffective, although there were bombings and terrorist activities; the troops often surrendered without resistance on finding they were not received as liberators.

The attacks on the Malay Peninsula brought into combat

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 236; Keesing's, February 20-27, 1965, p. 20591.

³The Masjumi and the PSI.

Australian troops based in Malaya as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. The raids on Malaya also caused Britain to reinforce its armed forces in the area. (See Section III for details.) Naval forces were greatly increased to prevent seaborne landings; and by the end of January 1965, there were more than 80 ships in the area, from the British, Malaysian, Australian, and New Zealand navies.¹ Indonesian raids on Sarawak and Sabah were continuing, and in February the first Australian troops were sent to Borneo; a New Zealand battalion was also made available.

In September 1964, Malaysia brought a complaint before the U.N. Security Council, charging Indonesian aggression. Indonesia did not deny the substance of the complaint, admitting that Indonesian guerrillas and "volunteers" had for some time been fighting in Malaysia. The justification cited was that Malaysia was a neo-colonialist front whereby Britain was seeking to subvert Indonesia. A mild Council resolution deploring the fighting and calling on both parties to respect the integrity and independence of each other was vetoed by the Soviet Union on a 9 to 2 vote, the Soviet delegate alleging that Malaysia was to be "used by British imperialism as a weapon in the fight against one of the important forces of the national liberation movement . . . the Republic of Indonesia."²

On December 31, 1964, after Malaysia, over furious Indonesian protests, had been elected to the U.N. Security Council, Sukarno ordered the Indonesian government to withdraw from the United Nations, which it did on January 7, 1965.

Beginning in May 1965, a political dispute arose that led three months later to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia. The problem was the familiar one of Malay-Chinese relationships and mutual suspicions. During this period of political turmoil, however,

¹Keesing's, February 20-27, 1965, p. 20592.

²The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1964 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1965), p. 112.

Indonesian landings on Malaya ceased, the last taking place on May 30.

3. Sub-Phase C: June 1, 1963 -- October 1, 1965. While raids on the Malay Peninsula ceased, Indonesian raids in Borneo continued. In the first week of July, about 8,000 Chinese villagers who had lived near the Sarawak-Indonesia border were resettled in temporary camps farther from the border to remove them from Indonesian and CCO influence and terrorism.

The articles of separation of Singapore from Malaysia were signed on August 7. However, the separation was not quite complete. There was to be a Joint Defense Council, Malaysia was to have the right to use the British bases in Singapore, and each party undertook not to make any treaty or agreement with a third party that was detrimental to the independence and defense of the territory of the other party. Singapore gave Britain the continued right to use its military bases, while Malaysia gave assurances that it would fulfill its water agreements with Singapore.

The separation gave new strength to leftist agitation in Singapore; it also weakened the hold of Malaysia on the Borneo territories. But the Malaysian-Indonesian conflict was not directly and immediately affected. Indonesia stated that the policy of confrontation would continue against Singapore as long as its bases were used by the "imperialists"; though later Sukarno said the matter was "under study."

Raids continued through October 1, 1965, when the abortive attempted coup in Indonesia by pro-Chinese military and Young Communist elements set in motion events that diverted Indonesian attention from Malaysia and eventually led to the formal ending of the confrontation. The position at that point was relatively static, Indonesia having failed to create serious military threats to the Commonwealth-supported Malaysian forces. No clear political gains had been made either. While the policy of confrontation may have contributed to the tensions leading to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia and certainly made the effects of the separation more dangerous to the rest of Malaysia,

no tangible results had appeared by October. While the economic burden of defense was considerable, Malaysia was incomparably better off economically than Indonesia, whose economy and currency had degenerated even further during the months of the conflict. Sukarno's political leadership had clearly failed; the effect of this failure on the balance he had maintained among opposing forces must surely have contributed heavily to the genesis of the still-cloudy events of October in Indonesia.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

- a. The British-controlled areas of Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei on the island of Borneo were objects of competing claims based on geographic logic (Indonesia), historic precedence (Philippines and Brunei), and British administrative practice (Malaya). All the claimants cited the basis of ethnic and linguistic ties.
- b. For Malaya, recently victorious over a major insurgency in which the Communist ideology and a split between Malay and Chinese populations had been involved, the broader geographic grouping of Malaysia provided a framework in which Singapore, Malaya, and the British-controlled areas on Borneo could develop a stable multi-racial state.
- c. For Indonesia, the ideological appeal of Pan-Malay nationalism offered an external goal that distracted attention from internal economic and political problems and made easier the delicate balancing within Indonesia of various political parties.

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. International arbitration, adjudication to settle competing claims, with guarantees for settlement arrived at; settlement based on assessment of wishes of different population; retention of British control until issue settled.
 - b. Sarawak and Sabah would have had less saliency if a more integrated society had been created within Malaya and between it and Singapore. This would have required racial tolerance and equality.
 - c. Greater integrity and stability within Indonesia; more rapid progress toward economic and political development; enhancement of goals of national economic and political development as targets for national energies.

- d. Having won its independence by force, Indonesia regarded as fraudulent any independence gained by amicable agreement between colony and colonial ruler. Particularly the retention of British military-base rights led to a lack of respect in Indonesia for the validity of Malaya's independence.
- e. Relations between Indonesia and the Sino-Soviet bloc had become closer, and at the same time Indonesian relations with the United States and the West had cooled. As competition between the Soviets and Chinese for leadership of world Communism developed, it took the form, in part, in Indonesia of competition for Sukarno's favor and an unwillingness to take unilateral steps or join in joint efforts to restrain his ambitions.
- f. Particularly vis-à-vis the Indonesia-Malaya area, Soviet and Chinese interests in removing British military bases coincided with Indonesian nationalist ambitions.
- g. In terms of a comparison between Indonesia's and Malaya's military forces, the former had quantitative and qualitative superiority. A large measure of its qualitative superiority, particularly in sophisticated aircraft, was a result of Soviet arms aid.
- d. More peaceful achievement of Indonesian independence; reducing the need for foreign bases by developing sea- and air-lift capabilities. [Note, however, that the presence of British forces helped counter Indonesian aggression and constituted a threatened intensification that may have been instrumental in keeping hostilities moderate.]
- e. Avoidance of the Cold War; barring that, efforts of great powers to keep it out of local conflicts; easing of Sino-Soviet competition. [Note, however, that this last, while relevant at the time, may no longer be relevant since that competition has reached a level where local parties are either firmly in one or another camp or pursuing a nationalist policy.]
- f. Measures suggested in (1d) above to reduce need for bases.
- g. Agreement among arms suppliers not to introduce arms into conflict areas; agreements about qualitative, quantitative restrictions on arms transfers.

- h. The PKI, the Indonesian Communist party, was the strongest--but not the dominant--force in Indonesian politics. It had close ties with radical parties in Brunei, Sarawak, Sabah, and Singapore as well as in Malaya. These latter parties led opposition to the union of the areas into Malaysia.
- i. Since its independence, Indonesia had faced a series of separatist challenges of differing degrees of seriousness. A stable, non-Communist Malaysia might become a magnet for these separatist elements.
- j. Radical elements in Brunei revolted--with Indonesian support and encouragement, Malaya and Britain charged. While quickly put down, the revolt gave substance to charges that the British-controlled parts of Borneo did not want to become part of Malaysia.
- k. The personality and style of Sukarno were important, if imprecise, factors in the conflict, particularly his preference for grand gestures.
2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military
- a. Britain had force in the area because of its continued control over Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei, its responsibilities in Singapore, and its treaty commitment to Malaya, as well as its SEATO and other alliance commitments. In Brunei it demonstrated its willingness to use that force to maintain order.
- h. Reducing the strength of the PKI; increasing the strength of anti-Communist forces in Indonesia; reducing the strength of radical parties elsewhere in the area.
- i. Greater internal political stability, coherence in Indonesia.
- j. Fact-finding to determine extent of Indonesian complicity; measures to reduce or control dissidents in Brunei.
- k. Elimination or neutralization of radical or irresponsible leaders; efforts to build prestige of more moderate alternatives.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Increase third-power force in the area. [The existence of British force and evidenced willingness to employ it at this stage constituted a factor tending to keep the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict non-military. At later stages, its impact was somewhat different.]

- b. As long as it continued unsettled, the Indonesian conflict with the Netherlands over West Irian kept Indonesian nationalist ambitions focused there.
- c. While Britain and Malaya charged that Indonesia, or some Indonesians, had fomented and aided the Brunei revolt, the Indonesian government did not recognize the Brunei government-in-exile and did not publicly declare support for the rebels' aspirations until after the revolt had been crushed.
- b. Creation or perpetuation of distracting conflicts. [Note that this may help control one conflict at the expense of exacerbating another.]
- c. Encouragement to Indonesia to keep its intervention verbal at most, and preferably unacknowledged.

B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

- 1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Refusing to yield to blackmail the first time to discourage the blackmailer from trying again, and for larger stakes.

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[The factors that had tended to push the conflict into Phase II continued to be operative. The factors noted in this section represent the new elements introduced in Phase II.]

- 1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities
 - a. Settlement of the West Irian conflict removed a distraction to Indonesia's concentration on the Malaysia issue. More important than the settlement itself was the strategy by which Sukarno had achieved his goals there: low-level military actions, vague threats of larger action, appeals that failure in the conflict would strengthen Indonesian Communists, and alternately bellicose and conciliatory postures had brought about strong U.S. pressure on the Netherlands to yield to Indonesian demands.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. Although also having claims to parts of British-controlled Borneo, the Philippines proposed that the issues be resolved by a Greater Malay Confederation composed of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaya, and the British-controlled territories.

C. PHASE III TO PHASE IV: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[Even as negotiations about the Greater Malay Confederation were going on, raids from Indonesian Borneo into British-controlled Borneo began. In the course of Phase III, one distinct intensification of hostilities occurred (the initiation of raids by Indonesia into Malaya proper) and one moderation (the virtual termination of attacks on the Malayan mainland while raids on Borneo continued). This section will analyze the three sub-phases of Phase III separately. It should be noted that throughout Phase III, the level of hostilities remained low, consisting for the most part of small raiding parties. It seems clear that here, as in West Irian and in Phase III₁ of the Cyprus conflict, force was being used not with the expectation of military victory but to add strength to a diplomatic campaign by injecting a note of urgency and uncertainty about intensification to a much wider war.]

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. International encouragement of efforts to resolve competing claims in regional setting; guarantees of support for those who agree and penalties for those who do not.

C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO MODERATE/TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

SUB-PHASE A: HOSTILITIES CONFINED
TO SARAWAK AND SABAH

1. Factors Tending to Intensify/Continue Hostilities
 - a. The initial hostilities failed to delay or prevent the creation of Malaysia and the inclusion in it of Sarawak and Sabah (although Brunei chose to remain outside).
 - b. Britain responded to continued Indonesian attacks with large British reinforcements to Sarawak and Sabah.
 - c. The land frontier between Indonesian and Malaysian Borneo was in a heavily-forested area with sparse population, so that infiltration was relatively easy.
2. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities
 - a. The Indonesian raids into Sarawak and Brunei were not successful either in causing significant damage or in provoking local unrest. Indonesia made no attempt to use the modern Soviet military equipment it possessed either to support the raiders or to undertake larger-scale operations.
1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Either resolution of competing claims before Malaysia was created or international guarantees against unsuccessful claimants.
 - b. Restricting size of forces introduced into area of hostilities to those needed to meet the attack. [Note, however, that to the extent the disproportionate British response deterred Indonesia from intensifying hostilities, the British action should be regarded as a factor tending to moderate hostilities.]
 - c. Border control, patrol.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
 - a. Reinforcing the limitations Indonesia placed on the weapons it possessed by threatening to respond in kind; accommodating to Indonesia's demands; restricting the introduction of sophisticated weapons into the conflict area;

maintenance by arms suppliers of control over use of weapons transferred. [Note, however, that military victory does not appear to have been Indonesia's goal.]

- b. Support from international organizations, other third parties for a regional solution to competing territorial claims; good offices, mediation, arbitration; guarantee of settlement agreed upon; threat of sanctions against adversary not accepting awards made.
- c. Reducing the pressure of time (in this case, delaying the formal creation of Malaysia until proper U.N.-supervised plebiscites could be conducted); guarantee of settlement based on results of plebiscite; threat of sanctions against states refusing to abide by the results.
- d. More formal indications of U.S. interest; more formal involvement of the United States in negotiating and enforcing a cease-fire.
- e. Action by international organizations, third states to supervise and enforce the cease-fire: demilitarized zones, interposition of forces, etc.

b. Tripartite and bilateral negotiations continued on the idea of a Greater Malay Confederation. (However, raids continued as the talks were held.)

c. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia agreed to have the United Nations ascertain the wishes of the populations of Sarawak and Sabah about their future. Although time did not permit a formal plebiscite, a U.N. investigation determined that the majorities in both areas wanted union in Malaysia.

d. A visit to the area by U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy was taken to indicate a growing U.S. interest in a termination of hostilities and a negotiated settlement.

e. After talks with Kennedy, Sukarno announced a cease-fire and called for a summit meeting of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The cease-fire was ineffective, although the summit meeting was held. At least three other formulae for termination of hostilities

were agreed to by the adversaries and the Philippines: a cease-fire supervised by Thailand with Thai mediation of the question of withdrawing "pockets" of Indonesian irregulars from Sarawak; withdrawal of Indonesian forces and mediation of the issues by the President of the Philippines; conciliation by the Philippines. None of these plans was implemented and infiltration continued during their negotiation.

SUB-PHASE B: EXTENSION OF HOSTILITIES
TO THE MALAY PENINSULA

[The beginning of raids from Indonesia onto the Malay Peninsula constituted an intensification: it was both a geographic extension with an involvement of forces of additional states, and an implicit threat of direct Indonesian efforts to establish contact and perhaps make common cause with the remnants of the Malayan insurgent forces, defeated a scant four years before.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify/Continue Hostilities

- a. Race riots between Chinese and Malays in Singapore, perhaps inspired and provoked by Communists and Indonesian agents, indicated that the basic racial cleavage in Malaysia remained acute and raised doubt about the continued viability of Malaysia.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Measures to increase racial, social integrity of Malaysia [see (1b) of Section A above].

- b. Indonesian action on the mainland brought Indonesian forces into combat with Australian forces stationed there. It also led to British reinforcements, dispatch of Australian and New Zealand forces to Sarawak and Sabah.
 - b. Restricting the stationing, use of third-party forces in conflict area. [Note, however, that the threat of even greater involvement of third parties may have served to deter a larger commitment of Indonesian forces and thus moderated (while not necessarily terminating) the hostilities. See (1d) and (2a) of Section A and (1b) of Sub-Phase A above.]
 - c. The Soviet Union gave strong diplomatic support to Indonesia, including vetoing an unpalatable Security Council resolution [see below].
 - c. A joint U.S.-Soviet approach, in support of either adversary. [See also (1c) of Section A above on question of role of Sino-Soviet split.]
 - d. Following the Security Council debate and the election of Malaysia to the seat in the Security Council, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations, not thereby freeing itself of the restraints of the Charter but closing off a channel of possible influence.
 - d. Strong pressure to retain Indonesia's U.N. membership; strong emphasis on continued U.N. role despite withdrawal.
2. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities
- a. The Indonesian raids on the mainland failed to accomplish the objectives either of inflicting military damage or of rallying anti-Malaysian sentiment.
 - a. Measures suggested above to reinforce limitations being observed by Indonesia or accommodating to Indonesia's demands. [See (1a) of Sub-Phase A above. Note, however, that military victory does not appear to have been Indonesia's goal.]
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Measures suggested above to reinforce limitations being observed by Indonesia or accommodating to Indonesia's demands. [See (1a) of Sub-Phase A above. Note, however, that military victory does not appear to have been Indonesia's goal.]

- b. Indonesian opinion may or may not have been split on the issue of Malaysia. But the confrontation appeared to be strengthening the internal position of the PKI. There began to emerge in Indonesia a coalition of opposition to the PKI. The political split in Indonesia was reflected in the armed forces, with prominent army and navy leaders appearing in the anti-PKI groupings.
- c. With Indonesia's raids on the mainland, Malaysia brought a charge of aggression to the U.N. Security Council. A mild resolution, calling for each adversary to respect the independence and integrity of the other, was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

SUB-PHASE C: VIRTUAL TERMINATION
OF MAINLAND RAIDS, CONTINUATION OF
SARAWAK, SABAH RAIDS

[About nine months after they had begun, the raids on the mainland virtually ceased. Raids into Sarawak and Sabah had not stopped when the mainland raids began and continued after the latter ceased.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify/Continue Hostilities

- a. Splits within Malaysia became open rifts with the withdrawal of Singapore. This both reflected the depth of the racial cleavage in Malaysia and also raised the prospect that other latent separations could be fostered.

- b. Strengthening, encouraging anti-PKI, anti-Sukarno forces in Indonesia.

- c. A consistent U.S.-Soviet position, in support of either side; utilizing General Assembly to authorize stronger U.N. action, e.g., peacekeeping force.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Measures suggested above to increase internal cohesion of Malaysia [see (1b) of Section A above].

2. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities

- a. In order to isolate Chinese villagers near the Sarawak-Kalimantan border from Indonesian influence and intimidation, they were re-moved to temporary relocation centers in the interior.

[This analysis ends arbitrarily with the initial PKI uprising and anti-PKI coup in Indonesia. Raids into Sarawak and Sabah continued for several months and then ended as Indonesia's attention and military strength turned inward to Indonesian problems. No formal settlement has been agreed upon, and insofar as the conflict represented Indonesian interests (as opposed to PKI-Sukarno interests) the dispute remains unsettled.]

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Removal of vulnerable and/or susceptible groups from contested border areas or from conflict area.

III. WEAPONS ANALYSISA. The Course of Military Operations

Although it is not clear whether the Indonesian government itself took a hand in the project, Indonesian supplies and support were being received by rebel forces in Brunei and Sarawak after December 1962. And by September 1963, Indonesia had recruited and trained, in Indonesian Borneo, about 3,300 men for guerrilla operations in Malaysian Borneo.¹ Included in these forces were some Indonesian air force or army paratroopers and pro-Communist ethnic Chinese defectors from Sarawak.

Opposing the infiltrators was a British Commonwealth force that in November 1963 consisted of 4,000 to 6,000 Malaysian troops, 7,000 British troops (including 2,000 paratroop, infantry, and commando units, two Gurkha battalions, and one Ferret armored car regiment), 1,000 Australian troops, and an equal number of New Zealand troops, for a total force level of 14,600 to 16,000.²

By late summer of 1964, Indonesia had reportedly sent more than 2,000 guerrillas into Sarawak,³ but judging from the original force estimates, this figure may be low. Most of these forces did not attain a permanent foothold in Sarawak, Commonwealth forces killing or capturing about 300. The increased Commonwealth forces consisted of about 10,000 Malaysian army regulars (formed into four or five battalions and a reconnaissance battalion), 10,000 British troops, including Gurkhas, and the previous 2,000 comprising the Australian and New Zealand battalions. Thus, a total of 22,000 Commonwealth troops was arrayed against the

¹Jacques-Francillon, "Sukarno's War Against Malaysia," New Republic, April 19, 1965, p. 17.

²The Military Balance: 1963-64 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1963), pp. 25-26; New Statesman, November 29, 1963, p. 769.

³U.S. News and World Report, September 21, 1964, p. 63.

infiltrators.¹ Further recruiting for the infiltrators was hindered by a British-trained Malaysian police force of about 23,000 and the government's \$300 bounty for captured raiders.²

The ground operation in Borneo having proved mainly unsuccessful, Indonesia mounted a second front in the campaign, using infiltration methods by sea and air to land raiding parties on Singapore Island and the Malay Peninsula. In order to recruit, train, and equip these forces, a special camp was set up on Batam Island, ten miles across the strait from Singapore. As before, Malaysian defectors and Indonesian army regulars were equipped with submachine guns, rifles, hand grenades, and homemade demolition bombs, and then sent across the narrow strait by sampan.³ A typical raiding party of 22 men per sampan probably utilized three or four submachine guns, about a dozen sniper rifles, a few side-arms, such as automatic pistols, and one or two hand grenades or homemade bombs per man. The first raiding party of 100 landed on the Peninsula in mid-August 1964. By the end of 1964, a total of 200 more men had landed and were engaged in bombing and other terrorist activities.⁴ (Twenty incidents were reported in Singapore.) At the peak of the raids on the Peninsula, it was estimated that as many as 220 men per month were dispatched, although many of these were captured before they reached the mainland.

There were no major encounters between the opposing navies, and the Indonesians continued to reinforce their second front solely by sampan. By March 1965, the Indonesians had reportedly sent 24 raiding parties onto the Peninsula, amounting to about 530 men. Half of these were captured by the Commonwealth sea patrols before landing.⁵

¹I.e., deployed in eastern Malaysia; estimates adapted from The Military Balance: 1964-65 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), p. 32.

²Time, November 27, 1964, p. 37.

³Ibid., September 4, 1964, p. 35.

⁴Newsweek, January 11, 1965, p. 36.

⁵U.S. News and World Report, May 3, 1965, p. 75.

The major activity of the Indonesian military in late 1964 was the massing of about 20,000 troops along the Sarawak and Sabah frontiers.¹ This deployment was later increased by the use of some 6,550 commando forces, equipped with Soviet submachine guns and supported by newly-acquired Soviet Mi-6 heavy helicopters.² As 1965 began, there were signs of renewed activity on the original front on Borneo.

Throughout 1964 the British land forces in Malaysia had been increasing so that by early 1965 the British force level was about three brigades, with an additional 1,000 paratroops. Sixty per cent of this force was operating from Brunei in addition to 1,000 New Zealand and 2,000 recently-reinforced Australian troops, all organized into a Commonwealth force comprising four brigades.³ By early 1965 the Malaysian army had at least 13,100 deployed in Sarawak, plus another 12,000 in western Malaysia. Some 27,000 conscripts were called up for duty. Thus there was a total Commonwealth force in eastern Malaysia of probably 17,000. There were nearly as many troops in western Malaysia.

When Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia in September 1965, the Indonesian sea infiltration by sampan continued, forcing Singapore to ban from its waters all Indonesian ships of less than 200 tons displacement.⁴

The confrontation and its related military build-ups on both sides virtually ended following an anti-government coup in Indonesia in October 1965. This conflict had reportedly cost Britain \$1.7 billion, which included aid to Malaysia and the build-up of the British South-

¹Newsweek, January 11, 1965, p. 36; Jacques-Francillon, op. cit., p. 17.

²J.W.R. Taylor, Warplanes of the World (New York, Arco, 1966), p. 97; The Military Balance: 1965-66 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), p. 34.

³Jacques-Francillon, op. cit., p. 17.

⁴Times (London), July 6, 1965, p. 9.

east Asian garrison, constituting 20,000-30,000 troops in Hong Kong and Singapore by June 1966.¹

B. Indonesian Weapons Employed in the Conflict

Because the Indonesian army was short of adequately-maintained weapons, the raiders had to be equipped with a variety of small arms including the following:²

Pistols: The ubiquitous U.S. Colt .45 ACP automatics and the Canadian FN Browning 9mm automatics.

Rifles: M1 .30 carbines from the U.S. aid program of the mid-1950s and British Enfield SMLE .303 jungle carbines, perhaps from the war of independence.

Submachine guns: British Sten 9mm SMGs and U.S. M1 Thompson .45 ACP SMGs.

Automatic rifles: Soviet AK-47 7.62mm assault rifles and the C3 version of the 7.62mm Spanish CETME light automatic rifles, produced in West Germany under license.

Other: Several thousand Chinese hand grenades.

For night operations across the border when supply lines were short, the Soviet 80mm mortar or its Chinese copy, as well as the Soviet or Chinese portable 50mm mortar, was available to the raiders.³

The Indonesian air force (AURI) had, in operational status, two or three squadrons of Soviet Tu-16 long-range bombers and Il-28 medium-range bombers, plus one squadron of MiG-21 jet fighters and

¹Time, June 19, 1966, p. 40.

²Joseph Smith, Small Arms of the World (Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Books, 1966), p. 461.

³B.I.S. Gourley, "Struggle in Sarawak," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1965, p. 34.

several squadrons of MiG-17 and MiG-19 interceptors. There was a total of 250 jet combat aircraft.¹

The Indonesian campaign on Borneo depended mainly on the ability of the infiltrators to recruit, train, equip, and supply their forces. To achieve this, a large training camp was set up inside Malaysian Borneo during 1963, and other border centers were added as the campaign ensued.² Training was provided in the use and maintenance of a variety of small arms supplied from surplus Indonesian stocks. Additional weapons and ammunition were provided by pre-positioned arms caches secretly located in Sarawak. Operations consisted primarily of night mortar attacks or daytime sniper attacks against British and Malaysian patrols. Infiltration operations were reinforced either by returning to Indonesian jungle bases for resupply or by paratroop drops by the several transport squadrons (U.S. C-130 or Soviet An-12 transports) of AURI.

It was not unusual for Borneo raiders to group in numbers as large as 100 with many mortars, grenades, and automatic weapons, evidently desiring to obtain local superiority in numbers and firepower before withdrawing. There was no evidence that the infiltrators had been supplied any weapons in addition to those on hand at the beginning of the campaign. Lack of standardization was evidenced by the great number of different weapons used and by the different types of U.S., Soviet, French, British, and Czech small-arms ammunition discovered in caches in Malaysia.³

During 1964, the Indonesian navy received from the Soviet Union four fast guided-missile patrol craft of the "Komar" class⁴ which, although capable of use against the frigates and patrol vessels of the Commonwealth reserve fleet, were not called into service. In addition, Indonesia had

¹William Green and Dennis Punnett, The MacDonald Air Power Guide (New York, Doubleday, 1963), p. 13.

²Time, September 6, 1963, p. 24.

³Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "This War in Borneo," Reporter, June 4, 1964, p. 18.

⁴Janes Fighting Ships, 1965-1966 edition (London, Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1965), p. 129.

some six Soviet "W" class submarines in operation along with 20 to 30 motor torpedo boats and minesweepers. Their destroyers (ex-Soviet "Skoryi" class) were in doubtful condition, and their cruiser (ex-Soviet "Sverdlov" class) was inoperable at dockside.¹ In 1965, Indonesia acquired two more "Komar" class patrol boats from the Soviet Union for possible action in the Straits.²

The air-power balance continued to be favorable to the Commonwealth in 1964. AURI attempted to offset deterioration and attrition in its MiGs and Il-28s by acquiring a second squadron of Tu-16 jet bombers with turbojet KENNEL antishipping missiles from the Soviet Union.³ In addition, the Indonesians attempted to reduce their dependence on outside training by acquiring twelve L-24 Delfin jet trainers from Czechoslovakia in late 1964.⁴ However, the balance of AURI strength remained unaltered vis-à-vis the powerful British force on Singapore.

The Indonesian army, except for some radar-directed 57mm AA guns and 105mm howitzers supplied by the Soviet Union,⁵ did not receive the magnitude of aid given the other services, and was without sufficient amphibious capability to support large-scale landings on the Peninsula. Much of the aid, such as the armored patrol cars promised Indonesia by the Soviet Union in late 1964, was irrelevant to the type of warfare involved.⁶

There were conflicting reports as to whether AURI had successfully integrated additional Tu-16s into its operation in early 1965.

¹Ibid.; see also Military Balance: 1964-65, p. 32; for the status of the navy, see Newsweek, March 4, 1963, p. 43.

²Janes Fighting Ships, p. 132.

³Military Balance: 1964-65, p. 32.

⁴Kenneth Munson, The Pocket Encyclopedia of World Aircraft (New York, Macmillan, 1966), p. 130.

⁵Military Balance: 1963-64, p. 24; Military Balance: 1964-65, p. 31.

⁶Defense Management Report, September 6, 1965, p. 1.

Perhaps for demonstration purposes, AURI assumed a more threatening posture against Malaysia and Singapore by creating a special "alert command." This consisted of about twelve Soviet MiG-21s with Soviet air-to-air missiles and a squadron of about twelve Tu-16s, which engaged in patrols and maneuvers along Malaysia's frontier.¹ Up to this time AURI crews had not acquired much familiarity with the ASM armament of the Tu-16s. Six were test-fired off Java in July 1965, also serving notice of a possible Indonesian stand-off capability against Singapore.² Steps were also taken in mid-1965 to acquire a radar early-warning capability to integrate both the Soviet surface-to-air missile units and the MiG-21 interceptors. Soviet technicians arrived to attempt to complete work on radar sites that had previously been abandoned by the British Decca Company in 1963.³

Weapons Used by Indonesian Infiltrators

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>
pistols, all types	over 3,000
AK-47 rifle	11,400
C-3 rifle	5,400
Enfield .303 rifle	over 2,000
rifles, other types	2,000
Sten/Thompson SMG	about 500
PPSH	about 4,300
50mm mortar	700
80mm mortar	300
homemade bombs, all types	over 120
hand grenades, Chinese type	6,000-8,000

¹Times (London), July 6, 1965.

²Ibid., August 7, 1965.

³Ibid., July 6, 1965.

Weapons Activated by Indonesia But Not Used in Combat

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>
patrol boat, "Komar" class	25-35 activated, not used
submarine	6 activated, not used
destroyer	6 activated, not used
Tu-16 bomber	12-25, patrol only
MiG-21 interceptor	12, patrol only
Il-28 bomber	25 activated, not used

C. Malaysian and Commonwealth Weapons Acquisitions

The basic small arms equipping the Commonwealth forces were:

Pistols/revolvers: British Enfield .38 revolver, British Webley .38 pistol, and Canadian FN Browning 9mm automatic.

Rifles: Belgian-designed, British L1A1 7.62mm light automatic rifles, Australian L1A1, and Charlton or modified Enfield SMLE .303.

Submachine guns: British Sterling L2A3 9mm SMG, British or Australian Sten 9mm SMG, and Australian Austen 9mm SMG.

Machine guns: Belgian-designed, British L7A1 GPMG 7.62mm, U.S. M60 7.62mm GPMG, U.S. Browning .50 cal. HMG, and British Bren .303 LMG.¹

Support squads of British infantry battalions were equipped with the U.S. 81mm medium mortar, and artillery regiments of Britain and Australia were equipped with the air- and road-transportable Italian 105mm howitzer.² Most Commonwealth brigades were air-transportable, supported by three squadrons of British army Belvedere transport helicopters and

¹Smith, op. cit., pp. 198, 522; Jac Weller, "Weapons and Tactics of the British Infantry," American Rifleman, February 1966, pp. 17-19

²Weller, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

tactical transport of RAF Transport Command (Singapore), the Malaysian air force, the Australian air force, and the New Zealand air force.

In order to neutralize the Indonesian air threat to Singapore, as well as to provide patrol and ground-support capability to Commonwealth forces, the British Far Eastern air force at three bases on Singapore consisted, by December 1963, of two squadrons of Gloster Javelin interceptors, one squadron of English Electric Canberra tactical bombers, equipped for the ground-support role, one squadron of Hawker Hunter F.G.A.9 ground-support attack aircraft, one squadron of Avro Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft, and about four Avro Vulcan or Handley-Page Victor bombers, normally part of the British nuclear strike forces but temporarily converted to carry free-falling iron bombs.¹ On the mainland at Butterworth was based the Royal Australian Air Force component, made up of two squadrons of Australian-built F-86 fighters and one squadron of Canberra tactical bombers. Later on, New Zealand added another Canberra squadron, based in Malaysia. On station near Malaysia was a reserve force of 1,000 helicopter-borne Royal Marine Commandos, with light automatic weapons, on alert status aboard the Royal Navy commando carrier HMS Albion.²

In order to cut down on the sea infiltration, the Commonwealth navies strengthened their patrol capability. The Royal Navy had transferred one frigate and three minesweepers to the Royal Malaysian Navy by the time of Indonesia's second front, and Malaysia had purchased three British Vosper patrol boats, tropicalized and radar-equipped for Malaysian service.³ The Royal Malaysian Navy was reported to consist of 2,100 men and one frigate, seven minesweepers, and six seaward defense vessels.⁴ The British had one guided-missile frigate, plus

¹Military Balance: 1963-64, p. 22; Economist, December 14, 1963, p. 1155; Flying Review International, August 1966, p. 72.

²Economist, December 14, 1963, p. 1155.

³Janes Fighting Ships, p. 174.

⁴Military Balance: 1964-65, p. 33.

several dozen patrol craft assigned to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. One Australian destroyer and two minesweepers joined the Strategic Reserve during 1964.¹

In early 1965 the British began to increase their sea-based air power. The aircraft carrier HMS Eagle sailed from East Africa for Malaysia in January 1965 with two squadrons of Supermarine Scimitar strike aircraft. It was joined on station during April 1965 by a second carrier, carrying about 50 DeHavilland Sea Vixen fleet-defense and Blackburn Buccaneer strike aircraft.² Total British naval strength reached its peak for this campaign: 70 ships, including two aircraft carriers, one commando-helicopter carrier, one guided-missile frigate, and 66 other types, mainly destroyers, minesweepers, and patrol craft.³ These units were deployed in the Strait of Malacca, the Celebes Sea, and the Java Sea by April 1965. Australia's navy contributed another two minesweepers to the Strategic Reserve fleet.⁴

In early 1965 the active Malaysian forces in Sarawak and Sabah included two reconnaissance battalions, utilizing British Ferret armored scout cars. The Malaysian army was supplied with a quantity of Italian-made 105mm howitzers by Britain.⁵ The Malaysian air force continued to perform in a non-combat role, acquiring eight Handley-Page Herald tactical transports from Britain in 1965.⁶ The air force requested a loan from the United States to acquire a number of combat-capable jet trainers, but disagreements between the United States and Malaysia over financing prevented the acquisition.⁷

¹United Service Quarterly, January-April 1966, p. 51.

²Taylor, op. cit., p. 71; U.S. News and World Report, May 3, 1965, p. 76; Time, January 15, 1965, p. 25.

³Jacquet-Francillon, op. cit., p. 16; Time, June 10, 1966, p. 40.

⁴Defense Management Report, September 6, 1965, p. 1.

⁵Military Balance: 1963-64, p. 36.

⁶Taylor, op. cit., p. 62.

⁷Time, January 8, 1965, p. 22.

As infiltration across the Strait mounted, Malaysia's navy took further steps to acquire modern patrol craft and training in their use. By early 1965 the Royal Australian Navy was training twelve Malaysian officers, and subsequently fourteen additional Vosper patrol boats with 40mm antiaircraft guns and advanced radar and communications gear were ordered from Britain.¹ An intention to acquire amphibious offense was possibly disclosed by the order of four landing craft (tanks) from the Australian navy in 1965.² Malaysia's land and sea forces were deployed defensively along a 1,000-mile coast line and a 600-mile jungle and mountain frontier with Indonesia on Borneo.

Weapons Available to Commonwealth Forces

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>
Enfield .38 revolver	5,000
Webley .38 pistol	2,000
FN Browning 9mm automatic	3,000
L1A1 7.62mm rifle	over 15,000
rifles, other types	10,000
L2A3 Sterling 9mm SMG	6,000
submachine guns, other types	6,000
L7A1 GPMG 7.62mm	3,000
machine guns, other types	1,700
105mm howitzer	200
aircraft carrier (U.K. Royal Navy)	2
commando carrier (U.K. Royal Navy)	1
frigate, guided-missile (U.K. Royal Navy)	1
patrol vessels, including destroyers and minesweepers (U.K. Royal Navy)	66
frigate (Royal Malaysian Navy)	1

¹ Military Export Reporter, August 4, 1965, p. 28; United Service Quarterly, January-April, 1966, p. 53.

² Janes Fighting Ships, p. 175.

WEC-98 III

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>
minesweeper (Royal Malaysian Navy)	7
patrol vessel (Royal Malaysian Navy)	6
LCT (Royal Malaysian Navy)	1
destroyer (Royal Australian Navy)	1
minesweeper (Royal Australian Navy)	2
Javelin aircraft (RAF Far East Air Force)	30
Victor/Vulcan (RAF Far East Air Force)	4
Canberra (RAF Far East Air Force)	15
Hunter (RAF Far East Air Force)	15
Shackleton (RAF Far East Air Force)	12-15
Sea Vixen (U.K. Fleet Air Arm)	25
Buccaneer (U.K. Fleet Air Arm)	25
Scimitar (U.K. Fleet Air Arm)	50
Sabre (Royal Australian Air Force)	30
Canberra (Royal Australian Air Force)	15
Canberra (Royal New Zealand Air Force)	15
RAF Bloodhound II air defense missile	1 squadrer

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL

"Controlling" the Conflict

In the circumstances, control meant preventing Sukarnoism, disposing peacefully of the disputed regions of Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei, and either permitting a quick Indonesian victory, or mobilizing peacekeeping agencies to suppress the conflict and keep the parties apart.

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. The fundamental basis for the dispute was territorial, but all three claimants for Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei employed ethnic arguments. As with Cyprus and Kashmir, a truly effective preventive policy could only be one that got at the root problem--self-determination for the people involved. Third-party fact-finding (such as the later U.N. opinion-sampling) might nip such conflicts in the bud, with the secondary benefit of dealing with tension-building charges and countercharges (such as that of Indonesian complicity in the Brunei revolt). This in turn can lay a factual basis for international arbitration or adjudication of the territorial claims. (An alternative to the latter is for the colonial power to settle the issues before leaving. This, however, can generate the bloodiest and least controllable kind of conflict.)

2. Much of the impetus behind the growing conflict was furnished by Sukarno's dream of empire. Timely replacement of a demagogic leader might have spared the world Hitler's later years, not to mention such would-be political messiahs as the latter-day Sukarno, Nkrumah, and Castro. Encouragement of internal freedoms and moderate leadership demonstrably can fix a nation on goals of domestic progress and refocus national energies away from quixotic foreign objectives. It can also reduce the reform-appeal of such flourishing radical movements as Indonesia's PKI. The extent to which the "foreign devil" preoccupation

with West Irian kept conflict with Malaysia at a low level, and in general kept a kind of internal unity among separatist Indonesian movements, probably did not outweigh in net conflict-prevention terms the dangers of potential international conflict created by such a policy.

3. Nothing--particularly in an aggressive policy--succeeds like success. Sukarno's success in bloodlessly capturing West New Guinea by a policy of threat encouraged him in confronting Malaysia. The lesson of the 1930s has been well learned when it comes to confronting Communism, but very badly learned otherwise. Peaceful nations are perpetually confronted with a choice of extreme solutions to a given problem (which incidentally represents the worst single aspect of the South African problem for the United States). West Irian (as some urgently proposed earlier^{*}) could have become, for example, a U.N. trust territory under Article 81 or a suitable variant thereof, as should any territory where the only available choices are the perpetuation of colonialism or the appeasement of aggression.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

4. Indonesia's ability to pursue a proto-imperialist policy was largely due to about \$1 billion of Soviet arms aid. Great-power agreements to limit arms aid to that needed for internal defense only, and in local area balance, might have discouraged Sukarno's ambitions. As it was, third-party counterforce in the area (in the form of British forces in Malaysia) supplied the necessary deterrence and balance. (Later it might have been better for an international force to monitor and deter Indonesian probes against Malaysia.)

5. Within the limits of diplomacy, it might have been useful to give more tangible encouragement to forces of moderation, for example,

^{*}See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston, Mass., Little, Brown, 1960), p. 161.

to the proposal by the Philippines for a resolution of the issue in a Greater Malay Confederation. The United Nations should have been far more active in pressing for a settlement. U.S.-Soviet cooperation, however tacit, is probably the single most useful device for exerting maximum diplomatic influence on local conflicts. Also influential is regional pressure on the parties to settle their differences peacefully.

Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

6. The introduction of offsetting third-party (here British) forces to defend against aggression can be seen as prolonging hostilities, where otherwise there might have been a quick victory (as in Goa, for instance). But by balancing the local force level, such intervention can tend to moderate hostilities.

7. Equally complex here was the availability of externally-supplied arms. Weapons are often used chiefly symbolically (as Khrushchev used nuclear weapons in Cuba, as Sukarno used his forces in West Irian, and the Turks theirs in Cyprus) to convey a political message and achieve a political end without actually using a significant degree of force. It may reduce the blackmail capability of a Sukarno to deny him sophisticated weapons; but in fact what were used in the raids on Malaysia were low-level.

8. This points to the utility of there being political activity and agencies to deal with this kind of game. A variety of U.N. instrumentalities were pertinent in this case, ranging from continuing fact-finding, through cease-fires and buffer zones, to guarantees with sanctions (for the results of the U.N. quasi-plebiscite that did take place). Neither Indonesia's withdrawal nor the Soviet veto in the Security Council should have diminished U.N. efforts to influence the situation. As always, significant great-power (e.g., U.S.) support diplomacy (like that represented by Robert Kennedy's visit) was a vital reinforcer to international-organization efforts. If a regional organization had existed in the area, it too ought to have been mobilized in support of peaceful settlement. These external pressures in turn might

have strengthened growing internal dissatisfaction in Indonesia.

9. Where ethnic trans-border groups help keep conflict alive, consideration should be given (as was done with Chinese villagers in Sarawak) to their relocation away from borders.

10. In sum, relevant conflict-control policy measures were:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Self-determination

Third-party fact-finding

leading to

International arbitration or adjudication

Prevention or elimination of demagogic dictatorships

Encouragement of internal freedom and moderate leadership

to work toward

Focus on development goals

Peaceful disposition of disputed territories*

e.g., under

U.N. trusteeship (Art. 81)

in any event

Denial of success to aggression

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Great-power agreement to limit arms aid to internal
defense purposes

Local area arms balances

or

Third-party counterforce in area*

preferably

International peacekeeping force

Encouragement of forces of moderation

U.S.-Soviet cooperation

Regional pressures on parties

MODERATING HOSTILITIES

Local area arms balances*

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

U.N. fact-finding, cease-fire, buffer zones

Settlement guaranteed with U.N. sanctions

Regional organization to assist pacific settlement

Significant great-power diplomatic support for settlement efforts*

Relocation from sensitive areas of trans-border ethnic groups*

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT :
1947 - 1965

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.	209
A.	Background of the Conflict	209
B.	Phase II: October 24, 1947 -- October 27, 1947.	227
C.	Phase III ₁ : October 27, 1947 -- January 1, 1949	229
D.	Phase IV ₁ : January 1, 1949 -- August 5, 1965.	242
E.	Phase III ₂ : August 5, 1965 -- September 22, 1965.	262
F.	Phase IV ₂ : From September 22, 1965.	284
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.	286
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option	286
B.	Phase II to Phase III ₁ : The Outbreak of Hostilities . . .	290
C.	Phase III ₁ : Hostilities	292
D.	Phase III ₁ to Phase IV ₁ : The Termination of Hostilities .	299
E.	Phase IV ₁ to Phase III ₂ : The Resumption of Hostilities. .	301
F.	Phase III ₂ : Hostilities	307
G.	Phase III ₂ to Phase IV ₂ : The Termination of Hostilities .	313
H.	Phase IV ₂ : Post-Hostilities	316
III.	Weapons Analysis.	317
A.	Indian Weapons Policy and Acquisition.	317
B.	Pakistani Weapons Policy and Acquisition	327
C.	A Problem of Control	331
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.	333

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT : 1947 - 1965

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES

A. Background of the Conflict

1. Physical and Human Geography of Kashmir.¹ The state of Jammu and Kashmir, containing 84,500 square miles and located due south of the juncture of the Soviet Union, Chinese Sinkiang, and Afghanistan, can be usefully subdivided into five regions. Clearly the most crucial of these, as far as the conflict between India and Pakistan is concerned, is the Valley of Kashmir. Though the Kashmir Valley represents only 4.5 per cent of the surface area of the state, it contains 36.6 per cent of the population and is the main source of the state's economic potential. In 1941 the population of the Kashmir Valley consisted of 1.3 million Kashmiri Moslems, 104,000 Hindus and Sikhs, and 70,000 non-Kashmiri Moslems.

The Valley of Kashmir is surrounded by mountain ranges that greatly limit land access to it. However, there are three important routes through the mountains. The Zoji La provides access from the regions of Ladakh in the east; cut through the Great Himalayan divide, it is located 11,500 feet above sea level. To the south the Banihal Pass at 9,200 feet opens into the region of Jammu, and thence south and west into the Punjab. Both the Banihal and Zoji are closed by snow during the winter months. The third route into the Kashmir Valley is

¹Material in this section is from the Times (London), August 10 and 11, 1948.

through the one major gap in the mountains, along the Jhelum River at Baramula. This route provides easy access directly from the Punjab at Rawalpindi.

The Western Districts of Kashmir form a second natural region. Divided from the Kashmir Valley by the mountains of the Pir Panjal range, they contain about 30 per cent of the population of the state. Though an estimated 40,000 Kashmiri Moslems (7 per cent of the state's population) had spread out from the Kashmir Valley into the Western Districts by 1941, 83 per cent of the people in the Districts were non-Kashmiri Moslems, primarily of Punjabi stock. A minority of Hindus and Sikhs represented approximately 8 per cent of the population.

From the eastern slopes of the Pir Panjal range, the major tributaries of the Jhelum and Chenab flow through the Western Districts into the plains of the Punjab, crucial to the economy of the Western Punjab as sources of hydroelectric power, of irrigation, and of communications. Indeed, it is up the river valleys from the Punjab that the natural routes of communication within the Western Districts lie. In 1947 there were no motor routes into the Poonch area either over the Pir Panjal from Srinagar or north from Jammu.

Jammu, the third area of Kashmir, extends to the south and east of the Western Districts. It is bordered on the north by the Pir Panjal range and the Himalayan divide. Approximately 26 per cent of the population of Kashmir live within this province. Sixty per cent of the population are Hindus and Sikhs; three-quarters of the Moslem 40 per cent are non-Kashmiri. As with the Western Districts, the major routes of communication are along the valleys of the Punjabi rivers, in this case the Chenab and the Ravi. The major road connections through Jammu are to Sialkot and the Rawalpindi-Lahore road, or over the Banihal Pass into the Kashmir Valley. In 1947 the road running south-east from Jammu went only as far as Kathua, near the Jammu-Punjab border, leaving access to the East Punjab only ten miles away across the Ravi at the railhead in Pathankot.

On the north and east side of the Himalayan divide are the regions of Gilgit and Baltistan-Ladakh. Though they make up the largest part of the land area of the state, their population is less than 8 per cent of the total. The people of these regions are predominantly Moslem, though Buddhists of Tibetan stock predominate in the southern and eastern parts of Ladakh.

The population of Kashmir is, then, characterized by both religious and cultural heterogeneity. Moslems make up 77 per cent of the population, but they are nearly equally divided among Kashmiris (53.2 per cent of the Moslems) and non-Kashmiris (46.8 per cent). The great majority of the Hindus in the state are not part of the Kashmiri heritage and culture, but rather--like most of the non-Kashmiri Moslems--have their cultural roots in the Punjab. Indeed, though the strategic Kashmir Valley is 90 per cent Kashmiri, the state as a whole is predominantly non-Kashmiri. The picture of heterogeneity is further complicated by the fact that each major religious-cultural group holds a numerically dominant position in one of the three populous regions--Kashmiri Moslems in the Kashmir Valley, non-Kashmiri Moslems in the Western Districts, and non-Kashmiri Hindus in Jammu. Each group also has, however, important minority communities in the other two regions. Religion is the most compelling basis of social identification in Kashmir, in part because of the great potential for animosity that seems to be inherent in relations between Hindus and Moslems. This fact should not be allowed, however, to obscure the importance of cultural and regional loyalties in the Kashmir conflict.

2. Lands Bordering Kashmir. Bordering Kashmir to the west, north of the Jhelum River, is the North-West Frontier Province. Under British rule, this borderland was long considered to be the major single defense consideration of the subcontinent, in part because of the threat of external invasion through Afghanistan, but largely because of the threat of attack by tribal bands from the Province itself. These tribes are almost all Pushtu-speaking Pathans of Afghan stock, each group with

AREA NAME	POPULATION	PER CENT OF TOTAL POPULATION		NUMBER OF KASHMIRI MOSLEMS		NUMBER OF NON-KASHMIRI MOSLEMS		NUMBER OF KASHMIRIS		NUMBER OF NON-KASHMIRI		BUDDHISTS
Kashmir Valley	1,474,000	36.6		1,300,000	70,000	104,000						
Western Districts	1,212,000	30.1		40,000	1,011,000							161,000
Jammu	1,030,000	25.6		110,000	301,000							619,000
Gilgit	115,000	2.9			115,000							
Baltistan and Western Ladakh	150,000	3.7			150,000							
Buddhist Ladakh	44,000	1.1										40,000
TOTAL	4,025,000	100.0		1,450,000	1,651,000	104,000						780,000
Religious-ethnic groups as per cent of total population				36.1	41.0	2.6						19.4
												0.9
TOTAL MOSLEM POPULATION: 3,101,000 (77.1 per cent)												
TOTAL NON-MOSLEM POPULATION: 924,000 (22.9 per cent)												
TOTAL KASHMIRI POPULATION: 1,554,000 (38.7 per cent)												
TOTAL NON-KASHMIRI POPULATION: 2,471,000 (61.3 per cent)												

*Information in this table is contained in the Times (London), August 10 and 11, 1948.

its own territory and chieftain, who have traditionally been unable to sustain themselves on the meager agriculture of the mountains. For generations they have lived by levying tolls on the caravans using the mountain passes and by raiding the fertile lowlands to the south. The British maintained a measure of control by paying sizeable annual tributes to many of the larger tribes and by garrisoning strong military forces at key outposts in and on the borders of the tribal areas.

In the partition of the subcontinent during 1947, the North-West Frontier Province became part of Pakistan. At that time it was estimated that the tribes could muster some 500,000 fighting men and nearly that many rifles.¹ At unknown locations in the mountains they had large armories in which they manufactured their own weapons, identical in appearance to British and Soviet ordnance but of inferior material quality.

South of the North-West Frontier Province are the five rich and fertile river valleys of the Punjab. All five of the rivers rise in the Great Himalayas, open out into the Punjabi plain, and then join the Indus River. Though populated predominantly by Moslems, the Punjab also includes large Hindu and Sikh minorities. The main communication route within the Punjab is the road and rail line from Rawalpindi to the south and east, a line that runs within ten miles of the Kashmir border at the Jhelum River, then proceeds south to Lahore, Amritsar, and Delhi. A secondary route begins at Pathankot, near the Jammu border, and travels south, meeting the Lahore-Delhi route at Jullundur. East of the Pathankot-Jullundur route, north-south communications become extremely difficult because of the crosscutting Himalayan gorges which open out into the Punjabi plains.

¹Major-General Sir Dashwood Strettell, "The Indian Army Before and After 1947," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XXXV, Part II (April 1948), p. 127.

In the creation of Pakistan, the Punjab was divided, the western portion going to Pakistan and the eastern part to India. The area between Kathua and Pathankot, as well as the territory between Pathankot and Jullundur, was awarded to India. The Rawalpindi-Lahore-Amritsar road, however, was in Pakistan. Thus, Kashmir's natural lines of communication--along the Indus, the Jhelum, the Chenab, and their tributaries--led into Pakistan. India was cut off from Kashmir by road, though the construction of a link between Kathua and Pathankot would make possible land travel between Srinagar and New Delhi.

To the east and north of Kashmir lie the mountainous and sparsely populated areas of Tibet and Sinkiang Province of China. Neither area seemed, in 1947, to pose a political or military threat to Kashmir or other parts of the subcontinent. To the north of Gilgit and the North-West Frontier Province lies the narrow Wakham Peninsula of Afghanistan which, along with the western tip of Sinkiang, separates the Soviet Union and Kashmir by about 30 miles.

3. Political History of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1752, Kashmir (then consisting only of the Kashmir Valley and the Western Districts) was invaded and conquered by Afghan tribesmen, who were driven out 67 years later by Sikh forces. The Moslem inhabitants of Kashmir were oppressed with nearly equal severity by both groups of invaders. In 1846 the British defeated the Sikh forces and forced them to relinquish control over the territories of Kashmir and Gilgit. Later the same year, an enterprising Hindu raja of the Dogra clan, Gulab Singh, purchased the territories from the British for £1 million and added them to his hereditary holdings of Jammu and Ladakh. Soon thereafter he gave up the small part of his territory that was in what is now the North-West Frontier Province in return for more land in the Jammu area. In this way the diverse areas of Ladakh, Gilgit, Jammu, the Western Districts, and the Valley of Kashmir were brought together under Hindu rule during the 19th century. When India and Pakistan gained their independence, Gulab Singh's grandnephew, Maharaja

Sir Hari Singh, was on the throne of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.¹

The policies of the Hindu Dogra rulers in Kashmir are generally agreed to have been repressive, authoritarian, and heavily extractive in nature. In 1930 a small group of Kashmiri intellectuals, led by Sheikh Abdullah, began agitating for greater Moslem representation in the state administration and for the beginnings of constitutional government. Sheikh Abdullah was jailed temporarily in 1931, but on his release the following year he organized the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. Its narrowly Moslem orientation was progressively discarded as its concerns shifted to agitation for responsible government, and, in 1939, its name was changed to the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, welcoming members of all castes and religions.²

As Sheikh Abdullah moved into various positions of leadership in the All India States Peoples' Conference--an organization that sought the democratization of areas not directly administered by the British--he came into increasing contact with the Indian National Congress and Jawaharlal Nehru, a fellow Kashmiri, with whom he shared an interest in socialism and a desire to foster secular politics in India.

Sheikh Abdullah developed extensive support in the Valley of Kashmir during the late 1930s and the 1940s, though apparently his following was less strong elsewhere in the state.³ In 1941, Abdullah's National Conference was offered competition by the developing Muslim Conference, which soon became closely associated with the Muslim League

¹Lord Birdwood, India and Pakistan: A Continent Decides (New York, Praeger, 1954), pp. 211-212.

²Dr. Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1955 (Amsterdam, Djambatan, 1958), pp. 84-85.

³Ibid., p. 88, and Birdwood, op. cit., p. 214. Birdwood suggests that though the National Conference membership in the Kashmir Valley was about 50 per cent Moslem, it became increasingly non-Moslem as distance from the Valley increased.

and its demands for the creation of a Moslem Pakistan.¹ There is no reliable indication of the relative influence and support of these two movements in the state at the time of the British departure from India.²

In the spring of 1946 the National Conference began a civil disobedience movement against the rule of the Maharaja, and Abdullah was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. In September of the same year, the leader of the Muslim Conference was also jailed for his part in a "direct action" campaign against the government. Thus, at the time of Indian and Pakistani independence, the leaders of the two significant political organizations in the state of Jammu and Kashmir were in prison.³

4. Relations Between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. Throughout the history of its struggle for independence, the Indian National Congress had held firmly to a vision of a secular India that would bring together, in cooperative leadership, Hindu, Moslem, Sikh, and Christian. As independence became a real possibility, however, increasing numbers of Moslems began to suggest that the predominantly Hindu leadership of the Congress was catholic in its vision only because it would exercise the dominant power in a free and united India. British raj, they predicted, would be replaced by Hindu raj.

The Muslim League that emerged was committed to a separate Moslem state of Pakistan and thus, despite its inferiority in size,

¹Das Gupta, op. cit., pp. 85-87.

²Elections were held in January 1947. They were boycotted by the National Conference, a rough indication of whose strength can be gathered by the fact that only 30 per cent of qualified voters turned out. See figures in ibid., p. 88. Suffrage, however, was limited to about 10 per cent of the total population, and it has been suggested that the main strength of the National Conference was among the landowners and literates who were in the suffrage lists.

³Ibid., p. 87.

experience, and leadership skills, represented a severe challenge to the ideology of the Congress, though of course it shared the desire to evict the British from the subcontinent. The tension between the League and the Congress--and their extensions, the Dominions of Pakistan and India--was greatly increased by the outbreak of large-scale communal rioting in early 1947. By far the worst massacres took place in the Punjab. An uneasy truce between Hindus and Sikhs on the one hand and Moslems on the other came to a disastrous end as it became clear that the Punjab would be split in the creation of two nations out of one. Uncontrolled violence and atrocities encouraged and exaggerated rumor, panic, retribution, and desperate attempts to escape to the presumed safety of areas dominated by one's coreligionists. Before order was restored, some 14 million refugees crossed the new border, and over 500,000 people were dead. Such violence and hatred among followers added to the store of suspicion and mistrust between leaders. Each side suspected that the forces available to the other were not being used in the interests of the impartial quelling of the riots. Each side became increasingly subject to the demands of the extremists among its followers.

Finally, a whole range of issues related to the division of British India presented difficult problems of negotiation between the leaders of India and Pakistan. The Indian army, air force, and navy, along with all their materiel, had to be divided. National assets and debts had to be apportioned, and terms for financial exchanges agreed on. Control over the irrigation waters of the Punjab had to be worked out, and some understanding on trade conditions seemed necessary to the economic viability of both sides.

5. The Issue of the Princely States. There were thus many serious problems complicating relations between the new states of India and Pakistan as they approached independence. The possibility of Kashmir's becoming a focus of conflict arose when the British announced in June 1947, as part of the partition plan for the subcontinent, that

the Princely States (areas not under direct British administration) would be given a choice of "entering into a federal relationship with the successor . . . governments . . . or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with . . . them."

Lord Mountbatten, the British Viceroy responsible for completing partition arrangements, independence, and the disposition of the Princely States, strongly urged the princes to determine in some manner the will of their people and to agree to an accession to either India or Pakistan before the August 15, 1947, transfer of authority. Whereas the Congress supported this position, both Mohammed Ali Jinnah (leader of the Muslim League and future Governor-General of Pakistan) and Liaquat Ali Khan suggested that the princes could appropriately assume complete and separate sovereign status for themselves and that, indeed, the domestic independence of states acceding to Pakistan would be guaranteed by Pakistan.

In July 1947, Lord Mountbatten visited the Maharaja of Kashmir and his Prime Minister, Pandit Kak. Mountbatten strongly advised the leaders neither to declare the independence of Kashmir nor to delay deciding on accession plans beyond August 15.¹ The Maharaja was, however, faced with a difficult choice. While his position as an unpopular Hindu autocrat in a Moslem Pakistan would be extremely insecure, in India his control over Kashmir would be seriously threatened by Nehru's friendship for Abdullah. It must have appeared probable that he would be forced to relinquish most, if not all, of his autocratic power to a popularly elected government. Following Mountbatten's visit, the Maharaja received deputations from several Congress leaders, including Gandhi.²

¹Rear-Admiral Earl Mountbatten, "Lord Mountbatten on His Viceroyalty," Asiatic Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 160 (October 1948), pp. 347-354. For an account of a later speech that Mountbatten gave to the heads of all Indian Princely States, see the New York Times, August 1, 1947.

²Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 92.

Finally, on August 12, the Maharaja took advantage of a diplomatic device known as a "stand-still" agreement to provide for "the continuation of the previous inter-state arrangements for normal flow of goods and traffic, pending final settlement of the issue of accession."¹ Though he expressed a desire to sign such an agreement with both India and Pakistan, only Pakistan responded positively.

It is probable that the Indian government, already beset by an enormous range of problems, did not want to become involved in an agreement with Kashmir that might be interpreted in Pakistan as a sign of Indian ambitions in that state. Later interviews with Pakistani officials indicated that they had interpreted the absence of a formal agreement between India and Kashmir as meaning that Kashmir would ultimately become a part of Pakistan.² Indeed, the government of India had let it be known through Mountbatten that it would not object to Kashmir's accession to Pakistan, and Indian official V. P. Menon suggests that the leadership of the Indian States Ministry was too preoccupied with problems elsewhere to take the initiative over Kashmir.³

Some indication of India's general position on the disposition of the Princely States is suggested, however, by the outcome of the first serious contest of wills in the accession struggle. On August 15, 1947, the Moslem ruler of the small state of Junagadh, on the western coast some 300 miles from the nearest Pakistani sea port, informed India of Pakistan's acceptance of its accession. Complex legal arguments followed, and the plights of smaller adjoining states and the Hindu majority of Junagadh were invoked by India as justification

¹Ibid., p. 93.

²Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (New York, Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 23.

³V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (New York, Macmillan, 1956), p. 395. The author served as senior assistant to the Indian States Minister.

for moving its troops in and eventually reversing the accession. This series of events both showed India's willingness to deal firmly with accession disputes and aggravated already tense relationships between India and Pakistan.

6. Kashmiri-Pakistani Relations. Following the signing of the "stand-still" agreement between Kashmir and Pakistan, relations between them began to deteriorate rapidly. One week after Gandhi's visit to the Maharaja, Kashmir's Prime Minister Kak resigned. He had been reported to sympathize with Pakistan because of a feud between his family and that of Nehru.¹ Kak's successor, who lasted less than two months, was reported to be pro-Indian, and the man who followed him had even closer ties to India.² The Kashmir government in August rejected Jinnah's request to visit Kashmir for a holiday.³ Then, during the last part of September, Abdullah was released from jail, but the leader of the pro-Pakistan Muslim Conference remained in prison. There followed a series of measures that seemed designed to prevent agitation inside Kashmir for accession to Pakistan. Newspapers were censored or closed, journalists were detained, and the state assembly was prorogued.⁴ Pakistan later claimed that these events were evidence of a plot between the Maharaja and Indian leaders to use the period of the "stand-still" agreement to create a fait accompli and incorporate Kashmir into India.

The existence of such a plot seems highly questionable. It is clear that the Maharaja was suspicious of Pakistan and of Pakistani intentions, but both British and Indian observers suggest that he was hoping to be able to strengthen his position with both India and

¹ Birdwood, op. cit., p. 218.

² Menon, op. cit., p. 296; Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 100.

³ Birdwood, op. cit., p. 218.

⁴ Alice Thorner, "The Kashmir Conflict," Middle East Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1949), p. 21. See also the Times (London), October 10, 1947.

Pakistan by delaying a decision and, eventually, to emerge with a large measure of independence from both.¹ It is also possible that the Pakistani perception of the plot was, ex post facto, designed to justify later claims that the accession of Kashmir to India was obtained by fraud and was, therefore, invalid.

A second set of developments that aggravated Kashmiri-Pakistani relations took place in the northern districts of Chitral and Gilgit. Both had been considered strategic areas by the British and had accordingly been administered by a British agent, though the leaders of both areas owed nominal allegiance to the Maharaja of Kashmir. Upon the withdrawal of the British, both areas were officially retroceded to the Maharaja.² By the time the Maharaja's appointed governor arrived in Gilgit, however, the Gilgiti Republic had been established, and the intervention of Pakistan invited.³ Soon thereafter, Pakistan extended its control into Baltistan. Then, on October 6, word was received that Chitral had, without prior consultation with the Maharaja, acceded to Pakistan.⁴ Though Pakistan did not accept the accession until February 1948, the Maharaja appears to have regarded it as a fait accompli in October 1947.⁵ Thus, in the cases of both Chitral and Gilgit, the Maharaja felt his hopes for strategically important extensions of his territory had been frustrated by Pakistani duplicity.

A third set of developments brought Kashmiri-Pakistani relations to a critical juncture. In the spring of 1947, a rebellion had broken out among elements of the Moslem population in the Poonchi area

¹Birdwood, op. cit., p. 217; Das Gupta, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

²Birdwood, op. cit., pp. 266-267.

³Ibid.; see also Menon, op. cit., pp. 404-405.

⁴New York Times, October 7, 1947.

⁵Wayne A. Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (New York, Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 81-83.

of the Western Districts of Kashmir. The immediate source of discontent appears to have been attempts to raise taxes.¹ Kashmiri state troops were dispatched to the area but were unable to suppress the unrest. In fact, many of the Moslems in the Maharaja's army deserted to the Poonchi rebels. The issue of accession became salient, and mass meetings and demonstrations in favor of accession to Pakistan took place in and around Poonch.² Out of these developments arose the Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) movement, probably sometime in August. The exact strength of the movement at this time is unknown, but later analyses estimate that within a short time it was able to muster a militia of 30,000 from the Western Districts.³

The forces of the Maharaja launched another attempt during the last week of August to secure the area. Martial law was declared and public meetings along the northern borders of the Poonchi area were fired on. Kashmiri troops also began moving toward Mirpur and Poonch from Jammu in the south; their activities were supplemented by the violence of militant Hindu and Sikh refugees from the Punjab.⁴ This precipitated the panicked departure of large numbers of Moslems across the Jhelum into Pakistan, where they demanded Pakistani intervention on the part of their coreligionists and spread stories of wholesale atrocities by the forces of the Maharaja and the Hindu and Sikh populations.⁵ The Azad Kashmir movement apparently consolidated

¹For an account of the Poonchi uprisings, see Das Gupta, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

²Birdwood, op. cit., pp. 218-219.

³Ibid., p. 219; Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 95.

⁴Birdwood, op. cit., p. 219; Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 94. See the Times (London), October 25, 1947, on the basis of reports circulating in Srinagar.

⁵Birdwood, op. cit., p. 219; General Sir Frank Messervy, "Kashmir," Asiatic Review, Vol. XLV, No. 161 (January 1949), p. 469. Messervy was the first commander-in-chief of the Pakistani army.

its position in the region of Poonch, however, controlling all of the district except for the town itself.¹

In September 1947, Kashmiri-Pakistani relations deteriorated still further. The Valley of Kashmir was dependent on supplies of gasoline, sugar, salt, and kerosene oil brought in along the Jhelum River route from what was now Pakistani Punjab. In September these supplies stopped arriving; reports of Moslem raiders crossing the borders began reaching Srinagar, and it soon became clear that armed Moslems were blocking traffic in and out of the Valley, though whether they were from Pakistan or from the Western Districts of Kashmir was not clear.²

In any case the Maharaja soon came to feel that he was the object of intentional Pakistani pressure, and he protested both the economic boycott and the border raids in a series of telegrams sent to the Pakistani government.³ When, in early October, Pakistan sent the Joint Secretary of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the settlement of outstanding issues, the mission was rejected with the demand that infiltration stop before discussions could begin.⁴ In a telegram sent on October 18, the Maharaja warned that if the Pakistani government did not bring to an end the "unfriendly acts," Kashmir "would be justified in asking for friendly assistance."⁵

¹Statesman (Calcutta), February 4, 1948, quoted in Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 94. See also Birdwood, op. cit., p. 219.

²The extent of the difficulty involved in getting supplies into the Valley is debated. Certainly the turmoil in the Punjab was enormous, and reliable writers suggest that supplies were not even getting from Lahore to Rawalpindi, let alone from Rawalpindi into Kashmir. See Wilcox, op. cit., p. 61. Other writers maintain that the Pakistani government "was attempting to force the Maharaja's hand by economic pressures." Birdwood, op. cit., p. 218.

³Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 68.

⁴Wilcox, op. cit., p. 61.

⁵Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 98.

7. Developments in the North-West Frontier Province. While relations with Kashmir were worsening, Pakistan was faced with potentially serious trouble in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province. The entire military forces of the new nation of Pakistan were smaller in size than those that had been used by the British in the North-West Frontier area alone.¹ Moreover, under the terms of the partition arrangements, Pakistan received organized infantry units of company size only, and thus had to build battalion and larger-sized units as their components arrived from India.² The number of units available for military operations was further limited by the heavy demands for the maintenance of order and the protection of refugee convoys that were created by the communal rioting. Potentially even more serious to the capacity of the Pakistani military was its total dependence on India for all weapons, ammunition, stores, and replacements. As tension with India increased, the chances of obtaining these items decreased correspondingly.³

There was also grave question about the combat-effectiveness of a Pakistani army seriously deficient in officers. There were probably between 100 and 200 well-trained Pakistani officers at independence. The remaining billets had to be filled by temporary officers from the British Indian army who had been hurriedly trained during World War II and by approximately 500 British officers who signed contracts to serve in the Pakistani army for from one to three years after independence.⁴

As Pakistan assumed responsibility for the North-West Frontier

¹Major-General S. F. Irwin, "The Indian Army in Partition," Army Quarterly, Vol. LVI, No. 2 (July 1948).

²Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, "The Final Phase of the British-Indian Army," Great Britain and the East, October 1948, p. 43.

³Strettell, op. cit., p. 128.

⁴Auchinleck, op. cit., p. 42; Lieutenant-General E. N. Goddard, "Indian Review," Army Quarterly, Vol. LVII, No. 1 (October 1948), p. 18.

Province, it began to withdraw all troops from the tribal areas back to the Indus. In part this was tacit recognition of its relative military weakness.¹ British officers with experience in the frontier region despaired of Pakistan's ability to maintain order in the tribal areas, and some suggested that the country's logical course of action was to turn over the area west of the Indus to Afghanistan.² What measure of confidence Pakistan expressed with regard to its position in the tribal areas was based on the belief that the tribesmen would be less hostile to a government of fellow Moslems than to one of Christian Englishmen.

Early in September, however, reports began reaching Lahore and Peshawar that raiding and plundering bands of Pathan tribesmen were moving into the valleys of the Punjab; and there were rumors of larger risings deeper in the mountains. Attacks on troop trains and "severe and prolonged" fighting with government troops were reported. These movements, however, were but a prelude to future activities since the Pathans were then busy with their herds and only later in the year would their "official" shooting season begin.³

8. The Invasion of Kashmir. It appears that as early as October 2, 1947, tribesmen were approached about organizing raids into Kashmir. Contact was made primarily with leaders of the Mahsud tribes, reputed to be "the most ungovernable and wildest of a wild community."⁴ These overtures were probably made either by members of the Azad Kashmir movement or by senior members in the government of the North-West Frontier Province and not by the central Pakistani government, though there is no firm evidence on this.

¹"Some Strategical Aspects of Pakistan," Army Quarterly, Vol. LVII, No. 1 (October 1948), p. 23; Goddard, op. cit., p. 19.

²See, for example, Major-General J. R. Hartwell, "Whither the New Dominions," Eastern World, October 1947.

³Times (London), September 5 and 6, 1947.

⁴Birdwood, op. cit., p. 222.

By October 20, reports of truck convoys carrying as many as 900 armed tribesmen reached the military and civilian leaders of the North-West Frontier Province. Governor Sir George Cunningham ordered that the advance of the convoys be blocked at several points, but the British military commanders of the Pakistani army demurred: they lacked effective units, and they may have feared that their Moslem soldiers would join the tribesmen. Cunningham sent a letter to the commander of the Indian army on October 20, warning him of the military movements and their apparent intentions, but, according to V. P. Menon, "these reports failed at the time to excite any feeling of undue alarm or concern in the Government of India."¹ There are indications that the advance unit of about 900 men entered Kashmir on October 20, and between 2,000 and 5,000 crossed the border on October 22.² A paramilitary force, consisting of tribesmen, members of the Azad Kashmir movement, and some organizers from the unofficial Muslim League army in Pakistan, then began to move up the Jhelum Valley road toward Srinagar. It was soon joined by three battalions of Moslem defectors from the Maharaja's army.

The members of the Azad Kashmir movement in this operation were clearly intent on moving into Srinagar, evicting the Maharaja, and establishing themselves as the government of Kashmir. On October 24 they issued a statement as the Provisional Government of Kashmir, claiming rule over most of the state, announcing their intention to include Moslems and non-Moslems in the government, and asserting the belief that the question of accession would have to be settled by referendum.³ The defectors from the state troops of Kashmir

¹Menon, op. cit., p. 414; see also Thorner, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

²Wilcox, op. cit., p. 61. Varying estimates of the number involved can be found in Menon, op. cit., p. 396, Birdwood, op. cit., p. 223, and the Times (London), October 28, 1949, which last noted that estimates vary from several hundred to 10,000 but that the force probably did not exceed 3,000.

³Reuters dispatch from Lahore, reported in the New York Times, October 25, 1947.

probably shared these goals and lent experience and organization to the campaign. However, for the tribesmen (who were probably at least equal in number to the Azadi), the expedition represented a mixture of communal revenge, search for loot and women, and a chance for a good fight. They sacked and burned any village in their path, irrespective of its religious or political allegiance. Their interest in the Valley of Kashmir and in Srinagar lay in the opportunities they provided for plunder.¹

The invading force moved down the road toward Srinagar in trucks that later estimates placed at between 100 and 300 in number. They were armed with rifles, automatic rifles, machine guns, and mortars.² The state forces of Kashmir, totalling ten battalions before the invasion and seven after the desertion of the Moslem units, were in no position to offer effective resistance to the invading force. The chief-of-staff of the Kashmiri army, on hearing of the invasion, gathered together about 150 men and moved them rapidly to the town of Uri, where they managed to hold off the advance for two days.

B. Phase II: October 24, 1947 -- October 27, 1947

Once large numbers of Pathan tribesmen (supplemented by Azad Kashmiri forces) descended on Kashmir, the military situation of the Kashmiri state troops, and with it the Pakistani-Indian conflict, deteriorated rapidly. The first firm indication of armed incursions into Kashmir from Pakistani territory reached the commander-in-chief of the Indian army on October 24, 1947. On that day, news was received of the fall to the invading forces of the Kashmiri town of Muzaffarabad, just across the Pakistani border.

Reports reaching Srinagar of the battles were confused and contradictory. It was clear, however, that a sizeable invasion was in progress and that Srinagar was in imminent danger. Near panic prevailed

¹Wilcox, op. cit., p. 61; Birdwood, op. cit., p. 223.

²Menon, op. cit., p. 396; New York Times, October 27, 1947.

in the city; Hindus and Sikhs began their fearful exodus, east into Srinagar and thence south and over the mountains to Jammu.¹ On October 24 the raiders captured the powerhouse at Mahura, putting the city of Srinagar in darkness. It was under these conditions that the Maharaja sent a desperate appeal for aid to the government of India.

As a result of this appeal, the commanders of the Indian armed forces were directed, on the morning of October 25, "to examine and prepare plans for sending troops to Kashmir by air and road." During the afternoon of the same day, staff officers of the army and air force accompanied V. P. Menon on a flight to Srinagar to consult with the Kashmir government and military. At the same time, orders were issued "to an infantry battalion to prepare itself to be flown, at short notice, to Srinagar."²

The Indian Defence Committee met on the morning of October 25, under the chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten, to consider the Maharaja's plea for help. Considering further information from Kashmir to be a prerequisite to intervention, the Committee alerted the military and dispatched Menon to Srinagar. Menon found that the information available in Srinagar was little better than that reaching New Delhi. Beyond the fact that the Maharaja "was completely unnerved by the turn of events," and the Prime Minister "seemed temporarily to have lost his equanimity," Menon was able to learn little more than that the commander of the Kashmiri troops had promised to hold the raiders as long as possible from reaching the opening into the Kashmir Valley at Baramula. Menon urged the Maharaja to depart at once by road to Jammu and planned to leave himself the following morning. He was awakened in the night, however, by the Prime Minister of Kashmir with reports of "rumours that the raiders had infiltrated into Srinagar," and the

¹Times (London), October 27, 1947.

²Quotations in this paragraph are from a note signed by the three British commanders-in-chief of the army, air force, and navy, cited by Menon, op. cit., pp. 401-402. The note stated that these were the earliest military preparations taken with regard to Kashmir.

advice that they all leave immediately. Menon, "hardly able to collect [his] thoughts," left for New Delhi in the first light of the morning.¹

At a meeting of the Indian Defence Committee later in the morning of October 26, Mountbatten pressed the view that India could legally move troops into Kashmir only if Kashmir acceded to India.² Menon was consequently dispatched to Jammu, where he obtained the accession of the Maharaja and an agreement that Abdullah would "carry the responsibilities in this emergency with . . . his Prime Minister." Menon returned to New Delhi, and that same evening the Defence Committee met, and decided after a long discussion to accept the accession--subject to the provision that a plebiscite be held when law and order allowed--and to send in an infantry battalion by air the following morning. The mission of the military unit, as described by Menon, was "to secure the airfield in Srinagar, to render assistance to the Government of Kashmir in maintaining law and order in Srinagar and, if possible, to drive away any tribesmen who might have entered the city."³

C. Phase III₁: October 27, 1947 -- January 1, 1949


The hostilities in Kashmir following the introduction of Indian troops went through a number of changes in scope, scale, and nature. The points of change will be analyzed separately.

1. Sub-Phase A: October 27, 1947 -- October 29, 1947. The introduction of Indian army units into the fighting in Kashmir presented the Pakistani government with a new problem. Jinnah learned of the Indian troop commitment on the evening of October 27, at the home of the Governor of West Punjab, an Englishman. Jinnah immediately telephoned

¹Menon, op. cit., pp. 397-399.

²Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten (New York, Dutton, 1953), pp. 224-225. The author was a press secretary to Lord Mountbatten.

³Menon, op. cit., pp. 399-400.



the commander-in-chief of the Pakistani army--also an Englishman--and ordered the dispatch of Pakistani troops into the Valley of Kashmir. The army commander strongly urged that such a decision be delayed for three reasons. First was the problem of finding adequate military units to carry out the action. Second, even if the Kashmir Valley could be taken, it was clear that the Pakistani army would not be able to withstand the full-scale Indian attack from East into West Punjab that official Pakistani intervention in Kashmir might bring about. Third, an order for the commitment of Pakistani troops in Kashmir could not be given without the knowledge or sanction of the Supreme Commander of the Joint India-Pakistan Defence Council. The decision was then made to delay the order until the following morning when the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Auchinleck, would arrive in Lahore.

Upon Auchinleck's arrival, the British military commanders of the rival armies emphasized the potential consequences of the act of war against India that would be represented in sending troops into Kashmir. They succeeded on this basis in persuading Jinnah to rescind his earlier order. In its place, a plan of compromise was formulated in which the mutual withdrawal of Indian troops and tribesmen should take place, to be followed by a referendum in Kashmir. This plan formed the basis for intermittent and unsuccessful attempts at negotiation between India and Pakistan during the following two months.¹ The military commanders also warned Jinnah that British officers would be withdrawn from the armies of both India and Pakistan if forces of the two nations began fighting each other.

2. Sub-Phase B: October 29, 1947 -- November 30, 1947.

Though Menon suggests that the mission of the Indian forces was to relieve Srinagar, it soon became clear that the commanders on the scene

¹For accounts of this meeting, which vary only in details, see Birdwood, op. cit., pp. 225-226; also Noel Cooke, "The Tribesmen in Kashmir," Eastern World, June-July 1948, p. 12; and the Times (London), October 30, 1947.

saw their job as clearing the Kashmir Valley of raiders. This proved to be considerably more difficult and to require considerably larger military commitments than originally envisioned.

Earliest estimates in New Delhi were that 2,000 to 2,400 Indian troops would be able to handle the situation.¹ The first company to fly into the Kashmir Valley, however, was not able to hold at Baramula and had to retreat to Pattan, some twenty miles inside the Valley. The raiders were thus able to deploy far more freely than was the case in the narrow gorges of the Jhelum.²

On October 29, reinforcements for the original company began to arrive, and combat aircraft were committed on a small scale by the Indians. Strafing of the Jhelum River road disrupted the leading elements of the invasion. The tribesmen, sensing the blockage of the route to Srinagar, began fanning out in search of alternate targets for loot.³ Two days later, the 2,400 troops originally scheduled for commitment had already arrived in Kashmir, but estimates of requirements had risen considerably. It was now estimated that six battalions would be needed just in order to provide security to Srinagar and the airfield. By November 2 it appeared that India intended to build its forces in Kashmir to division strength without delay.⁴

The threat to Srinagar and the airfield continued to appear serious, however. Though the attack along the main Baramula-Srinagar road had been stopped, rebel forces seemed to be moving in from three directions.⁵ During the nights of November 3, 5, and 7, concerted

¹See different estimates in the New York Times, October 29 and November 1, 1947.

²Menon, op. cit., p. 403; New York Times, October 29, 1947.

³Times (London), October 30, 1947.

⁴New York Times, November 1, 1947; Times (London), November 3, 1947.

⁵Ibid., October 30 and November 1, 1947; New York Times, November 2, 1947.

attacks by forces of 700, 300, and 1,000 tribesmen reached to within four miles of the airfield.¹ On November 5, however, word was received that armored trucks and Bren carriers had crossed the Banihal Pass from India on their way into the combat area. By November 7 they had been committed on the Srinagar-Baramula road; and by November 9, Baramula was in Indian hands and most resistance within the Kashmir Valley had been overcome. The Indian army was driving on to Uri, 30 miles down the road, where, it was predicted, the backbone of the invaders would be broken.

The task of the army, however, remained the consolidation of its gains and the clearing out of pockets of resistance within the Valley.² By November 12 the army had recaptured the power plant at Mahura and had wiped out all organized opposition. The Indian forces at hand in the state of Jammu and Kashmir now consisted of a division of infantry, two troops of armored cars, two troops of 25-pounders, some mountain artillery, and a number of Spitfire and Tempest aircraft armed with machine guns and rigged to carry light bomb loads.³

In Srinagar it had become clear by November 2 that large numbers of new tribal raiders, apparently aware of the failure of the drive on the Valley, were moving across the Jhelum from Pakistan into the Western Districts of Kashmir, looting and raiding villages indiscriminately. Officers in the Valley told the London Times correspondent that if the invaders in this area consolidated their position, they would prove difficult to dislodge without a large-scale campaign that might last for months.

In New Delhi, meanwhile, intelligence reports from Kashmir were extremely meager. Telephone communication had been destroyed during the rioting and chaos in the Punjab. The New York Times

¹Times (London), November 5, 7, and 8, 1947.

²New York Times, November 7 and 9, 1947; Times (London), November 8 and 11, 1947.

³Times (London), November 10 and 13, 1947.

correspondent, Robert Trumbull, reported that "radio equipment in Kashmir is unreliable and one might say that it is a good case of 'snafu.'" Five days later an Indian military spokesman told Trumbull that intelligence from places other than Srinagar remained "all but nonexistent."¹ New Delhi was thus almost entirely ignorant of developments in the Western Districts.

When the Indian army reached Mahura, on the road to Uri, they discovered that the retreating forces had begun blowing up bridges along the route; as a result, it was estimated that it would take weeks, and possibly months, to recapture the road as far as the Pakistani border. With this route of Indian advance largely blocked, attention turned increasingly to the situation in the Western Districts and around Jammu.² By November 6, word had been received in Srinagar that nearly 100 villages in southern Jammu had been burned. In reprisal for these tribal attacks on predominantly Hindu villages, extremist Hindu and Sikh refugees from the Punjab began attacking Moslem villages.³ The remnants of the state troops of Kashmir garrisoned in the Western Districts were clustered into three of the major towns in the area under serious siege from the raiding forces.⁴

On November 19, Indian troops set out from Jammu to relieve the beleaguered towns of Mirpur, Kotli, and Poonch in the Western Districts of Kashmir. They were forced to travel along what were little more than paths through terrain that was crosscut by valleys and gorges.⁵ Though it is not clear who issued the orders for dispatch of the relief column, it appears that they came from within the

¹For reports from Srinagar, see ibid., November 3, 1947; the situation as seen from New Delhi is reported in the New York Times, November 3 and 8, 1947.

²Times (London), November 13, 1947.

³Ibid., November 7 and 18, 1947.

⁴Birdwood, op. cit., p. 228.

⁵Times (London), November 20, 1947.

divisional command in Srinagar. In any case, they were contrary to the advice of the chief-of-staff of the Indian army, General Bucher, who was in New Delhi.¹

Within two days, the Indian forces relieved Poonch, and five days later the siege of Kotli was raised. At that time there were two depleted battalions in the Poonch-Kotli area. The division commander of the Indian forces indicated that, unless the opposition collapsed suddenly, a long infantry campaign would have to be fought before the raiders were finally pushed back over the Pakistani border and that he was prepared to wage the campaign.²

The decision to relieve and hold Poonch and the surrounding area had serious implications. The two Indian battalions could receive logistical support only from Jammu, 100 miles away over treacherous routes that ran parallel to and within 30 miles of the Pakistani border. Supply movements were further complicated by guerrilla activities among the hostile population of the Western Districts of Kashmir and by raids from across the border. Nevertheless, within a short time the Indian army moved a division into the Western Districts and established headquarters at Naushahra.³ These operations extended an initially limited military action and required large new commitments of Indian troops. Moreover, they seemed to pose both threats and opportunities to Pakistan, leading to further extensions of military action.⁴

3. Sub-Phase C: November 30, 1947 -- January 20, 1948. India's predicament in the Western Districts of Kashmir became apparent both in Srinagar and in New Delhi by the end of November 1947. Snow began to

¹Birdwood, op. cit., p. 229.

²Ibid.; Times (London), November 28, 1947.

³New York Times, January 7, 1948.

⁴Birdwood, op. cit., pp. 230-231.

pile up in the Banihal Pass and motor traffic from India would soon be cut off entirely. Flying conditions were steadily worsening, complicating the supply of the Kashmir Valley by air. There appeared to be a serious danger that Indian troops in the Poonchi area would be cut off from reinforcements and supplies. The tribesmen and Azad Kashmir forces, meanwhile, were able to get supplies from, and take refuge inside, the Pakistani border. For the Indian army, therefore, the maintenance of security for existing forces in the Western Districts seemed to be the maximum possible capability until spring. Senior officers advised the Indian government that full protection for its own troops and a clearing of the raiders from western Kashmir could be accomplished only by crossing the Pakistani frontier, capturing the rebel headquarters there, and cutting off the supplies and the sanctuary that Pakistan provided. Moreover, it was suggested, the security of the Kashmir Valley itself could not be fully guaranteed so long as the rebel bases across the Pakistani border continued in operation.¹

In the early stages of the Kashmir invasion, most Indian officials tended to assume that it was simply a large-scale tribal raid that the Pakistani government was quite unable to control. By the middle of December, however, the Azad Kashmir movement's involvement and its connections to sympathetic organizations in Pakistan had been noted. The Indian military had gathered evidence that indicated clearly to them that the state government of the North-West Frontier Province, and very possibly the government of Pakistan as well, had provided the invading forces with transport, fuel, and weapons. High-ranking officers in the Pakistani army were "known" to have been leading the troops in Kashmir, and increasing numbers of Pakistani troops, "on leave," had appeared in the fighting.

¹See Sir Archibald Rowlands, "The Financial and Economic Prospects of Pakistan," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XXXV, Parts III and IV (July-October 1948), pp. 226-227; also Thorner, op. cit., p. 29. Rowlands was in Pakistan during this period as a financial advisor to the government.

Indian Prime Minister Nehru appears to have believed that he had clear-cut proof of Pakistan's complicity in the military invasion of Kashmir. Having been convinced by his military advisors that troop movements into Pakistan were necessary, he apparently determined to lay his case before the U.N. Security Council, obtain a rapid decision condemning Pakistani aggression, and then proceed to take the necessary military steps to consolidate the Indian position in Kashmir. On December 31, 1947, he dispatched an appeal to the Security Council, detailing the Indian case on Kashmir against Pakistan.¹

Very much contrary to Nehru's expectation, the United Nations did not immediately condemn Pakistan. The self-righteous case of the Indian prosecution was countered by apparent candor from the Pakistani delegate with respect to Kashmir, and by countercharges against India with respect to its actions in Junagadh, Hyderabad, and the Punjab. On January 20, 1948, the Security Council decided to appoint a committee to investigate further and mediate the conflict. Three months passed, however, before the committee was chosen and its terms of reference defined. By this time spring had arrived in Kashmir, and new military alternatives were open to both sides.

4. Sub-Phase D: January 20, 1948 -- May 1948. By the middle of January 1948, India had 15,000 troops in the field in Kashmir,² and rumors persisted that it might be forced to invade Pakistan in order to protect its commitments in Poonch. With the support of a second division in the western sector, however, Indian forces managed to hold their positions during the winter.³ Pakistan was evidently providing

¹This line of explanation for India's move to the United Nations is argued by Alice Thorner (op. cit., pp. 29-30). As far as can be determined from her citation of sources, it is conjecture only. The military evidence in her support, however, is strong and is corroborated by Rowlands.

²Times (London), January 13, 1948.

³Ibid., January 9, 1948; New York Times, January 13, 1948.

arms, ammunition, and supplies to the raiders throughout the winter, but refrained from committing its own troops.¹ With the coming of spring, the arrival of reinforcements shifted the military advantage again in favor of the Indian forces. What had once been an exposed Indian garrison in Poonch was now a powerful military force. It became clear that the existing Azadi forces would not be able to hold their positions.

As the expected arrival of a U.N. mediation committee neared, Pakistan feared the establishment of a cease-fire line that would provide India with close access to the Punjabi plains. Pakistan was, moreover, concerned about the security of the headwaters of the Upper Jhelum and Upper Chenab and seems to have been very much distraught by the prospect of the additional fugitives that would result from further Indian expansion in the Poonch region.² There were 6 million Moslem refugees already in the Punjab.

By March 1948 the government of Pakistan had committed units of mountain guns to the Kashmir front; and by May, the better part of an infantry division. The initial orders that sent these troops into Kashmir provided that the division headquarters would remain in Pakistan, that battalions would be committed in toto on Kashmiri soil, and that the mission of the regular troops would be solely to backstop the Azadi forces.³ Thus a reasonably balanced and stable military situation was established in the Western Districts at a new level of commitment for both sides.

Meanwhile, the stalemate on the Jhelum road continued. In May the Indian army undertook a flanking movement to the north and reached Tithwal safely. It was met and stopped, however, by regular forces of the Pakistani army. This front, too, returned to an uneasy

¹Times (London), January 13, 1948. See also a report of an interview with an American participant in the Azadi forces, in the New York Times, January 29, 1948.

²Messervy, op. cit., p. 475; see also Birdwood, op. cit., p. 230.

³Ibid., pp. 229-230.

stability.¹

5. Sub-Phase E: May 1948 -- June, July 1948. Following the accession of Gilgit District to Pakistan in 1947, the situation in the area remained quiet through the spring of 1948 as Pakistan began to consolidate its control. It was clear that the administration of this area had no relation whatever to the activities of the Azad Kashmir movement.

In May 1948, however, Moslem tribal guerrillas apparently began moving through Gilgit into Ladakh and met Indian army forces on May 17 near Skardu.² There is no indication that this guerrilla move was planned or sanctioned by the Pakistani government or army. In July 1948 the Gilgit Scouts, a unit of militia trained by the British and turned over to the Gilgit government, was reported to be involved in fighting in Ladakh.³ It appears that this extension of hostilities was the result of an attempt by disgruntled tribesmen uninterested in the conventional military conflict in western Kashmir to enter the Kashmir Valley by a wide flanking movement across Ladakh and through the Zoji Pass.⁴

The Indian forces were quick to counter the threat as it developed. They met the movement to the Zoji with tanks that had been partially disassembled, moved up to the 10,000-foot pass, and then reassembled. The air force began flying over the pass to Leh, and by October 8, Indian forces had secured the valley of Ladakh.⁵

6. Sub-Phase F: June, July 1948 -- January 1, 1949. During the summer fighting, the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP)

¹Thorner, op. cit., p. 168; Birdwood, op. cit., p. 232.

²New York Times, May 18, 1948.

³Ibid., July 18, 1948.

⁴Birdwood, op. cit., p. 233.

⁵Ibid.; New York Times, October 9, 1948.

visited the subcontinent, returned to Europe, wrote an interim report, and passed a resolution on August 13, 1948, proposing terms for a cease-fire. The resolution, which suggested the withdrawal of Pakistani troops before the withdrawal of Indian troops, was rejected by Pakistan.

As the first anniversary of hostilities approached, the positions of the forces in western Kashmir were similar to what they had been before winter closed in the previous year. The main difference was that India had now committed three divisions to the front, and Pakistan had two divisions of its own army plus the forces of the Azad Kashmir movement.¹

Pakistani forces managed to cut off the town of Poonch a second time, but by then Indian engineers had put through a road from Jammu and Poonch was relieved with the aid of a 25-pounder gun. Attacks on key Indian installations were attempted by the Pakistani army during November and early December, but the Indian positions held firm.² The Indian army appeared to have established effective control over a major part of western Kashmir; to have secured its position fully, however, would have required a large-scale movement into Pakistani territory.

¹Communication from Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan to President of Security Council, U.N. Document S/1087. See also the Times (London), December 3, 1948. There is some evidence that in early June Pakistan was planning "a major air and ground offensive in Kashmir before the arrival of the United Nations commission." Apparently the Indian government learned of the plan, and in response informed the British government and warned that its result would be an Indian declaration of war against Pakistan. The British were anxious to avert war between two Commonwealth countries, especially as both were partially officered by the British. Therefore, Prime Minister Attlee is reported to have informed the Pakistani government that all British officers would be withdrawn from the armed forces of both countries if the Pakistani air force was employed in Kashmir. At that time Pakistan was using about 700 British officers while India had only 300 serving with a force twice the size of Pakistan's. Pakistan is reported to have responded to the British government with assurances that its air force would not be used in Kashmir. See the New York Times, August 8, 1948, for a report on this quoted from the Times (Hindustan).

²Birdwood, op. cit., pp. 233-234.

By this time, both sides were suffering under the costs of supporting their forces. One report estimated that the cost to India was about £75,000 a month.¹ The strain on Pakistan's financial resources was described as prohibitive.²

As the end of the year approached, a member of UNCIP, Dr. Alfredo Lozano of Colombia, visited both nations; and on December 11 he drew up a list of principles that were to provide the basis for a revised resolution for a cease-fire. The principles called for the simultaneous withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces, but the continued presence of the existing government of Sheikh Abdullah in Indian-controlled Kashmir during a plebiscite. This latter condition was one that the government of Pakistan had consistently refused to consider since the first negotiations on the problem in November 1947. On December 29, 1948, however, reports circulated in Karachi that Pakistan would accept the principles: while unconvinced that such an arrangement would ensure complete impartiality for the plebiscite, the government wanted to make an effort to resolve the problem.³ The same day in New Delhi, "usually dependable quarters" reported that India also was willing to accept the principles.⁴

The development of a military stalemate thus seems to have led to a political willingness on the part of both governments to accept the idea of a cease-fire based on the existing military front. Once this agreement was understood, it was put back into military hands for implementation. On December 30, 1948, the British commander of the Indian army sent a telegram to the British commander of the Pakistani army that read in part:

¹M. Philips Price, "Impressions of Pakistan, Kashmir and the North-West Frontier," Asiatic Review, Vol. XLV, No. 162 (April 1949), pp. 566-574.

²Thorner, op. cit., p. 178.

³Times (London), December 30, 1948.

⁴New York Times, December 30, 1948.

In view of political developments my Government [India] thinks continuation of moves and countermoves too often due to misunderstanding accompanied by fire support. Seems senseless and wasteful in human life besides only tending to embitter feelings. My Government authorises me to state I will have their full support if I order Indian troops to remain in present positions and to cease fire. Naturally I cannot issue any such order until I have assurance from you that you are in a position to take immediate reciprocal and effective action. Please reply most immediate.¹

General Gracey responded positively, and at one minute before midnight, December 31, 1948, a cease-fire came into operation.

D. Phase IV₁: January 1, 1949 -- August 5, 1965

The cease-fire of January 1, 1949, was a military agreement to stop fighting, and constituted the first of three agreements contemplated by UNCIP in two resolutions. The first resolution, approved on August 13, 1948, had been concerned with both a cease-fire and the principles to govern a truce; the second, dated January 5, 1949, set forth principles to govern a plebiscite.

Military representatives of India and Pakistan meeting with members of UNCIP were able to agree in July 1949 to the demarcation of a cease-fire line over 800 miles of front. Forty military observers were assigned the task of the demarcation of the line on the ground and its observation. But the next question--the demilitarization of Kashmir in preparation for the holding of a plebiscite--was an insurmountable obstacle to agreement for the succeeding fifteen years.

Three issues frustrated the attempts to end the conflict:
(a) Pakistan objected to the occupation by Indian forces of strategic points in the northern areas of the state, maintaining that the Kashmiris were a meek people who would not express their true feelings in a plebiscite so long as the dominant military and police force in the area was that of the Indian army; (b) India insisted that law and order

¹Quoted by Birdwood, op. cit., p. 302.

required the disarmament and disbandment of the Azad Kashmiri forces, even though the U.N. resolution had not called for it; (c) there was no agreement on the synchronization of the withdrawal of Pakistani forces on the one hand and Indian forces on the other.

Efforts to resolve the impasse were undertaken by UNCIP, by direct consultation under Security Council auspices, and by individual mediation missions on behalf of the United Nations undertaken by Sir Owen Dixon, General A. G. L. McNaughton, and Frank P. Graham. The British Commonwealth offered itself as a forum for resolving the conflict, and bilateral negotiations between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan were begun. Though neither side explicitly rejected third-party arbitration of the conflict, at no point were they able to agree on the choice of an arbitrator and terms of reference for his work.¹

As the political issues involving the future of Kashmir continued to be discussed and debated but not resolved, changes took place in India, in Pakistan, in Kashmir itself, and in the significance of these areas for the rest of the world. These changes not only modified the positions of India and Pakistan in the conflict over Kashmir, but also greatly altered the political, economic, diplomatic, and military context of the conflict. Indeed, it is only in the light of these changes that the outbreak of renewed violence in 1965 can be fully understood. The most relevant of these developments will be only briefly summarized here.

1. Sub-Phase A: 1949-1962.

- a. Developments in India

In the first years of independence, one of the greatest problems

¹The long and arduous political and diplomatic maneuvering over Kashmir are described by many students of the question. Among them are: Das Gupta, op. cit.; Brecher, op. cit.; Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966); and Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy (Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 227-247. Korbel was the Czech delegate on the original UNCIP. See also The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1949) and the reports for subsequent years.

facing India involved the nearly 500 autonomous Princely States that were the legacy of British control over the subcontinent. Due in large part to the skillful and aggressive diplomacy of Sardar Patel and V. P. Menon of the Indian States Ministry, these areas were rapidly integrated into the Indian Union and then consolidated into fifteen states large enough to support the administrative and political machinery necessary to participation in federal India.

As competitive politics flourished and came to be based on the natural social divisions within the society, however, Indians became increasingly aware of their ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity. This awareness was soon expressed in growing demands for the reorganization of states along linguistic boundaries and, in the cases of those groups most alien to the Sanscritic traditions of central India, in demands for political secession from the Indian Union. When one state was reorganized along linguistic lines in 1954, it became politically impossible to resist similar demands in other states, and by 1956 the linguistic reorganization had been completed. As the decade progressed, Nehru became increasingly worried that the escape of one ethnic element from the Indian Union--whether the Dravidian south, the northeastern tribes, or the Kashmiris--would trigger uncontrollable centrifugal forces that would destroy the nation.¹

Whereas regional awarenesses and tensions in India were aroused and heightened during the 1950s, religious tensions had continued to fester since the disruptions of partition. Even after the migrations of some 16 million Hindu and Moslem refugees during 1947, there remained in India a minority Moslem community numbering over 50 million. Though these people were regarded officially as full and

¹For an understanding of the importance and threat attributed to regional movements during the mid-1950s, see Selig Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960). For an analysis of the relationship of this issue to the question of Kashmir, see James Reston, New York Times, September 23, 1965, and George L. Montagno, "Kashmir: The Dispute Continues," South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Winter 1964), p. 13.

equal members in the new secular nation of India, religious intolerance remained widespread and intense. The suspicion persisted that the Moslem in India would always owe his primary allegiance to Moslem Pakistan. Occasional outbreaks of violence indicated to many Indian leaders of the Congress Party that religious warfare remained just below the surface. They came increasingly to fear that a Kashmiri plebiscite in which the bulk of the Moslems voted for accession to Pakistan would trigger massive recriminatory attacks against Indian Moslems.¹

Despite the social, ethnic, and religious heterogeneity of India, the long traditions and experience of the Congress Party provided the basis for a reasonably strong and integrated competitive political process. Most of the competitiveness of the Indian political system, however, operated within the Congress Party itself. Though no one was in a position to challenge Nehru as leader, the Congress represented a wide range of ideological beliefs, regional interests, and personal ambitions, and its coherence and effectiveness depended on Nehru's ability to manipulate policies, decisions, and programs in such a way as to accommodate the vast majority of its elements. Thus though Nehru, and later to a lesser degree his successors, set the tone of government in India, his range of activity always remained constricted by the pressures of internal politics, both within and outside of Congress.

Nehru's greatest freedom was clearly in the making of foreign policy. He articulated and put into practice a philosophy of nonalignment that called for the newly-emerging nations of Asia and Africa to maintain friendship with both the Western and Communist worlds, but to enter into alliances with neither. Nehru believed in keeping the struggle of the Western and Communist giants outside the domain of the new nations so that they might turn their full attention to the problems of economic development and nation-building. A corollary of this ideal

¹On the nature of religious tension in India and Nehru's attitudes toward it, see the New York Times, May 2, 1965; also an analysis by A. M. Rosenthal, ibid., September 10, 1965.

was a new nation's maintenance of a military establishment both small and independent of foreign control. In the Indian case this meant armed forces strong enough to maintain internal order and to counter any threat from Pakistan; it also meant the supplying of those forces with equipment and ordnance that was, if possible, manufactured in India, or, if obtained from foreign sources, purchased outright.¹

b. Developments in Pakistan

Like India, Pakistan faced serious problems of national integration at the time of independence. The immediate dangers of tribal violence in Pakistan were alleviated by the diversion of the Pathans' attention to events in Kashmir, and the government of Pakistan quickly began negotiations with tribal leaders that eventually culminated in agreements for tribal cooperation with Pakistan in return for a good measure of autonomy. The integrative problems posed by the geographical and cultural separation of East and West Pakistan were also severe.²

Unlike the Indian Congress, the Pakistani Muslim League lacked commitment to and experience with democratic forms. Individual state governments were unable to operate effectively under the forms of parliamentary democracy suggested by the British. At the national level, Jinnah's death in September 1948 hastened the trend toward a cabinet politics that was remote from the electorate and based more on personal advancement than on public interest. In 1958 the nation's continuing political instability and ineffectualness precipitated a military coup d'état led by General Mohammed Ayub Khan. The emphasis of the new administration was on efficiency and honesty; and as an increasingly effective government was established, increasing tolerance of political discussion and participation was demonstrated. Thus Ayub, though a military dictator in name, permitted a considerable circumscription of his own range of action on matters of greatest concern to the Pakistani

¹Palmer, op. cit., pp. 196-197.

²For a thorough treatment of national integration in Pakistan, see Wilcox, op. cit.

public.

Pakistan's general lack of success with political democracy was only one element in the growth of its strong sense of inferiority to India. In land area, population, national income, and military might, Pakistan was dwarfed by its neighbor at independence. As the battle over Kashmir moved toward a stalemate in 1948, Pakistanis became increasingly frustrated by their inability to counter effectively what they believed to be India's illegal military occupation of the state.

The consuming goal of Pakistan's foreign policy during the 1950s thus became the search for military and diplomatic parity with India. Efforts to line up support on the Kashmir issue first among fellow Moslem nations and then among the nations of the British Commonwealth both failed. Meanwhile, the United States was seeking bases of support for its policy of containing the Soviet Union and China. Pakistan, with its western division a logical part of the Middle Eastern defense pattern and with its eastern division in the Southeast Asian sphere, was a welcome ally. Thus, an alliance between Pakistan and the United States was formed out of two very divergent sets of national interests.¹ One analyst suggests that:

For Pakistan, it was a diplomatic miracle. At the stroke of a pen, it would receive military hardware of the most modern variety, an alliance with the most powerful state in the world, a ready-made set of friends and allies immune to seduction by India, and millions of dollars besides. All that was necessary was to assign some territory for American use and declare hostility to the world Communist conspiracy, as it was called. This was a very small price for Pakistan to pay in 1954, for the Soviet Union and China had little to do with Pakistan and Communism was surely not a live domestic issue. On the part of Pakistan, this was not a matter of conviction--there was simply nothing to talk to the Soviets about--no borders, no trade, and no interests.²

¹See Jacques Nevard in the New York Times, September 2, 1965.

²Wayne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China (New York, Walker, 1964), p. 41.

Though both the Middle Eastern Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) were circumspect in their statements of mutual defense commitments,¹ Pakistan appears to have foreseen the evolution of a wide-ranging alliance in which the United States would join in presenting a common diplomatic and military opposition to both the Communist nations and India. As the years passed and the United States maintained a distant neutrality on the Kashmir issue, Pakistani enthusiasm for the treaty relationship began to wane. In May 1960 the risks of the relationship were driven home to the Pakistanis by the revelation that Gary Powers had piloted his U-2 over the Soviet Union from a U.S. air base at Peshawar in West Pakistan.²

c. South Asia and the Great Powers

At the time of the 1947-1948 conflict over Kashmir, the focus of the great powers was on the evolving Cold War in Europe. The limited warfare in Kashmir and even the massacre of half a million people in the Punjab and Bengal, along with equally anxious developments in China, Palestine, and Indonesia, were of lesser international concern.

During the 1950s, however, the range of Cold War issues extended into the Near East and Southeast Asia. With the rise of a unified and aggressive Communist China and extension of its control to Tibet, over half of the perimeter of Kashmir faced onto land controlled by a great power. Moreover, the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh in Kashmir was the key to an important route of Chinese access into western Tibet, and by 1957 the Chinese had built 150 miles of road across the eastern tip of Kashmir without Indian knowledge of its existence.³

¹SEATO provides, in the case of armed attack against a member, for each partner to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process." In CENTO there is no commitment for mutual support unless provided for in separate agreement. See the New York Times, September 8, 1965, for a discussion of the relevant portions of both treaties.

²Palmer, op. cit., pp. 185 and 209; New York Times, September 7 and 12, 1965.

³P. C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy (Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 70-71.

As the states of Asia and Africa moved toward independence and the centers of control over land areas multiplied, both the Soviet Union and the United States began expending increasing attention and money on influencing the new nations. India, because of its great size and early start, soon became a kind of prototype of the development process that both the United States and the Soviet Union wanted to exploit in their attempts to influence new nations: the United States emphasizing and encouraging the role of competitive political processes and the private sector in the economy; the Soviet Union emphasizing and encouraging the role of socialist planning and the public sector. Thus, although Pakistan was a U.S. ally, it received less than a third of the \$330 million in U.S. economic aid given to India between 1949 and 1961.¹ Soviet aid to India during the same period amounted to about \$80 million.

d. Indo-Pakistani Relations

During the 1950s, India and Pakistan were one another's primary enemy. In each country, deep hatred characterized popular perceptions of the other, and relationships between the two governments themselves were marred by an intense mutual distrust. Recriminatory policies were demanded by militant sectors of the press and extreme religious nationalists in both countries.²

A number of substantive issues also provided ample scope for disagreement and mutual recriminations.³ The burden of absorbing millions of refugees from communal violence weighed heavily on both nations. Since each new outbreak of religious warfare stimulated new waves of refugees, many on each side suspected extremists on the other of fomenting violence in order to intensify the refugee problem.

¹ Adapted from figures in Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China, pp. 113 and 132.

² Montagno, op. cit., p. 18.

³ The remainder of this section draws heavily on Palmer, op. cit., pp. 219-226.

Religious violence that took place on the other side of the border was frequently exaggerated and seen as part of a deliberate policy of religious extermination.

A further aspect of the refugee problem was the disposition of refugee property in both India and Pakistan. Attempts to sell property on one side of the border to provide compensation for refugees coming from the other side resulted in inequities and hard feelings, in large part because of the disproportionate number of Hindus entering India from Pakistan.

Disputes over the location of the Indo-Pakistani borders were a further source of friction. By 1961, however, most of these issues had been resolved; the only outstanding problems were in the desert area known as the Rann of Kutch and in some areas of Bengal.

The former economic interdependence of the areas of India and Pakistan was subject to serious dislocations and resulting intensified bitterness during the 1950s. Before partition the West Punjab had sent food surpluses into Rajasthan and other areas of India. Cotton and jute grown in what was to become Pakistan was all processed in what was to become India. The progressive extension of retaliatory duties and differing monetary policies after partition resulted in a decline in the value of trade between the two nations in 1958-1959 to one-tenth of what it had been a decade earlier.

To Pakistan, perhaps the most important issue after the question of Kashmir related to control over the waters of the five tributaries of the Indus which rise in Kashmir and the Indian Punjab but provide irrigation for the vast plains of West Pakistan. The fact that for two months in 1948 India cut off all canal waters crossing the border intensified Pakistan's concern over this issue. After eight years of negotiations, agreement was reached in 1960 on the Indus Waters Treaty, in large part because of the \$600 million of international economic aid involved.

e. Developments in the Kashmir Conflict

Of all the issues between India and Pakistan, the Kashmir question remained the most explosive and emotion-laden, probably outweighing all other issues combined. Though the cease-fire line remained very quiet, the conditions on which the cease-fire were based remained in acrimonious dispute. A solution to the Kashmir problem assumed special importance to Pakistan since a perpetuation of the status quo clearly favored India. Under the de facto division of the state, India controlled 73 per cent of the land area and 81 per cent of the population, including the most highly prized area, the Valley of Kashmir.¹

India strengthened its position by a series of moves inside Kashmir. Elections were held in 1951 for a Constituent Assembly, and in 1954 that body ratified Kashmir's accession to India. Though Kashmir was accorded provisional status in the Indian Constitution of 1949, steps were taken between 1954 and 1961 to bring Kashmir increasingly under provisions applying to all other Indian states. The head of Kashmir remained a Prime Minister in name, the state government retained the right to restrict political and civil liberties for reasons of security, and only certain cases could be appealed from the Kashmir High Court to the High Court of India. Otherwise, Kashmir became, legally as well as in fact, a state in the Indian Union.

Indian administration of Kashmir was not, however, without opposition. As Indian and Pakistani positions on Kashmir rigidified, Sheikh Abdullah, the Prime Minister of Kashmir, began to express openly his impatience for a plebiscite. In August 1953, Abdullah was dismissed from office at the behest of the central government, arrested, and replaced by the leader of a dissident faction of the National Conference, Ghulam Mohammed Bakshi. Except for a five-month period in 1958, Abdullah remained in prison without trial until 1964. While it was clear that significant opposition to complete integration into the

¹New York Times, August 22, 1965.

Indian Union did exist within Kashmir, in the restrictive political atmosphere it was difficult to determine the extent of that opposition and the range of alternatives it would support.

As time passed, the conditions under which India would consider compromising its de facto control of Kashmir in return for a lessening of tension with Pakistan became increasingly stringent. In part this was due to the large and growing Indian investment in Kashmir. The state had cost India heavily in terms of lives, military commitment, financial involvement, and international prestige;¹ as the investment grew, willingness to risk its total or partial loss declined.² As noted earlier, Nehru and other Congress leaders also were afraid that the loss of all or part of Kashmir would trigger serious, and perhaps uncontrollable, communal riots and separatist movements within India. Finally, Nehru's attitudes on Kashmir were greatly stiffened by Pakistan's alliance with the United States. When Pakistan expanded the Cold War into South Asia by joining the SEATO and CENTO pacts, India felt itself forced to divert economic growth funds into defense projects. Moreover, Pakistan's move destroyed Nehru's dream of Asian and African development outside the context of the Cold War. Wilcox suggests that:

[This] was a shattering experience for New Delhi. It sullied the clean hands of the professional pacifists to have to buy French tanks with American dollars or to barter for Russian vetoes in the Security Council at the expense of keeping silent about the Hungarian revolt. India, because of the impingement of the Cold War, was losing both its flexibility and its regional hegemony. Its economic development was being slowed, and the weight of its international preachments was discernibly lighter.³

¹During the period 1948-1959, it is estimated that India invested about \$100 million in Kashmir. See ibid., July 28, 1955.

²Montagno, op. cit., p. 13.

³Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China, pp. 42-43.

The government of India justified the retraction of its willingness to consider a plebiscite in Kashmir on the grounds of the changed conditions in Kashmir and South Asia.¹ Whereas Pakistan maintained that the Kashmir conflict had to be resolved before other issues could be dealt with, India began to suggest that settlement of some of the lesser issues between the two countries was a prerequisite for any progress on the Kashmir impasse.² The solution India began to propose, moreover, was one based on minor adjustments in the existing cease-fire line.

2. Sub-Phase B: 1962-1965.

a. Diplomatic and Strategic Changes

During the last years of the 1950s, a pattern of international balance developed in South Asia, rooted in the U.S.-Pakistan alliance on the one side and the generally cordial relationships among India, China, and the Soviet Union on the other. The United States strengthened Pakistan militarily, but India retained a sense of military security without foregoing its independent defense policy. The only destabilizing force within this pattern was created by the U.S. attempt to maintain a friendly relationship with India, which it managed to do only by remaining neutral on the question of Kashmir.

The evolution of the Sino-Soviet split, however, revolutionized this international balance. As Sino-Soviet ties began to break down, China took a more belligerent approach toward India, culminating in the invasions of 1962. Common enmity toward China now united the United States with India, and substantial quantities of U.S. military assistance were sent to India. This new relationship and the resulting deterioration of Pakistan's military position vis-à-vis India further alienated Pakistani leaders from the United States and they began searching elsewhere for allies in the struggle against India. The obvious choice was now China but

¹New York Times, April 3, 1956.

²Palmer, op. cit., p. 216. This basic divergence in approach to bilateral relations frustrated attempts at negotiations after 1960. See the New York Times, August 22, 1965.

Pakistan had to proceed with caution, both because China was in no position to provide military or economic assistance equal to that given by the United States, and also because Pakistan's continued military potential depended on the supply of ammunition and spare parts from the United States.

Nevertheless, with even cautious Pakistani overtures to the Communist bloc, the supply of U.S. aid began to slow down, and in mid-1965 the United States postponed making a pledge of \$300 million in economic aid to Pakistan, reportedly pending a review of that country's relations with Moscow and Peking.¹ Two factors help to account for the U.S. response. First, it seems clear that the U.S. government resented the Pakistani moves toward the Communist nations.² Second, the importance of the Pakistani alliance to the United States had declined in preceding years because of the cessation of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union and because of the progressive replacement of U.S. strategic-bomber capabilities by intercontinental and submarine-based missile systems.

Thus, by the middle of 1965, the positions of the great powers with respect to Indo-Pakistani relations had substantially changed from what they had been in 1962. China, once neutral, came out in open and full support of the Pakistani position in February 1964. The Soviet Union, a strong advocate of the Indian position during the last half of the 1950s, began to hedge its stand. Though the Soviet Union wanted to retain friendly relationships with India, it was now also in its interest to attempt to wean Pakistan away from its military alliance with the United States as well as to prevent the development of a new alignment of Pakistan with China. The Soviet Union was moving then toward the U.S. position of friendship with both India and Pakistan--which of necessity entailed neutrality on the issue that divided them,

¹Ibid., August 14, 1965; Economist, September 11, 1965, pp. 987-988.

²New York Times, August 30, 1965.

the problem of Kashmir.¹

b. Changes Within Kashmir

Within Kashmir also, the early 1960s brought change. The government of India, embarrassed by the restrictions on civil liberties in Kashmir, the generally poor quality of government in the state, and the continued imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah, forced Bakshi out of office in August 1963 and arranged for the release of Abdullah in April of the following year. The public expression of open political dissension became possible. Public consciousness was aroused by the extensive rioting that resulted from the theft of a hair of Mohammed from a mosque near Srinagar and was reinforced by Abdullah's speeches in support of greater autonomy for Kashmir.

Late in 1964, Abdullah requested a passport to travel abroad; and though India was reluctant indeed to have him express his views publicly outside of India, it would have been even more embarrassing to refuse a Moslem citizen the right of pilgrimage to Mecca.² Abdullah spoke clearly in support of Kashmir's right of self-determination during visits to countries in the Middle East as he had done earlier in Pakistan. Then on April 2, 1965, he had a private meeting with Chou En-lai in Algiers at which he accepted an invitation to visit China "as soon as conditions permit."³ Limitations were quickly imposed on Abdullah's passport to prevent such a visit, and when he returned to India on May 8, 1965, he was detained and placed under house arrest in the south of India. This event touched off what were probably the largest anti-Indian demonstrations in Kashmir since partition. Police opened fire, as many as 200 people were arrested, at least six people were killed, and all air and telephone communication with the outside world was

¹Sundar Rajan, "Kashmir: Shastri's Time for Decision," Reporter, September 23, 1965, p. 42.

²New York Times, January 30, 1965.

³Ibid., April 2 and 3, 1965.

temporarily disrupted.¹

Opposition political organizations that had been developing in Kashmir now moved to capitalize on discontent over Abdullah's arrest. An action committee, composed of nine organizations united in their support of self-determination for Kashmir, called for a week-long general strike and a Gandhian sit-in campaign which they hoped would result in the arrest of over 1,000 volunteers. State authorities moved in quickly to prevent these demonstrations of opposition; and by the middle of June 1965, between 300 and 1,000 leaders of the movement had been arrested.²

Meanwhile, the actual autonomy of Kashmir was being further reduced. By actions in January and April 1965, two more provisions of the Indian Constitution were extended to Kashmir, giving the central government the right to take over the state administration and issue laws for the state in times of serious internal disorder. One of the few remaining symbols of sovereignty was also removed when the official government titles were changed to conform to those used in the Indian states.³

c. The Rann of Kutch and Breaches of the Cease-Fire

During March and April 1965, Pakistani troops occupied positions in Indian-held, but disputed, areas of the Rann of Kutch, a barren desert then rumored to be the location of significant oil deposits. Fighting continued on a small scale over a period of several months. Skirmishes also took place along the cease-fire line in Kashmir, and small arms and mortar fire across the line became part of a pattern of daily mutual harassment.⁴ On May 19, 1965, the Indian government claimed that it had repulsed a battalion-sized attack across

¹Ibid., April 6, May 8, and May 10, 1965.

²Ibid., June 9, June 11, and June 15, 1965.

³Korbel, op. cit., p. 322; New York Times, April 4, 1965.

⁴New York Times, May 23 and June 17, 1965.

the Kashmir cease-fire line near Mendhar.¹ About a month later, India announced the capture of two posts on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line north of Kargil, alleging that Pakistan had been using the posts as bases for attempts to cut the Srinagar-Leh highway, the sole land route for supplying Indian troops facing the Chinese in Ladakh.²

Under pressure from the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain to resolve the conflict at the conference table, and faced with unfavorable tactical conditions and the partial success of the Pakistani attacks, India's Prime Minister Shastri agreed to British proposals to submit the conflict to international arbitration in return for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Rann.³ A sharp reduction in the number of incidents along the cease-fire line in Kashmir followed; and on June 24, 1965, after arranging with the United Nations for stronger observer forces in the area, India ordered the withdrawal of its troops from the posts overlooking Kargil.⁴

d. Military Strength of India and Pakistan

India's GNP is nearly five times that of Pakistan, although per capita income is similar. Thus in 1961, while the percentage of Indian GNP devoted to defense was less than two-thirds of the percentage of Pakistani GNP similarly spent, actual expenditures were almost three times higher. After the war with China in 1962, the ratio climbed to nearly six to one.⁵

¹Ibid., May 21, 1965.

²Ibid., June 18, 1965.

³On Soviet neutrality in this issue, see ibid., May 9, 1965.

⁴Two days before the border violations that led to the warfare of August and September 1965, the Indian Defence Minister reported that the number of violations along the cease-fire line in Kashmir had been much smaller since the Rann of Kutch cease-fire. On this, see ibid., August 4, 1965. On the withdrawal from the Kargil posts, see ibid., June 25, 1965.

⁵The 1961 figures are from H. Roberts Coward, Military Technology in Developing Areas, Report for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Center for International Studies, April 1964). Figures on the 1964-1965 budgets of India and Pakistan are from the New York Times, February 28 and June 15, 1965.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, U.S. assistance to Pakistan made possible the modernization and equipping of five and a half army divisions and the maintenance and training of 40,000 additional troops. Eighty-five per cent of the army had modern U.S. equipment, including approximately 600 highly sophisticated Patton tanks. The air force received nine squadrons of F-86 Sabrejet fighters and two squadrons of B-57 bombers, as well as the training of its personnel.¹ (See Section III for details.)

The Indian armed forces contained more than three times as many men as did those of Pakistan, but they had less modern equipment. In the early 1960s the army was still using weapons dating back to World War II and, in the case of the Enfield rifle, back to World War I.² India retained all the defense production facilities existing in the subcontinent as of 1947; and under the leadership of V.P. Menon, the Defence Ministry pushed ahead with its plans to modernize the facilities and produce as much as possible of India's military equipment within the country. Indian officers were trained in a staff college modeled after Sandhurst, and advanced training was frequently obtained through Commonwealth arrangements.³ Writing in 1961, John Masters rated the Indian army as "first class in its senior leaders and its enlisted men, something less than first class in its junior officers and its overall morale, and third class in its equipment and political direction."⁴ After suffering catastrophic reverses in the battles with China, India began a major program of military rebuilding. It obtained extensive aid in the form of communications and transportation equipment from the United States and made use of further credits of \$2 million and its own expanded defense budget to modernize ten mountain divisions and build up armored and air strength.⁵ (See Section III for details.)

¹Palmer, op. cit., p. 202; All-India Radio, September 23, 1965.

²Palmer, op. cit., p. 196.

³Ibid.

⁴Quoted in ibid., p. 197.

⁵New York Times, September 7, 1965.

India's armored vehicles could not be considered equal in combat capabilities to the Pattons used by Pakistan; and none of India's planes offered a performance to equal Pakistan's F-86s.¹ When the imbalance in the air seemed destined to increase as the United States began delivering F-104s equipped with Sidewinder missiles to Pakistan, India accepted a Soviet offer to provide three squadrons of MiG-21s for immediate needs, and assistance in developing manufacturing facilities for the building of additional planes and missiles.²

One of the earliest and (to the Pakistanis) most disturbing casualties of deteriorating U.S.-Pakistani relations was the program for the supply of F-104 fighters. At most, Pakistan probably received support for two squadrons--far short of its goal of replacing all its F-86s.³ Though Pakistan apparently approached both the Soviet Union and China in a search for alternate sources of supply, it seemed clear that no agreement with the Soviet Union would be rapidly forthcoming and that China would not be able to supply anything like the quantities of planes Pakistan felt it needed.⁴

The shifting balance of power in the air was, however, just one aspect of Pakistan's rapidly worsening military position with respect to India. During the early 1960s the Indian-Pakistani ratio of over-all military strength was rated at about five to one; and with India's build-up of forces beginning to accelerate, the ratio had already begun to change in August 1965 and was expected to approach eight to one by the time the Indian build-up was completed.⁵

¹Ibid.

²Palmer, op. cit., p. 198; see also "The Diffusion of Combat Aircraft, Missiles, and Their Supporting Technologies," prepared by Browne and Shaw Research Corporation for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), October 1966, pp. A7-A8.

³Times (London), December 18, 1965; Palmer, op. cit., p. 202.

⁴Interview with Elmore Jackson, former Special Assistant to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, August 1966.

⁵New York Times, September 7, 1965.

e. Pressures for Pakistani Action in Kashmir

In 1965 Ayub Khan completed seven years as the head of government in Pakistan. Though he could point to significant advances in many areas, no substantive change in the status of Kashmir had been achieved. Moreover, the opportunities for achieving such a change seemed to be declining rather than increasing. The series of small steps that India had taken toward the integration of Kashmir into the Union had had the cumulative effect of presenting a situation that, given the direction of events, would soon have to be recognized as a very unpleasant fait accompli. Pakistan had exhausted every channel for peaceful negotiation, found no indication that India would agree to terms that were satisfactory to Pakistan, and indeed noted a hardening of the Indian position. The chances of any satisfaction through military action also seemed bound to decrease with the passage of time. The balance between the Indian and Pakistani armed forces was becoming even more lopsided, and the Pakistani advantage in the field of equipment and ordnance was beginning to decline as the Indian MiG-21s became operational.

Any military operation against India in Kashmir would have to take into account the 100,000 Indian troops already stationed in the state and the Indian capability for rapid reinforcement by air as long as the Srinagar airfield remained in Indian hands.¹ However, a significant, though indeterminate, portion of the Indian combat forces would have to be retained along the borders with China and kept in reserve for use in the event of hostilities with that country. Indian forces in Kashmir would, in addition, be more difficult to support than would those fighting on the Pakistani side. Indeed, the strategic disadvantages India would face while fighting in Kashmir might induce the Indian leaders to extend conflict into the Punjabi plains. Ayub's

¹The Times (London) in a Reuters dispatch on August 14, 1965, and the New York Times in a dispatch from Lahore on August 29, 1965, agree on the figure of 100,000 troops in Kashmir at the beginning of August.

estimation of India's military response to war in Kashmir is unknown, but the improbability of containing the conflict within that state was almost certainly a moderating pressure on his own plans.

The Pakistani army had long been agitating for an opportunity to undertake military operations in Kashmir and the dissatisfaction of his former army associates was one of Ayub's internal problems. Further pressures came from military and political elements within Azad Kashmir. The provisional government had been in continuous operation since 1947, maintaining its army and administering the Azad section of Kashmir, but feeling deprived of its rightful role of governing the entire state. Pressure for intervention also came from a force of some 3,300 men (twelve companies of guerrillas and eighteen companies of the Pakistan army trained in the techniques of insurgency) that was largely Kashmiri in composition and that had almost certainly been formed for the purpose of encouraging revolt within Kashmir.¹

The chances of fomenting a revolt must have appeared in July 1965 to be at their highest point since 1947. The growing expression of opposition to the government, the outrage at the re-arrest of Abdullah, and the indications of effective organization against the government lent support to the Pakistani feeling that the Kashmiris needed only a spark to mobilize them against what was viewed (from Pakistan) as the tyrannous rule of Hindus over Moslems. The most auspicious occasion for such a spark was probably believed to be August 12, 1965--the twelfth anniversary of Abdullah's original arrest. Demonstrations were scheduled in commemoration of the occasion; tension and opposition to the regime could be expected to be at their peaks.²

¹Information on the special insurgency unit is derived primarily from Indian intelligence sources as reported in the New York Times, August 10 and 13, 1965, and the Times (London), August 11, 1965. At the time of the infiltrations, the Governor of Kashmir charged that the guerrillas were trained by the Chinese (New York Times, August 15, 1965), and though Shastri later expressed doubt about the charge (ibid., August 22, 1965), there are indications that it was given some credence in Washington (Jackson interview, cited above).

²Times (London), August 11, 1965.

Perhaps the most serious danger involved in Pakistani intervention in Kashmir would be the international reaction. Though major world powers seemed to view with sympathy Pakistan's claim to a larger role in Kashmiri affairs than India was willing to concede, probably only China had given any indication of support for the position that India's diplomatic intransigence justified military retaliation. Thus, any military attack across the cease-fire line would be almost certain to produce strong international pressures for Pakistani withdrawal from Kashmir, thereby greatly reducing the chances for successful prosecution of a campaign and seriously prejudicing Pakistan's chances for redress through the United Nations.


On the other hand, international reactions to the recent conflict over the Rann of Kutch had indicated that no nation of military or diplomatic consequence would unequivocally support India's position, especially if it were believed that the Kashmiris were in revolt against their Indian-imposed government and that Pakistani troops were introduced only to prevent the massacre of Moslems by the Indian army. Moreover, since India had been encouraged by the great powers to accept arbitration of the Rann question, some hope existed that similar pressures would develop in the event of hostilities over Kashmir.

The chances of getting 3,000 men across a 500-mile cease-fire line--undetected by the Indian army--and assimilated into the local population must have seemed limited at best. But there was even less likelihood that the 45 U.N. military observers on the line, lacking any aerial observation capability, would be able to build a convincing case to prove that the Pakistani government had directed the intervention in Kashmir.¹

E. Phase III₂: August 5, 1965 -- September 22, 1965

1. Sub-Phase A: August 5, 1965 -- August 16, 1965. During the night of August 5, 1965, elements of a force totalling between 3,000

¹See the dispatch by Jean Wetz, Le Monde, September 4, 1965.



and 5,000 men began moving across the cease-fire line from Azad Kashmir into Indian-occupied Kashmir. Armed, but frequently disguised as peasants or Kashmiri women, the men operated in small groups. They moved across the Pir Panjal range into the Valley of Kashmir and toward Indian military command headquarters in the western part of the state. Some groups in the Valley began distributing gifts to villagers and handing out pamphlets urging revolt against the state government. During the next five to seven days, raids were made against Indian military headquarters, key bridges, convoys, schools, and communications centers.¹

Indian troops in Kashmir were rapidly reinforced, and by August 14 order had been largely re-established within the Valley, though occasional incidents took place during the following week.²

Although the actual operation of the Pakistani forces was almost entirely abortive, it is possible to piece together from prisoner interrogation reports and other sources the plans and expectations on which it appears likely to have been based. Perhaps the most revealing corroboration for this reconstruction comes from the reports of Radio Pakistan and a clandestine station called the Voice of Kashmir. Deprived of day-to-day information about developments within the state, these stations gave reports that were far removed from reality and almost certainly based on an anticipated scenario prepared in advance by planners of the operation.

On August 8, announcement was made in Karachi of the formation of a "revolutionary council," accompanied by reports of a revolt against Indian rule in Kashmir. The Voice of Kashmir began providing directions for civil resistance and assurances that an effective government would soon be set up by the revolutionary council. Radio

¹This account is based on day-to-day developments reported in the New York Times, August 9 through 14, 1965, and the Times (London), August 16, 1965; later reconstructions of events are in the New York Times, October 12, 1965, and in Commandant Maurèle's article, "Le conflit Indo-pakistanaï," Revue de Defense Nationale, Vol. 22 (janvier 1966), p. 105.

²New York Times, August 16, 18, 20, 21, and 24, 1965.

and newspaper reports stated unequivocally that revolt had broken out in Kashmir.

As allegations of infiltration from Azad Kashmir into Indian-held Kashmir came from the Indian government, they were promptly denied by the governments of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Reports soon followed suggesting that the people of Azad Kashmir were "restive to go and help their brethren in the Indian part of Kashmir who have taken up arms against Indian imperialism in the true Moslem tradition"; and that if the Indian authorities tried to crush the freedom movement through sheer force, the Azad government would not hesitate to order its army to cross the cease-fire line.¹ The stage was thus being set for a more overt and sustained military movement into Kashmir.

To accompany and support the expected popular revolt, the insurgency force that had infiltrated the cease-fire line between August 5 and 7 was to have reassembled into three columns inside the Kashmir Valley and moved to surround Srinagar. Bridges along the three roads leading to the city were to have been destroyed and the airport captured, thus cutting the city off from outside support and isolating the forward Indian units in the Uri sector from their reserve and support elements. The All-India Radio station in Srinagar was to have been captured, a revolutionary proclamation read, and the formation of a new revolutionary government announced. Sabotage missions both within the Valley and in western Kashmir were to have reduced the retaliatory capability of the Indian army.² Expectations beyond this

¹Times (London), August 10, 1965; New York Times, August 11 and 15, 1965; Radio Pakistan, August 11, 1965.

²The main source of these details is a dispatch in the Times (London), August 19, 1965, based on information from Indian authorities. It parallels a report by Edmund Taylor, "Up Front in Kashmir," Reporter, Vol. 33, No. 7 (October 21, 1965), p. 37. On August 11 the Voice of Kashmir reported that Kashmiri "freedom fighters" had blown up bridges, cut twelve roads, captured a number of Indian army ammunition depots, attacked three Indian army brigade headquarters, and struck supply lines. On August 16 the same station declared that

point are unclear but probably involved Azad Kashmiri forces first, Pakistani army forces moving later into the state to consolidate positions in anticipation of international pressures for a cease-fire and negotiations.¹

What in fact happened bore little resemblance to these expectations. The infiltrators were discovered very early in the operation; villagers in the mountains not only failed to hide them, but in some cases reported their presence to the local police.² Though some of the insurgents got close to Srinagar, the planned rendezvous probably never took place, all attempts to blow up bridges were discovered and foiled, and the radio station and airfield remained firmly in Indian hands.³ Perhaps most distressing and surprising to the Pakistanis was the fact that the inhabitants of Indian Kashmir failed to respond to the call for revolt.⁴ The extent of dissatisfaction in Kashmir had probably been magnified far out of proportion. Even more serious, however, was Pakistan's erroneous assumption that disaffection with the existing government in Kashmir implied incipient support for a Pakistani-backed alternative.⁵ Commenting at the time on the Pakistani expectations, one analyst noted that, inflated though they were, their hopes were no further from reality than those of the United States at the Bay of Pigs.⁶

the freedom fighters had encircled Srinagar and that the Indian forces were using aircraft, artillery, and mortars in a desperate attempt to save the city, which was being supplied by air since it had been completely cut off by land. See the dispatches by Reuters in the Times (London), August 12 and 17, 1965.

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 37. Taylor visited Kashmir in October 1965 and conducted extensive interviews with Indian military officers.

²New York Times, August 13, 1965.

³Ibid., August 11, 19, and 20, 1965.

⁴Ibid., August 15 and 29, 1965.

⁵Jackson interview, cited above.

⁶New York Times, September 9, 1965.

2. Sub-Phase B: August 16, 1965 -- September 1, 1965. On August 16, 1965, Indian troops reoccupied the same two posts overlooking Kargil and the Srinagar-Leh road that they had taken during the Rann of Kutch action. More than a week later, on August 24, two more positions were captured in the Tithwal area, on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line. Again, three nights later, a force of Indians moved across the cease-fire line, this time to seal off about 150 square miles of territory that formed a bulge in the line between Uri in the north and Poonch in the south; within two days the Indian troops had accomplished their objective. On all three occasions the Indian army met only token resistance and prepared for counterattacks that never materialized.¹

These limited and deliberate operations constituted India's military response to the infiltrations from Pakistan during the week of August 5, and to the wide range of pressures--military, diplomatic, political, and economic--that faced Indian Prime Minister Shastri. Shastri had little desire to become involved in a war with Pakistan over Kashmir. His political experience and his greatest concern had been almost entirely in domestic affairs. His greatest political qualities were not those of an inspiring and dynamic leader, but rather those of a conciliator and mediator. These skills he used to cajole, rather than lead, the Congress government in the implementation of its development programs. As an early follower of Gandhi, Shastri had a strong emotional commitment to nonviolence and was known personally to be anxious for a political reconciliation with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue.² Moreover, he recognized that any new major outbreak of violence over the issue would lead to the resurrection of international demands for India to make some concessions to Pakistan. The threat to India from China was already a source of enough concern without adding hostilities with Pakistan.

¹Maurèle, op. cit., p. 105; New York Times, August 17, 26, and 29, 1965.

²Palmer, op. cit., p. 241.

Early reports of infiltrations in Kashmir were received with relative calm in New Delhi. The first official Indian statements, on August 8, noted only that a "considerable number" of men were involved. Two days later the number was placed at 1,000, and on August 11 it was raised to "more than 1,200."¹ Shastri spoke over the radio to the nation on August 13. Although he expressed certainty that the infiltrations represented "a thinly disguised armed attack on our country organized by Pakistan," the only conclusion that he said could be reached--that "Pakistan has probably taken a deliberate decision to keep up an atmosphere of tension"--was hardly a belligerent call to arms.² As each day passed, however, estimates of the size of the force grew--2,000-3,000 on August 14 and 3,200 on August 15. As evidence on the missions of the infiltrating units was accumulated, it became increasingly difficult to minimize the importance of events in Kashmir.³

Political pressure on Shastri began to grow both among the opposition parties and within the Congress Party. Spokesmen for four opposition parties declared that the government was practicing appeasement. The most virulent and anti-Moslem of the parties attracted 100,000 demonstrators to the Parliament building to appeal for a hard line against Pakistan. Within Congress, similar pressure began to build and there was talk of the need for a strong leader who would act decisively against the Pakistani incursions.⁴ Tensions were increased by the militant comments of the Congress leader in Kashmir, who called for a "final and crushing reply" to the "full-blooded invasion" and threatened "to liberate the illegally held territory of Kashmir."⁵ The climax of the political pressure was expected to come in the Parliamentary

¹New York Times, August 9, 11, and 12, 1965.

²Ibid., August 14, 1965.

³Ibid., August 15, 1965; Times (London), August 16 and 19, 1965.

⁴Rajan, op. cit., p. 42; New York Times, August 17 and 18, 1965.

⁵Ibid., August 10 and 15, 1965.

debate and voting on a motion of no-confidence between August 17 and 26.

The intense political pressure for swift and decisive military reaction to the Pakistani incursions was in large measure a result of the profound humiliation that the Indian armed forces had experienced at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 and, to a lesser degree, at the hands of the Pakistanis in the Rann of Kutch.¹ This sense of humiliation was increased by India's feeling that it had been under constant attack from Pakistan over the Kashmir issue: verbal attack in the Pakistani press, diplomatic attack in the United Nations and other international forums, and military attack in the form of border harassments and bellicose troop movements.² India chafed at the continuing sense of helplessness engendered by what appeared to be its own interminable defensiveness. Indian policy seemed to be limited to repeated denials and countermeasures, and India's capacity to act otherwise began to come into question. As one observer noted, "the psychological jibes and the goading of the Pakistani forces in the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir were taken by the hypersensitive Indians as a challenge to their national manliness." What was needed was "simply to show that India was not afraid to fight when provoked and was able to give a good account of itself on the battlefield."³

Shastri, the mild conciliator, could easily become the symbol of weakness, uncertainty, and defensiveness within India. He must have been acutely aware, on the other hand, that a strongly belligerent reaction to Pakistan could easily rekindle the unrestrained communal violence of 1947.⁴ Meanwhile, however, pressure continued to build for

¹Max Frankel later wrote in ibid. (September 11, 1965) that: "Many officials believe that the main reason for India's overreaction to Pakistani provocations in Kashmir resulted from India's emotional and political need to compensate for the defeat administered by the Chinese Communists three years ago."

²Ibid., August 14, 1965.

³Edmund Taylor, "A First Report from India," Reporter, Vol. 33, No. 6 (October 7, 1965), p. 14.

⁴New York Times, August 22, 1965.

a military response to a military threat.

The actual military threat to Kashmir posed by the infiltrations was not great. The military was concerned, however, by the vulnerability of Indian positions in the Uri-Poonch area, where most of the infiltrations had taken place. It was here that the cease-fire line came closest to Srinagar. Moreover, the northern part of the salient was on the Indian side of the Pir Panjal ridge line, making possible Pakistani movements to a number of infiltration routes that could threaten the Baramula-Uri road. A point of secondary infiltrations was at Tithwal, where access could be had to two routes into the northern end of the Valley of Kashmir. Of least short-term relevance, but of possibly the greatest long-term strategic importance, was the continued Pakistani threat to the Srinagar-Leh road at Kargil.

Shastri was perhaps most frustrated by the response of the international community to the Pakistani incursions. U.N. Secretary-General U Thant had held five conferences each with the U.N. delegates of both India and Pakistan by August 17.¹ Thant's style of diplomacy, however, was that of the quiet mediator, careful not to offend either party by offering judgments of right and wrong, searching always for the terms on which the two sides could be brought together and violence ended.² Thus, as he began receiving reports from U.N. observers along the cease-fire line that clearly indicated a large-scale military movement from the Pakistani side,³ he reported publicly only that "there had been mass crossings of the cease-fire line."⁴ No world power

¹Ibid., August 18, 1965.

²Jackson interview, cited above.

³In a personal report to the U.N. Security Council on September 5, Thant quoted the observers as noting a series of violations starting August 5, when "armed men, generally not in uniform, crossed the cease-fire line from the Pakistani side." New York Times, September 6, 1965.

⁴Taylor, "Up Front in Kashmir," p. 36; New York Times, August 11, 18, and 24, 1965.

supported India in its contention that Pakistan was responsible for the border violence. The United States merely urged India to avoid retaliatory action that could catapult the conflict into a full-scale war.¹ Thus the Indian government, highly suspicious of the United Nations in matters relating to Kashmir, had little indication that an appeal to the Security Council would bring even moral support to the Indian cause. The more likely result would, in fact, be new appeals for restraint and new pressure for the stationing of additional U.N. observers on what India now considered to be its sovereign territory.²

Shastri's actions during the last half of August 1965 therefore seem to have been based on a policy of cautious and limited responses designed to achieve primarily political aims by the use of as little force as possible.

The emergency cabinet of the Indian government began holding meetings dealing with the Kashmir situation on August 8. The earlier reinforcement of troops in the Valley seemed to be dealing adequately with the military situation, though it did little to reduce the political pressure for stronger action. By August 14, Shastri was apparently still delaying a decision on retaliation. Observers at the time thought he would not take direct military action against Pakistan if the Indian army could "mop up the rest of the infiltrators rapidly and give the country an impression of strength." That same day, however, reports of new infiltrations began to arrive in New Delhi. These were confirmed the following day, as the beginning of debate on the no-confidence motion approached.³

On August 17 the Indian government announced the capture of

¹Ibid., August 14, 1965.

²For a discussion of Indian attitudes toward the United Nations, see Le Monde, September 4, 1965. Elmore Jackson, in the interview cited above, noted Indian reluctance to see the U.N. observer force expanded.

³Times (London), August 11 and 16, 1965; New York Times, August 15, 1965.

two posts overlooking Kargil.¹ This move created only a minimum risk of retaliation, both because it was a repetition of a step safely taken several months earlier and because reinforcement and supply on the Pakistani side depended on a long and tortuous line of communication. Perhaps for the same reasons, the capture created little response politically. Opposition leaders still delivered their accusations of appeasement and demands for a tougher approach to Pakistan.²

On August 18 the Indian government announced the cancellation of a scheduled conference of the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Ministers on the Rann of Kutch settlement because of the "sharp and serious deterioration" of relations between the two countries. The announcement was greeted in Parliament by thunderous applause (even though it noted that the provisions for sending the conflict to international arbitration would remain in force), but the government continued to be vigorously attacked for weakness and appeasement.³

On August 24, Shastri said that "we must prevent the infiltrators from coming into our territory; we have also to go to the points, as we did in Kargil, from where the infiltrators entered Kashmir across the cease-fire line." His statement was followed that evening by Indian occupation of two posts overlooking Tithwal, and, the following day, by the occupation of a third post in the same area. Though these operations blunted attacks on the government to some degree, and Parliament rejected the no-confidence motion, public pressure remained high for a more general attack against infiltration bases.⁴

On the night of August 27, Indian troops moved south from Uri to cut off as many as 1,600 guerrillas and Pakistani troops believed

¹Ibid., August 17, 1965.

²Ibid., August 18, 1965.

³Ibid., August 19, 1965.

⁴Times (London), August 25, 1965; New York Times, August 26 and 27, 1965.

to be in the bulge. Within three days they captured a series of posts on high ground and occupied the Haji Pir Pass, announcing that it would be premature to think about relinquishing the posts at that time. Privately they suggested that they had no intention of giving up the newly-won terrain in the foreseeable future, if at all.¹

3. Sub-Phase C: September 1, 1965 -- September 6, 1965.

While Indian forces were consolidating their positions in the Uri-Poonch bulge, Pakistan launched its response to the Indian capture of posts across the cease-fire line. Seventy-five miles south of the Haji Pir Pass, in the open plains at the foot of the Pir Panjal range, 70 Patton tanks, supported by an army infantry brigade and tactical air missions flown by F-86 and F-104 fighters, crossed the Kashmir cease-fire line and the Kashmir-Pakistan border in the vicinity of Chhamb.² Within two days this striking force had captured the town of Chhamb and moved five miles into Indian-held Kashmir, where it was stopped at the Manawarwali River. On September 4 the Pakistani drive forced its way across the Manawarwali and in two days moved to within a few miles of the Akhnur.³

Thus the Kashmir conflict intensified from small-unit deployments of mountain infantry into major hostilities involving modern tanks and their jet-fighter support in an area hitherto outside the area of important action. A combination of internally-created public expectations and geographically-imposed tactical considerations made this new development a nearly-inevitable consequence of earlier decisions.

As the plans of the original Pakistani infiltrators in Kashmir disintegrated into a scramble for self-preservation, and as the dream of a massive public uprising against Hindu imperialism was

¹Ibid., August 29, September 1 and 2, 1965.

²Maurèle, op. cit., p. 107; New York Times, September 2 and October 12, 1965; Leo Heiman, "Lessons from the War in Kashmir," Military Review, February 1966, pp. 24-25. Heiman is an Israeli military journalist.

³New York Times, September 4, 5, and 6, 1965.

proving to be only a projection of Karachi's own fears and hatred, the government and mass media of Pakistan found themselves burdened with their premature claims of success. Jacques Nevard, writing from Lahore on August 28, noted that "ordinary Pakistanis are exultant over government radio reports of a steady string of victories by Kashmiri 'freedom fighters' over Indian 'occupation forces' in Kashmir."

It was widely believed that India would not be able to hold Kashmir much longer.¹ News of the Indian thrusts across the cease-fire line had been distorted to the point of sounding like massive defeats for the Indian forces.²

The problems involved in recapturing the posts lost to the Indian forces were difficult at best. The long lines of communication to Kargil meant a high price would be paid in any attempt to rescue those positions; access to the Tithwal and Uri-Poonch areas would be easier, but the dislodging of well-entrenched and alert Indian forces from strategic positions on high ground would be a tedious and costly enterprise. Moreover, all this would serve little political or military purpose: India's control over most of Kashmir would remain unchallenged and its military potential undiminished; Pakistan's version of revolution in Kashmir would be revealed to its people as an official fabrication, and a rapidly disappearing opportunity to bring superior armor and air power to bear against the Indian military would be lost.

The logical military alternative for Pakistan was an operation in open terrain where the superior mobility and firepower of the Pattons, Sabrejets, and Starfighters could be brought to bear and where the Pakistani lines of communication were both shorter and less vulnerable than those of India. For political and diplomatic reasons it would be advantageous to move into and establish control over an area of Indian-held Kashmir, thus lending some reality to public perceptions of Kashmir

¹Ibid., August 29, 1965.

²Ibid., August 29 and September 1, 1965.

as a state in revolt and improving the chances for later U.N. reconsideration of the disposition of Kashmir.

The military geography of Kashmir had not significantly changed in seventeen years, and the obvious military objective in 1965 was--just as it had been in 1948--to cut the Jammu-Poonch road which supplied all Indian forces in western Kashmir. Akhnur was a natural point at which to attempt the breach since it was a major Indian supply point and provided the natural protection of the Chenab River against counterattack from the south; in the event of a rout of Indian forces, it would offer easy access to the even more strategic Jammu-Srinagar road. Of course, by shifting the major arena of battle, Pakistan would risk the Indian countermove of a strike across the border at the Lahore-Gujrat road from bases supplied by the relatively invulnerable Amritsar-Ludhiana road and rail lines. Moreover, a premeditated armored attack into Indian Kashmir without a credible claim that it was undertaken to protect indigenous Kashmiri rebels from massacre would risk the threat of international sanctions.

4. Sub-Phase D: September 6, 1965 -- September 10, 1965.

On September 6, two days after the Pakistani drive across the Manawarwali toward Jarian and Akhnur, Indian forces crossed the border between Indian and Pakistani Punjab, opposite Lahore. An armored brigade, supported by two infantry divisions, advanced along three fronts and quickly reached the Ichogil Canal, halfway between the border and Lahore. Following this attack by two days came an even larger movement--an armored division supported by three infantry divisions--from Ramgarh in southern Jammu, toward the town of Gujranwala, 30 miles away on the Lahore-Gujrat road. The following day an Indian reinforced brigade crossed the Rajasthan-Sind border at Gadra, 350 miles south of Lahore and 450 miles south of Akhnur, moving in the general direction of Hyderabad and Karachi.¹

¹Maurèle, op. cit., pp. 107 and 109; New York Times, September 7 and October 12, 1965.

In accordance with a developing pattern, this Indian response followed more closely on the preceding extension of the conflict. The decision that precipitated it resulted more from military pressures and less from diplomatic and political pressures than had earlier decisions.

Of central importance was the military threat to the Jammu-Poonch road at Akhnur.¹ The Indian army, like many of its counterparts throughout the world, had been busily preparing to refight the last war. It was now given the rare opportunity of doing so--in a tactical sense at least--and was determined not to allow what it firmly believed to have been Nehru's sin of timidity in not driving into Pakistan to cut off the bases from which attacks on the Jammu-Poonch road were launched. The Indian army had a complete plan of counterattack that it almost certainly began urging on the Prime Minister as soon as the Pakistani attack on Akhnur was launched.²

Shastri, however, demurred. He apparently hoped that Indian armor and air power would be able at least to stave off, and perhaps to repulse, the Pakistani attack.³ The political and psychological pressures for a determined military response to Pakistani thrusts remained intense, but they were now more nearly balanced by a unanimous U.N. Security Council demand for a cease-fire (made on September 4 and again on September 6), by U.S. and British threats to withdraw all economic and military aid and food shipments, by the added dangers of all-out war implicit in an attack across the international border, and by the increasing threat of communal violence that would follow on any intensification of the war.

These moderating considerations were quickly cast aside, however, when the Pakistani armored forces broke across the Manawarwali and began moving rapidly toward Jarian and Akhnur. The Indian

¹Times (London), September 8, 1965.

²New York Times, October 12, 1965.

³Ibid., September 3, 1965.

forces opened attacks near Lahore to draw the Pakistani armor south from Sialkot, thus taking the pressure off Akhnur and leaving a relatively open line of attack from Ramgarh toward Gujranwala. An attack in Rajasthan-Sind was begun to keep Pakistani armor in that sector from reinforcing elements in the Punjab.¹

In its most immediate goal--the relief of Akhnur--the Indian plan succeeded. On September 7, Pakistani armor began withdrawing from that front, presumably for use against the Indian forces near Lahore.² In its other aspects, the record of the Indian operation is less clear.

5. Sub-Phase E: September 10, 1965 -- September 12, 1965.

On the day of the Indian drive toward Lahore, Ayub Khan spoke to the Pakistani nation and appealed not for retribution and all-out war against India, but rather simply for the defense of Pakistan.³ India's Defence Minister replied in kind two days later with the declaration that "our action is limited to making Pakistan realize that we will not tolerate any interference with the territorial integrity of India, of which Kashmir is a part."⁴

Following the Lahore attack, B-57 bombers (not previously used by either side) were employed by both India and Pakistan in raids on major military and air installations. With a few minor exceptions, both sides avoided striking population centers and key economic operations (factories, dams, major bridges, etc.). Ground fighting as well seemed designed to avoid population centers and leave the countryside intact.

Official press releases from both sides, however, gave the impression that vigorous fighting was taking place on several fronts

¹Ibid., October 12, 1965.

²Times (London), September 8, 1965.

³New York Times, September 7, 1965.

⁴Ibid., September 9, 1965.

and that astronomical quantities of enemy equipment--tanks and airplanes, particularly--were being destroyed. Daily communiqués were liberally worded with victorious fighting language, creating a sense of pride and well-being on both sides of the border.¹ By September 15 an Indian government spokesman announced that India's broad military objective--to "draw out and blunt the edge of the Pakistani war machine"--had been achieved,² although reports of further massive destruction of Pakistani equipment continued to be issued.

Both Pakistan and India took stringent measures to try to be sure that official communiqués were the sole source of information presented to the outside world. During the entire period of hostilities, no foreign correspondent was allowed near areas of actual fighting. Thus, although fighting after the first few days was limited to cautious engagements along rather stable fronts, both populations continued to get euphoric reports of their troops' successes.

Perhaps the most seriously threatened intensification of the war was that of the fighting in East Pakistan. As early as September 8, the Indian Defence Minister reported to Parliament that "we have no quarrel with East Pakistan and . . . I do not visualize our taking any action to escalate the war in that field, unless, of course, the rulers of Pakistan compel India to do so."³ In the following days, official Indian spokesmen tended to discount reports of attacks in the eastern area, suggesting that, if true, they represented only the kind of border skirmish that had been taking place for months and were no cause for concern. As reports of Pakistani air attacks on Indian military installations in the eastern area continued, India declared that, though it had not wanted to extend the fighting to the eastern sector, the attacks were one more example of Pakistani aggressive action that could lead to intensification. In the following days, India appears

¹See ibid., September 20, 1965, for descriptions of official Pakistani press policy.

²Ibid., September 16, 1965.

³All-India Radio, September 8, 1965.

to have begun bombing a few selected targets in East Pakistan, and this tacit mutual limitation on military activity in the eastern zone continued for the duration of the hostilities.

A self-imposed limitation of the war also took place in the treatment of minorities. The threat of communal violence was especially great in India. Indeed, in the early days of the hostilities, there were recriminations against Moslems in the city of Poona; and elsewhere in the country, suspicion of Moslems was widespread. The Indian government, however, ordered heavy police alerts to prevent the spread of such violence and imposed newspaper censorship in stories that played up communal difficulties or identified religious communities involved in rioting.¹ Moreover, specific Moslem members of the Indian armed forces were singled out for high public praise for valor, bravery, and loyalty, and widespread publicity was given to acts of merit or patriotism performed by Moslem civilians in India.

A major function during the war for the leaders of both countries was to placate and reassure whoever might doubt either the capacity or the willingness of their country to stand up militarily to its traditional enemy. Clearly the leaders of both countries were also concerned with limiting the extent of the conflict to the goals they wished it to serve. Indeed, the desire to avoid unnecessary retaliation seems to have been a major determinant of policy on both sides after the battles around Lahore and Sialkot began.² Shastri and Ayub were each primarily concerned with the problems of his country's economic development, and neither appeared interested in destroying the economic potential of the other.

The Indian plan of coordinated attack in the Punjab, southern Jammu, and Sind was carried out as planned by the strategists but failed to achieve its objectives.³ A major counterattack by Pakistani tanks

¹New York Times, September 2 and 14, 1965.

²Ibid., September 20, 1965.

³The following description of the Indian attack draws heavily on Heiman, op. cit.

was launched from Kasur, south of Lahore, on September 8, and only the third line of Indian artillery and tank defense prevented a Pakistani breakthrough to cut off the Indian lines of supply at the Dhillwan bridge. The Indian main drive from Ramgarh toward Gujranwala was met by stiff Pakistani resistance and was unable to move beyond the Ichogil Canal, thus leaving the Lahore-Gujrat road open.

Indian failures, however, should not be taken to imply Pakistani successes. Though the road to the Akhnur front remained open, the Pakistani tank advance outstripped the capacity of its supporting forces to supply it. Shortly after Shastri acted to counter the threat to Akhnur, the Pakistani attack ground to a halt and the Patton tanks, lacking adequate infantry protection, became easy prey for Indian hunter-killer teams. In the Ramgarh-Gujranwala sector, the Pattons of Pakistan and the technologically inferior Shermans and Centurions of India faced each other in open battle. It became clear at this point that advanced weapons technologies lose much of their potency in the hands of technologically untrained armies. The Pakistani tank crews were unable to feed accurate information into the automatic control systems of the Pattons and ended up having to direct the guns manually. The Indians were thus able to make better use of their older weapons. Moreover, the low silhouette of the Patton proved to be a serious handicap in the tall canefields of the Punjab. Tank commanders had to stand on top of the turrets to direct their fire, a practice that resulted in a tank-commander casualty rate that greatly reduced the morale and the capability of the Pakistani armor.

It soon became clear that the Indian forces were best employed in defense and that the Pakistani Pattons were too sophisticated to be effectively used in offense. The hostilities rapidly degenerated, therefore, into tentative probing along the fronts of the shallow intrusions into enemy territory that each side had managed to make in its initial drives.

6. Sub-Phase F: September 12, 1965 -- September 22, 1965.

The pressures on the Indian government to continue the war fell off rapidly after the public came to feel that the nation was vindicated militarily and had truly taught Pakistan a lesson. And while it was true that the recent cessation of U.S. and British military assistance to both sides would serve to benefit the more self-sufficient India in the event of continued hostilities, it was also true that the prolonging of hostilities would worsen India's potential vis-à-vis China, whose intervention on the side of Pakistan had always to be considered a possibility. In addition, curtailment of U.S. economic assistance was devastating to India's plans for economic growth. Finally, India was diplomatically isolated on this issue and under great international pressure to agree to a peaceful settlement.

In early September, the conditions stated by Shastri for a cease-fire were that Pakistani infiltrations be ended and that the responsibility of preventing further incursions be assumed by Pakistan.

Pakistan's central condition for a cease-fire was that it be accompanied by specific provisions for a satisfactory long-term political solution of the Kashmir question. Pakistan explicitly demanded a U.N. force of African and Asian nations to handle security in Kashmir pending a plebiscite that would be held within three months of the cease-fire.¹

Pakistan could be fairly certain that, in the absence of some firm guarantee of a political solution, a cease-fire would lead only to continued Indian control over Kashmir with little or no hope of a successful challenge to that control in the foreseeable future. A cease-fire based simply on the status quo ante would mean that Pakistan had suffered a high cost without achieving any benefit. Part of the cost to Pakistan lay in the further deterioration of its military alliance with the United States, the termination of a major source of economic assistance, and an unexpected weakening in military potential--

¹New York Times, September 5 and 12, 1965.

in part because of the mauling it had received at the hands of the Indians and in part because of the foreclosure of the supply of ammunition and spare parts on which future effectiveness would depend. Moreover, the credibility of its sophisticated armored and air elements had been seriously compromised.

Added to this, the Pakistani nation still believed that the people of Kashmir were in revolt against the state government and that the Pakistani army was defeating the Indian army in their continuing military confrontation. Given these perceptions, the nation could be expected to have very little sympathy for a leader who accepted a cease-fire without clear provisions for a political solution.

Early diplomatic maneuvering revealed that, at the United Nations, negotiations for a cease-fire would begin on the basis of a return to the situation as of August 5,¹ and that Pakistan would need to develop a significant pressure on India in order to achieve any modification of this. It was possible that a coordinated effort with China might put India under so much military pressure that it would be forced to agree to a cease-fire on Pakistani terms. Such an effort, however, would almost certainly strain Pakistani relations with the United States to the breaking point and would perhaps prompt the United States into open military action against Pakistan, China, or both. Then too, China, though sharing Pakistan's animosity toward India, was in no position to replace the United States as Pakistan's primary supplier of military hardware and economic development funds.

As the direction of the U.N. mediation efforts became increasingly clear, Ayub Khan apparently began casting about for an alternative forum for the establishment of terms. In a press conference on September 15, Ayub gave the first indications that he would be prepared to depart from his demand for a plebiscite within three months. This note of conciliation was accompanied by an appeal for a more positive U.S. role in the matter.² The following day, Ayub let it be

¹Ibid., September 7, 1965.

²Ibid., September 16, 1965.

known through diplomatic channels that what he wanted--and would respond positively to--was a direct and open appeal by President Johnson for an immediate cease-fire.¹ Johnson, however, firmly maintained his position of deferring to the mediation efforts of the United Nations.² It had become clear by September 15 that Ayub was ready to agree to a cease-fire on terms that would be satisfactory to India. The only problem remaining was to agree on a forum and to evolve some face-saving gambit that would soften the blow to Ayub's prestige.

Early in the morning of September 17 China presented a diplomatic note warning India to dismantle its military bases inside the Chinese border within three days or bear full responsibility for grave consequences that might arise.³ Two days earlier the U.S. Ambassador to Poland had held a discussion with Chinese Communist representatives and almost certainly let China know that the United States would not tolerate Chinese military intervention in the Kashmir struggle.⁴ It was viewed as highly unlikely that China would risk U.S. intervention just to provide unsolicited support to Pakistan. India rejected the Chinese ultimatum, but included a minor concession that it had previously been unwilling to grant--namely joint inspection of points in Tibet where it had been accused of establishing positions.⁵

Instead of easing Ayub's perception of pressure for a cease-fire, the Chinese ultimatum seems to have increased the urgency of the Pakistani efforts to end the conflict. Ayub had apparently concluded that both Pakistan's military security and primary economic support could be effectively maintained only by the United States and that the cease-fire would have to be the first in a series of steps designed to

¹Ibid., September 19, 1965.

²Ibid., September 16, 1965.

³Ibid., September 17, 1965.

⁴Ibid., September 16, 1965.

⁵Ibid., September 18 and 19, 1965.

re-establish a working relationship with that country. The only way Pakistan could now provide convincing evidence to the United States that it was not involved in a cooperative venture with China was to agree to a cease-fire before the Chinese ultimatum expired.¹ The U.N. Security Council was moving toward agreement on the wording of a cease-fire resolution, but it would not be ready before the deadline. Then on September 19 the Chinese, taking note of the Indian concession, extended the ultimatum time by three days.² On September 20 the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution demanding a cease-fire within 24 hours and the subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held prior to August 5. Steps to be taken for a settlement of the political problem underlying the conflict were to be decided upon after the cease-fire and troop withdrawals had been implemented.³ On September 21, India agreed to the cease-fire conditions and Pakistan followed suit the next day, warning that it would leave the United Nations if a settlement of the basic Kashmir dispute was not reached in a reasonable period of time.⁴

Later that same day, the Chinese government announced that India had met the terms of its ultimatum by withdrawing from the posts in question. (See Section I of the study of the India-China border conflict.)

F. Phase IV₂: From September 22, 1965

The cease-fire that went into effect on September 22, 1965, does not mark the end of the conflict, but does represent a termination of major hostilities over Kashmir. Following the cease-fire, border clashes and extensive diplomatic maneuvering continued to take place, but these were primarily a result of Ayub Khan's need to cushion the shock felt by his own people when he agreed to an unfavorable termination of hostilities that they believed their military forces were

¹Ibid., September 19, 1965.

²Ibid., September 20, 1965.

³Ibid., September 21, 1965.

⁴Ibid., September 22 and 23, 1965.

winning. On October 21, Indian Kashmiri authorities rounded up 30 leaders of the Kashmiri self-determination movement, thus removing the leadership of the Moslem movement that had sought a plebiscite.

In early January 1966, Ayub and Shastri met in Tashkent in an attempt to improve relationships between their two countries. With the help of the good offices of Premier Kosygin of the Soviet Union, they were able to reach a formal agreement that followed the general lines set for the cease-fire the previous September and included other commitments designed to re-establish relations between India and Pakistan. The Tashkent Agreement represented, in a very real sense, the conclusion of Ayub Khan's attempt to gain control over Kashmir by force.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

[The partition of British India into the independent states of India and Pakistan left many complex problems for the two new states to resolve to complete the division and consolidate their independence. The future of Kashmir, one of over 500 Princely States never directly ruled by Britain, was not in 1946 a major or even important cause of tension between India and Pakistan. The following analysis will concentrate on factors that led it to become so.]

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

- a. The division of the subcontinent and long mutual distrust between Moslems on the one hand and Hindus and Sikhs on the other led to bloody communal riots and to millions of refugees' seeking security with their coreligionists.
- b. These events contributed to distrust between India and Pakistan, severe economic and social problems for each in sustaining and relocating the refugees, and the creation of large and powerful internal pressure groups, both refugees and their sympathizers.

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Internationally controlled, supervised, protected population exchange.
- b. Controlled population exchanges; outside assistance in resettling refugees; strengthened internal cohesion in each state; stability of government to resist extremist pressure.

- c. While agreement on division of the portions of British India that had been directly ruled by Britain preceded independence for the most part, the Princely States were left free to negotiate with India and Pakistan about their future status. In the Princely State of Junagadh, which had a Moslem ruler and a Hindu majority and was inaccessible from Pakistan, Indian troops marched in to reverse a decision by the ruler to opt for accession to Pakistan.
- d. Adjacent to Kashmir was the North-West Frontier Province, whose Pathan tribesmen had never been fully controlled by the British. Partition had left Pakistan even less well equipped with police and internal security forces to deal with the tribes. Given Pakistan's military weakness, when the Pathan tribesmen began to move out of their mountains on raiding forays, the Pakistani military made no effort to stop them. There is no evidence to suggest that the tribesmen were deliberately encouraged by the Pakistani central government to divert their energies into Kashmir, away from Pakistani Punjab, but no effort was made to prevent them from pouring down into Kashmir.
- e. Kashmir was of strategic and economic importance to Pakistan. Critical Pakistani communication routes ran parallel to and adjacent to its borders; essential water routes for communication, irrigation, and hydroelectric power flowed into Pakistan
- c. International supervision of the Princely States; e.g., plebiscites to determine popular will; international guarantees of implementation of popular choice, including choice of autonomy or independence; arbitration; prohibitions against employment of force in settling territorial issues.
- d. Strengthened police and internal security forces in Pakistan; outside assistance in pacifying and controlling tribal areas; assistance to Pakistan, by the United Nations, outside states, or joint Pakistani-Indian efforts, to contain the tribesmen.
- e. These factors could have been made less salient by the following: outside assistance to develop alternate, more secure communications networks; joint Indian-Pakistani (or Kashmiri-

from Kashmir; and its agricultural produce appeared at the time to be a key foreign-exchange earner for Pakistan.

Pakistani) agreements on water rights, perhaps guaranteed by outside states or international agencies; joint Indian-Pakistani (or Indian-Kashmiri-Pakistani) agreement on hydroelectric development, with outside assistance to develop it; external economic assistance to diversify and develop Pakistan's economy. These factors could also have been offset by partition of Kashmir to place the strategic areas under Pakistan's direct control.

f. The Maharaja of Kashmir preferred autonomy to accession to either new state. He was a Hindu autocrat ruling a Moslem population and unlikely to be acceptable to either Moslem Pakistan or democratic socialist India. However, his armed forces were too weak to cope with revolts against him and in fact defected in large numbers to the rebels. The rebels plus defectors formed the nucleus of the Azad Kashmir forces.

g. Generally hostile and bitter relations between India and Pakistan led each to suspect the other's actions and intentions in Kashmir.

f. Strengthened internal stability in Kashmir; development of internal security capability; development of popular government in Kashmir (free to opt for autonomy or accession to Pakistan).

g. Fact-finding by joint or neutral commissions; explicit statement of national objectives in Kashmir; direct contact and communication between heads of government.

- h. The head of the Indian government, Nehru, was a member of a Kashmiri family and was intensely distressed at reports of tribal atrocities against Kashmiris of all religions.
2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military
- a. Nehru and other Congress leaders shared with Sheikh Abdullah, leader of the largest Kashmiri political organization, a dream of a secular Indian state in which loyalties would be to nation rather than religious sect.
- b. India in 1946-1947 lacked a strategic interest in Kashmir. China was in the throes of civil war, access to Kashmir from India was virtually nonexistent except by air. India had expressed its willingness to see Kashmir accede to Pakistan, voicing concern only over Pakistan's ability to maintain order.
- c. In an effort to buy time during which he hoped to reassert control in Kashmir, the Maharaja proposed to India and Pakistan a "stand-still" on negotiations concerning Kashmir's future. Pakistan accepted the proposal; India did not.
- h. Insulation of personal loyalties from major government decisions, plus all the measures suggested above to halt or mitigate tribal raids.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Greater political democracy in Kashmir would have put in positions of leadership men intent on a peaceful resolution of its future.
- b. A firm Indian public commitment not to seek to acquire control in Kashmir; offers of joint patrols with Pakistan to restrain tribesmen; pressure on the Maharaja of Kashmir to yield to Kashmiri public opinion.
- c. Indian acceptance of the Kashmiri proposal for a "stand-still" agreement, coupled with joint or third-party action to deal with tribal threat.

B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT HOSTILITIES

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[The factors noted above had created a situation in Kashmir in which the Maharaja's forces were in danger of being overrun by a combination of Azad Kashmir forces and Pathan tribesmen. These factors had also led India to suspect Pakistani encouragement of the Azadi and tribal forces and Pakistan to believe that its problems with the Maharaja stemmed from Indian machinations. Thus what had been at most a Pakistani-Kashmiri dispute became an Indian-Pakistani conflict.]

1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. As the military situation of the Maharaja's forces rapidly deteriorated, very little reliable information reached India. Refugees brought rumors of wholesale massacre--massacre of Hindus by Azad Kashmir forces and indiscriminate massacre by Pathan tribesmen. While the threat was clearly serious, its scale and urgency were not known.
- b. The renewed flow of refugees into India and spreading rumors of anti-Hindu, anti-Sikh atrocities raised the possibility of renewed communal violence if the situation in Kashmir were not rapidly stabilized.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Reliable information channels on the precise situation in Kashmir; third-party presence or joint Indian-Pakistani presence.
- b. Assistance in handling refugees; international or other third-party action to stabilize Kashmir.

- c. The Maharaja asked India urgently for aid. The Indians were loath to move into Kashmir illegally and thus pressed the Maharaja to accede to India so that its action would be legal.
- c. Illegal Indian intervention, while perhaps not controlling in this situation, might have obviated much later tension. Available alternate forces, preferably neutral third-party or U.N. forces, would also have avoided the Indian-Pakistani hostilities that ensued. In circumstances such as those that prevailed in Kashmir at this time, these third-party forces would have needed to be forces-in-being with air-lift capabilities, able to be committed quickly.
- d. The British, who more than any other third party were in a position to influence both governments, did not press the Indians not to move into Kashmir.
- d. British pressure on all parties to settle the future of Kashmir peacefully, coupled with joint or neutral third-party action to cope with the threat from the Pathans.
- e. Disregard for the plight of the Kashmiris, or possibly neutral, multilateral efforts to assist them.
2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities
- a. Access to Kashmir from India was limited at that time to air transport to Srinagar.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Measures to limit armed-force capabilities to requirements of internal security.

C. PHASE III₁: HOSTILITIES

[The introduction of Indian troops into Kashmir moved the Indian-Pakistani conflict into the hostilities phase. During the course of these hostilities, a number of distinct intensifications, moderations, and threatened intensifications that did not materialize can be identified. These will be analyzed in this section.]

SUB-PHASE A: PAKISTAN'S THREAT TO
INTERVENE IN RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN
MOVE INTO KASHMIR

[The initial reaction of the leaders of Pakistan to the news of Kashmir's accession to India and India's movement of troops into Kashmir was to order a similar movement of Pakistan's forces. The action was not taken at this time.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

- a. The strong Pakistani interests in Kashmir outlined earlier [see (1e) of Section A above] were threatened by the Indian actions.

C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO MODERATE
HOSTILITIES1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Meeting Pakistan's legitimate interests by other means [see (1e) of Section A above]; Indian commitment, perhaps with third-party guarantee, to permit a plebiscite on Kashmir's future when order had been restored; replacement of Indian forces by neutral (perhaps multi-lateral) forces.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate Hostilities

- a. The partition had left Pakistan with very weak military forces.
- b. Particularly if, as British advisors warned might occur, such Pakistani intervention sparked a direct Indian-Pakistani war, Pakistan's relative military weakness could be disastrous for the country.
- c. The British officers in Pakistan's armed forces threatened to withdraw if Pakistan intervened. This would have crippled a large part of Pakistan's armed power.

SUB-PHASE B: INDIA'S DECISION TO RELIEVE POONCH

[After its initial dispatch of a small force to Srinagar, India found that additional forces were required to defend the city. Later, the Indian military decided that Srinagar could be defended adequately only if the entire Valley of Kashmir were cleared of tribal and Azadi forces, requiring still additional Indian troops. Up to this point, most of the fighting in which Indian forces were involved was within the Valley. As India succeeded in securing the Valley, the tribes and Azadi turned their attention to the Western Districts of Kashmir (between the Valley and the Pakistani border) and to Jammu (between the Valley and the Punjab, now divided between

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Keep Pakistan too weak to intervene directly.
- b. Availability of competent military advice; threat of intensified hostilities with India extending beyond Kashmir.
- c. Encouraging dependence on outside sources for major human or material components of military forces.

Pakistan and India). The Maharaja's forces in the Western Districts were quickly reduced to a few isolated outposts under siege. The Indian move into the Western Districts constituted a geographic extension of the fighting and also brought Indian forces closer to the Pakistani border.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

- a. Inadequate information in Delhi at the time Indian forces were first sent to Kashmir led to underestimation of the magnitude of commitment required to carry out the mission of relieving Srinagar. Subsequently, these forces had to be significantly augmented.
- b. Communication between Indian forces in Kashmir and political leaders in Delhi was inadequate. Military leaders in Kashmir made what appeared to be tactical decisions without assessment of their political implications. Thus the decision to relieve the Maharaja's forces under siege at Poonch was taken by local military officers.
- c. Many Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistani Punjab had fled into Kashmir. They were involved in raids on Moslem villages in reprisal for Azadi and tribal raids. This raised the spectre of renewed communal rioting.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Adequate Indian intelligence about the state of affairs in Kashmir; or third-party or neutral sources of accurate information. [Had India been aware of the magnitude of its eventual commitment, it might have been more hesitant to intervene unilaterally. On the other hand, of course, it might merely have sent in a larger force initially.]
- b. Improved communications, perhaps third-party assistance in developing secure, rapid communications links; political education of the military; firmer civilian control of the military.
- c. Dispersal, resettlement of refugees; controlled population exchanges [see (1b) of Section A above].

2. Factors Tending to Moderate Hostilities

- a. The initial Indian mission was conceived as a limited, humanitarian one of preventing indiscriminate massacre of the Kashmiris.
- b. The commander-in-chief of the Indian army advised against the decision to relieve Poonch, citing the logistical problems, the likelihood that Pakistan would perceive the action as a more direct threat, and the need to commit additional Indian forces.

SUB-PHASE C: INDIA'S DECISION TO TAKE THE ISSUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

[As winter approached and the weather in Kashmir would soon make fighting almost impossible, as well as virtually cut Indian units off from supplies, India decided to take the issue to the United Nations.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

- a. Some of the Indian military believed that a military solution to the problem was possible and recommended that Indian forces cross the Pakistan-Kashmir border to wipe out the raiders' supply bases and sanctuaries.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Articulation of the nature of Indian objectives; use for non-political, humanitarian objectives of neutral third-party forces [see (1c) of Section B above].
- b. More reliable communication between Delhi and Srinagar; stronger command and control within the military.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Third-party border control; enforcement by Pakistan of regulations against use of its territory as a base; neutral fact-finding on the extent to which this was actually the case; U.N. and other outside pressure on India not to extend the war further. This last would suggest U.N. initiative in pressing for an end to hostilities, without

awaiting India's raising of the issue.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate Hostilities

- a. India believed it had firm proof of Pakistan's complicity in the Azadi and tribal raids and that the United Nations would endorse its position.

SUB-PHASE D: PAKISTAN'S DECISION TO COMMIT ITS REGULAR FORCES

[Contrary to India's expectations, the Security Council did not construe the evidence on Kashmir as clear proof against Pakistan. It declined to condemn either side in the conflict and instead called for an end to hostilities, creating a commission to help the parties resolve their differences.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

- a. India had found it necessary to commit more troops to the Poonchi area than had been anticipated. This action led to greater anxiety in Pakistan both that invasion of Pakistan was threatened and that, despite promises of an eventual plebiscite, India's aim was to seize and hold all of Kashmir.
- b. While the Security Council had created the U.N. Commission on India and Pakistan in January, it was three months before its

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Fact-finding by neutral third parties.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. More adequate military intelligence; greater awareness of the political implication of military acts; articulation of clear Indian objectives in Kashmir, perhaps reinforced by outside (possibly U.N.) commitment to ensure their compliance.
- b. Greater dispatch in getting U.N. mediating machinery and presence into the field.

members were selected and even longer before it reached the area.

- c. It seemed likely that with the arrival of the U.N. Commission strong pressure would be brought to bear to terminate hostilities. Following the Indian move into and subsequent build-up in the Western Districts, a cease-fire line along the existing front would leave Indian troops, in Pakistan's view, perilously close to the Pakistan border and vulnerable road and rail communications.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate Hostilities

- a. The U.N. action had clearly registered the desire of the members of the Security Council that hostilities cease and a negotiated settlement be reached.

- b. Militarily the balance between India and Pakistan remained heavily in favor of the former. Should direct intervention in the conflict by Pakistan have precipitated a strong Indian response, the Pakistani forces could have been overwhelmed and even driven back into Pakistan.

SUB-PHASE E: THE PATHAN TRIBESMEN'S
MOVE INTO GILGIT, BALTIKISTAN, AND
LADAKH

[Blocked by Indian forces in the Valley
of Kashmir, the Western Districts, and

- c. More rapid moves to implement U.N. actions; interposition of neutral (perhaps U.N.) force along the frontier; border control; guarantees (third-party or U.N.) of borders.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. More rapid U.N. action; additional U.N. action addressed to the substance of the conflict and the interests of the parties [see (1c) of Sub-Phase D above].
- b. Limit the military capacity of states to intervene; threat of intensified hostilities.

Jammu, the tribes turned to other parts of Kashmir--Gilgit and Baltistan to the north of the Valley and Ladakh to the east. Gilgit and parts of Baltistan had earlier defied the Maharaja and come under nominal Pakistani control. In their raids into Ladakh, the tribesmen were apparently joined by state forces of Gilgit.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

- a. Pakistan and the local administrations of Gilgit and Baltistan were too weak to halt the tribal raiders if they wished to do so.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate Hostilities

- a. Indian forces were sufficient to control the raiders and, in particular, to keep them out of the Valley of Kashmir.

SUB-PHASE F: THREATENED PAKISTANI
AIR AND GROUND OFFENSIVE IN WESTERN
DISTRICTS

[While the limited intervention of Pakistani forces in the Western Districts had halted the Indian advance, it had not succeeded in pushing the Indian forces back. The front was stabilized about where it had been when the intervention occurred.]

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Strengthened internal security forces; third-party assistance in border control [see (1d) of Section A above].

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. While Indian counterforce kept this intensification of hostilities at a low level, other neutral counterforce could have accomplished the same objectives.

1. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

- a. The concerns that had led to the initial Pakistani intervention remained but the force level committed was unable to secure Pakistani objectives.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate Hostilities

- a. India warned Pakistan that an air and ground offensive would lead to an Indian declaration of war on Pakistan.
- b. Britain, whose subjects still supplied a large proportion of Pakistan's officer corps, threatened to withdraw its officers if the Pakistani air force were used in Kashmir.

D. PHASE III TO PHASE IV₁: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

- a. The strategic and other interests of Pakistan that had led to its intervention in the hostilities continued to be salient.

2. Factors Tending to Terminate Hostilities

- a. Despite several intensifications of the hostilities, neither side was able to obtain a decisive military victory at the level of commitment and risk it was prepared to accept.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. The measures suggested above to guarantee Pakistan's vital interests and clarify India's objectives [see (1a), (1c), and (2a) of Sub-Phase D above].

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Threat of intensified hostilities.
- b. Enlarge the degree to which outside states control key materiel and personnel resources of the military.

D. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. The measures suggested above to guarantee Pakistan's vital interests and clarify India's objectives [see (1a), (1c), and (2a) of Sub-Phase D above].

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Augmentation and reinforcement of those factors that had tended to moderate the hostilities [see control measures in Section C above].

- b. The costs of hostilities for both sides were becoming burdensome, especially as they detracted from desired development goals.
- c. Britain was pressing for an end to hostilities and, in view of continued Indian and Pakistani reliance on British services and personnel in many fields, its views were significant. However, Britain was reluctant to intervene too openly or strongly in view of the very recent grant of independence and Indian and Pakistani sensitivity to evidence of "neo-colonialism."
- d. The United Nations was also actively seeking a political formula to end hostilities.
- e. There were many British officers serving in both armed forces. In view of the bitterness and distrust between India and Pakistan, these officers provided a channel of undistorted communications between the opposing forces that facilitated agreement on and implementation of a cease-fire agreement.
- b. Increasing the costs for both sides by economic penalties; enhancement of development goal; making assistance with desired development goals contingent on cessation of hostilities.
- c. Stronger British pressure, perhaps exercised through backing of multilateral U.N. action.
- d. U.N. action aimed at coupling a cease-fire agreement with the outlines of procedures and policies to meet each side's perceived vital interests.
- e. This same resource could have operated at earlier phases of the hostilities to prevent the many misunderstandings that developed and that led to intensification of hostilities. To the extent that these officers were suspected by each side of a lack of neutrality, the same role could have been played by neutral third-party channels of communications.

E. PHASE IV₁ TO PHASE III₂: THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

[Nearly fifteen years elapsed between the cease-fire in 1949 and the resumption of hostilities. During that time, the international environment changed profoundly in ways that bore directly on the course of the conflict. This section will not detail the evolution of those changes but will concentrate on the ways they affected the control objectives of preventing resumption of hostilities, restricting their potential scale/scope, and settling the underlying dispute.]

1. Factors Tending Away from Settlement

a. Kashmir acquired for India a strategic, political, psychological, and economic importance it had not had in 1946. The civil war-torn China of 1946 had become a Communist state; as it asserted its control over Sinkiang and Tibet, a major Asian power emerged on the borders of Indian-held Kashmir. Indian economic investment in Kashmir was high. And as separatist sentiment developed among some Indian groups, the value of not allowing Kashmiri separation to succeed increased.

E. MEASURES DESIGNED TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE, RESTRICT THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES, AND PREVENT THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

a. Any strong, friendly power in Kashmir could have provided India a security against Chinese encroachment equal to that offered by a Kashmir controlled by India. International guarantees, backed if necessary by third-party presence, could have been equally effective. Restraints on Chinese expansionism would not necessarily require a third-party counterforce in India. Provision for adequate compensation or guarantees of India's economic investments; greater internal integrity in India.

b. Measures mentioned earlier to secure Pakistan's vital interests [see (1e) of Section A above].

c. Short of resolution of the great-power conflicts that underlay the Cold War, agreement to insulate local conflicts from great-power competition or to remain neutral on the issues while backing international-organization settlement efforts.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. U.N. efforts to induce the parties to settle the dispute were confined to persuasion and mediation. Stronger measures--arbitration or adjudication--were available.

b. Enhancement of development goals; pressures from external suppliers of assistance for settlement [but see (1c) of Section E above].

b. Pakistan's interests in Kashmir had not lessened in the intervening years. Given Pakistan's general sensitivity to its status vis-à-vis India, the psychological and political importance of what Pakistan believed to be an unjust and illegal Indian seizure of a part of Kashmir continued to grow.

c. U.S.-Soviet Cold War competition had resulted, as far as India was concerned, in a set of relationships in which the United States felt constrained to remain neutral on the Kashmir issue and the Soviet Union initially supported India's position and then moved toward a similar position of neutrality. Thus neither superpower felt itself in a position to exert strong pressure on both parties to settle the dispute.

2. Factors Tending Toward Settlement

a. U.N. efforts persisted, through the Commission created to help bring about a cease-fire and through the regular U.N. organs.

b. Both India and Pakistan had undertaken significant economic development programs to which national resources and external assistance were committed. Neither welcomed

the drain on these resources that was required to maintain military readiness in Kashmir.

- c. Fighting along the border between Indian-controlled Kashmir and China and between India and China faced India with the possibility either of being challenged by two enemies at once or of seeing Pakistan and China coalesce on an anti-Indian policy.

3. Factors Tending to Expand the Scale/Scope of Potential Hostilities

- a. During the fifteen years between hostilities, both India and Pakistan expanded and modernized their military forces. Pakistan became a military ally of the United States, a step taken by the latter in the light of its broader strategic interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. India sought to modernize its forces initially by purchase from a number of sources and by development of an indigenous production capability. After its border conflict with China, India quickened the pace and goal of its military build-up, receiving U.S., British, and Soviet materiel for this purpose.

- b. To the extent that Pakistan and China built upon their common enmity to India to concert their efforts, or to the extent that hostilities between India and one of the two was seized as an opportunity to concert attacks, a potentially wider war threatened to grow out of the initial India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir.

- c. To the extent that this threat would make the Kashmir issue less important, increasing the threat of China or making a Pakistan-China alliance appear more likely would have enhanced this factor.

3. To Offset These Factors

- a. While serious military imbalance in the area would likely have contributed to instability, joint great-power efforts to stabilize forces at a lower level, perhaps as part of a broader regional agreement, would have limited the scope of potential hostilities.

- b. Measures to restrain or counter the Chinese threat [see (1a) of Section E above].

4. Factors Tending to Restrict the Scale/Scope of Potential Hostilities
- a. While the Soviet Union initially gave diplomatic support to India's case in the Kashmir conflict, India pursued a policy of nonalignment between the blocs. Thus the prospect of the conflict's becoming essentially a U.S.-Soviet one did not arise.
 - b. While the United States was Pakistan's chief military ally and sole supplier of arms, the United States was anxious that its support not be used by Pakistan to seek to force a military solution in Kashmir. Pakistan's almost exclusive reliance on the United States and the lack of realistic alternatives gave some weight to U.S. urgings for restraint.
 - c. The United States placed qualitative and quantitative limits on the weapons made available to Pakistan.
5. Factors Tending to Favor Resumption of Hostilities
- [These factors cited above kept the conflict from settlement and introduced into the military inventories of India and Pakistan the potential for hostilities on an expanded scale. But while the frustrations of continued conflict and the tensions of rising competition doubtless contributed to resumed hostilities, other factors bore directly on the timing and manner of the new outbreak.]
4. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Restraint by outside powers and by parties to conflicts in seeking to inject larger conflicts into local ones.
 - b. Where external military support is given one party to a conflict, retaining a high degree of control over the purposes to which the materiel are put.
 - c. Keeping the military balance in the conflict area at the lowest possible level, preferably by not introducing additional arms.
5. To Offset These Factors

- a. Unrest persisted in Indian-controlled Kashmir against continued Indian control and in particular against steps taken by India to incorporate the area virtually as a state in the Indian Union.
 - b. U.S. military assistance to India following China's incursions threatened, in Pakistan's view, to upset the military balance between it and India in the latter's favor. This development, however, merely accelerated a set of circumstances that were operating in any event. With its larger population and greater GNP, the military balance appeared destined to favor India. Whereas previously Pakistan had had the advantage of its alliance with the United States, this now appeared to be offset by U.S. arms assistance to India and U.S. refusal to balance that with the additional sales to Pakistan the latter thought necessary.
 - c. While the future military balance seemed likely to become increasingly in India's favor, the present balance, particularly in qualitative terms, was not so one-sided. Pakistan's armed forces were U.S.-trained and its equipment was more modern than India's. Thus the military position of Pakistan was as favorable as it was likely ever to be.
- a. In the absence of Indian willingness to settle the dispute on the basis of ascertaining the will of the Kashmiris, pressure on India not to alter the status quo unilaterally.
 - b. The U.S. intent with arms shipments to India could have been secured in alternate ways. The measures mentioned above of countering the threat to India from China [see (lc) of Section E above] or stringent conditions on arms made available to India to ensure, insofar as possible, that they would not be used against Pakistan.
 - c. Restraint in introducing highly sophisticated weapons into the arsenals of states involved in a conflict, particularly to states that are dissatisfied with the status quo in that conflict.

- d. In the spring before hostilities resumed in Kashmir, Pakistani and Indian troops clashed in the disputed border area in the Rann of Kutch. While fighting was small in scale, it appeared to demonstrate the technical superiority of Pakistan's armaments.
- e. While India had improved access routes into Indian-held Kashmir since 1949, the routes remained limited and vulnerable. Pakistan, on the other hand, had more direct and easier natural access.
- f. Sympathizers of the Azad Kashmir movement and Moslem refugees in Pakistan from Kashmir exerted strong pressure on Pakistan to take some action.
- g. Unrest in Kashmir was viewed by Pakistan as evidence that the area was ready to revolt and needed only a spark to burst out. The availability of Azadi units and Kashmiri elements in the Pakistani army trained in insurgency tactics made a strategy of infiltration and incitement seem a feasible way to force India to negotiate a settlement more amenable to Pakistan.
- d. Restraint in introducing highly sophisticated weapons [see (5c) of Section E above].
- e. Border controls, third-party or international-organization.
- f. Refugee resettlement, removed from the border areas; international assistance with rehabilitation of the refugees.
- g. More adequate Pakistani intelligence about popular sentiment in Indian-held Kashmir; more intensive patrol of the ceasefire line in Kashmir, particularly provision for aerial surveillance, to make undetected infiltration more difficult.

6. Factors Inhibiting Resumption of Hostilities

- a. The head of the Indian government, Shastri, was anxious to explore ways to normalize relations with Pakistan, which perforce included some accommodation on the Kashmir issue.
- b. The cease-fire line in Kashmir was patrolled by U.N. observers. However, the numbers were inadequate for full coverage of the line or for control of movement across it, and the observers lacked aerial reconnaissance capability.
- c. The fighting in the Rann of Kutch brought strong U.S., British, and Soviet pressure for settlement. This suggested the extent to which the three powers had moved to similar positions vis-à-vis Indian-Pakistani conflicts.
- d. If hostilities in Kashmir erupted into full-scale warfare between India and Pakistan, India's larger size, larger military forces, and greater independence from external arms suppliers would give India a military advantage over Pakistan.

F. PHASE III₂ : HOSTILITIES

[Infiltrators crossed the cease-fire line into Indian-held Kashmir from Azad Kashmir. They included armed but not uniformed members of the Azadi forces, Kashmiri members of the Pakistani army, and some Pakistanis as well as civilian sympathizers. These groups clashed with Indian forces in Indian-held

6. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Initiatives by India; articulation of Indian objectives.
- b. Strengthening observers on cease-fire line; increasing numbers and mobility; provision of aerial reconnaissance.
- c. Joint declarations by the great powers of their intention to take a concerted position on a resumption of hostilities between India and Pakistan.
- d. Raising the potential costs by maximizing the likelihood of a general Indian-Pakistani confrontation should Pakistan move against Kashmir.

F. MEASURES DESIGNED TO MODERATE HOSTILITIES

Kashmir. The uprising of Kashmiris against India, however, failed to materialize, and Indian troops restored relative order relatively quickly. This development posed for Pakistan the questions of stopping its aid to the infiltrators or intervening with its regular forces. It posed for India the questions of confining its military response to dealing with unrest within the parts of Kashmir it controlled or moving across the cease-fire line to cut off the infiltration routes. The latter occurred first when India moved at two points to improve its defense of the Valley of Kashmir. The major of these moves occurred north of Poonch in the part of Azad Kashmir that had been part of the Western Districts. This section will examine this and other actual or threatened intensifications of hostilities.]

SUB-PHASE A: THE INDIAN MOVE ACROSS
THE CEASE-FIRE LINE

1. Factors Favoring Intensification of Hostilities

- a. Internal pressure in India mounted on the Shastri government to respond vigorously to Pakistan's action. Elements both within the Congress Party and in the opposition charged Shastri with weakness and appeasement. A vote was impending on a motion of no-confidence. India's military leaders were anxious to redeem what they regarded as loss of face in the fighting with China and in the Rann of Kutch.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Greater political cohesiveness in India; stronger civilian control of military.

- b. India was concerned with the security of two groups of strategic routes: the routes to Srinagar, so that forces could be built up rapidly if the threat in Kashmir became more serious, and the routes to the China border area. Both were vulnerable to sabotage within Kashmir and to disruption if the fighting there broke into open Indian-Pakistani warfare.
- 2. Factors Favoring Moderation of Hostilities
 - a. Shastri desired to avoid war with Pakistan.
 - b. The U.N. Secretary-General urged restraint on both sides (although both apparently took his stand as indicating a lack of understanding of the issues at stake).
 - c. The United States urged India to avoid retaliatory action that might develop into a full-scale India-Pakistan war.
- b. Adequate air transport to compensate for possible loss of land routes; development of alternate road and rail links farther from the borders.
- 2. To Reinforce These Factors
 - a. Greater political cohesiveness in India; stronger civilian control of military.
 - b. Stronger U.N. pressure. In circumstances such as these, U.N. initiative in seeking ways in which the interests of both sides can be accommodated may be more effective than merely urging patience and restraint.
 - c. Stronger U.S. pressure for moderation of hostilities, perhaps including warnings to both sides of retaliatory actions that might ensue; joint U.S.-British-Soviet pressures.

SUB-PHASE B: THE INTRODUCTION OF REGULAR PAKISTANI FORCES

[India's move across the cease-fire line was confined to the occupation of only two sectors, and India did not appear to be threatening to take over all or most of the remaining part of the Western Districts. However, the move marked the final failure of the strategy of provoking revolt in Kashmir. The hostilities were intensified when a Pakistani armored column drove into Indian-held Kashmir at a point where the cease-fire line and the India-Pakistan border converge to strike at the road link between India and Kashmir. This action both increased the geographic scope of hostilities and transformed what had been a war between mountain infantry into a war involving modern armor and its air support.]

1. Factors Favoring Intensification of Hostilities

a. While events in Kashmir had failed to develop as Pakistan anticipated, the news released to the Pakistani people indicated that Indian-held Kashmir was in full revolt and Indian control imperiled. To have accepted the end of hostilities without accomplishing any of its objectives would, in these circumstances, have been a serious political embarrassment to the Pakistani government.

1. To Offset These Factors

a. Greater candor in reporting war news; less censorship of outside coverage; greater political stability in Pakistan.

- b. Armor was definitely regarded as one area in which Pakistan's arsenal was qualitatively superior to India's. However, the terrain at the points of India's crossing the cease-fire line was unsuited to its use.
 - c. Indian leaders were ambiguous about their intentions in the areas on the Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line which they had occupied. This raised for Pakistan the prospect of ending the hostilities in an even less advantageous position than before they began.
2. Factors Favoring Moderation of Hostilities
- a. To the extent that Pakistan's strategy lay in maintaining the appearance of a move into Kashmir in support of a spontaneous Kashmiri rebellion, the nature and location of the attack weakened that claim.
 - b. The Pakistani move against Indian supply lines risked precipitating a similar Indian counterattack against Pakistani supply lines, since both supply systems were near the frontiers and vulnerable to attack.
 - c. The United States, Britain, the United Nations, and others maintained pressure for an end to hostilities and avoidance of intensification.
- b. Pakistani armor was externally supplied by the United States. Avoidance of introducing destabilizing weapons into the conflict area; maintenance of a military balance at the lowest possible level.
 - c. Unambiguous articulation of Indian aims; external pressure for a restoration, at a minimum, of the status quo ante.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. To the extent that international credence had been given to the unrest in Kashmir as an internal Kashmiri problem, Pakistani inclinations to treat it otherwise would have been countered.
 - b. Increasing the likelihood of an Indian countermove; prior articulation of Indian intentions.
 - c. Stronger external pressure, coupled with articulation of consequences of prolonged or intensified hostilities.

SUB-PHASE C: THE MOVEMENT OF INDIAN
ARMORED FORCES ACROSS INDIA-PAKISTAN
BORDER

[Indian forces reacted quickly with a counterattack across the India-Pakistan border with the objectives of attacking the Pakistani base and cutting road and rail links leading to the area of the Pakistani attack. Thus hostilities that had begun as clashes between infiltrators and Indian forces inside Indian-held Kashmir had intensified to breaches of the cease-fire line, the introduction of Pakistani forces into Kashmir, and now attack across an international border.]

312

1. Factors Favoring Intensification of Hostilities

- a. Tactical military logic seemed to the Indian military to dictate this move as the best response to the Pakistani move. It reflected as well the lessons the Indian military felt they had learned from the 1947-1949 hostilities.
- b. Indian public opinion, like that of Pakistan, had been fed on official releases that magnified Indian military successes and Pakistani reverses. Feeling the flush of victory, Indian public opinion supported intensifying the hostilities to teach Pakistan a decisive lesson.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Greater understanding by both military and civilian leaders of the political implications of acts undertaken for tactical reasons, even if sound.
- b. Greater candor in reporting war news; less censorship of outside coverage; greater political stability in India.

2. Factors Favoring Moderation of Hostilities

- a. The areas into which the hostilities had spread were the scenes of the worst communal rioting in the late 1940s and the areas in which millions of refugees from those riots had settled. Both Pakistan and India were concerned lest these communal tensions again lead to uncontrolled bloodshed.
- b. The dangers of all-out war, which both sides wanted to avoid, were increased when hostilities spilled out of Kashmir.
- c. The United States and Britain increased their pressure for a cease-fire, threatened to withdraw all economic aid from both sides and suspend military aid and food shipments.
- d. The Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution demanding a cease-fire. Thus the common position of the Soviet Union and the United States was made clear.

G. PHASE III₂ TO PHASE IV₂ : THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[Both the Pakistani armored drive into Kashmir and the Indian armored drive into Pakistan were stopped short of their objectives. While some additional intensifications threatened, neither side was prepared further to widen the geographic or military scope of hostilities. Thus while some air raids were carried out by both sides, each exercised caution in avoiding population centers. And

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Measures outlined earlier to disperse, resettle, and integrate refugees.
 - b. Increasing the risk that intensification of hostilities would lead to all-out war.
 - c. Stronger United States and British pressure in the form of actual termination of aid.
 - d. More substantive U.N. action on the issues in the conflict; coupling of modes of settlement of the dispute with termination of hostilities.
- ## G. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

while some belligerent gestures were made on the East Pakistan-India border, the hostilities were not extended to that area. Furthermore, each side took strong measures to prevent inflamed public opinion from triggering communal violence.]

1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

- a. However one might define them, Pakistan's objectives in Kashmir had not been achieved. Indian troops were in control of slightly more of Kashmir than before the hostilities broke out; the Kashmiris in Indian-controlled Kashmir were not in revolt; Pakistan had been unable to bring sufficient military pressure to bear on India to make it amenable to a more equitable settlement in Kashmir. Furthermore, such international pressure as was being generated for the termination of hostilities did not include any element of pressure on India to accommodate to Pakistan's grievances.
- b. India, content with the status quo in Kashmir, had no interest in extending hostilities to better its position. However, India had demonstrated its willingness to continue the hostilities as long as Pakistan was prepared to fight.
- c. Communist China's ultimatum to India to withdraw from posts allegedly on Chinese territory created for Pakistan the possibility of assistance from a powerful ally.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Measures suggested earlier to accommodate Pakistan's interests in Kashmir.
- b. Pressure on India to agree to negotiated settlement of Kashmir issue on terms acceptable to both sides.
- c. Neutralization of Chinese threat by great-power counter-pressure.

- d. Censorship of news reaching the Pakistani people had left them with the impression that, far from stalemate, the hostilities had resulted in stunning Pakistani victories.
- 2. Factors Favoring Termination of Hostilities
 - a. The United States and Britain carried out their threat to halt military assistance to both sides. This was particularly pressing for Pakistan, which lacked indigenous military production and faced shortages of ammunition, spare parts, and replacements if fighting were prolonged or intensified.
 - b. The United Nations maintained its pressure for an immediate cease-fire without political preconditions.
 - c. While possible Chinese intervention might have tipped the military balance temporarily in Pakistan's favor, direct Chinese intervention on Pakistan's side might invoke U.S. and other intervention on India's side.
 - d. The economic costs of the war, plus interruption of external economic assistance, imperiled economic development goals on both sides.
 - e. The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union took a common stand of insisting on a cease-fire and refused to endorse the policy goals of either party in Kashmir.
- d. Measures suggested earlier for a better-informed public opinion.
- 2. To Reinforce These Factors
 - a. Retaining control over use made of weapons supplied by restriction of amount of ammunition, spare parts available locally.
 - b. Equal U.N. pressure on both parties to agree to terms or at least modes of reaching political settlement.
 - c. U.S., other third-party warnings of consequences of Chinese intervention.
 - d. Increasing potential economic costs.
 - e. Equal pressure for agreement on terms, modes of settlement.

H. PHASE IV₂ : POST-HOSTILITIES

[This analysis stops with the cease-fire
agreement concluded on September 22, 1965.]

III. WEAPONS ANALYSIS

[This analysis deals with Indian and Pakistani arms acquisitions and policy since independence but focuses in detail on the weapons available to India and Pakistan at the time of the 1965 hostilities in Kashmir.]

A. Indian Weapons Policy and Acquisition

In the two decades since partition and independence in 1946, India has created an 879,000-man military force and provided it with modern weapons which have been imported or produced in India under foreign license agreements.

India has acquired arms from a large number of suppliers, a reflection in part of India's nonaligned policy of avoiding over-identification with either Cold War camp. Perhaps an even stronger motivation for this feature of India's arms policy is the desire not to rely on any single large supplier who might thus acquire too great a voice in the uses to which Indian arms might be put. This latter interest probably explains in large measure India's policy of developing domestic arms-production capabilities.

Before World War II, Britain assisted India in building several ordnance factories for the production of British-designed small arms, such as the .303 Lee Enfield rifle, the Vickers Berthier machine gun, and later the Bren gun. The 7.62mm LIAI rifles and Sterling sub-machine guns now being produced at Ishapore and Kanpur, respectively, are Indian modifications of British designs.¹ In 1946, Britain licensed production of Vickers Vampire jet fighters in India, and arranged for

¹Joseph Smith, Small Arms of the World (Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Books, 1966), p. 460.

the licensed production of Folland Gnat jet fighters ten years later.¹ Britain has also sold a large number of Hawker Hunter fighters and English Electric Canberra bombers to India, as part of a plan drawn up by the British and Indian governments in 1953 to modernize and re-equip the Indian air force.² These aircraft were built to the specifications of the Indian air force.

In addition to a variety of battlefield guns, the major proportion of India's armor has come from British stocks. In December 1965 the first production model of the Vickers-designed 37-ton medium tank, the Vijayanta, rolled off the production line in India. The construction of a factory for its production began in 1961. The guns and engines for this tank are known to come from Britain, but India hopes to reach 80 per cent indigenous production of the Vijayanta by 1970.³

Most of the ships in the Indian navy were built in Britain. In September 1964 it was announced that financial assistance would be given by Britain in reconstructing the Mazagon dockyards in Bombay and in the subsequent production of three frigates there.⁴

The only weapons known to have been supplied to India by the United States before 1962 were a number of Sherman tanks purchased in 1947-1948 and in 1952.⁵ After the India-China border conflict of 1962,

¹William Green, The World's Fighting Planes (New York, Doubleday, 1965), p. 115.

²Ibid., pp. 106, 95.

³The Hindu, July 9, 1966.

⁴See press notice issued by the Commonwealth Relations Office in London, September 21, 1964.

⁵Selig S. Harrison, "Undoing a Mistake," New Republic, September 7, 1959, p. 14. For the terms of the 1951 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and India, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2241. The agreement provided for the sale of arms.

both the United States and Britain agreed to further aid to India to assist in its defense against China. Even prior to formal agreement, the United States air-lifted a number of small arms, mortars, and mountain artillery to India from European stockpiles.¹ Under the terms of the agreement subsequently signed on November 14, 1962, which provided for grant aid, India agreed to accept a U.S. mission to observe and review the use to which such grant aid might be put. The restrictions from the earlier agreements--e.g., that the arms would not be used to commit aggression--were continued. India further agreed to return the weapons received under the grant agreement when they were no longer required.² Under the 1962 agreement, the United States is reported to have agreed to provide arms for the formation of six mountain divisions, although some reports suggest that the United States has been increasingly reluctant to provide arms that might be used against Pakistan.³ In 1963 the United States exported an ammunition factory to India consisting of two high-speed assembly lines that would turn out millions of rounds of ammunition daily in sizes ranging from 7.63mm to 20mm.⁴

France has also assisted India in arms acquisition. It is claimed by one analyst that the 40 AMX-13 tanks supplied by France to India, probably in 1955-1956, were in direct response to Pakistan's acquisition of M-41 Bulldog tanks from the United States.⁵ France

¹Times (London), November 19, 1962.

²Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5206.

³Daily Telegraph (London), August 13, 1963.

⁴New York Times, September 2, 1963.

⁵Harrison, op. cit., p. 14.

has also given India a production license for Hotchkiss-Brandt mortars and for Sud Alouette helicopters.¹ In 1953 three squadrons of Dassault Ouragan fighters were bought from France. In 1958 a large number of Dassault Mystère IVA jet fighters were delivered to the Indian air force. Some Breguet Alize ASW patrol aircraft were supplied in 1961 to the Indian navy for use on its aircraft carrier.²

In 1962 shortly before the Chinese attack, a Indian-Soviet agreement was signed for the transfer of several MiG-21 aircraft to India with the possibility of licensed production of these aircraft in India. Since 1963 a three-factory complex has been set up in India for production of the MiG-21 and its armament and equipment.³ Prior to signing its agreement with the Soviet Union for licensed production of the MiG-21, India considered acquiring the British Lightning, French Mirage III, and U.S. F-104 aircraft. Each of these might have filled the gap that India saw in its air force, but for various reasons the deal with the Soviets for the MiG-21 was the most advantageous in the opinion of the Indian government. France was reported willing to sell the Mirage III to India, but probably would not have been receptive to the idea of licensed production.⁴ Although the Lightnings were apparently not refused to India, it has been stated that Britain was not very enthusiastic about either selling them to India or licensing their production there.⁵ Other sources indicate that the United States did refuse

¹This information is from the 1964-1965 annual report of the Indian Ministry of Defence, p. 25.

²Green, op. cit., pp. 12, 17; Aviation Week, June 22, 1953, p. 14.

³Norman D. Palmer, "The Defense of South Asia," Orbis, Winter 1966, p. 914.

⁴Business Week, June 2, 1962, p. 91.

⁵New York Times, July 8, 1962.

to sell F-104 aircraft to India but offered aircraft of an earlier generation.¹ The Soviet Union, on the other hand, offered India the independence it wanted through licensed production and also provided the MiG-21 at low cost and on favorable long-term credits.

Since 1964, additional Soviet equipment has been shipped to India, including about 70 PT-76 light tanks, a number of SA-2 missiles, and a few models of Soviet guns.² There have also been reports that the Soviet Union refused an Indian request for licensed production of Soviet surface-to-air missiles.³ In August 1965 it was announced that India intended to purchase six Soviet submarines, but as yet there has been no public evidence that a transfer has occurred.⁴ Britain expressed considerable concern over this deal, reportedly because it would give Soviet personnel free access to sensitive equipment on ex-British vessels now with the Indian navy.⁵

Yugoslavia has also shown an interest in the Indian military market. During the Chinese attack in 1962, Yugoslavia began producing ammunition according to Indian specifications to aid in the conflict against China.⁶ This arrangement has since been discontinued.

In addition to production of arms under license or with foreign design, India has designed and developed the entirely indigenous Ishapore rifle. Early in 1965, India claimed that these

¹Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 13, 1965, p. 26; Manchester Guardian, March 6, 1964; Palmer, op. cit., p. 913.

²Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 28, 1964, p. 20; New York Times, May 13, 1964.

³Palmer, op. cit., p. 915.

⁴Janes Fighting Ships, 1965-1966 edition (London, Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1965).

⁵Defense Management Report, August 16, 1965, p. 2.

⁶Christian Science Monitor, August 23, 1963.

rifles were being produced at the rate of 2,500 per month, exceeding the planned target.¹ Existing .303 caliber rifles and light machine guns are being converted to 7.62mm. In addition to the machine guns, mortars, and light artillery already being produced, Indian ordnance factories began production in 1964 of a tank gun, a heavy mortar, a new mountain gun of Indian design, 30mm ammunition for the Indian air force, and ammunition for the heavy mortar.² It is probable that India is now self-sufficient in small-arms production, although there have been reports within the past three years that all of the small-arms factories have largely outmoded equipment that is scheduled to be replaced during the current five-year plan.³

Indian dockyards have supplied the navy with seaward defense boats and a survey ship, and are now constructing three general-purpose frigates.⁴

India has made a strenuous effort to develop an indigenous supersonic ground-attack all-weather fighter, the HF-24. Design began in 1956 with the assistance of a team of German technicians, but serious difficulties have been encountered, particularly with the development of a suitable engine. As a result, development of the aircraft has proceeded very slowly, much behind schedule, and fully satisfactory performance has not been achieved.⁵

Although India's indigenous arms production meets a large proportion of its needs, there are probably limits on the extent to

¹"Unique Achievements of Ordnance Factories," Defense Equipment and Supplies (India), January 1965, p. 5.

²See the 1964-1965 annual report of the Indian Ministry of Defence, p. 25.

³Smith, op. cit., p. 460.

⁴Janes Fighting Ships, pp. 125, 126, 128.

⁵For a fuller account, see "The Diffusion of Combat Aircraft, Missiles, and Their Supporting Technologies," prepared by Browne & Shaw Research Corporation for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), October 1966.

which complete self-sufficiency can be achieved in the near future especially in highly sophisticated systems such as jet aircraft. As was noted earlier, aircraft production lines have operated in India since before World War II, and the first Indian-produced British-licensed Vickers Vampire jet fighter-bomber was delivered in 1953.¹ Despite this experience with aircraft production, the difficulties encountered with the HF-24 program suggest that India's present industrial, technological, and managerial capacity will make fully indigenous design, fabrications, and assembly of supersonic aircraft a difficult and distant prospect.

Although India is dependent on foreign suppliers to a certain extent for spare parts, refusal to supply has had less effect on India than on Pakistan. For example, Hindustan Aeronautics claims to be exceeding normal production rates for Gnat aircraft despite Britain's refusal to ship parts and components. The servicing of Indian air-force aircraft is divided among Hindustan Aeronautics, Air India, and the Indian air force; and there are repair facilities in India for all but the most recently introduced aircraft, which must be sent abroad for overhaul. India now plans to buy foreign aircraft with a lifetime of spares, despite the initial expense involved.² It is felt that this will leave India with less long-term dependence on foreign suppliers and probably save money in the end by allowing the aircraft to be serviced domestically.

With a variety of tanks, India seems to have been successful in keeping a fairly high operational rate. It is known that, during the 1965 Kashmir hostilities, a corps of engineers was kept at the front to maintain the Sherman and Centurion tanks. Ordinarily, these tanks would have spent three or four days in battle and then have been withdrawn for repairs. As it was, some tanks were kept in battle for

¹Indian Aviation, March 1965, p. 1.

²S. P. Baranwal, ed., Military Year-book 1966 (New Delhi, 1966), pp. 50-51.

as long as two weeks.¹

Before 1962 India probably paid for most of its imported weapons on a cash or short-term basis, particularly in its purchases of British and French aircraft. In the case of the British aircraft, as a member of the Commonwealth, India was probably charged a low rate. As an example, 68 Canberra bombers, built in Britain for the Indian air force, are believed to have cost India only \$56 million.² After the India-China border conflict in 1962, U.S. weapons supplied to India for protection against future Chinese attack were provided as grant aid. India paid in rupees the local costs of U.S. observation and review personnel.³

Soviet weapons have been provided to India for credit repayable in rupees over a period of eight years. Evidently the cost of the MiG-21s and their production in India has risen considerably since 1962. When the agreement between India and the Soviet Union was first announced, the MiGs were said to have been offered to India for about \$250,000 each, or roughly one-seventh the cost of a new F-104. By 1965 the price of the MiGs appeared to have more than doubled, and the construction of the plants in India was lagging.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 220.

²Military Review, April 1957.

³See Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4322.

⁴Business Week, June 2, 1962, p. 92; Air Force/Space Digest, June 1965, p. 85.

WEC-98 III

Weapons Available to India in September 1965

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
.303 Lee Enfield rifle	(692,587 produced in India during W.W.II)	India
7.62mm FN "FAL" rifle in L1A1 version	(British)	India
7.62mm Ishapore AR (could be same as above)		India
.303 Vickers Berthier light machine gun Mk. III	(8,357 produced during W.W.II) now in limited use	India
Bren gun		India
7.62mm FN MAG machine gun	now standard	India
.30 cal. Browning machine gun		U.S.
.50 cal. Browning machine gun		U.S.
Vickers heavy machine gun	in limited use	
52mm mortar		India
120mm mortar		India/France
81mm mortar	a few air-lifted in 1962	U.S.
106mm recoilless rifle		
bazooka		
3.7" antiaircraft gun		U.K.
40mm Bofors antiaircraft gun		
57mm towed cannon		
75mm towed cannon		
light howitzer)		India
105mm howitzer (mountain artillery))	2,500 pieces of artillery	U.S.
heavy artillery)		U.K.
AMX-13 light tank	40	France
PT-76 light tank	70	U.S.S.R.
Stuart light tank	80	U.K.
M-4 Sherman tank	180	U.S.
Centurion tank	360	U.K.

WEC-98 III

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
Vijayanta medium tank	(production began in Dec. 1965) 100 or more to be produced	India
Folland Gnat jet fighter	at least 100	India/U.K.
Vampire jet fighter	100	India/U.K.
F-56 Hawker Hunter fighter	150-160	U.K.
Mystère IVA jet fighter	110	France
Ouragan fighter-bomber	104	France
MiG-21 fighter	20-36	U.S.S.R.
HF-24 Mk.I Maruta jet fighter	4	India
Canberra bomber	80	U.K.
SA-2 missile	about 50	U.S.S.R.
aircraft carrier	1	U.K.
cruiser	2	U.K.
destroyer	3	U.K.
antiaircraft frigate	3	U.K.
antisubmarine frigate	5	U.K.
general-purpose frigate	3 (under construc- tion)	India
frigate (escort destroyer)	3	U.K.
frigate (ex-sloop)	2	U.K.
training frigate	1	U.K.
coastal minesweeper	4	U.K.
inshore minesweeper	2	U.K.
coastal defense boat	3	India
coastal defense boat	2	Yugoslavia
coastal defense boat	4	Italy
seaward patrol craft	4	U.K.
landing ship	1	U.K.
survey ship	1	India
survey ship	3	U.K.

B. Pakistani Weapons Policy and Acquisition

When India and Pakistan became separate states, the Pakistani army was equipped with weapons produced before or during World War II. Without its own production capabilities, Pakistan applied to foreign powers for weapons-- mainly Britain and the United States. Pakistan now claims to import 80 per cent of its war materiel. ¹

The policy pursued by Pakistan in arms acquisition has differed significantly from that of India. Unlike India, Pakistan was, until 1965, almost exclusively reliant on a single supplier, the United States. It is doubtful, however, that the multiple options on sources of arms open to India would have been open to Pakistan. India's ability to select from among competitive sources does not derive exclusively from its deliberate policies but is also a reflection of its size, wealth, and political importance. For Pakistan to maintain the type and size of force that it has deemed necessary will probably always require heavy, if not exclusive, reliance on a single great-power supplier.

The United States has supplied the largest proportion of the arms that have gone to Pakistan since the late 1940s. Before 1950 a number of Sherman tanks were transferred to Pakistan from U.S. stocks.² The bulk of U.S. military aid to Pakistan has been furnished, however, under a series of aide-mémoires signed in 1954, 1960, 1961, and 1962, in which the United States agreed to supply, maintain, support, modernize, train, and equip specific units of the Pakistani armed forces. Much, if not all, of the U.S. military equipment that has gone to Pakistan under these agreements has been provided at little cost to Pakistan.

It is known that an assortment of U.S.-built artillery and guns has been supplied to Pakistan, as well as M-24, M-41, M-47, and M-48 tanks. The M-47 and M-48 tanks were of an advanced U.S. design that was

¹Times (London), September 11, 1965. This cites the same Pakistani source who asserted that India was 80 per cent self-sufficient. The exact percentages should probably be accepted only with caution, but the general picture of relative reliance on external suppliers is undoubtedly accurate.

²Harrison, op. cit., p. 14.

still in regular use with NATO forces when they were transferred to Pakistan.

Between 1956 and 1958, Pakistan received its first U.S. jet fighters--North American F-86 Sabrejets.¹ When the United States began phasing out its B-57 bombers in 1958, a number of the aircraft went to Pakistan.² In 1961 the United States began to supply F-104 jet fighters to Pakistan, and by 1965, it was calculated that there were about 50 of these in the Pakistani air force.³

Britain has been the second most important source of arms for Pakistan. It is probable that the majority of arms in Pakistan at the time of partition were of British design, if not manufacture. Many of these are probably still in use. After 1960, Britain delivered 50 Canberra bombers to Pakistan.⁴ The Pakistani navy is composed almost entirely of British-built ships, many of which were purchased by the United States and transferred to Pakistan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.⁵

Also in contrast to Indian policy, Pakistan has not sought to develop indigenous production capabilities. Pakistan appears to have built only a single large weapons production enterprise, a factory to produce small arms and ammunition. Construction of this facility began in 1949 and was completed in about 1956-1957, at an estimated cost of \$100 million.⁶ Ammunition for heavy weapons is not produced in Pakistan and must be bought abroad.

¹Green, op. cit., p. 202.

²Harrison, op. cit., p. 14.

³Newsweek, June 25, 1962, p. 43; ibid., September 20, 1965, p. 33.

⁴Ibid., September 20, 1965, p. 33.

⁵Janes Fighting Ships, pp. 199-202.

⁶Major M.I. Karim, "Pakistan Army," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1955, p. 29.

There is also a great difference between the Indian and the Pakistani ability to maintain weapons. Pakistan is almost entirely dependent on the United States for maintenance and resupply. For example, there is an overhaul base in Pakistan for F-86 Sabrejets, which is most likely supplied with spare parts by the United States, although there is a possibility of Pakistan's buying limited amounts of spare parts from Iran and Turkey, which also maintain F-86 aircraft.¹ The United States is said to have restricted supplies of spare parts and ammunition to Pakistan, making prolonged use of the weapons impossible without U.S. cooperation. Even with the necessary spare parts, Pakistan was able to maintain only a 42 per cent "in commission" rate with its F-86 aircraft, as compared to a 70 per cent rate maintained by the United States.²

Since the 1965 Kashmir hostilities Pakistan has been receiving new supplies of weapons from China. These have included MiG-19 fighters and T-59 tanks.³ China is also reported to be providing training in guerrilla warfare to Pakistani forces.⁴ As yet, however, the new weapons have not altered the basic U.S. character of the bulk of Pakistan's arms, nor Pakistan's reliance on the United States for spare parts, maintenance, and to a lesser extent ammunition.

Weapons Available to Pakistan in September 1965

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
9mm Sten submachine gun		U.K.
.303 Bren light machine gun		U.K.
7.69mm Madsen machine gun	(acquired after W.W.II)	Denmark/ Germany

¹Times (London), December 18, 1965.

²New Republic, March 14, 1960, p. 5.

³Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 1966.

⁴Statesman, August 21, 1965, p. 2.

WEC-98 III




<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
.50 cal. Browning machine gun		U.S.
83mm rocket launcher		
60mm mortar		
81mm mortar		
125mm artillery)		U.S.
150mm artillery)	900	U.S.
175mm artillery)		U.S.
20mm Oerlikon cannon mounted on weapons carrier		U.S.
90mm antiaircraft weapon		U.S.
155mm self-propelled gun		U.S.
M-4 Sherman tank	probably about 200	U.S.
M-24 Chaffee light tank	about 50	U.S.
M-41 Bulldog light tank	about 50	U.S.
M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks	about 400	U.S.
T-33 jet trainer	at least 6	U.S.
T-37 jet trainer	at least 22	U.S.
Martin B-57 bomber (Canberra)	30	U.S.
Canberra bomber	50	U.K.
F-86 Sabrejet	100	U.S.
F-104 Starfighter	50	U.S.
light cruiser	1	U.K.
destroyer	5	U.K.
frigate	3	U.K.
coastal minesweeper	8	U.S.
patrol craft	4	U.K.
submarine	1	U.S.

C. A Problem of Control

The 1965 Kashmir hostilities serve as a prime example to the weapons suppliers involved of how little control they have over weapons that have been handed over to another country. In this case, agreement by both India and Pakistan that they would not use the weapons supplied by the United States against one another was disregarded when the fighting broke out.

Another example of attempted control, with limited success, is provided by an agreement made between India and Britain when the latter supplied aircraft to India in 1955-1956 to match the F-86 fighters sent to Pakistan. At that time, the British government received a letter from Nehru agreeing to consult Britain before making future aircraft purchases elsewhere. Evidently, this was not as binding as the British had hoped, for when the MiG deal was made between India and the Soviet Union in 1962, Nehru claimed to have forgotten the letter and stressed India's right to purchase aircraft where it wished.¹

¹Ian C. C. Graham, "The Indo-Soviet MiG Deal and Its International Repercussions," Asian Survey, May 1964, p. 826.



INDIA AND PAKISTAN FORCE LEVELS, ARTILLERY, TANKS, AND JET AIRCRAFT
1950 - 1966

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL"Controlling" the Conflict

Once India was partitioned in 1947 into the ethnically and religiously separate states of India and Pakistan, the problem of disposing of the Princely States was set in that potentially conflictual context. The Princely States had to be disposed of in accordance with the same principles that had governed the partition, or grounds for conflict would be generated. Accession to India by Kashmir--a predominantly Moslem area--was bound to create a dispute. Turning it into a conflict could be avoided only by dealing with the merits of the dispute. When that was not done and hostilities did break out, the reverse was true: limiting violence meant in this case permitting either side quickly to achieve a clear-cut victory, or otherwise quickly terminating it by putting on ice the basic cause of conflict. In fact the latter took place, but failed to hold up in 1965 when many of the original causes remained operative.

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. Minorities as such have not been accepted as a fundamental international problem since the early days of the League of Nations, but they do in fact constitute a major issue in the ambit of peaceful change, which itself describes the greatest need of our age. For even if the legal status of territory is disposed of peacefully, the aftermath with its intensely emotional fallout can not only be painful for the humans involved, but can set up running sores in the form of minority problems with built-in permanent preconditions for conflict. Given the ethnic-religious-racial basis for the Indian partition in the first place, preventing conflict from developing over Kashmir meant dealing with the fundamental and passionate problem of human affiliations. Perhaps the chief preventive in this kind of

situation is to separate the populations, either by exchange or by partition. Population exchange can be tragically wrenching for the human beings involved. But if racially or religiously clashing populations cannot integrate, conflict prevention argues for physical separation (as with India and Pakistan in 1947, and as Greece and Turkey agreed to do in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne). This kind of policy is also relevant to Cyprus today, where the Turkish Cypriot population probably ought to be resettled to the mainland; to Palestine, where there may be no prospect for genuine peace until the Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip and Jordan who will not integrate are resettled; and to Nigeria, where in fact population exchanges are now under way. In Kashmir, apart from panicked flights of refugees from massacre, no controlled population exchanges took place.

2. The related policy is partition. Particularly if local authority is clearly committed to one side of the argument (for example, a Cyprus government dominated by the majority obviously will favor the Greek Cypriots), partition may well be indicated. Partition is a confession of political failure, and can also involve exchanges of populations, resettlement of refugees, and international help in financing these actions. But draconic measures of this sort might represent the surgery necessary if continuous conflict over Kashmir were to be avoided.

3. The ability to take rational measures as sensitive as partition, exchanges of population, the invitation of international observers, or assistance in resettling minorities requires a degree of internal cohesion and governmental stability that few governments in the world are strong enough to exhibit. Communalism is a form of fragmented nationalism. To overcome it, a strengthening of national authority might have enabled the Kashmiri government that was formed to handle the problem of communalism rationally and humanely. Given the kinetic energy, so to speak, of a communal conflict, stable and effective governmental authority is an absolute requirement to

prevent it from widening in scope. Contemporary cases in point are tribalism in Africa, for instance in Nigeria and the Congo; ethnic warfare in Cyprus; and the unresolved ethnic-religious problem in Kashmir. Considering the capacity of each of these to intensify, perhaps the best argument for rapid political development of weak countries is that of international stability. On the other hand, if governments are excessively authoritarian, this may have the contrary result of increasing international tension.

4. In Kashmir the path to prevention of conflict perhaps lay above all in the possibility of potential adversaries' communicating constructively. Good communication might have helped both sides to recognize a common security problem neither could solve alone, namely the rampaging Pathan tribesmen. Joint patrols of Indian and Pakistani forces might have prevented the Pathans' uncontrolled violence, thereby helping to reassure India and thus support its original acceptance of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan (which it later rescinded). This would have taken considerable courage on the part of both governments. But joint patrols involving potential adversaries have been possible--for example in Austria during the worst of the Cold War until a neutralizing peace treaty was possible in 1955.

5. The proximate source of conflict was the disposition of the so-called Princely States of India. These tended to fall into place fairly logically, but it was a "free market" process and provoked violence in the case of Hyderabad as well as Kashmir. Where there were potential difficulties, it would have been helpful to have third-party international procedures available--ranging from fact-finding by joint or neutral commissions, through "stand-still" agreements, to recommended solutions such as plebiscites, international guarantees, and provisions for international arbitration of disputes arising out of the situation. Equally, international support for Kashmiri autonomy with provisions for reform might have averted conflict. Third-party preventive activity may be helpful in the future

when other states break up in a pattern resembling either India in 1947 or the Congo in 1960. The role of the international, third-party, or neutral agency must of course be objective and effective: the case of West Irian in 1963 constitutes a shabby precedent, particularly if there is no follow-up on the promised plebiscite in that area.

6. The Pakistani government should have performed better in the job of pacifying and controlling the tribal area, both before the fighting broke out and later. Internal defense capabilities after all are not only for the purpose of maintaining internal order. They ought to help a state avoid inadvertently causing international conflict because of an inability to keep internal order. The prescription here could have taken several forms: as mentioned above, international assistance; joint Indian-Pakistani action against their common problem; or strengthened internal defense capabilities in Kashmir with arms appropriate for the task, plus training in essentially police and peacekeeping methods. The last particularly could have helped the Maharaja in an early stage of the conflict to push to his preferred solution of autonomy (although seeds of conflict would have remained).

7. Kashmir's strategic and economic value to Pakistan might have been less of an incentive to Pakistani intervention if there had been a development of alternative and more secure communications networks plus a joint Indo-Pakistani agreement on water rights and hydroelectric development backed up by international guarantees. The strategic problem for Pakistan could have been met equally well by either an autonomous Moslem-ruled Kashmir or, alternatively, partition.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

8. After the Pakistan-Kashmir dispute had become an India-Pakistan conflict, better intelligence capabilities might have deflated the horror stories that were brought to India and that magnified the Indian sense of outrage and need to intervene. (They might also have sobered India with a more realistic appreciation of the implications

of intervention.) Where the facts were disputed, again a joint or third-party investigation might have been the best solution. Next to that, there could have been action to restrain the Pathan tribesmen, who were a basic element in the spiral of conflict.

9. Once the situation started to deteriorate in Kashmir, it acquired a snowball effect. This stage was the last chance for preventive measures. Such measures could have taken the form of an impartial presence along with intensive pressures by friendly countries (notably Britain) who could still influence the situation. International refugee action at this stage would also have been helpful. Conflict prevention could also have been accomplished by a fait accompli--in the form here of a quick Indian take-over action.

10. Probably the most relevant preventive measure at the stage just prior to open warfare would have been an international military force, speedily decided upon and able to be positioned by means of a readily available air-lift capability.

Moderating Hostilities

11. Pakistani intervention might have been prevented if that country's legitimate interests had been previously met, though the ethnic factor would have of course remained. Once the fighting started, moderating it meant not letting Pakistan become strong enough to be a serious combatant, while at the same time detering Pakistan with a far stronger potential Indian opposition.

12. British officers in Pakistan were useful "conflict-controllers" by threatening to resign from the army and subsequently the air force if Pakistan intervened in the fighting. This suggests that, even though one cannot hope to leave a London-centered network of Sandhurst graduates throughout the regions indefinitely, there is something to be said as a form of control mechanism for having the countries in question dependent on external forces. This factor was operative in the entire India-Pakistan conflict through 1965. If

British-trained officers are not available to form the private three-way network (via London) that often prevented conflict in the subcontinent in the postwar years, the next best thing might be some form of neutral or third-party channels of communication.

13. This same principle of external dependence argues for arranging the arming of developing countries by means of transfer of weapons rather than permitting indigenous productive capacities to develop. This will be particularly important when missiles and space technology are more widespread. Generalized arms-control agreements would be better yet (although any regional arms-control agreement supported by great powers would need to guard against the danger of stimulating local efforts toward autarchy in weapons production).

14. When the fighting was going on, intensification of a limited nature was caused by decisions made on the ground by local Indian commanders. These were not necessarily decisions New Delhi would have made, which suggests that better command and control as well as political education of military leaders and firm civilian control were in order. The possible spread of institutes of strategic studies, international policy, and defense planning may go a long way to help accustom unsophisticated countries to the need of clarifying objectives, limiting hostilities, and keeping secure and open communications-- measures that form important segments of the arms-control doctrine.

15. Once fighting has broken out, the international community can be expected to exert strong pressure to terminate hostilities, as well as pressure in favor of moderation rather than intensification. On the record, this is where U.N. intervention is most likely, and most efficacious. In this case, U.N. border controls already in position when fighting started could have supplied a sound basis for multilateral action to stop it by impartial fact-finding that would have made the situation far clearer to all sides. Above all, a U.N. force interposed between the sides might have been of great utility. At this particular point, the forces allied to Pakistan did

not seem able to restrain raiding tribes that were exacerbating the situation. The Indian forces were able to handle the problem, but from a political standpoint a third-party force would have been more conducive to the termination of hostilities. Particularly after fighting has started, the crucial condition for U.N. action is that it be fast and decisive in getting the presence to the field. UNCIP in fact took several months to be organized. But it should be borne in mind that the very speed of a cease-fire can militate against the settlement of the dispute. In Kashmir in 1947 little U.N. attention was paid to the substance, which in turn continues to plague the parties and the international community.

Terminating Hostilities

16. One logical method of terminating hostilities is to make the costs to the parties increasingly burdensome if fighting continues. International guarantees have already been discussed. Probably more realistic are economic sanctions. Multilateral sticks should also be accompanied by carrots such as enhanced development assistance contingent upon the cessation of hostilities. (Multilateral action was particularly appropriate in the Kashmir case because of the British government's sensitivity to any appearance of its intervening so soon after independence.)

17. The disparity in military force and capability between the parties can be, as in Kashmir, an agency for bringing about rather quick termination of hostilities. It can enable one party, as it did India at that time, to threaten an unacceptably wider war if the other party should continue to intervene. This is of course subject to the difficulty inherent in all deterrent policy: disparity between the parties can be the reason why the stronger party began the war in the first place. To arrange for relative parity (like between Israel and Jordan today) is to attempt to deter aggression, and it may succeed. But if hostilities break out, parity may guarantee their intensification and militate against their early termination. The solution to

this vexing dilemma is to encourage equality and parity of forces between potentially belligerent neighbors, but to do this at the lowest possible level, ideally at the level of internal defense forces. At the same time, this should be accompanied by guarantees against overt aggression and by the capability of the United Nations and/or a regional organization to enforce a cease-fire if fighting should start.

18. The ideal--and in the long run indispensable--accompaniment to all these actions, if a conflict is not to continue indefinitely, is of course to deal with the substance of the dispute. The best way to terminate hostilities includes some kind of satisfaction of the just claims and interests of the parties. Pakistan was given no such satisfaction when hostilities in Kashmir were terminated in 1947. Ideally, a U.N. cease-fire would be coupled with action to meet each side's vital interests. But if the objective is to minimize violence and avoid possible intensification, then it is desirable to strengthen tendencies that work toward termination of hostilities, regardless of justice or satisfaction of basic claims. This approach, however, led inexorably to renewed conflict in Kashmir in 1965. It is the fundamental trade-off between peacekeeping and peacemaking that remains unsatisfactorily understood and acted upon.

Preventing the Resumption of Hostilities

19. Many of the early policy measures, most particularly in refugee operations and diplomatic efforts to achieve settlement and remove Pakistan's sense of injustice, continued to be relevant. U.N. action should have been broadened to include arbitration and adjudication. U.N. cognizance of the situation in Kashmir should have resulted in far more actual pressure than it did, particularly on India to carry out the agreed plebiscite and, at a minimum, not to alter the status quo unilaterally. It also should have included more effective and mobile controls, both ground and aerial, on the cease-fire line and borders, particularly given the disparity between the two sides' access routes into Kashmir and the Pakistani tactic of infiltration.

20. Over the sixteen years after the 1949 cease-fire, as Chinese power became deployed on Indian borders and animosity between India and China increased, Kashmir acquired new strategic importance for India. To keep this from mattering as much as it did by 1965, India needed either to be completely deterred by a powerful enemy (or great-power) coalition, or , more realistically, given alternative sources of security. Unilateral backers were unwanted, so international guarantees against Chinese aggression--and against potential losses of Indian investments in Kashmir--were in order. In practical terms this meant, above all, diplomatic efforts to insulate local conflicts from great-power competition (which the Soviets eventually came to accept in Kashmir). This is obviously easier said than done. A genuine non-alignment policy helps achieve such isolation. A more comprehensive way to encourage it is to give the largest possible role in local conflict-management to international organizations, global or regional. Then, even if competing great powers cannot agree to keep a region out of their cold warfare, one of them can, by its policy initiative, help support preclusive international-organization intervention (as the United States did in the Congo in 1960).

21. It is moot whether a greater sense of internal progress toward economic development would have eclipsed the military impulses on both sides in Kashmir. Historical evidence is fragmentary, but, to take one example, in the Soviet Union today a reduced willingness to run risks seems to coincide with increased economic progress. Perhaps in Kashmir, donor countries could have done more to influence matters.

Certainly arms suppliers should exert a maximum of influence on the recipient against misuse. Moscow has much to answer for in its reckless arms-supply game around the world; but Washington should try harder to retain better control over the purposes to which its arms exports are placed (which it did not do effectively in its arms aid to India after the Chinese threat materialized). In sum, there should be perhaps less hesitancy in making both economic and military aid

contingent on the willingness of recipients to pursue peaceful policies.

22. The modern, sophisticated weapons supplied to both sides were roughly equivalent. This had the deterrent effect of preventing one side from expecting a quick victory. But if deterrence fails, it may produce warfare more prolonged and intense than otherwise. As with great-power intervention generally, so in specific regard to arms transfers, the principal arms suppliers should seek agreements region by region to stabilize forces at the lowest level consistent with internal security. (And of course where adequate consensus exists within a region--as it did not in the Indian subcontinent--an indigenous agreement along these lines is obviously preferable.)

23. Pakistani misperception about conditions in Indian-held Kashmir might have been overcome by means of better intelligence. It seems almost axiomatic that any means to offset exaggerated rumors of likely collapse (such as Pakistan with regard to Kashmir in 1965, John Foster Dulles in the 1950s about the Soviet Union, and Washington regarding Cuba in 1961) helps prevent tragic miscalculation. Pakistan probably did realize India's general military superiority, which could in turn have been better used as a deterrent.

Moderating Resumed Hostilities

24. Few entirely new factors were at work when fighting broke out following India's 1965 move across the cease-fire line. To be sure, new weapons had been introduced in the interval. And the Soviet Union, rather than continuing to favor India's side of the case at all times, acted now like a status quo power nervous of fire breaking out on one of its exposed flanks.

25. But the chief kinds of policy activity that were relevant to moderating resumed hostilities were those long pertinent in the Indo-Pakistani conflict: strengthened civilian control in India to restrain

military assertiveness; requiring, in turn, greater domestic political cohesiveness; to avoid the necessity of recovering land routes, adequate Indian air transport plus alternative road and rail links; as at all stages, stronger U.N. pressures, and initiatives designed to accommodate both sides' interests; these accompanied indispensably by strong U.S. and joint (U.S.-British-Soviet) pressures backed by implied sanctions.

26. When Pakistan intensified the fighting geographically, policies already mentioned in the earlier stages were again relevant. To restrain Pakistan, several actions might have helped: greater internal Pakistani stability and greater candor with its own people; an unambiguous assertion by India of its aims; external pressures on both sides to restore the status quo ante (a positive virtue when fighting is going on). As to arms, by this point it was clear that the United States by its arms-transfer policies may encourage a country with a grievance to use the arms for same. In this connection, delicate local arms balances can be seriously destabilized through imports of sophisticated (e.g., armored) weapons systems. All of which reaffirms the urgency of keeping antagonistic local forces balanced at the lowest possible level.

37. Further intensification of the 1965 fighting took place when Indian armor crossed the international border. At this stage (as well as at every other), the key preventive of intensification is such deterrence by each side as effectively inhibits the other from broadening the conflict. Other policy measures working to minimize violence would be the same as before: greater Indian domestic stability; greater Indian candor with its people. The United States and Britain might have kept hostilities to a minimum if they had ruthlessly terminated all aid to both sides. U.N. action was still in point. And it might have made a difference at this stage if measures had been taken earlier on refugees.

Terminating Hostilities Again

28. The policy measures relevant to stopping the renewed outbreak

of fighting were essentially the same as in 1947: assurance that the costs of continuing would be increasingly burdensome; accommodation of Pakistan's legitimate interests, by means of whatever pressures on India were required; neutralization of contingent threats (in this case Chinese) by great-power action; U.N. pressure on parties, preferably with terms of settlement (as provided for--but little used--in Article 38 of the U.N. Charter). The second Indo-Pakistani round underscored the importance of what may be one of the most difficult policy measures of all--retention of control by suppliers (the United States and Britain in this case) over the use made of the weapons they have supplied, and such further detailed controls as restriction of supplies of ammunition and spare parts.

29. To sum up, the key conflict-control measures here might have involved:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Peaceful-change procedures in disposing of disputed territory

Partition

with

Resettlement of refugees and population exchanges, with international financing

Strengthened national authority, stability, and cohesiveness

Good communications between sides

Joint patrols of disputed areas

Preclusive international-organization intervention

International joint or neutral fact-finding

"Stand-still" agreement

Plebiscite

U.N. pressures for settlement, with international guarantees, and provisions for arbitration of disputes

Internal defense arms and training in police and peace-keeping functions

Alternative and more secure local communications and transport networks

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Joint water rights and hydroelectric agreements, backed by
international guarantees

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Improved intelligence capabilities

Joint or third-party investigation

Third-party or international presence

backed by

Pressure by friendly countries

International refugee action

Fait accompli (quick take-over of disputed territory)

International military force

with aid of

Ready air-lift capability

MODERATING HOSTILITIES

Accommodation of legitimate interests

Neutral or third-party communication channel*

Arms transfer rather than indigenous production

General arms-control agreements

Improved command and control, and communications in general

Political education of military leaders

Firm civilian control

Assistance to LDCs in clarifying objectives and other
strategic doctrine

U.N. border controls*

U.N. force interposed between sides

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Increased costs of fighting

Economic sanctions

Disparity between forces* (But this can encourage outbreak.)

Action to settle dispute

PREVENTING RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

Refugee disposition

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Efforts to achieve settlement
U.N. arbitration and adjudication
U.N. and other international pressure*
Mobile U.N. border controls, ground and aerial
Provision of alternative sources of security with
international guarantees
Insulation from great-power competition*
Major conflict-management role for international
organization
Strings on both military and economic aid
Better intelligence

MODERATING RESUMED HOSTILITIES

Strengthened civilian control to restrain military
assertiveness
requiring
Adequate air transport plus alternative road and
rail links
Stronger U.N. and international pressures, and
initiatives designed to accommodate both
sides' interests
Greater candor with own people by each government
Unambiguous assertion by parties of their aims
External pressures on parties to restore status quo ante*
Effort to keep antagonistic local forces balanced at the
lowest possible level
Mutual deterrence
Termination of aid by external suppliers

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES AGAIN

Efforts to make costs of fighting increasingly burdensome
Great-power and U.N. neutralization of contingent threats*
U.N. pressure on parties, preferably with terms of
settlement*
Restriction by suppliers of supplies of ammunition and
spare parts*

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

THE INDIA - CHINA BORDER CONFLICT :
1954 - 1962

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.	351
A.	Background of the Conflict	351
B.	Phase II: June 29, 1954 -- September 8, 1962.	358
C.	Phase III: September 8, 1962 -- November 21, 1962	368
D.	Phase IV: From November 21, 1962.	372
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.	378
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option	378
B.	Phase II to Phase III: The Outbreak of Hostilities.	379
C.	Phase III to Phase IV: The Termination of Hostilities	383
D.	Phase IV	385
III.	Weapons Analysis (not prepared for this case)	386
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.	387

T H E I N D I A - C H I N A B O R D E R C O N F L I C T :

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
I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES

A. Background of the Conflict

1. Geographic and Demographic Factors. The physical locale of the India-China border conflict was the Himalayan range separating the Indian subcontinent from Tibet. The principal areas of hostilities were in extreme northeast and northwest India: in Ladakh, part of the Indian-controlled portions of Kashmir; and in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), a border area administered normally by the Governor of Assam as agent of the Indian central government. The sparse populations in these areas were under only loose government control and maintained traditionally close economic, cultural, and, in many cases, ethnic relationships with the peoples on the Tibetan side of the border.

The contested areas were at altitudes of well over 10,000 feet and could be supplied most efficiently by air from the Indian side. The terrain ruled out the use of tanks and heavy guns during the hostilities.

2. The Status of Tibet. Historically, Chinese hegemony over Tibet waxed and waned according to the degree of power and influence the dynasty of the moment was able to exert. By the end of the 19th century, when China was beginning to disintegrate under the



Adapted from U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China:
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations
(Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1966).

pressures of Western influence, Tibet was asserting the right to conclude binding treaties. In 1890 a convention defining the Tibetan-Sikkimese border, signed only by the Chinese and British Indian governments, was not recognized by Tibet and became a dead letter. In 1904 the British signed a convention with Tibet, although they showed their recognition of a vague Chinese suzerainty by confirming the agreement with China in 1906. According to one analyst, however, this confirmation served to demonstrate "the right of Tibet to conclude treaties with foreign governments without the intervention of the Chinese Government, and . . . the lack of power on the part of China to conclude treaties on behalf of Tibet."¹

At the Simla Conference of 1914, called to settle border questions, the Chinese representative made no protest at the inclusion of the Tibetan representative on an equal basis with the British and Chinese. In fact, in spite of Chinese attempts to exert greater influence, Tibet maintained effective independence, even observing neutrality during World War II. After the war, Nationalist China continued to maintain that Tibet was not a state separate from China.² And on January 1, 1950, the Communists, having gained control of China, announced that the liberation of Tibet was a basic goal of the army. The Tibetan government sent delegations to India, Britain, and the United States asking for support, but without success. The delegations were denounced as illegal by the Chinese.

A Chinese invasion of Tibet started on October 7, 1950, though it was not announced until October 25. India sent notes to Peking expressing surprise and regrets, but did not support proposed U.N. discussion, ostensibly for fear of interfering with prospects for a peaceful settlement of the issue. The Chinese advance had halted by the end of October.³ In May 1951 a seventeen-point

¹Shanti Prasad Varma, Struggle for the Himalayas (Jullundur, University Publishers, 1965), p. 14.

²Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy (Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 251.


³Varma, op. cit., p. 20.

agreement was signed between Peking and a Tibetan delegation calling for the gradual integration of the Tibetan army into the Chinese army and giving China complete control over external affairs while leaving internal authority in Tibetan hands. By the end of November 1951, Chinese military control over Tibet was essentially complete. Military roads, air strips, and radio stations were constructed, Chinese settlers were moved in, and Chinese-influenced police and army units were established and trained.


The immediate impact on India of the Chinese military occupation of Tibet was minor. The Indian political agent in Lhasa was retitled Consul General, but he and other Indian representatives at major Tibetan towns retained the troop escorts guaranteed them under British-Tibetan agreements until 1954. In 1954, India and China signed an agreement regulating trade and pilgrim traffic between India and Tibet, withdrawing the Indian military escorts, turning over to the Chinese the rest houses that the British, and then the Indian, government had maintained in Tibet, and providing for Chinese trade agencies in India and Indian trade agencies in Tibet. The agreement recognized Tibet as "the Tibet Region of China," and set forth five principles of peace--the Panchsheel, pledges of mutual respect for sovereignty and avoidance of interference in each other's internal affairs. There was no discussion of frontier questions, and the Indian press and government explicitly stated at the time their belief that this was not a subject of contention.¹

3. The Status of the Frontiers, 1954. The Tibetan-Indian border between Burma and the Indian protectorates of Bhutan and Sikkim had been agreed upon--along with the Tibetan-Burmese border--at the Simla Conference of 1914. The frontier, known as the McMahon Line, was designated in a convention initialed by representatives of Britain, Tibet, and China. However, the convention was eventually signed only by the British and Tibetan representatives, the Chinese

¹Ibid., pp. 32-33.



Adapted from U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China:
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations
 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1966).



Adapted from U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1966).

repudiating it for reasons unconnected with the McMahon Line.¹

The frontiers west of Nepal, between Tibet and India proper, between Tibet and Kashmir, and between Sinkiang and Kashmir, were less clearly defined. The delimitation of the border had rarely been an important issue, since even British administrative control of the border areas had been loose. While in general the line claimed by India in the Ladakh area of Kashmir followed watershed lines, several different lines were considered by the British around the turn of the century. The contemporary Indian claim line, running along the Kuen-lun mountains and including the important plateau of Aksai Chin, was given firm British support only in 1913, though Kashmir and Hunza, a mountain state under general Kashmiri control, also had claims to the area. Effective occupation and control on the part of India, Sinkiang, or Tibet was very vague, but what there was tended to favor Indian claims.²

However, from 1950 on, maps were published in China showing substantial areas in NEFA and in Ladakh as falling within China. On receiving Indian objections to these maps, the Chinese government replied that these were Nationalist Chinese maps that the new government had not had time to revise.

4. Political Factors. The international scene in 1954 was dominated by the Cold War and to a lesser extent by the gradual emergence of independent states from the former Western colonial empires.

In India, the Congress Party under Nehru remained firmly in control, Nehru himself asserting, with much rhetoric and energetic diplomacy, the doctrine of nonalignment. Only with Pakistan did there seem to be any danger of hostilities. Indian defense policy was oriented almost entirely to the threat that Pakistan posed in

¹Ibid., p. 15; W. F. van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute With China (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 13-17.

²van Eekelen, op. cit., p. 164.

the unresolved conflict over Kashmir.

The Communist government of China appeared to have consolidated its rule despite the pressures of the Korean War, now dormant. The Soviet alliance appeared close and cordial. In June 1954, China for the first time achieved prominence on the diplomatic stage by participating in the Geneva Conference on Indochina. At that time, Premier Chou En-lai was invited to visit India to discuss further the prospects for Asian unity.

B. Phase II: June 29, 1954 -- September 8, 1962

1. Sub-Phase A: June 29, 1954 -- August 1959. In the context of Chou En-lai's recent visit to India and the agreement on Tibet that had just been signed, the Chinese government complained that Indian troops had crossed into Tibetan territory on June 29, 1954, in the Wu-je area (called by the Indians Bara Hoti) in the central sector of the border, between Nepal and Kashmir. India countered that in fact Tibetan officials were in Indian territory, in an area under regular Indian administration.¹

During a visit to Peking in October 1954, Nehru raised again the question of recently-published Chinese maps claiming large areas of Indian territory and was reassured by Chou En-lai that they were merely Nationalist maps that had not yet been revised.²

Relations between India and China achieved a high point of amity during the Bandung Conference of April 1955 at which 29 Asian and African countries unanimously adopted a ten-point "declaration on the promotion of world peace and cooperation," incorporating the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Indian five principles--the Panchsheel.

Nevertheless, further incidents in the central sector, near

¹Palmer, op. cit., p. 256.

²Ibid.

the Niti Pass, occurred in September 1955; and in April and September 1956, armed Chinese entered Indian territory at the mouths of two other border passes in the central sector. In October 1957, a Chinese party was seen at Walong, in the extreme eastern portion of NEFA; and in July 1958, Chinese troops occupied a ruined fort at Khurnak in Ladakh.

In 1956-1957 the Chinese built a road connecting Sinkiang and Tibet across the Aksai Chin plateau in an area rarely visited by Indian officials. The Indian government was apparently unaware of the existence of the road until a map showing it was published in a Chinese newspaper in 1957.¹ Two reconnaissance patrols were sent out in 1958. One returned and confirmed the existence of the road and its route through Indian-claimed territory; the other was captured by the Chinese and held for five weeks. In reply to an Indian protest note, the Chinese government claimed Aksai Chin was part of Sinkiang. And in September 1958, after Indian revenue officers had left with the onset of winter, an armed Chinese party entered the Bara Hoti area and constructed two outposts.

In December 1958, under the impact of these events, Nehru sent the first of a series of three letters to Chou En-lai. He stated that at the time of the conclusion of the Chinese-Indian agreement of 1954 and again during a visit to India by Chou En-lai in 1956, there had been no indication given by the Chinese of any unsettled border questions. In spite of this, maps placing large tracts of Indian territory inside China continued to be published by the Chinese; and in the latest instance, the Chinese government

¹Except where otherwise noted, material in the rest of this section is drawn from Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, 2 volumes (New Delhi, External Publicity Division, Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.); a series of ten White Papers published under the general title of Notes, Memoranda and Letters (New Delhi, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.); van Eekelen, op. cit.; and the New York Times.

had implied the entire Indian-Chinese border was an open issue. Chou's response of January 1959 claimed the border had never been formally delimited. The McMahon Line, he said, was the product of British aggression against Tibet, and therefore illegal and unrecognized by the Chinese government. Chou suggested that, to avoid border incidents, each country should keep for the time being to the border areas at present under its jurisdiction and not go beyond them.

Chou's challenge to the legal status of the Indian-Chinese border elicited another letter from Nehru in March 1959. In it he presented a legal basis for the Indian claims, using arguments from treaties, the geographical principle of the watershed, the traditionally observed boundary, and previous official maps. He countered Chou with the suggestion that the position as it was before the recent disputes should be respected and territory occupied since then should be restored.

Up to this point, the outward course of Indian-Chinese relations had been apparently calm, with no public disclosure of the border incidents. Then in March 1959 a revolt against Chinese domination broke out in Lhasa, echoing previous revolts that had occurred among Tibetan border tribes such as the Khambas. This time, the involvement of the Dalai Lama in the revolt and the somewhat fuller information on it available to India produced strong Indian reaction and sympathy for Tibet in the press and Parliament.¹ Though the revolt was quickly suppressed, the Dalai Lama fled to India at the end of March requesting political asylum; several thousand refugees followed him. India was denounced by China for

¹Despite public and Parliamentary opposition to the Chinese crushing of the Tibetan revolt, India did not support a subsequent U.N. General Assembly resolution (1353 [XIV]) expressing grave concern at the forceful denial by China of the human rights and freedoms of the Tibetan people. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 45 (including the United States) to 9 with 26 abstentions. International Organization, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (Winter 1960), pp. 130-131.

its sympathetic discussion of the revolt and the granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama and the other Tibetan refugees.

The Tibetan revolt and the Indian reaction to it marked a significant change in Indian-Chinese relations. From this point on, the Indian government came under growing domestic pressure to re-examine its foreign policy, strengthen its opposition to Chinese claims, and improve its defense posture.

In July and August 1959 there were three more incidents on the border--one in the Ladakh area and two in NEFA, one of which involved the forcible occupation of the Indian frontier post of Longju.¹

2. Sub-Phase B: August 1959 -- September 8, 1962. Late in August 1959, Nehru publicly disclosed for the first time the history of Chinese intrusions into Indian territory. He announced that border defenses would be strengthened but that he would attempt to settle the conflict by conference.

These revelations, following upon the Tibetan revolt and its suppression, produced strong reaction in India. While the Congress Party supported government policies, both the Praja Socialists and the Jan Sangh,² already disturbed over Nehru's policy of friendship with China, criticized the government for underestimating the border situation, called the border incidents clear evidence of Chinese expansionist policies, and proposed that, if Chinese forces did not evacuate Indian territory within a stipulated period, they should be compelled to do so.

The Indian Communist Party had a more ambiguous reaction. At first, while it declared it stood for the territorial integrity of India, it also expressed confidence in Chinese intentions and urged negotiations without preconditions. However, S. A. Dange,

¹Varma, op. cit., p. 75.

²A Hindu communalist party.

leader of the Communists in Parliament, took a stronger position, hoped China would "correct its attitude," and called for negotiations on the basis of the McMahon Line.¹ Though the Communist Party censured Dange for a breach of party discipline, its national council subsequently supported the substance of Dange's position by declaring the area south of the McMahon Line as part of India and stating that the government was correct in its position on the Ladakh frontier.

In a letter to Nehru in early September 1959, Chou En-lai claimed that, while the Indian-Chinese border had not been formally defined, the boundary shown in previous Chinese maps had grounds to support it. He reasserted the invalidity of the British-imposed McMahon Line, but stated that Chinese troops would not cross it for the sake of maintaining amity. Describing the border situation as having been fairly good in the past, in spite of repeated intrusions of Indian troops into Chinese territory, Chou claimed that conditions had worsened with the Tibetan rebellion; Indian troops, he said, had advanced even beyond the invalid McMahon Line, were in occupation of several Tibetan localities, and were sheltering armed Tibetan rebels.²

An Indian note of September 10 called Chinese territorial claims, as shown on Chinese maps, completely inadmissible. The note stated that the Indian government might discuss minor frontier changes, but not the major areas claimed by Chinese maps, and that Indian forces would not withdraw under illegal foreign intimidation from outposts on the Indian side of the frontier.³

¹Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, p. 17122.

²van Eekelen, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-99; see letter of September 8, 1959, in White Paper II of Notes, Memoranda and Letters, cited above, pp. 27-33.

³See note of September 10, 1959, in White Paper II, cited above, pp. 8-10.

A major incident occurred on October 20-21 in southern Ladakh, when Chinese troops 40 miles inside the claimed Indian frontier killed nine members of an Indian police patrol and captured ten, who were badly treated.¹ The Chinese asserted that the incident had taken place in Chinese territory and hinted that if continued Indian patrolling took place on the western border, the Chinese would increase pressure along the McMahon Line. The incident occasioned severe Parliamentary and press criticism of Indian government policy and of the Defence Minister and close advisor of Nehru, Krishna Menon, known for his anti-Pakistani, pro-Chinese bias.

The Soviet government adopted what a leading student of Chinese-Soviet relations has called "a declaration of neutrality" toward the conflict,² called for an amicable solution, and played down the importance of the problem.

U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter, answering questions at a news conference, said that there was insufficient evidence on which to base an opinion as to the legal merits of the conflicting border claims.³ The rather surprised reaction to this initial statement led to further statements pointing out that, quite apart from the legal aspects of the conflict, the Chinese use of force clearly put China in the wrong.⁴

Meanwhile, on November 7, 1959, Chou proposed that each side withdraw its forces twenty kilometers from the McMahon Line in the east and from the line up to which it had actual control in the west, and he further suggested talks between Nehru and himself in the immediate future. Nehru sent a counter-proposal

¹van Eekelen, op. cit., p. 94; see also note of December 13, 1959, in White Paper III, pp. 8-9.

²William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1964), p. 6.

³U.S. Department of State Bulletin, November 30, 1959, pp. 782-783.

⁴Ibid., pp. 786.

on November 16 that India would withdraw all of its personnel in Ladakh to the boundary shown on Chinese maps if the Chinese would withdraw their personnel to the line claimed by the Indians. Chou considered Nehru's proposal a violation of the status quo, since the Chinese had effective control of the area of Ladakh claimed as Chinese. In spite of the apparent lack of basis for agreement, Chou accepted an Indian proposal to halt patrolling along the frontier; and a meeting of the two Prime Ministers was arranged for April 1960 in New Delhi.

As a result of the April meeting, arrangements were made for officials of India and China to meet and examine the historical documents, maps, and other material on which the respective boundary claims were based; during this period the two countries were to attempt to avoid friction and border clashes. Before his departure from China for the meeting, Chou apparently hinted at an exchange of Chinese acceptance of the McMahon Line in the east for Indian acceptance of Chinese claims in Ladakh, but this was probably not concretely proposed. In any event, there was no public response from India. Nehru's resistance to Chinese claims during the meeting strengthened his domestic political position.¹

The subsequent meetings of Indian and Chinese officials, which continued from June to September 1960, produced only more detailed statements from each side. The Chinese in general supported the boundaries shown on their disputed maps of the past, although their most recent maps included more territory in Ladakh than their maps had indicated in 1956. The Chinese were, however, much less specific than the Indians about the exact boundary line they claimed as the traditional border.

India by now had taken some steps toward strengthening its

¹ van Eekelen, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

border defenses. In November 1959, responsibility for defending the border in Ladakh and NEFA had been taken away from local police and militia and given to the Indian army.¹ At the same time, a program of improving and building roads and communication facilities had begun. Some forward frontier outposts were strengthened and new ones established.

Throughout this period, India was rapidly expanding the size and modernizing the equipment of its military forces. (See Section III of the study of the Kashmir conflict.) However, the bulk of India's force remained deployed in terms of possible renewed hostilities with Pakistan over Kashmir. While the Indian forces along the Chinese border were somewhat strengthened, the Chinese military strength in Tibet and along the border remained vastly superior to Indian strength in the area.² It has been estimated that in 1960 the Chinese had in Tibet six to eight divisions of 15,000 men each.³ There was also a vigorous Chinese building program for military roads and air strips. In spite of Chinese superiority in the disputed area, however, the Indian government by 1961 was expressing relative satisfaction at the improvement in its defense position. And Defence Minister Krishna Menon remained Nehru's most trusted foreign-policy advisor in spite of Parliamentary criticism.

The Indian military build-up resulted in a stiffening of India's political position. China had been making statements implying an intention to incorporate Sikkim and Bhutan, whose external affairs were by treaty managed by India, into the Chinese People's Republic. Nehru accused the pro-Chinese wing of the

¹Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, Vol. I, Part 1, pp. 158-163.

²Palmer, op. cit., p. 203.

³Varma, op. cit., p. 316.

Indian Communist Party centered in West Bengal of carrying on subversion in the northern border areas in support of Chinese claims. In February 1961, Nehru issued a White Paper condemning China as an aggressor in occupying 50,000 square miles of Indian territory. He stated that there was no reason for negotiation of China's claims and that a formal settlement and delimitation of the border would be possible only when China accepted India's position and the principles on which the Indian-claimed boundary was based.

By the latter half of 1961, Indian military outposts were being established closer to Chinese positions, especially in Ladakh. In November the Chinese protested that if the status quo should continue to be disturbed, the Chinese government would have reason to send troops across the McMahon Line into the southern slopes of the Himalayas.

Confrontations between Indian and Chinese patrols and increasing numbers of charges of border violations had been occurring ever since 1959, at first infrequently, then in greater numbers as Indian posts began to be moved forward in Ladakh. In January 1962 the Chinese threatened obliquely to push across the plains. Nevertheless, from early April on, the forward movement of Indian troops increased, with posts being established between and behind Chinese outposts. This resulted in more patrolling by the Chinese in Ladakh during April and May, accompanied by the threat that if the Indian posts behind the Chinese perimeter were not withdrawn, Chinese patrolling would be resumed along the entire border.

China, despite the failure of its "great leap forward" and the strains on its economy from the withdrawal of Soviet aid, was by now pursuing an increasingly militant external policy. Pressure was being exerted on the offshore islands near Taiwan, assistance was being funnelled to the Pathet Lao forces in Laos, and the personal rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao for leadership of the Communist movement was being waged openly.

Meanwhile, Nehru's Congress Party had scored a decisive victory in the February 1962 general elections, winning approximately 65 per cent of the seats in the popularly-elected lower house. Defence Minister Menon retained his seat despite a bitter campaign waged against him on the grounds that he was a Communist.

In May 1962, China obtained Pakistani agreement to negotiate the delimitation of the boundary between China and Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir), China having claimed 4,000 square miles of territory beyond the previously accepted line. India protested that any Chinese-Pakistani agreement concerning any part of Kashmir would be invalid.

On May 14, India renewed the proposal, previously made in November 1959, that India and China should each withdraw its forces behind the line claimed by the other. India also expressed its willingness to permit use of the Aksai Chin road by Chinese civilian traffic pending a formal settlement of the boundary dispute. The proposals were rejected by China. In June, the India-China agreement of 1954 on Tibet, which had an eight-year term, was allowed to lapse, and India closed its three trade agencies in Tibet, claiming the atmosphere of the five principles of the Panchsheel had to be restored before a new agreement could be made.

During June and July, the Indians and Chinese were both working to strengthen their positions; new posts were established and patrols covered wider areas. Neither side was committing its military force; rather, each side sought by the placement and display of military strength to induce the other to withdraw. In July, after an Indian post had been placed on the supply line to a Chinese post on the Galwan river in Ladakh, a Chinese force of 400 men advanced to within fifteen yards of the Indian post in an apparent attempt to intimidate the Indians into withdrawing.¹ After several days and

¹Ibid., p. 145.

protests by the Indian government, the Chinese force pulled back.

Incidents were accompanied by a series of Chinese protest notes to India, warning that a border clash might be touched off and holding India responsible for all the consequences that might arise from its provocations. By the end of July, there had been three shooting incidents along the border, and the Chinese were reiterating their previous threats about the use of troops in the eastern sector.

On August 4 the Chinese sent a detailed note charging India with having set up a total of 34 military posts in Chinese-claimed territory in Ladakh since the spring and with other incursions in the Bara Hoti area and along the McMahon Line. It was suggested that discussions be held soon. India replied that useful discussions would require restoration of the status quo in Ladakh as it existed before the Chinese occupation. China responded with proposals for meetings in Peking and New Delhi without preconditions. During August and September, the Indians and Chinese continued to build up their outposts in Ladakh.

C. Phase III: September 8, 1962 -- November 21, 1962

On September 8 a Chinese patrol threw grenades at an Indian outpost at Dhola in NEFA, wounding three soldiers; the Indians returned fire, killing one Chinese and wounding others. By September 14, Indian troops were reported to have been moved up in strength. In notes of September 20 and 21, the Chinese stated that their troops had been ordered to carry out the same measures in the eastern and middle sectors as in the west and warned that war might break out.

On September 20, Chinese troops opened fire near Dhola and the exchange continued for five days. There was a heavier attack on September 29, followed by a lull. But during the month after September 8, when Chinese troops had first fired, they moved into a sector of

Indian territory fifteen miles long and three to six miles wide,¹ in the wedge of territory separating Bhutan from the rest of NEFA. On October 12 the Indian army was ordered by Nehru to push the Chinese out of NEFA. The Indian government also informed the Chinese of its willingness to enter discussions at Peking or New Delhi as soon as the incursions in NEFA had ended. At this point, New Delhi was under the impression that the intruding force numbered from 300 to 400 men, despite reports of reinforcements. An attack on the Khinze-mane-Dhola area of NEFA by a Chinese force estimated at 30,000 men and simultaneous attacks in Ladakh caught the Indian government by surprise.²

The Chinese invading forces greatly outnumbered the Indians; they were equipped with machine guns and heavy mortars and were supplied by truck convoy. On October 21 the Chinese opened a new attack at the southern end of the disputed zone in Ladakh, and on October 22 they attacked at the extreme eastern end of NEFA and at Longju in the middle of NEFA. In western NEFA, Chinese forces captured Tawang, the Indian administrative post in the area. In Ladakh the Indian posts behind the Chinese claim lines were destroyed, but only a few strategic points beyond the Chinese claims were occupied.

On October 21, President Nasser of the UAR offered his services as a mediator and a few days later suggested a plan that included a return to positions held prior to September 8. India accepted with some reservations but China rejected the plan, suggesting in turn a withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides twenty kilometers from the current line of actual control. Nehru rejected this as allowing the Chinese to retain much of the territorial gain they had made, and demanded as a minimum a return to the line as it stood before September 8. By October 26, when India declared a

¹Ibid., p. 148.

²Ibid., p. 162.

state of national emergency, the initial Chinese offensive was almost at an end.

Substantial territory in Ladakh had been occupied by the Chinese. Their gains in NEFA, while much smaller, were considerably more important to India: the main advances had taken place at the eastern and western ends of NEFA, with the eastern advance threatening the Assam oil fields and the western advance threatening the supply route through the narrow neck connecting Assam and NEFA with the rest of India.

A wave of angry patriotism swept over India and the Parliament. Parliamentary pressure forced the resignation of Menon from the cabinet (first as Defence Minister, then from the newly-created post of Minister of Defence Production) because of the poor state of Indian defense preparation against China that the fighting had revealed and, in particular, the inadequacies of supply and transportation. The anti-Chinese faction of the Indian Communist Party won clear ascendancy; on November 1 the Party's national council issued a statement of support for Nehru and the defense effort, and the pro-Chinese members of the secretariat resigned.

India quickly sought and received political support and military aid. Britain stated it would give India "every support" and British shipments of small arms--automatic rifles, submachine guns, and mortars--began arriving by air October 29. On November 27 an agreement was signed for the supply of British arms to India without payment, for use only against China. The United States arranged immediately for shipments of infantry weapons, the first consignments arriving November 3. An arms agreement similar to the Indian-British one was concluded November 14, and on November 21 twelve large U.S. jet transports with crews were sent to India to air-lift troops and cargo. The United States and Britain also sent missions to discuss larger-scale and longer-term Indian defense needs. In addition, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, and West Germany sent aid.

The Soviet Union at first seemed undecided what position to take on the fighting. While the Soviet government took no official position of support for either side, a Pravda article of October 25 supporting China's proposals as constructive and denouncing the McMahon Line as an imperialist heritage clearly favored the Chinese. However, on November 5, Pravda called for negotiations without pre-conditions, resuming a neutral position.¹

In early November, most of the fighting took place in the eastern part of NEFA, where the town of Walong remained under attack and where Indian troops actively patrolled and attacked a Chinese hill position. On November 15 the Chinese launched another attack in NEFA; its two main prongs were, as before, in the eastern and western extremes of the area, one close to the Burmese border heading for the Brahmaputra valley and the other in the west pushing past Tawang toward the plains.

At this point, on November 16, Ceylon proposed a conference, including Ceylon, Burma, Ghana, Cambodia, Indonesia, and the UAR, to work out a joint approach to the governments of India and China. The proposal was accepted, and thereafter the two adversaries endeavored assiduously to line up support.

By November 19 both Walong in the east and the important position of Se La in the west had fallen, the latter by mountain artillery brought up on a road built by the Chinese in thirteen days. The Chinese were thus in command of the major natural approaches through the Himalayas to Assam. In Ladakh the Chinese completed the conquest of the areas claimed by them and were in a position to capture the Indian airfield at Chushul, through which passed most of India's men and military supplies. Indian casualties were estimated for the invasion as 224 killed and 468 wounded; one Indian source

¹Griffith, op. cit., pp. 56-59. An agreement had been made in the summer of 1962 for the supply to India of Soviet MiGs; the first shipment eventually arrived in February 1963, according to Palmer, op. cit., p. 200.

estimates several times that number of Chinese casualties were inflicted.¹

The Chinese were now in military positions advantageous to sealing off Tibet, where there was still some native dissidence. The Chinese advance was moving well; the Indian defenses were disorganized and breaking up. China thereupon abruptly announced a unilateral cease-fire effective November 21 and proposed that a twenty-kilometer demilitarized zone be created by having each side withdraw behind the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959, with only Chinese civilian checkposts between the military positions and the line. This line as drawn by China was, with some exceptions, the same in the western and middle sectors as the line claimed by China in the officials' talks of 1960. It followed the McMahon Line in the east. However, according to India, the Chinese had not moved up to the western claim line in 1959, reaching it only after the latest advance in 1962.

The Indian response to the latest Chinese proposal, as it had been to the Chinese offer of October 24, was that the situation must be restored to the status quo as of September 8, 1962. The Indian government accepted the cease-fire, however, leaving the question of the withdrawal of forces unsettled.

D. Phase IV: From November 21, 1962

1. Sub-Phase A: November 21, 1962 -- August 1965. The Colombo Conference of small powers that had been proposed by Ceylon began on December 10; agreement was reached by December 12, but the resulting recommendations, known as the Colombo Proposals, were not

¹India 1963 (New Delhi, Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1963), p. 452. Much higher Indian casualties are suggested by the figures given the Indian Parliament by Prime Minister Nehru on December 12, 1962. Nehru said that between October 20 and December 10, India had suffered 197 killed and 291 wounded with 6,277 unaccounted for, some of whom the Chinese may have taken prisoner. (The Chinese set the number of Indian prisoners at around 1,000.) See Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, Vol. II, pp. 209-210.

made public until they had been presented to India and China. Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, was designated to go to Peking on December 31 and to Delhi on January 12, 1963.

As they were "clarified" at Delhi by the Indian government and Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Colombo Proposals contained the following major provisions: in the western sector of Ladakh, the Chinese troops were to withdraw twenty kilometers from their claimed line of control as of November 1959 (which corresponded roughly to the 1962 cease-fire line), while the Indian troops were to stay where they were; the intervening demilitarized zone would be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon; in the middle sector, where no fighting had occurred, the status quo was to be maintained; in the eastern sector, the McMahon Line would serve as the boundary, with no intervening demilitarized zone. The only exceptions would be two disputed areas that were north of the McMahon Line as it appeared on maps attached to the Simla Convention of 1914 but which conformed to the watershed principle of the Indian-Tibetan border and had been administered by India; these were to be settled by negotiations between India and China. The Proposals were not to prejudice the position of the two countries as to their legal rights.

The Chinese interpreted the Colombo Proposals to mean that Indian military forces were not to advance to the cease-fire line in NEFA--i.e., to the McMahon Line--as well as in Ladakh, so that demilitarized zones would be created in both eastern and western sectors. China had continued to press India for a decision on its withdrawal offer of November, stating that implementation of the cease-fire was not the same as a formal acceptance of it and demanding a meeting of officials to settle the details of troop withdrawal. However, Chinese troops did withdraw and Indian troops did not advance, though civil administrators began moving back into NEFA. On January 13, China modified somewhat the November formula by specifying a withdrawal to the McMahon Line and not twenty kilometers behind it, thereby incorporating those provisions of the

Colombo Proposals that were favorable to the Chinese positions. On January 19, China accepted the Proposals in principle and on a preliminary basis.

With the Chinese showing at least verbal interest in the Colombo Proposals, Nehru consented to present them to Parliament. He argued that the Proposals were roughly equivalent to the Indian demand for a return to the September 8 line, since the demilitarized zone created by Chinese withdrawal in Ladakh would remove Chinese forces from the areas they had captured since September and would in some places even move Chinese troops back across the Indian-claimed border; thus Indian civilians, if not Indian troops, would be able to move up to the September 8 line and in some cases farther. In NEFA the Colombo Proposals, as clarified by Mrs. Bandaranaike and the delegates from Ghana and the UAR who accompanied her to Delhi after visiting Peking, would be equivalent to the Indian demands and would allow Indian troops to move up to the McMahon Line with only two exceptions. Parliament gave informal approval in spite of some opposition on the grounds that the Proposals constituted an acceptance of and submission to Chinese aggression.

However, it was clear that Peking's interpretation of the Proposals differed from India's or that expressed in the Delhi clarifications. Peking claimed on January 14 that the Proposals required Indian troops to maintain their existing position not only in the western sector but along the whole border; they therefore could not advance up to the McMahon Line in the east. Peking, however, offered not to establish civilian checkpoints in the proposed twenty-kilometer demilitarized zone if India also did not.

At this point, with differences in interpretation still unsettled, there were repeated notes of protest and denial between India and China on further military incursions. China complained in late March 1963 of incursions in Ladakh and charged India with building defense posts on the Chinese side of the Sikkimese-Chinese border (Indian

troops being stationed in Sikkim by virtue of Sikkim's status as an Indian protectorate). The exchanges of protest, however, had no significant effect on the border situation. China completed its announced withdrawals and even refrained from establishing civilian posts at the two disputed points along the NEFA-Tibetan border where the Indian administrative border went beyond the McMahon Line as drawn in 1914; it did establish civilian posts along the cease-fire line in Ladakh. Though Nehru stated in Parliament that India had the right to send troops up to the McMahon Line in NEFA, it appears India did not do so for some time, though civil administration was restored. There was also no attempt by the Indian army to enter the areas of Ladakh vacated by Chinese troops. The Chinese consistently refused to have even an Indian civilian presence in the demilitarized zone in Ladakh, and there was no Indian attempt to install one.

Even though conditions on the border approximated the substance of the Colombo Proposals, formal agreement was not attained. China refused to recognize the Delhi clarifications as part of the original Proposals and was unwilling to allow Indian personnel on the Chinese side of the "line of actual control" in Ladakh. China also refused to consider further mediation by the Colombo countries. As late as April 1964, Nehru told Parliament that he would be willing to negotiate an agreement on the basis of neither side's maintaining posts in the demilitarized zone in Ladakh; but China refused, while setting up stone cairns marking the line of control. (It is worth noting, however, that China had been able to conclude border agreements with Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan without difficulty.)

After the China-India border fighting, India began a major program to build up the strength of its armed forces more rapidly. (See Section III of the study of the Kashmir conflict for details.)

2. Sub-Phase B: From August 1965. During the resumed Indo-Pakistani hostilities in Kashmir that began in August 1965, the border conflict between China and India again became an issue. (See

Section I of the study of the Kashmir conflict.) China's relations with Pakistan had been improving since the March 1963 border agreement. Chou En-lai had endorsed the Pakistani position on Kashmir and excused Pakistani membership in SEATO as being directed against India. During the Indo-Pakistani war, China appeared to use the border issue to put pressure on India's flank. On September 8, China declared that unless Indian military positions on the Chinese side of the Sikkim-China border were dismantled and provocations ended, India would bear responsibility for the consequences; on the same day, Peking Radio announced that Chinese forces on the Indian border had been put on the alert. The Indian government denied the existence of any such posts on September 12, suggesting that an independent observer be sent to the Sikkim border to inspect. On September 16, China rejected this proposal and charged the Indians with building 56 military works on the Chinese side of the border since September 1962, intruding into Chinese territory, kidnapping inhabitants, and stealing livestock. Unless India were to dismantle the works within three days, cease all intrusions, return the inhabitants and livestock, and pledge to refrain from future raids, it would bear full responsibility for grave consequences. India's reply the next day called the accusations groundless, proposed a joint inspection, and said the responsibility for Chinese aggression would be China's. The Chinese reply on September 19 extended the time limit of the ultimatum by three days to midnight of September 22.

The Indian Ambassadors in Moscow and Washington and the Indian High Commissioner in London were reported on September 17 to have proposed that the three powers issue a joint declaration warning China against an attack on India. Premier Kosygin assured the Indian Ambassador that the Soviet Union would continue its regular arms supplies to India. The United States said that if India were attacked by China, U.S. military aid, which had been foreclosed to both sides during the Indian conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, would be resumed.

On September 18 there was evidence that Chinese forces had reoccupied the demilitarized zone in Ladakh. The next day they were near Indian positions in extreme northern Ladakh, near the Karakorum Pass. On September 20 a few shots were reported fired by the Chinese along the Sikkimese and Ladakh borders, with no return fire. Simultaneously, China accused Indian troops of having intruded into Chinese territory in Ladakh and having fired on Chinese civilians. The next day, India maintained that Chinese troops had fired on a police party in Indian territory. On the same day, an exchange of fire was reported on the Sikkim-Tibet border, with no casualties.

On September 21, Peking Radio announced that Indian forces had destroyed the military installations along the Sikkim border and fled; no mention of the Chinese ultimatum suggested that it had been in effect withdrawn. When Pravda two days later spoke of reports of Chinese troop concentrations along the Indian border as "evoking concern," the article was promptly denounced by the New China News Agency. Several more notes passed between India and China, notably Indian notes on October 3 and 6, both accusing Chinese troops of having crossed the Sikkim border and opened fire. By this time, however, the cease-fire between India and Pakistan was becoming effective, and no more incidents occurred. Since then, no significant incidents appear to have occurred on the Indian-Chinese border.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option
 - a. The precise delimitation of the many segments of the China-India border, including the border between China and what had become the Indian-controlled portions of Kashmir, had been uncertain for many decades.
 - b. Chinese Communist efforts to re-establish Chinese control over Tibet and Indian assertion of a claim to part of Kashmir gave India and China a common border. Boundaries between British India and China had always been indistinct; and for many years, neither state exercised firm control over the border regions. China's efforts to re-incorporate Tibet into China in particular brought a strong military force into the border area for the first time in generations.
 - c. Both regimes--recently independent Indians and recently victorious Chinese Communists--were intensely and sensitively nationalistic.

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. International arbitration, adjudication of border claims; international agreements not to settle border conflicts by force.
 - b. Self-determination for Tibet and for Kashmir would have created buffer states.
 - c. Actions to turn nationalistic energies to constructive channels; barring that, international action to contain nationalism that turns to imperialism.

d. While the attitude that denigrated the value of nonalignment was short-lived, the West, particularly the United States, did not encourage close, friendly relations between India and Communist China.

2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

a. In keeping with its policy of nonalignment, India sought friendly relations with Communist China. In pursuit of this policy, India did not question China's sovereignty over Tibet, the portion of China representing the largest part of the India-China border.

b. China's Communist leaders were preoccupied with consolidating their internal hegemony and restoring order after years of war and civil war.

c. India's attention was focused on the threat of renewed hostilities with Pakistan over Kashmir.

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[Phase II of this conflict can be divided into two distinct segments. The first saw the continuation of India's policy of friendship with China and China's wooing of the nonaligned states. A conflict of growing seriousness over border problems

d. Avoiding introduction of great-power conflicts (i.e., the Cold War) into local situations; active encouragement of Indian-Chinese friendship.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Encouragement of friendly Indian-Chinese relations, bilateral agreements creating machinery for settling disputes, etc.

b. Enhancement of goals of internal political and economic development; alternatively, creating internal threats and diversions.

c. Fostering distracting conflicts elsewhere; keeping the Kashmir conflict active. [This of course would be contrary to the objective of controlling that conflict.]

B. MEASURES TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

existed, but it was a private matter between the two governments while superficially good relations prevailed.]

SUB-PHASE A: THE PRIVATE CONFLICT

1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. Tibet revolted against Chinese efforts to consolidate control and "Sinify" Tibetan institutions, including religion. Chinese repression was brutal and efficient.
- b. Indian public opinion was aroused by the Tibetan episode and the opposition parties urged a firmer policy toward China.
- c. The Tibetan religious leader, the Dalai Lama, and many other Tibetans sought political asylum in neighboring India.
- d. Minor incidents occurred along the India-China border as each state established border posts in territory the other claimed as its own.
- e. As part of its move to consolidate control in Tibet, China built a road across the Aksai Chin plateau, which India also claimed. This road acquired added strategic importance to China as a means for rapid deployment of forces to deal with Tibetan unrest.
- f. China shifted from its position that there was no pressing border conflict to a position that appeared to imply that the entire border was in doubt.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. International action, including U.N. action, to obtain and guarantee self-determination for Tibet.
- b. Strengthening pro-Chinese elements in India; weakening or suppressing anti-Chinese opposition.
- c. Self-determination for Tibet; or Indian refusal to succor or harbor Tibetan refugees.
- d. Third-party fact-finding and supervision of border areas. [This would have been technologically difficult in the Himalayan area.]
- e. Either self-determination for Tibet; or more thorough Chinese control in Tibet; or development of Chinese air-lift capacity to reduce value of Aksai Chin road.
- f. Third-party machinery for settlement plus guarantees of an agreed boundary and sanctions against either side's refusal to comply.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. The U.N. General Assembly expressed grave concern over the forceful denial of human rights by China in Tibet. While the United States supported the resolution, India did not.
- b. Chinese policy toward the nonaligned states was exemplified by the spirit of Bandung. China sought to present itself as no threat to the nonaligned but rather the champion of their grievances against the imperialist, exploitative West.
- c. China proposed that each state halt its encroachment at its current line. While this did not satisfy India, which wanted China to pull back to the border claimed by India, it did suggest that China would have been content with the relatively minor gains it had made to date.

SUB-PHASE B: THE PUBLIC CONFLICT

[The private period of the pre-hostilities conflict lasted eight years. Over that period, each side became more rigid in its demands. The situation worsened rapidly after the Indian government made the eight-year record public. The three years that still preceded hostilities constitute the public period of Phase II.]

1. Factors Promoting Hostilities

- a. With the public disclosure of the conflict, Indian public opinion became increasingly

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. More forceful U.N. action to ensure basic rights in Tibet; Indian endorsement of an active U.N. role.
- b. Encouraging genuine nonalignment, including a role in that system for China.
- c. Pressure on India to negotiate a settlement with China.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Strengthening pro-Chinese elements in India; weakening or suppressing

anti-Chinese elements.

- b. A "stand-still" agreement pending mediation, arbitration; creation of a neutrally-patrolled demilitarized zone.
- c. Prevention of introduction of additional forces into area; better Indian intelligence to yield more realistic assessment of situation.
- d. International pressure on India to accept a more flexible basis for negotiations.
- e. Settling the complex of world issues that underlay Chinese militancy; encouraging continued and increased Soviet influence in China; alternatively, containment of China by great-power force.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Mutual recognition that conflict suppression is in joint interest.

anti-Chinese, although this was still a minority view. The opposition parties urged that China be presented an ultimatum to withdraw, and be forced out if necessary.

- b. Incidents in the disputed area increased in seriousness and number as each adversary quickened the pace of its building of border posts and extended them farther into the territory claimed by the other.
- c. Both adversaries strengthened their military forces in the border area, although Indian estimates of the magnitude of Chinese strength proved drastically low.
- d. India's position on the border question hardened to the point where it would contemplate negotiations only if China accepted India's claim as a basis for them.
- e. The years of this sub-phase saw a general increase in the militancy of Chinese policy, evidenced by events on the Indian border as well as over Laos, Quemoy-Matsu, etc. This militancy was part cause, part consequence of the Sino-Soviet split which now was being waged publicly.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. Both the Soviet Union and the United States adopted neutral positions on the growing border conflict. Thus while neither tried to restrain either side, perhaps because it could not have done so, neither sought to exploit the situation to its own advantage.

- b. China proposed what amounted to a demilitarized zone between the two armed forces. Although the idea was not acted upon because the adversaries could not agree on the base line, each in principle accepted the idea of such a zone.
- c. The adversaries created a commission to study the historic evidence on which each based its claim.
- d. China reached a negotiated border settlement with Pakistan and other bordering states.
- e. While India had been building up the size of its armed forces since independence, the bulk of India's men and materiel remained deployed against possible resumed hostilities with Pakistan.
- b. International, perhaps U.N., backing for a demilitarized zone and third-party assistance in defining its limits; interposition of neutral forces.
- c. Arbitration, adjudication of historic claims.
- d. International pressure on India to negotiate.
- e. Fostering distracting conflicts. [However, see (2c) of Section A above.]

C. PHASE III TO PHASE IV: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[Phase III began with the development of a sustained, coordinated Chinese drive into Indian-claimed territory on the eastern and western ends of the disputed border.]

1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

- a. Chinese military forces in the area outnumbered the Indians and were better trained, led, equipped, and supplied for the terrain in which the fighting occurred.

C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Equally strong, defensively equipped Indian forces to induce a quick stalemate. [Note, however, that the limited nature of China's objectives may have meant that hostilities terminated more quickly because of Chinese superiority on the scene.]

- b. Indian public opinion rallied behind the struggle against China. The pro-Chinese Krishna Menon was forced out of office; even the pro-Chinese wing of the Indian Communist Party lost out to the pro-Soviet faction and the Party supported the government's stand.
 - c. Chinese advances in the Northeast Frontier Agency threatened the Assam oil fields and menaced Indian control of the narrow neck of land that connects Assam to the rest of India.
2. Factors Tending to Terminate Hostilities
- a. While its political motives in the fighting may have been complex, China's military and territorial objectives appear to have been limited.
 - b. Whatever Chinese intentions, the practical limits of the long and difficult supply routes for operating across the Himalayas would have made extended operations into India difficult, if not impossible.
 - c. Partly because of preoccupation with Kashmir, partly because of lack of adequate preparation for the special requirements of fighting in the high altitudes of the Himalayas, partly because of a misreading of China's intentions, and partly because of faulty intelligence about the numbers and deployment of Chinese forces, Indian
- b. Strengthening pro-Chinese elements in India.
 - c. Statements by India's supporters of intentions to intervene to protect vital economic, human resources.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Articulation by China of the nature and limits of its territorial objectives; clear indications of forceful action by third parties if these were exceeded.
 - b. Restricting China's military capability to mount large operations far from its borders; containment of China.
 - c. Given China's limited goals, India's inability to stop the Chinese drive or attempt to drive the Chinese out of territory claimed by India hastened the termination of hostilities. However, greater Indian defensive capability on the border might

forces offered ineffective resistance and were unable to stop or deflect the Chinese attack.

have had the same effect.

d. The United States and Britain moved quickly to provide India with small arms and ammunition and air transport support to supply beleaguered troops in the border areas. This action carried with it the implication of more extensive, perhaps direct aid if hostilities persisted.

d. Threats to intensify hostilities.

e. The Soviet government remained officially silent and quasi-officially neutral on the conflict.

e. Articulation by the Soviet Union of its neutral stand; Soviet pressure on China.

f. First Nasser of the UAR offered his personal services as mediator, then Ceylon proposed and convened a conference of neutral states to consider a formula for a settlement of the conflict.

f. U.N. endorsement, cooperation with neutrals' efforts.

D. PHASE IV

[Phase III ended with a unilateral Chinese cease-fire. In effect, the operation left China in control of the border it had claimed before the hostilities, and left India unwilling to give that position official sanction but unable to force China out. A tacit demilitarized zone separates the two armed forces. No progress toward a mutually agreed boundary has been made.

The conflict worsened again during the 1965 Kashmir hostilities, but hostilities between India and China were not resumed. The 1965 episode is analyzed in the study of the Kashmir conflict.]

WEC-98 III

III. WEAPONS ANALYSIS

[This case is not among those selected for weapons analysis.]

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL"Controlling" the Conflict

Control here meant not letting disputed borders generate hostilities; either allowing a quick Chinese victory or a quick Indian repulsion of the Chinese probe; and making vigorous efforts to settle the substance of the dispute.

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. Imprecise or disputed borders have by no means disappeared as casus belli. The remedies remain unchanged: either to delimit the borders definitely, through bilateral negotiations or international procedures such as arbitration or adjudication of historic claims; to separate the contestants physically, as China and India have traditionally been separated by buffer states (in this case implying autonomy for Tibet and Kashmir); or to divert the parties to concentration on internal development (as Indonesia proved able to do--ending its "confrontation" policy even without settling its territorial disputes).

2. In all events it is desirable for states to feel bound by international rules against the use of force to settle such disputes. The U.N. Charter explicitly (Art. 2, para. 4) does this, which may be an argument for seeking to bind China to the provisions of the Charter.

3. China's take-over in Tibet, and India's hospitality to Tibetan refugees including the Dalai Lama, exacerbated basic Sino-Indian relations. India might have appeased Peking by refusing succor, although appeasement is hardly a sure-fire road to peace. Self-determination for Tibet would have been far better, achievable perhaps by a strong and unified world (i.e., U.N.) refusal to accept China's seizure. Failing all that, a more secure Chinese hold on Tibet might have lessened the strategic importance of new roads from China.

4. Finally, the development of hostile incidents along an unsettled border should be a signal for, if not settlement, at a minimum the invitation of third-party fact-finding and supervision of the border area, backed by international sanctions on any attempt at forceful settlement.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

5. It is axiomatic that such issues as disputed borders assume significance in the context of broader relationships. It might be argued that an earlier Western posture toward Peking of "containment without isolation" might have lessened China's inclination forcefully to press its various claims.

6. Unified great-power deterrence of China might have slowed the latter down. But an over-all posture toward China ought also to have included acceptance of reasonable offers made on border issues while Chinese policy was still relatively moderate. To negotiate the legitimate grievances of a hostile state, while maintaining a firm deterrent stand against aggression, bears little resemblance to the justly-decried appeasement policy of the 1930s. Such reasonable flexibility might also have made it possible to keep a war party in India from solidifying, while encouraging peace-oriented factions.

7. If border issues are not to be arbitrated and tension is mounting, conditions are ripe for an international presence, complete with "stand-still" agreement, barring of introduction of new forces into the area, demilitarized zone (which China proposed), and observation and patrol force. (Perhaps the prescription also fits South Arabia today, also South Africa's northern borders when Bechuanaland acquires its independence.)

8. Better Indian intelligence about Chinese intentions and capabilities, and better capacity to deter or defend against armed attacks, might have affected the actions of both parties.

Terminating Hostilities

9. A strong united India might conceivably have completely deterred Peking, or in any event brought about a quick stalemate along the borders. Ex hypothesi, a divided India might have encouraged Chinese belligerence. One cannot be certain of cause and effect because Chinese aims were probably limited anyway. In the circumstances, the most effective conflict terminator would probably have been a combination of great-power and U.N. pressures toward negotiations. Soviet abstention from involvement would have been a highly important precondition to the success of such pressures.

10. In sum, relevant conflict-control measures were:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Definitive delimitation of borders

International arbitration or adjudication of claims

Physical separation by buffer states, through grant of autonomy to Kashmir and Tibet

Diversion of parties by concentration on internal development

Binding of countries such as China to provisions of U.N. Charter

Self-determination

Refusal to harbor refugees (sic)

Unified international stand against take-over attempts through

U.N. and great-power deterrence

More secure Chinese hold on Tibet (sic)

Third-party fact-finding and supervision of border area, backed by international sanctions

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

"Containment without isolation"

including

Negotiation of legitimate grievances

WEC-98 III

and

Acceptance of reasonable offers

while maintaining

Deterrence against aggression

Unified great-power deterrence

Discouragement of local war party

International presence for observation and patrol

Barring of new forces from area

Demilitarized zone

Better intelligence

Improved Indian defenses

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Soviet abstention from involvement*

Great-power and U.N. pressures to negotiate*

Strong united India

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

T H E B A Y O F P I G S : 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 1

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.	395
A.	Background of the Conflict	395
B.	Phase II: March 1960 -- April 1961.	405
C.	Phase III: April 17, 1961 -- April 19, 1961	425
D.	Phase IV: From April 19, 1961	430
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.	432
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option	432
B.	Phase II to Phase III: The Outbreak of Hostilities. . . .	436
C.	Phase III to Phase IV: The Termination of Hostilities . .	440
D.	Phase IV	441
III.	Weapons Analysis.	442
A.	Cuban Weapons Acquisition.	442
B.	Cuban-Exile Weapons Acquisition.	445
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.	449

T H E B A Y O F P I G S : 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 1

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES


A. Background of the Conflict

Since the Spanish-American War, Cuba and the United States enjoyed close relations both politically and economically. A large percentage of Cuban business was U.S.-owned before the take-over by Fidel Castro, and the United States traditionally exercised a great influence over the government of Cuba.

The Bay of Pigs conflict centered around a force of Cuban exiles equipped and trained by the U.S. government who invaded the island of Cuba in an effort to precipitate the overthrow of Premier Castro and establish a new government acceptable to the United States. Military action against Castro was devised by and dependent upon a coalition of the Cuban exiles and the U.S. government; neither of these forces was in a position to carry out this action independently.

The United States was apparently unwilling to initiate military action openly against Castro out of concern for international opinion.¹ However, the U.S. government felt that it could utilize the large numbers of anti-Castro Cuban exiles in an effort to overthrow

¹Haynes Johnson, in The Bay of Pigs (New York, W.W.Norton, 1964), p. 66, adds that without the support of the Cuban exiles, the United States would have run the risk of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. (Johnson's book is based on information obtained from Cuban exiles as well as Washington sources.) There is some reason to doubt the degree to which direct Soviet involvement in Cuba



Adapted from an end paper map by Vaughn Gray from Eye on Cuba by Edwin Tetlow, with permission of Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

the Castro regime. The Cuban exiles were split into too many factions to organize themselves into an effective counterrevolutionary force. Support and training from the United States provided them with the necessary rallying point from which to attempt perhaps the only objective upon which they could all agree--the overthrow of Castro.

The U.S. government was concerned with Castro's anti-Americanism and his desire to export his increasingly Communist-dominated revolution to the rest of Latin America. The Cuban exiles desired to return to their homeland and set up a different type of government.

1. The End of the Batista Regime. When it became obvious that the Batista government had lost its supporting base, the United States (both the government and the public) began to see Castro as a possible alternative. During Castro's stay in the Sierra Maestra mountains in Oriente Province (1956-1958), many of his supplies and arms came from friends in the United States.¹ Within Cuba, those who were later to make up the bulk of the Cuban exile forces trained by the U.S. government were either sympathetic to the Castro cause or actively fighting beside him in the mountains. The dispute--both between the United States and Castro and between Castro and his former Cuban supporters in exile--developed after Castro came to power on January 1, 1959; and it was caused and aggravated by his progressive steps toward Communism and alliance with the Soviet bloc. Many previous Cuban governments had forced opponents into exile, usually to the United

was a factor that was weighed heavily in decisions concerning the Bay of Pigs. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., mentions his own personal concern at Soviet reactions in other parts of the world. See A Thousand Days (Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 215-297. Theodore C. Sorensen mentions the possibility of a direct U.S.-Soviet clash if a full-scale U.S. invasion were attempted. See Kennedy (New York, Harper & Row, 1965), p. 297. Neither of these, however--the former a participant in the decision-making process, the latter writing on the basis of conversations after the event--places these considerations high on the list.

¹Earl E.T. Smith, The Fourth Floor (New York, Random House, 1962), p. 65; Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution (New York, Praeger, 1962), p. 110. Earl Smith was U.S. Ambassador to Cuba during Castro's rise to power.

States. Castro's did the same: members of Batista's government and others who had been close to him fled Cuba. These people comprised the original anti-Castro exile group, and they began independent military action against Castro shortly after they went into exile. But the bulk of the Bay of Pigs fighting forces were early supporters of Castro who had become disillusioned with him at various points in the course of his reforms.

2. Castro's First Months in Power: Deteriorating Relations with the United States. When Castro first assumed power, the U.S. government recognized the new Cuban government immediately and greeted the change with friendly reserve. Castro, however, made a point of his anti-Americanism. Some argue that Castro needed this enemy to retain his image as a strong rebel leader and to shift popular discontent from his regime onto the great neighbor to the north.¹

In January 1959 Philip Bonsal was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, in part because he was generally identified as a liberal.² However, friendly overtures to the Castro government from the U.S. government were being compromised by bombing flights over Cuba mounted from Florida by exiled Batistianos. Castro vociferously blamed the U.S. government for the resulting deaths of Cuban citizens because it made no successful effort to prevent these flights; he charged that some of the pilots were U.S. citizens or U.S.-trained.³ Castro also demanded the return of exiled Batistianos with the money they took with them when they fled.⁴ The United States, however, was not prepared to

¹Tad Szulc and Karl E. Meyer, The Cuban Invasion (New York, Ballantine Books, 1962), p. 13. Tad Szulc was an important figure in press coverage of Cuban affairs for the New York Times.

²Robert F. Smith, What Happened in Cuba? (New York, Twayne Publishers, 1963), p. 245; also Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 20.

³Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., pp. 25, 41.

⁴However, R. Hart Phillips, in The Cuban Dilemma (New York, Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1962), p. 57, writes that "an official [of the U.S. Embassy] told me that no formal documented petition had been presented by the Cuban government. It was obvious that Castro did not

send the exiles to certain execution. The mass political executions that Castro had initiated upon his take-over were turning U.S. public opinion against him.

In April 1959 Castro made his first visit to the United States as the Cuban Premier. He was accompanied by the moderates in his government,¹ but he received a very cautious welcome. President Eisenhower was on a golfing trip, and Secretary of State Herter received Castro in a hotel room.² On this visit, Castro was mild in his approach and asserted that he was not a Communist. However, after a three-hour talk with the Premier, Vice-President Nixon became alarmed that Communist influences were gaining control in Cuba. He reportedly expressed this view to President Eisenhower and suggested that Cuban exiles be trained by the U.S. government to fight Castro.³

When Castro returned to Cuba, he resumed his verbal attacks on the United States and in May 1959 introduced a radical agrarian reform law.⁴ After unsuccessful attempts by Ambassador Bonsal to moderate the law, relations between the United States and Cuba began to deteriorate.⁵

want to extradite the Batista officials." Phillips was the head of the New York Times office in Havana during the period.

¹The fact that they were the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Economy, the head of the National Bank of Cuba, and the managing director of the Cuban Bank of Foreign Trade led U.S. officials to believe that Castro was interested in loans. His aides, however, made no approaches whatsoever to the State Department, the Development Loan Fund, or the International Cooperation Administration in Washington. New York Times, March 13, 1960.

²R. Smith, op. cit., p. 246.

³Johnson, op. cit., p. 25, states that Nixon urged a "stronger policy within Administration councils" and "favored a military solution, if necessary." See also Draper, op. cit., p. 62; Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 226.

⁴The Agrarian Reform Law was promulgated on May 17, 1959, and under Article 48 of this law, the INRA [National Institute of Agrarian Reform] was established. It "is responsible for the agricultural and industrial development of Cuba; it has the authority to seize lands and redistribute them; it is in charge of establishing farm cooperatives and industrial cooperatives." Boston Daily Globe, February 23, 1960.

⁵R. Smith, op. cit., p. 246.

3. The Problem of Expropriated Property. The radical agrarian reform law helped to confirm suspicions in the United States that Castro's was a Communist revolution, and the spectre of a possible Communist political and military base of operations 90 miles from the Florida coast began to take on ominous substance. It was also becoming evident that steps taken by the U.S. government to moderate Castro's policies were producing just the opposite of the desired results. Castro was interpreting the actions of the United States as hostile to his revolution and using them as fuel for his "anti-Yankee" campaign.¹ Since the United States exercised virtually total control over the Cuban economy since the Spanish-American War, Castro was able to persuade many Cubans that the United States was responsible for all the economic and social inequalities present in Cuba.

Following the introduction of the agrarian reform law, great pressure was brought to bear upon the U.S. government by U.S. citizens with economic interests in Cuba. Just after the law had been drafted, Senator Smathers of Florida, speaking before the Sugar Club of New York, voiced the first public warning to Cuba that its sugar quota would be reduced if it chose to carry out drastic land reform.² At that time, five American sugar companies owned or controlled more than two million acres of Cuban land and stood to lose all but 16,650 acres.³ The U.S. government soon told Cuba officially of its fear that the new land reform law would not give American investors fair compensation. At the same time Castro was proposing to sell eight million tons of sugar in the United States in 1961.⁴ The sugar quota only provided for three million tons, a third of total U.S. consumption.⁵ During 1959 the U.S.

¹ Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 18.

² Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1959.

³ Ibid., June 12, 1959.

⁴ Ibid., June 16, 1959.

⁵ Under a reciprocity agreement signed by Cuba and the United States in 1934, Cuba was guaranteed a U.S. market for three million tons of sugar a year at two cents per pound above prices in the world sugar market.

State Department suggested that the premium quota payment be put into an internationally administered fund to compensate landowners until Cuba agreed to settle their grievances.¹

In October 1959 the Cuban government passed a law that would deprive American owners of most of their mining and petroleum rights on the island.² Later, in answer to threats of curtailment of the sugar quota, the Cuban government issued this statement:

It might be interesting to ask the American statesmen and public opinion at large if they believe it possible for a small country like Cuba to bear indefinitely a trade and payment deficit resulting from its relations with its powerful neighbors . . . particularly considering that the international exchange reserve of the Island, with which that deficit was covered, was practically exhausted . . . owing to the fatal policy so unwisely followed by the tyranny.³

In reply, Secretary of State Herter offered the alternatives to Cuba of discussing complaints peaceably with the United States or of pursuing anti-American policies and suffering the loss of the sugar quota.⁴

In January 1960 Ambassador Bonsal attempted new negotiations regarding confiscation of American property. The New York Times gave a good summary of his case:

Though several notes have been exchanged between the United States and Cuba since the [agrarian reform] law was promulgated last spring, the Government of Premier Fidel Castro has made no concessions to Washington's demand that, under international law, United States citizens whose land has been expropriated should receive "prompt, adequate and effective" payment. . . .The Cuban Government is apparently willing to let the matter drift. . . .Since the exchange

¹R. Smith, op. cit., p. 248; Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

²New York Times, October 29, 1959.

³Republica de Cuba, Ministerio de Estado, Boletin, No. 92 (December 8, 1959).

⁴Wall Street Journal, December 11, 1959.

of these notes, the United States has become increasingly concerned over the manner in which the Cuban Government has implemented the agrarian reform.¹

Despite continued U.S. efforts at negotiation, the Cuban government increased the pace of its seizures of American-owned property in 1960. In February Castro announced the start of his industrialization program with the statement that private foreign investment would be accepted in Cuba only if delivered to the government to be used as it saw fit.²

4. Other Sources of Tension. Although uncompensated confiscation of American property in Cuba seemed to be the main issue at this time, there were other factors that were being debated. Bombing runs over Cuba by exiled Batistianos continued and in early 1960 became more frequent;³ it was even rumored that Castro had instigated some of the raids himself, because they provided effective propaganda against the United States. The New York Times reported that:

An analysis of the available evidence, including eyewitness reports, indicates that many, if not all, of the persons injured received their wounds either from stray rounds of 20 mm. and 40 mm. shell fragments from anti-aircraft fire of the Cuban armed forces or from grenades or bombs thrown from automobiles by terrorists.⁴

As the raids increased over the sugar fields in an effort to destroy the sugar crop, the Castro government complained bitterly about the refusal of the United States to sell it fighter aircraft and about

¹New York Times, January 10, 1960.

²Ibid., February 26, 1960.

³Some observers contend that, while some efforts were made to stop flights originating from U.S. territory, they were not pressed very vigorously. See Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., pp. 25, 41; and the New York Times, October 17 and 23, 1959.

⁴New York Times, November 10, 1959.

attempts by the United States to dissuade Britain from exchanging several jet Sea Hunters for some obsolete Sea Furies. "For this reason we cannot defend ourselves against the raiders," it claimed.¹ On March 6 a shipload of guns from Belgium blew up in Havana harbor, and there were subsequent charges of U.S. sabotage.² This incident provided Castro with some of his most effective propaganda against the United States at this time.

As early as the autumn of 1959, Castro was insisting that the United States would invade Cuba in the near future.³ In the same way, he blamed all the exile activities against his government on U.S. government policy. His refusal to negotiate differences with the United States was further indication of his determination to consolidate his revolution against the United States.

In 1959 U.S. concern over Castro's continued hostility increased as members of the original revolutionary government were gradually replaced by Communists. This trend culminated in February 1960 in a trade and economic agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union⁴ that gave the Soviets a major role in Cuban affairs.

This pro-Soviet trend in Cuba's orientation made more serious another development during 1959, when Castro engaged in military forays in Central America and the Caribbean. The U.S. State Department charged that he had "aided or supported armed invasions of Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. These projects failed and all invited action by the Organization of American States."⁵ However, efforts to

¹Boston Daily Globe, February 17, 1960.

²Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 42.

³Ibid., p. 26.

⁴On February 14, 1960, Mikoyan signed a trade agreement in Havana under which the Soviet Union would buy one million tons of sugar a year and extend \$100 million of credit to Cuba. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 42.

⁵U.S. Department of State, Cuba (Department of State publication 7171, Washington, D.C., G.P.O., April 1961), as referenced in R. Smith, op. cit., p. 322.

get decisive OAS action failed. The strongest language the OAS Foreign Ministers could agree upon at their Santiago, Chile, meeting in August 1959 was that "the existence of anti-democratic regimes constitutes a violation of the principles . . . [of OAS] and a danger to united and peaceful relations in the hemisphere."¹ Many Latin Americans were at that time sympathetic toward the Castro revolution. Even those who may have shared Washington's concern over the nature of the Castro government were too committed historically to an anti-intervention stance to contemplate decisive OAS action.

Efforts to negotiate differences with Cuba continued, despite mounting U.S. concern over the political orientation of the Castro government and over its active efforts to stimulate similar movements elsewhere in the hemisphere. For example:

As late as January 1960 the United States government made a new effort to reach an understanding using Dr. Julio A. Amoedo, the Argentine ambassador to Havana and a personal friend of Castro's, as an intermediary. There appears to have been still another attempt in March through [Cuban Finance Minister] Rufo Lopez Fresquet. On the morning of March 17, 1960, President Dorticós rejected this last United States overture.²

Schlesinger reports that "on the same day in Washington President Eisenhower agreed to a recommendation from the CIA to train a force of Cuban exiles for possible use against Castro."³

If the various Cuban exile groups were to be united and make

¹U.S. Department of State, Inter-American Efforts to Relieve International Tensions in the Western Hemisphere, 1959-1960 (Department of State publication 7409, Washington, D.C., G.P.O., July 1962), p. 70.

²Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 222. When Fresquet told Dorticós that he would resign if no reconciliation were possible with the United States, Dorticós accepted his resignation. According to Phillips, op. cit., p. 178, two other high-ranking Cuban officials also resigned on March 17 in protest against Communist control in Cuba: the Cuban Naval Attaché and the Military and Air Attaché in the Washington Embassy.

³Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 222.

effective contact with the underground that was rising inside Cuba, some external force needed to assume the role of organizer and benefactor to these groups. The fact that the U.S. government decided to organize the potential for military action against Castro did not necessarily mean a commitment to use that force. However, it seems clear that the decision to utilize Cuban exiles represented both an increased readiness to employ force in the mounting U.S.-Castro crisis and an unwillingness to use U.S. force directly. There were, of course, circumstances that could have changed this. However, during this period Castro appears to have been very cautious not to provide the United States with a clear case for direct military action.¹ Sensitivity to world opinion appears to have played a large part in determining the extent of the action against Castro contemplated by the United States. Although there were certain to be widespread presumptions of an active U.S. role in the exiles' activities, "the hope existed that it could be plausibly disclaimed by the United States government."²

B. Phase II: March 1960 -- April 1961

There appear to have been three main sub-phases in Phase II. The first extended from the spring to the fall of 1960, when the proposed use of indirect U.S. force through the Cuban exile groups appears to have centered around prospects for effective guerrilla opposition within Cuba. The second sub-phase, from the fall of 1960 to early 1961, saw a gradual shift of emphasis from activities designed to support and encourage the guerrilla movements toward plans that involved an invasion by exile forces. The third sub-phase, from early 1961 to the April invasion, saw many modifications and amendments of the proposed Cuban assault, and, more significantly, was the period in which the decision

¹For example, "he kept his hands off Guantanamo Naval Base." Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 98.

²From an interview with former CIA official Richard M. Bissell, Jr., in the Washington Star, July 20, 1965.

to use force--as distinct from having it readily available--was made. This paper will describe Phase II under these headings.

1. Sub-Phase A: Spring 1960 -- Fall 1960. In the spring of 1960 the United States through its intelligence structure made contact with Cuban exiles and underground leaders in Cuba. These Cubans were reportedly told that wealthy interests in the United States who were sympathetic to their cause were prepared to give them financial and other support.¹ However, the Cuban exiles and underground leaders report that they realized from the beginning that their benefactors had the full support of the U.S. government. This support provided the incentive the exiles needed to embark on a serious campaign against Castro despite the disability of unreconciled factions; they believed that with the backing of the United States they could not lose. As one of the Cuban troops later said, "We thought Uncle Sam was behind us. He wanted to do this secretly. That was all right because he was Uncle Sam, and he is strong."²

One group of Cubans with professional military experience was gathered at Miami and sent to a small island in the Caribbean to be tested for officer ability. Twenty-eight were chosen from this group to train in guerrilla tactics at the U.S. Army jungle-warfare school in the Panama Canal Zone. On August 22, after seven weeks of training, they were taken to a camp on the Pacific coast of Guatemala,³ where they were to assist in training larger numbers of exiles in guerrilla warfare. The Cuban troops in Guatemala then numbered 160, 47 of whom were pilots. In the middle of September the first weapons arrived⁴ and shortly after that an additional 20 guerrilla instructors of various nationalities were

¹Johnson, op. cit., p. 31.

²Ibid., p. 37.

³Ibid., pp. 37-39.

⁴Thirteen Springfield rifles, vintage World War I, and a few pistols. Ibid., p. 48

brought in to help train the Cubans.¹

At this time there was no definite commitment by the United States to use the Cuban exile force, only a decision to train it. The U.S. intelligence community was executing the mandate it had been given to carry out the day-to-day routine of military training. A special interdepartmental committee in Washington, consisting of top officials from the State Department, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House, was to decide on the specific use to be made of the troops.²

Such contingency planning as appears to have existed when the force was conceived and being gathered was based on the assumptions that the existing isolated guerrilla bands in Cuba could be effectively coordinated by the creation of communication networks and that these communication facilities would make it possible to bring in supplies for larger guerrilla operations. With such developments inside Cuba, the small numbers of exiles then training in Guatemala could be infiltrated to strengthen a guerrilla network sufficiently powerful to ignite an anti-Castro campaign. Simultaneously with the training in Guatemala, therefore, U.S.-exile efforts were made to establish effective liaison with guerrillas inside Cuba.

In Cuba, meanwhile, Castro continued to warn against impending invasion from the United States. Because his warnings contained a considerable amount of accurate detail about the training of exiles, it can be assumed that his intelligence network was keeping him well informed. As early as May 1, while the Guatemalan camps were being readied but before any Cubans had arrived, Castro had warned that the United States was preparing aggression against Cuba with the aid of Guatemala. By July he was stirring up public militancy against invaders and impressing upon the Cuban populace the idea that any invasion would

¹Ibid., p. 48.

²Ibid., p. 53.

be the direct responsibility of its enemy, the United States.¹

During the spring and summer of 1960, political relations between Cuba and the United States deteriorated steadily, and soon it became impossible for the two countries to communicate diplomatically.² Castro refused to meet with the U.S. Ambassador to discuss differences. Instead he told a CBS correspondent that Cuban-U.S. relations could be improved if he could meet privately with President Eisenhower or Secretary of State Herter. A State Department spokesman answered that Castro should tell this to Ambassador Bonsal.³

Castro's continued expropriation of U.S.-owned land led to the suggestion in Congress in March 1960 that the Cuban sugar quota be cut.⁴ In May the State Department announced that the small remaining economic aid program to Cuba would be ended within six months.⁵ By June, as signs in Washington pointed toward the likelihood of a cut in the sugar quota, Castro warned that this "economic aggression" by the United States would be met with the seizure of all remaining American-owned property and business in Cuba.⁶ On July 5 President Eisenhower received authority from Congress to cut the quota; and the next day he announced that he was reducing the quota sharply, adding that:

The inescapable conclusion is that Cuba has embarked on a course of action to commit a steadily increasing amount of its sugar crop to trade with the

¹Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 47.

²Also, the popular support in the United States that Castro had enjoyed when he first came to power had largely disappeared, weakened by his mass executions of counterrevolutionists and his apparent repudiation (which he made official on May 1, 1960) of promised elections and representative democracy.

³New York Times, April 18, 1960.

⁴R. Smith, op. cit., p. 277; Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., pp. 60-62.

⁵New York Times, May 28, 1960.

⁶Ibid., June 27, 1960.

Communist bloc, thus making its future ability to fill the sugar needs of the United States ever more uncertain.¹

Castro seized the U.S. oil refineries on the same day. The next day, he was given authority to expropriate U.S.-owned land with "nothing more than a decision and a signature."² On August 8, in retaliation for "economic aggression" by the United States, Premier Castro began implementation of the authority he had received in July to nationalize U.S.-owned property in Cuba.³

Since February 1960, Cuba had been drawing closer to the Soviet Union. Just after the sugar quota was cut, the Soviet Union promised to buy more Cuban sugar, and Soviet Premier Khrushchev announced that he would defend Cuba with rockets if necessary.⁴ On July 8, 1960, Castro announced that the arrival of Soviet arms in Cuba was imminent. On July 26 he told the marching militia that it was the last time they would have to march without arms because Soviet rifles had already arrived.⁵

As U.S.-Cuban economic and political relations rapidly deteriorated over the summer of 1960, the number of incidents in Central and South America which the United States attributed to Castro increased. One later account summarized these as including all the following: Guatemala and Nicaragua were facing rebel movements directly inspired by Castro and armed from his arsenal; many copies of Major Ernesto Guevara's

¹President Eisenhower, Statement on Signing of the Cuban Sugar Quota Bill, July 6, 1960, as referenced in R. Smith, op. cit., p. 278.

²Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1960.

³New York Times, August 8, 1960. It is interesting to note that Castro did not begin to use the authority until after Soviet arms had arrived.

⁴Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 72.

⁵Andrés Suárez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966, forthcoming from The M.I.T. Press, 1967, Chapter 4, note 34, which cites Revolución, July 27, 1960. The U. S. State Department later confirmed the arrival of Soviet arms in July. New York Times, November 18, 1960.

book on guerrilla warfare had been sent into Chile along with supplies for earthquake victims; the Cuban Ambassador to Panama, who was endowed with a fine voice, was singing in villages and asking parish priests to lead Friends of Cuba chapters; "Fidelista" rifle groups in Peru were training members in guerrilla tactics; the peasant revolt in northeastern Brazil was becoming "Fidelista"; radical groups in Venezuela were demanding alliance with Cuba and land reform on the Cuban pattern; the "Fidelista" movement centered in Caracas had actually battled with police and soldiers; the Cuban Ambassador to Bolivia was sponsoring anti-U.S. demonstrations; and British Guiana had gone to Cuba for a \$5 million loan.¹ With a good supply of weapons in Cuba to add force to pro-Cuban movements in other Latin American countries, Castro's threat of exporting his revolution was appearing more real and immediate.

On several occasions in the summer of 1960, the United States registered its growing alarm over Castro's policies with the Inter-American Peace Committee, which had been given the previous year the responsibility for a general survey of causes of tension in the Caribbean. In August the OAS Foreign Ministers met again, at San José, Costa Rica, to consider U.S. charges against Cuba. The final resolutions adopted were stronger than those of the previous summer but still fell short of the condemnation Secretary of State Herter is said to have wanted,² much less a decision for action some had thought possible. The Declaration of San José condemned "energetically the intervention or threat of intervention . . . by an extra-continental power in the affairs of the American republics" and said further that "the attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic, or social situation of any American state" could endanger the peace and security of the hemisphere. At the same meeting, however, the Ministers also reaffirmed the general OAS prohibition of intervention by one state in the affairs

¹Tad Szulc, "Castro Tries to Export 'Fidelismo'," New York Times, November 27, 1960.

²R. Smith, op. cit., p. 277.

of another.¹

On September 26, 1960, at the U.N. General Assembly, Castro reiterated all the charges that he and the Soviet Union had made against the United States. His speech ended with a plea that the United Nations condemn the U.S. government for supporting insurgents in Cuba and for planning an invasion of Cuba in the near future.² He also stressed the Soviet pledge of July 9 to defend Cuba with rockets.³ A month later, however, Khrushchev announced that his pledge to defend Cuba with rockets should be interpreted "really to be symbolic."⁴

On October 19, the United States increased its economic pressure on Castro by imposing an embargo on U.S. exports to Cuba. The U.S. Department of Commerce charged that from the start of the Castro regime a variety of discriminatory taxes and trade regulations had been instituted in an effort to divert trade away from the United States, and that, as a result, U.S. exports to Cuba had fallen to less than 50 per cent of the 1958 total. The Department also cited Castro's seizure of American-owned properties and claimed that "all efforts on the part of the United States to reach a fair and equitable solution . . . have been rebuffed by the Castro regime."⁵ On the same day that the United States announced the embargo, Major Guevara, who served as president of the National Bank of Cuba, was reported to be making plans to leave for the

¹U.S. Department of State, Inter-American Efforts to Relieve International Tensions in the Western Hemisphere, 1959-1960, cited above, pp. 368-369.

²The Cuban complaint was placed on the General Assembly's agenda, but the Assembly had not reached the item when the invasion at the Bay of Pigs occurred.

³Speech by Fidel Castro to the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 26, 1960, as referenced by R. Smith, op. cit., pp. 284-303.

⁴TASS release, October 30, 1960.

⁵U.S. Embargo on Exports to Cuba, October 19, 1960, as referenced by R. Smith, op. cit., pp. 280-282.

Soviet Union to negotiate a new trade agreement.¹

During the summer of 1960, while the camps for training Cuban exiles were being developed in Guatemala, Castro was establishing firm control over his militia and the civilian population. He was also carrying on a vigorous campaign against a counterrevolutionary guerrilla group that was operating from the Escambray mountains in central Cuba.

As was noted earlier, contingency plans for the use of trained Cuban exiles were, at this time, based on the development of anti-Castro guerrilla forces in Cuba, and this in turn required the improvement of communications both among isolated guerrilla groups and between them and those seeking to supply them by air. The required communication network was proving very difficult to achieve. Failure to develop communications skills adequate to guide supplying aircraft was resulting by the autumn of 1960 both in Castro's interception of supplies intended for the guerrillas and in greater risk-taking by the guerrilla bands as they were forced to leave secure bases to forage for supplies. The anti-Castro guerrillas were becoming isolated in small, weak groups vulnerable to attack by the Castro forces. In effect, Castro was succeeding in localizing guerrilla operations against him. The situation seemed bound to worsen as the unsettled autumn weather made air supply even less reliable.

Castro was also, during the summer of 1960, strengthening his military forces. A State Department release in November 1960 summarized these developments. It stated that Castro had already built a force ten times the size of Batista's and larger than any other Latin American army. When the 8,000-man 26th of July Movement had taken power, it had gained, in addition to its own arms, materiel sufficient for 25,000 men. On this base, Castro had, in less than two years, equipped a militia of over 200,000 with modern light and heavy arms and an army of at least 40,000. In 1959 Cuba had bought 100,000 rifles in Belgium, and since July 1960 at least 28,000 tons of arms had been shipped in from the

¹New York Times, October 20, 1960.

Communist bloc. Among these supplies were antiaircraft and antitank artillery, tanks, helicopters, mortars, other light arms, and ammunition. (See Section III for details.) In particular, the State Department pointed out that arms deliveries from the Soviet bloc had stepped up noticeably since the OAS resolution in August that had disapproved of extra-continental intervention in the American continents.¹ Many observers were alarmed at the speed with which Soviet-bloc arms were arriving. It appeared that within six months Castro's forces would be sufficiently large and well-equipped to make effective action by guerrilla forces impossible.

Sometime between August and November 1960,² the contingency plans for a small force of exiles designed to augment a guerrilla movement inside Cuba became transformed into plans for a larger force capable of invading the island and establishing and holding a beachhead.³ This change was more probably the result of an accruing number of small decisions than of one single act of decision. Two lines of development appear to have been central to the transformation. First, the expectations about guerrilla operations inside Cuba had not been fulfilled so that the force as originally designed had no role to play. Second, worsening U.S.-Cuban relations, particularly Cuba's growing reliance on the Communist bloc, increasing military strength, and expanded intervention in the hemisphere, added urgency to the need to act.

During the months the decision to build an invasion force was being formed, the United States was in the midst of an election in which Cuba had become a major issue. Presidential-candidate Kennedy appeared especially anxious to debate this issue with his opponent.

¹Ibid., November 18, 1960.

²One source (Johnson, op. cit., p. 53) places in August the first suggestion that the plans be changed.

³Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 229; Johnson, op. cit., p. 54; Sorensen, op. cit., p. 295.

Nixon advocated nonintervention in Latin America, saying that U.S. support for Cuban exile forces would be a violation of international law; Kennedy insisted that Castro was an outlaw and that the U.S. government should train and support Cuban exiles. The Vice-President was aware of the contingency preparations underway; the Senator from Massachusetts had not been briefed on the situation.¹

Perhaps even more significant, however, was the fact that, regardless of its outcome, the election would bring a new President to office. It had been political responsibility at the highest executive level that had been the focus of decisions to limit U.S. involvement to indirect support of anti-Castro forces. In the election period, those making the highest-level decisions were temporarily divorced from the threat of political repercussions that might be produced by exposure of U.S. participation in a Cuban invasion. There was no strong political figure to present the case against invasion.²

2. Sub-Phase B: Fall 1960 -- Early 1961. In the camps in Guatemala the remaining months of 1960 were spent in training the exile force for its redefined mission. Castro continued to warn that invasion was imminent. For example, in late October he mobilized his militia in anticipation of an invasion from the United States. One newspaper speculated that the mobilization was an answer to the recent landing of 1,450 marines at the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo.³ By and large, however, the U.S. press expressed bewilderment at Castro's furious preparation for imminent invasion. For example, the New York Times called Castro's actions "hysterical" and remarked:

¹Johnson, op. cit., p. 49.

²Haynes Johnson states that factors "in the nature of the Presidency itself and also in Eisenhower's personality . . . created an atmosphere of not bothering the chief, of going ahead in an interim period, in effect of postponing the final collection in the certainty that payment would be made." The final decision would rest with a new administration. Ibid., p. 54.

³New York Times, October 31, 1960.

All this would be comic if it were not so tragic. The United States Government has made it clear that it has no intention of invading Cuba. . . . One obvious intent of this Castro maneuver is to inflame his people's passions against this country and build hatred of the United States. . . . Another reason for this paranoid behavior may be to take the Cuban people's minds off their growing difficulties at home. . . . Finally, there is the worst possibility that Castro may be planning some provocation against the United States, at Guantanamo or elsewhere. This is certainly a time for us to guard against any such provocations, should they occur.¹

Then in December, Castro began to demobilize the militia. A new President had been elected in the United States and Castro was expressing hopes that perhaps this would provide the beginning of a new attitude toward Cuba in Washington.² Despite the fact that, during the election campaign, Kennedy had openly advocated that the United States support the overthrow of the Castro regime, Castro appeared to believe that he could reach an accommodation with Kennedy as President.

In early January 1961, Cuba again urged immediate consideration in the United Nations of its charge that the United States was planning an invasion of the island.³ Subsequently, Castro declared that the U.S. Embassy in Havana was the center of counterrevolutionary activities against his regime and ordered that its staff be reduced to 11 within 48 hours. Eighty per cent of the 300 officials, he charged, were spies of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Pentagon. There were actually only 42 U.S. officials in the Embassy at the time and 87 U.S. employees in all.⁴ Eisenhower answered Castro's charges as follows:

¹Ibid., November 1, 1960.

²Christian Science Monitor, November 28, 1960.

³New York Times, January 1, 1961.

⁴Ibid., January 3, 1961.

This unusual action on the part of the Castro Government can have no other purpose than to render impossible the conduct of normal diplomatic relations with that Government.

Accordingly, I have instructed the Secretary of State to deliver a note to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Cuba in Washington which . . . states that the Government of the United States is hereby formally terminating diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba. . . .

This calculated action on the part of the Castro Government is only the latest of a long series of harassments, baseless accusations and vilifications. There is a limit to what the United States in self-respect can endure. That limit has been reached.¹

Cuban representative Raúl Roa then delivered a speech in the United Nations assailing President Eisenhower for breaking off diplomatic relations with Cuba. He remarked that "although the Central Intelligence Agency has very often changed its plans and postponed them, we have accurate information that we are now facing the final blow." In his speech were details about where Cuba expected the attacks.² However, apparently still with the belief that the Kennedy administration would pursue significantly different policies from those of its predecessor, Major Guevara appeared on Cuban television to say that "it was important that President-elect John F. Kennedy took no part in the United States diplomatic break with Cuba."³ Guevara had recently returned from Moscow, where he had been promised increased economic trade and aid. This was a multilateral trade agreement, he announced, under which Communist countries would purchase four million tons of Cuban sugar. Other benefits obtained in the treaty included: assistance in resuming operations at the American-owned Nicaro and Moa Bay nickel plants; technical training in Communist nations for 2,400 Cubans;

¹Eisenhower's Statement Announcing the Break in Diplomatic Relations with Cuba, January 3, 1961, as referenced by R. Smith, op. cit., p. 282.

²New York Times, January 5, 1961.

³Ibid., January 7, 1961.

equipment from Poland for a shipyard capable of building ships of up to 10,000 tons, for facilities to produce shoes and electric batteries, and for two slaughterhouses capable of handling 300 cattle and 300 pigs daily; equipment from Communist China for 24 plants for such things as automobile parts, paper, dynamite, and rubber; prices 50 per cent below those "in capitalist countries" from Communist China; and credit from Czechoslovakia of 40 million pesos to be used to build a plant for producing motor vehicles in Cuba.¹

During January 1961 Castro again mobilized his militia against an imminent invasion. At the same time, in an intensified drive, an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 militia and regulars were battling 300 to 1,000 guerrillas in the Escambray mountains.² On January 2, Soviet tanks, vehicle-drawn artillery, and four-barrel antiaircraft guns were displayed in a Havana parade.³ The fortification of Havana was then stepped up.⁴ On January 9 there was a stir in Cuba when a U.S. aircraft carrier sailed into Guantánamo to be incorporated into the forces there.⁵ By late January, reports of executions of Escambray insurgents were becoming more frequent. It had also become expensive to maintain the 200,000-man militia supposedly ready to defend Cuba from invaders, and most of it was demobilized. Castro claimed that he had expected the invasion to come before Kennedy's inauguration.⁶

During late 1960, dissension had emerged among the exiles.

¹Ibid., January 14, 1961.

²These figures are from several newspaper accounts. There is no proof of their accuracy and it is quite probable that the number of remaining guerrilla troops was exaggerated, because they were completely defeated about three weeks later.

³New York Times, January 2, 1961.

⁴This was most likely calculated for its propaganda value, since it was most improbable that invaders would choose Havana for their attack.

⁵New York Times, January 9, 1961.

⁶Ibid., January 21, 1961.

The political voice for the exile forces was a group in Miami called the Frente. It reportedly "represented the center of the exile world at a time when the Right was still unduly prominent."¹ In December 1960, disagreement had developed between the Frente in Miami and the exile leaders in Guatemala over the question of who would make the decisions for the Cuban exile forces. Added to this was the fact that many of the lately-arrived Cuban exiles demanded representation in the Frente for the socialist elements among them. By January 1961 this dissension was being carried into the Guatemala training camp as new recruits arrived from Miami. There was a general strike against the Brigade leader,² who then resigned his command. U.S. leaders, however, refused to let him step down and convinced the strikers that they should obey him.³ This division among the troops threatened to force cancellation or delay of the invasion. One of the problems in maintaining order at the Guatemala camp was that many of the recent arrivals had no military background and were more concerned with their political beliefs than with military discipline.

3. Sub-Phase C: Early 1961 -- April 1961. After his inauguration, President Kennedy called for a review of the invasion plan. As it stood at that point, the plan provided for a landing at Trinidad, a city of 20,000 at the base of the Escambray mountains, where there had been an extensive guerrilla force (although it was rapidly dwindling). The idea was that the invaders could link up with what remained of this guerrilla force and gain a foothold in Cuba that would serve as a base for operations against Castro. The Kennedy administration was anxious to conceal its participation in the proposed action and feared that a landing at Trinidad, with its relatively large civilian population,

¹Draper, op. cit., p. 70.

²The official name of the Cuban exile troops was Brigade 2506.

³Johnson, op. cit., pp. 60-63. While available accounts of events in Guatemala at this point suggest that the strike was of serious proportions and arose from political differences among the exiles, the episode may have been exaggerated and may, in any event, have contained large elements of personal rather than political rivalry.

might require additional commitment by the United States. Another drawback to the Trinidad plan was that there was no near-by airfield capable of servicing B-26 bombers that could be easily secured and held. It was regarded as essential that Cuban exile aircraft operate from Cuban soil as soon as possible after the invasion.¹

President Kennedy is reported to have been particularly concerned with the consequences of unfavorable world opinion regarding U.S. intervention. He stipulated that no U.S. forces whatsoever would be used in the invasion and that the U.S. position remain correct in the United Nations: "The integrity and credibility of Adlai Stevenson constitute one of our great national assets. I don't want anything to be done which might jeopardize that."²

In early February the Cuban militia forces battling the Escambray guerrillas were reportedly increased to 40,000.³ Beginning at this time, several teams of Cuban exiles trained in the United States, Guatemala, and Panama were infiltrated into the island and began efforts to foster popular discontent and upheaval. They reported that Castro had tightened his militia operations to the point where it was impossible for them to receive any of the air-dropped supplies. As Castro had announced earlier in great detail, his troops were intercepting the air drops⁴ and had also captured several U.S. citizens who had been fighting against him.⁵

¹This information is compiled from several sources: Johnson, op. cit., pp. 64-67; Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 242-243; and Charles J. V. Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," Fortune, September 1961.

²Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 271.

³New York Times, February 10, 1961.

⁴Ibid., January 7, 1961. The list of arms captured (from only two air drops) included 67 Garand rifles, 23 machine guns, 61 (unidentified) rifles, 3 bazookas, 2 mortars, hand grenades, and large amounts of ammunition. At this rate, Castro could have accumulated a good arms supply just from intercepted air drops.

⁵Johnson, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

The captured U.S. citizens were executed with much fanfare; and Castro declared that if the United States could promote counter-revolution in Cuba, he could promote revolution elsewhere in Latin America.¹ By the end of February the guerrilla uprisings in Cuba had been virtually completely crushed.² There were also reports circulating of short-range Soviet rockets in place near Havana.³

At the same time, Castro continued to make overtures to Kennedy for negotiation of Cuban-U.S. differences. Since January there had been a marked decline in anti-U.S. harangues from Havana. Castro proclaimed that he was ready to "begin anew with the United States," although he would wait to see what Kennedy would do about the "anti-Castro mercenaries being trained by the United States in Florida and Guatemala."⁴ President Kennedy answered that the United States wanted a better life for Latin American people and would welcome progressive governments that promised this. However, he said he would not consider a restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba "as long as he was convinced that the Castro Government was aligned with the Communist bloc."⁵ Castro answered that Cuba's economic ties with Communist nations were "totally without political commitments." He suggested that, if President Kennedy were to demonstrate "by deeds" that Washington would not interfere in Cuban internal affairs, Cuba was prepared to "do its part" to reduce tension in the Western Hemisphere. He insisted, however, that the United States would have to end its "economic aggression" against Cuba as a condition of negotiations.⁶ In March President

¹New York Times, March 15, 1961.

²Ibid., February 28, 1961.

³New York Herald Tribune, February 20, 1961. These were reportedly 19.6 feet long, but no substantiation of the report can be found.

⁴New York Times, January 20, 1961.

⁵Ibid., January 26, 1961.

⁶Ibid., February 15 and 25, 1961.

Kennedy cut off a large part of the remaining trade between Cuba and the United States.¹ The presence of Soviet military equipment and "technicians" in Cuba, as well as Castro's clear intention to continue his strong relations with the Communist bloc, made it impossible for Kennedy to accept Castro's professed good intentions.

Meanwhile, arguments among the Cuban exiles had been eased with the dissolution of the Frente and creation of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which provided representation to those exiles who had socialistic leanings. With this matter settled and a stronger bond established between the Council and the camp in Guatemala, recruitment increased rapidly. From 300 to 400 men a week began to arrive at the Guatemala camp in February.²

At the end of February 1961, it has been reported, an inspection team from the Pentagon was sent to Guatemala to report on the readiness of the troops. When the team returned with the judgment that morale was high and combat readiness good, the National Security Council met to consider the undertaking.³

By the middle of March a new invasion plan had evolved. The landing point had been changed from Trinidad to an area more remote from population centers, and one with a suitable air strip that could easily be secured. Such an air strip would eliminate the need for long bombing runs from Central America. One other change in strategy called for in the new plan was a night landing, instead of a day landing as had been planned previously. By the time the Revolutionary Council had been formed, the new plan was set for an invasion at the Bay of Pigs on April 5. (The date was subsequently postponed to April 10 and finally to April 17.)⁴ The Kennedy administration stressed that under no circumstances would U.S. forces enter the conflict--short of an attack

¹Ibid., March 11, 1961.

²Johnson, op. cit., p. 63.

³Ibid., p. 66.

⁴Ibid., p. 67.

by Castro on Guantánamo.¹

To improve the chances of the exile landing, it was decided that B-26 bombers manned by Cuban exiles would attack military airports in Cuba before the invasion to wipe out Cuba's small air force and thus prevent air strikes against the invasion force.² The exile air force was to consist of sixteen B-26 bombers, two of which would attack Managua, two San Antonio, two Santiago de Cuba, four Ciudad Libertad (the main base), and one San Julián and Baracoa.³ Castro's air force was estimated to be disorganized and lacking experience, and few of its planes were considered to be in combat condition. Two bombing attacks on the Cuban air force before the invasion were calculated as sufficient to destroy it.

Up until this point it appears that, although detailed plans were far advanced for the use of the exile forces, the final commitment to their use had not yet been made. The time was rapidly nearing, however, when some action would have to be taken, or the effort dismantled.

The authors of the plan urged its immediate implementation on various grounds. According to current intelligence, by June Cuba would have fliers trained to man the Soviet MiG aircraft Castro had received, a factor that might make the invasion effort disastrous. The number of Cuban exile troops in Guatemala had increased rapidly and, it was argued, it would be unwise to return them to Miami in their present frame of mind. Morale was then high among the troops, but it was likely that unrest could break out anew at any time.⁴ President Ydígoras of Guatemala was anxious that the troops be removed from his country by June, because their presence was causing political unrest.⁵ Despite his

¹Stewart Alsop, as referenced in R. Smith, op. cit., p. 70.

²Johnson, op. cit., pp. 67, 70, 88.

³Eight more bombers were later added to the sixteen originally planned.

⁴Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 104.

⁵Ibid., p. 104.

assertion that they were his own troops training to defend Guatemala from imminent attack by Castro,¹ it was becoming public knowledge that they were actually Cuban troops training with U.S. aid. Also, the rainy season would start shortly in Guatemala, making further training operations impossible.²

On April 3, 1961, the State Department issued a strongly-worded White Paper on Cuba that made clear the gravity with which the United States viewed the situation:

The present situation in Cuba confronts the Western Hemisphere and the inter-American system with a grave and urgent challenge. . . .

What began as a movement to enlarge Cuban democracy and freedom has been perverted . . . into a mechanism for the destruction of free institutions in Cuba, for the seizure by international communism of a base and bridgehead in the Americas, and for the disruption of the inter-American system.

It is the considered judgment of the Government of the United States of America that the Castro regime in Cuba offers a clear and present danger to the authentic and autonomous revolution of the Americas--to the whole hope of spreading political liberty, economic development, and social progress through all the republics of the hemisphere.³

However, at a news conference on April 12, President Kennedy said that there would not be "under any condition, an intervention in Cuba by the United States armed forces." He declared that:

The basic issue in Cuba is not one between the United States and Cuba. It is between the Cubans themselves. And I intend to see that we adhere to that principle, and as I understand it, this administration's attitude is so understood and shared by the anti-Castro exiles from Cuba in this country.

¹New York Times, March 21, 1961.

²Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 239-240.

³U.S. Department of State, Cuba, cited above, as referenced in R. Smith, op. cit., pp. 312-313.

On April 10 the Cuban exile forces in Guatemala (numbering about 1,400) were moved to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, the embarkation point. On April 14 the bulk of the force left for Cuba on several old cargo ships, which were armed with .50 caliber machine guns.¹

At the same time, a diversionary action was being attempted between Baracoa and Guantánamo. This plan called for a small landing of Cuban exiles to draw Castro's attention and forces to the lower end of Cuba, away from the actual invasion point. The exiles never landed, however, reportedly because they encountered evidence that Castro's militia had anticipated their arrival and set up an ambush.²

On April 15 several B-26 aircraft manned by exile pilots trained in Guatemala bombed Castro's air force at various points on the island. Much of the Cuban air power was destroyed in the raid, but four fighters and two bombers survived. As was noted earlier, the invasion plan had called for two raids on the Cuban air force prior to the landing. The decision to cancel the second raid and reportedly to scale down the one that did occur is one of the more obscure and controversial aspects of the entire Bay of Pigs episode. That the failure to eliminate Castro's air power had serious implications for the invasion will become clear, although no one can say with certainty that the invasion would otherwise have succeeded. Among the explanations offered for the decision to cancel the second raid are: the adverse international reaction to the first raid; pressures within the U.S. government, especially from U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson; faulty military advice as to the significance of the remaining Cuban aircraft; underestimation of the number of planes remaining and their type; and failure to account for the novel use Castro made of the remaining craft.

After the air raid and reports of ships off Baracoa, Castro braced himself once again for an invasion. On April 16 the Brigade paratroop battalion, numbering 176 men, left Puerto Cabezas in five

¹Johnson, op. cit., pp. 74-87.

²Ibid., pp. 85, 88, 95.

C-46 transports bound for the Bay of Pigs.

C. Phase III: April 17, 1961 -- April 19, 1961

The Bay of Pigs invasion was designed to secure a relatively small base. If this could be accomplished, U.S. planners saw two possibilities for subsequent action. The first would be that the establishment of a beachhead would permit bombing of strategic military targets on all parts of the island, leading potentially to the disintegration of the Castro government. A second possibility would be that the opposing forces might reach an impasse in which the exiles could neither extend their territory nor be forced off the island. This impasse might result in a negotiated cease-fire and free elections.¹ In any event, its presence in Cuba would provide a rallying point for anti-Castro Cubans.

Initially, only a small area of combat would be involved. There were three major strategic points: Playa Larga, Playa Girón, and San Blas--forming a triangle. The Bay of Pigs is bordered by impassable swamps and accessible only by three highways. This is one of the reasons it was chosen as the invasion point, for the beachhead² could fairly easily be held by a small number of troops blocking the access routes. Because the Cuban navy was regarded to be of no consequence³ and because the air force would presumably be destroyed by the Brigade

¹Statement by Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Washington Star, July 20, 1965.

²The beach is firm, rocky soil extending inland for three miles. Johnson, op. cit., p. 82.

³No account mentions the Cuban navy as a consideration in the invasion plans. Early in April the U.S. government made an agreement with some members of the Cuban navy to escape in several Cuban torpedo boats. The plan failed when a private U.S. vessel stationed in the area to fuel the escaping boats was intercepted by a Cuban warship. There was not enough gasoline in the tanks of the torpedo boats to pilot them to safety. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 117.

air raids, Castro would have to depend upon his ground forces.

The Brigade troops were to land at Playa Larga, Playa Girón, and a point 20 miles east of Girón called Green Beach. From Playa Larga to Green Beach they would extend over 40 miles of Cuban coast line. The battalion of paratroopers would land in three places along each road crossing the swamps and their commander would then establish his headquarters at San Blas, 20 miles northeast of Girón.¹

In this way, Castro's counterattack would be confined to very narrow approaches, and the area of battle would be predetermined by the attacking forces. Given sufficient ammunition and the proper weapons, the invading forces would be able to hold their positions despite the superior size of Castro's forces. The invading forces would not need the roads for their supplies, which could be brought in by sea or by air. They would need the airfield² and a protected port. These could easily be secured from ground attack by obstructing the roads; however, they would be highly vulnerable to enemy air attack.

There were roughly 1,400 men in the invasion force,³ divided into six regular battalions and one paratroop battalion. Of these, only 135 were professional soldiers; the rest were students, professional men, or peasants. The average age was 29, but ranged from under 20 to over 60. About half of them had received less than a month of training or none at all.⁴ Their weapons were those available in Western markets. (See Section III for details.) In addition, small arms were to be made available for the Cubans who might join the invaders once they had landed.⁵ These extra arms were never unloaded in Cuba, and

¹Johnson, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

²The airfield was near Playa Larga.

³This figure is compiled from various accounts, especially those of Schlesinger and Sorensen.

⁴Johnson, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

⁵Ibid., pp. 84-85. It was estimated that 5,000 Cubans might join the Brigade voluntarily in the first two days.

ammunition for the invaders' own arms lasted less than two days. Because those who had been trained were trained well and used their training to advantage in battle, the invasion force was successful, while ammunition lasted, in holding positions against forces many times its size. The fact that many of the exiles had not received adequate training does not seem to have had a negative effect on their final performance.¹

Castro's total force prior to the invasion was about 240,000 equipped troops--200,000 militia and 40,000 regulars. (See Section III for details.) The forces deployed against the invasion were estimated at 36,000 troops (both militia and regulars) with 40 tanks, 122mm artillery, mortars, two bombers and four fighters (the other aircraft having been destroyed in the April 15 raids). The Cuban troops were not very well trained, and there is evidence that they did not perform well in battle although they were deployed well by their leaders.² The invading forces were overwhelmed by numbers and lack of ammunition.

A large part of Castro's troops were left behind to carry out police duties at the time of the invasion. In Havana alone, 200,000 people were arrested and such arrests were made all over the island.³ Very few of the population defected when the invaders landed, and the underground that might have existed was effectively incapacitated by arrests.⁴

The invasion plan hinged on the supposition that it would take Castro enough time to mobilize his forces and reach the beachhead with effective (large) weapons to allow the invaders to land and secure their positions. While it was hoped that the invaders' strength would be increased by defections, the immediate rallying of the Cuban population

¹This is derived from Haynes Johnson's description of the battle.

²Also derived from Haynes Johnson's account.

³Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 274.

⁴This statement and the following account of the battle are based on Johnson, op. cit.

was not regarded as a prerequisite for their success in establishing the beachhead.

The cargo ships carrying the exile force reached the Bay of Pigs before dawn on April 17 and began landing troops under cover of darkness. The first troops ashore encountered some Castro militia guards but overcame them. Castro alerted all his forces in the Bay of Pigs area and mobilized several near-by battalions. His principal objective was to crush the invaders at Playa Larga, the invasion point farthest inland. He also ordered the remainder of his air force to strike the supply ships at dawn.

Upon arriving at the Bay of Pigs, he received word of another invasion in Pinar del Rio Province, and immediately headed there. This was a simulated battle that had been set up with rubber rafts and sound devices to add to Castro's initial confusion.

When the Castro air force attacked at dawn on April 17, Brigade troops were still coming ashore, their landing having been delayed by unforeseen problems with reefs that had not been taken into account in planning the operation. The ships were forced to leave with most of the supplies and some troops still on board. The command ship, bearing the bulk of the supplies, and the communications ship were sunk by Castro's pilots.

With tanks, heavy mortars, cannon, and bazookas, the invaders had little trouble defending their positions as Castro's troops moved down the highways into the swamps. However, the exile force did not have enough ammunition to carry on indefinitely, and the supply ships did not return that night for fear of Castro's air force.

During the first day of the invasion, the Brigade troops at Playa Larga faced and defeated ten to fifteen times their own strength in men, arms, and tanks. They retreated to Girón the next morning for lack of ammunition.

Throughout the first day, the paratroop battalion at San Blas

held its position on the approachways. The ferocity of the battle led Castro's 20,000 troops to believe that they were facing great numbers of men and caused them to delay their attack, thus giving the paratroopers time to retreat to Girón.¹

On April 18, the second day at Girón, defenses were set up with the hope that the United States might provide direct support rather than see the undertaking fail. When it became apparent to the Brigade leader that there would be no support from U.S. aircraft, he ordered his troops to disband and destroy their equipment.²

At this point, U.S. naval destroyers and the Brigade supply ships appeared offshore accompanied by several U.S. fighter aircraft. In the belief that they were planning to attack,³ Castro halted his forces approaching the beach and the Brigade survivors escaped possible annihilation.

It had been decided during the invasion to make an attempt to bomb the main Cuban air force base at San Antonio de los Baños, but when the Brigade's B-26s arrived on April 18, clouds obscured the field and they were forced to return without striking.

It had also been decided that the Brigade's B-26s would strike Castro's forces at the battle area under the protective cover of several U.S. fighter aircraft. Due to a miscalculation of time, the B-26s arrived an hour early at the Bay of Pigs on April 19 and were lost to Castro's

¹A conservative estimate places Castro's losses during the entire battle at 1,250 dead on the battlefield, 400 dead from wounds and lack of medical care, and 2,000 wounded. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

²The alternative plan had been to escape into the Escambray mountains 80 miles away and mount a guerrilla offensive from there, but the Brigade leaders had not been informed of this. It would have been impossible to conduct a guerrilla campaign in the impassable swamps around the Bay of Pigs.

³Earlier in the day, two unmarked F-86 Sabre jets had appeared overhead, and Castro later claimed that they fired on his troops. This has never been proven or disproven. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

aircraft. The U.S. fighter aircraft never left their carrier.

For several days after the invasion, U.S. naval forces remained positioned off the coast of Cuba to rescue survivors. They also threatened to attack if Castro should begin to execute his captives.

On April 18 Premier Khrushchev had sent President Kennedy a note defining the position of the Soviet Union: "We shall render the Cuban people and their Government all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack on Cuba." President Kennedy answered that the United States planned no military intervention in Cuba; but should an outside force intervene, the United States would honor its obligations to defend the hemisphere from external aggression.¹

D. Phase IV: From April 19, 1961

Addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 20, President Kennedy stated that while the United States had held to its policy of nonintervention in Cuba, its restraint was "not inexhaustible" and it would intervene in order to safeguard its security.² With this speech, Castro's fear of U.S. intervention increased once again, especially in view of the continued presence of two U.S. task forces in the waters off Cuba.³

There was no question of settlement between the United States and Cuba. The dispute simply continued, setting the stage for direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962. The invasion force taken prisoner was eventually ransomed for a very large quantity of medical supplies. When the exiles returned to the United States, they were still uncompromisingly against the Castro regime.⁴ The United States remained for Cuba the imperialist neighbor

¹Ibid., pp. 151-152.

²Ibid., p. 174.

³Ibid., p. 189.

⁴Ibid., p. 352.

threatening the Cuban revolution; and the U.S. government continued to see Castro as "no Tito, nor a satellite, nor an immediate military threat, nor simply a minor nuisance, but a persistent source and model for insurgency and terror in the hemisphere."¹

¹Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, "Controlling the Risks in Cuba," Adelphi Paper No. 17 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), p. 24.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

- a. Historically the United States had dominated the Caribbean and Latin America. This was particularly true of Cuba, whose independence from Spain the United States had directly helped to achieve, on which the United States had a major naval base, and whose economy was U.S.-dominated and closely tied through preferential agreements to the United States. This history colored each adversary's perception of the other. The United States was perhaps more sensitive to developments in Cuba than in other parts of the region, and anti-Yankeeism was a favored theme of Caribbean demagogues.
- b. U.S. relations with Batista had been cordial until very late in his regime. Castro was thus able to identify the excesses of Batista with the objectives of U.S. policy and interest in Cuba.
- c. Castro's policies and the political orientation of the men he chose for positions of power created the strong impression that his regime was Communist-dominated. Broad strategic, political, and ideological concerns of the

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Short of reversing history to remove the events and attitudes that adversely colored U.S.-Cuban relations, U.S. initiatives to rectify the consequences of past errors; re-examination of the strategic value of Guantánamo or the development of alternate bases or alternate means of securing equal strategic value; more U.S. understanding of and less sensitivity toward anti-Yankee sentiments.
 - b. Re-examination of U.S. relations with unpopular dictatorships, in Latin America and elsewhere, in cooperation with such organizations as OAS; active U.S. policies to encourage liberal, even if less docile, regimes.
 - c. Distinguishing between political and ideological differences and security threats; counteract latter by other means, preferably on a multilateral OAS or U.N.

Cold War were thus injected into the dispute.

- d. Distasteful as a Communist Cuba might have been, support for Castroism in other parts of the Caribbean and active Cuban efforts to foster and support "Fidelista" revolutionaries raised a threat to the stability and security of the whole hemisphere. Increasingly close economic ties between Cuba and the Soviet Union made the development of Cuba as a base for Soviet-sponsored subversion in the hemisphere a distinct possibility.
- e. While Soviet support for Cuba was increasing, Cuba's proximity to the United States and distance from the Soviet Union and the overwhelming U.S. military superiority in the Caribbean isolated Cuba from direct Soviet military support in the event of a military showdown, unless--and it appeared unlikely--the Soviet Union were prepared to risk a direct clash with the United States.
- f. U.S. public opinion switched dramatically from initial support of Castro to anti-Castroism. This switch was spurred by Castro's growing reliance on Cuban Communists and the Soviet
- basis: e.g., "containment" of Castro, strengthening potential Latin American victims; ideally, ending the East-West Cold War.
- d. Measures suggested above [see (c)] to contain Cuba and strengthen potential victims of Castro actions; direct pressures on the Soviet Union to desist.
- e. Insofar as the lack of a threat of a superpower clash developing from Cuba-U.S. conflict represented the absence of one control factor, increasing the likelihood of direct Soviet involvement by Soviet guarantees to Cuba, presence of Soviet forces, etc. [Note, this would probably have controlled the conflict at the cost of creating a more dangerous one--vide the 1962 missile crisis.]
- f. Education of the U.S. public to distinguish between an irritation and a threat; international instruments and action on human-

bloc, by excesses in rooting out Cuban liberals as well as Batistianos, and, for specific segments of public opinion, by uncompensated expropriations of American-owned property.

rights violations; international agreements, with international enforcement machinery, to prevent uncompensated expropriations; U.S. guarantees for private investors against loss from such expropriations.

- g. Continued opposition within Cuba to Castro was evidenced by the existence of anti-Castro guerrilla bands and a continued outflow of refugees, including increasing numbers of people who had initially supported Castro.
- h. The guerrillas and large numbers of Cuban exiles made available a proxy for the achievement of U.S. goals and made it possible for the United States to avoid the undesirable consequences of direct action.
- i. The United States had had great success in dealing indirectly with a comparable threat of a Communist-dominated government in Guatemala.
- j. The action of the Organization of American States was weak, in terms both of taking effective steps to isolate or counter the threat from Castro and of seeking to limit the range of U.S. responses to that threat.
- g. To the extent that U.S. policies were based on the existence of an anti-Castro movement in Cuba, more rapid achievement by Castro of control over dissident Cubans.
- h. Enforcement of U.S. laws and international agreements concerning actions of refugee groups; dispersal of refugees both among countries and, within the United States, away from areas proximate to Cuba.
- i. Analysis of lessons of past experience, particularly of the preconditions for success and the chances and consequences of losses as well as of gains.
- j. Strong OAS action to contain Cuba and deal jointly with its threats to other American states; and/or a strong OAS stand against unilateral U.S. action.

2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

a. The United States was concerned with world reaction to overt U.S. moves against Castro. In the developing countries in general and in Latin America in particular, little distinction was made between Communist subversion and Western imperialism. Credence given to the widespread Latin American suspicion of U.S. motivations and intentions would further weaken the potential of an inter-American system willing and able to maintain peace and stability within and among the American states.

b. The U.N. and OAS Charters prohibited the threat or use of force among states, and specific inter-American agreements proscribed the training and arming of exiles for action against their homelands or the provision of bases for exiles for this purpose.

c. For reasons cited above, the United States did not want to intervene overtly against Castro.

d. Castro avoided direct provocation--such as an attack on the Guantánamo naval base--that might have precipitated a direct U.S. response.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Strengthening the likelihood of adverse reaction to U.S. action by the OAS and United Nations, and other statements opposing unilateral intervention; public and private bilateral pressure on the United States; creating a U.N. presence in Cuba.

b. Enforcement machinery for such prohibitions.

c. U.N. or other international fact-finding machinery to make it more difficult to act covertly; enhancement of desire to avoid acting overtly by specific threats of counteraction.

d. Articulation, jointly or reciprocally, of Castro's intentions vis-à-vis Guantánamo and clarification of what acts the United States would regard as casus belli.

e. The Cuban refugees were weak and divided over the future of Cuba. They agreed only on the immediate objective of overthrowing Castro. Furthermore, the likelihood was great that their ranks were infiltrated by Castro agents.

e. Further weakening the cohesion of exile groups; dispersion; and legal controls of their activities. [See (lh) above.]

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[During Phase II, several questions arose concerning the scale and scope of threatened hostilities. In one instance--the shift from a strategy of strengthening anti-Castro guerrilla movements inside Cuba, directly and by infiltration of U.S.-trained exiles, to a strategy for a small-scale invasion by exile forces to provide a focus for coalescence of anti-Castro elements in Cuba--the expansion of the scale/scope of potential hostilities took place. In at least two other instances, the potential for expansion did not occur: threatened Soviet defense of Cuba with missiles, and potential direct involvement of U.S. troops. The invasion plans were twice altered to restrict their scale and scope: cancellation of one pre-invasion air raid, and selection of an invasion site far from centers of civilian population. These shifts will not be analyzed separately.]

B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities

a. The arrival of Soviet arms in Cuba gave substance to the prospect of Cuba's becoming a base for active Soviet subversion in the hemisphere.

1. To Offset These Factors

a. Agreement among arms suppliers to avoid introducing additional arms to conflict areas; in this case, agreement coupled with alternate guarantees of Cuban

- security from United Nations, Soviet Union, others.
- b. Measures to contain Castro, strengthen capacity of potential victims to resist; hopefully U.N. or OAS action to achieve or supplement these goals; international fact-finding to determine extent of Cuban complicity; U.N. or OAS sanctions or other strong measures against Cuba if proven violations persisted.
 - c. Creation of neutral, U.N. or other, channels of communication, good offices, mediation.
 - d. Stronger OAS action to reduce or counter Castro threat and to place obstacles in the way of U.S. unilateral action. [See above suggestions on fact-finding, for example.]
 - e. U.N. action to reduce or counter Castro threat and to place obstacles in the way of U.S. unilateral action: e.g., fact-finding, U.N. presence, multilateral assistance to potential victims of Cuban subversion.
- b. The prospect of such a base for subversion was made more salient by continued activities by Castro to foment and encourage rebellious groups in Latin American and Caribbean countries.
 - c. Normal channels of diplomatic communication were disrupted, first by Castro's refusal to use them and subsequently by the formal severance of diplomatic relations by the United States.
 - d. The OAS took no concrete action either to counter the potential threat of Castro and Castroism or to place obstacles in the path of U.S.-Cuban exile actions.
 - e. While it was the scene of heated Cuban-U.S. exchanges, the United Nations took no action either to counter the potential threat of Castro and Castroism or to place obstacles in the path of U.S.-Cuban exile actions.

- f. The Presidential election in the United States heightened public attention to events in Cuba. The widely publicized debates on television saw the advocacy of strong action against Cuba by the candidate who eventually won the election.
- g. The timing of the U.S. election and the Presidential inauguration were such that either an administration about to leave office or one freshly installed was in office when critical decisions were made.
- h. Castro's growing internal military strength, success of his efforts against the guerrillas, the arrival of Soviet arms, and in particular the impending availability of trained pilots to man Soviet-supplied MiGs created a pressure of time. Unless action were taken quickly, it was doubted that the exile effort could succeed without U.S. involvement.
- i. While at one point in Phase II the Soviet Union threatened to defend Cuba with missiles, the threat of direct Soviet involvement was discounted. This discounting was given added credence when the Soviet Union later qualified its threat as "symbolic."
- j. As their training progressed, the motivation of the exile forces increased. It was feared that U.S. efforts to halt the invasion plan would lead to independent action by exiles who would, furthermore, be embittered by the U.S. policy reversal.
- f. Short of altering the U.S. governmental system, measures to insulate sensitive foreign-policy issues from partisan election-time politics.
- g. Short of altering the U.S. governmental system, time-stretching devices proposed internationally or taken on U.S. initiative.
- h. Time-stretching devices, which would in this instance have included a delay in the delivery of Soviet aircraft and in the return of trained pilots.
- i. Increasing likelihood of Soviet involvement. [However, see caveats in (le) of Section A above.]
- j. Willingness to control and physically restrain, if necessary, disgruntled exile forces.

k. Other channels of U.S. influence over Castro and Cuban policy had been tried but had failed. In particular, the leverage of U.S. economic pressure had been weakened by the willingness of the Soviet Union to fill the breaches created by the cut in Cuba's quota of sugar sales to the United States and the U.S. embargo on Cuban trade.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities

a. Despite the position taken by Kennedy during pre-election debates, Castro made overtures to the new President for a negotiated modus vivendi.

b. The dissensions among the Cuban exiles increased, spreading at one point from political leaders in Miami and New York to the training camps in Guatemala.

c. Concern over world reaction was given substance by the international outcry over the first of two planned pre-invasion air strikes. Reputedly in response to this reaction, the second strike was cancelled.

k. To the extent that Soviet backing removed pressure on Castro to seek an accommodation with the United States, maintaining that pressure by reducing Soviet incentives to replace the United States as Cuba's chief trading partner by increasing the cost to the Soviets, threatened trade reprisals, pressure from other producers, etc.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Increased international pressure on the United States to seize the opportunity of a new administration to seek negotiations; enhancement of prestige value of agreement to negotiate by offer of prestigious auspices, etc.

b. Promoting weakness and division among exiles.

c. Clearer, earlier, and more explicit criticism of U.S. actions; U.N., OAS articulation of the obligations of the United States not to take unilateral action.

C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO MODERATE AND TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

C. PHASE III TO PHASE IV: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[Hostilities ended quickly with the military victory of Castro's forces over the exiles. The issue for the U.S.-exile side was whether to accept the situation created by the defeat or to continue hostilities. In the circumstances, continuing the hostilities would have required the direct introduction of U.S. forces, thus intensifying hostilities.]

1. Factors Tending to Continue and Intensify Hostilities

a. Despite U.S. hopes to keep its role covert, the prime U.S. role in the invasion was widely presumed, and in fact was publicly acknowledged by President Kennedy. There was thus little strength left to the argument that U.S. prestige would not be harmed so long as its role could be successfully denied.

b. The United States continued to have overwhelming military preponderance in the area.

c. The United States felt a high sense of responsibility for the fate of the captured exiles.

1. To Offset These Factors

a. To the extent that the desire of the United States to keep its role covert had served as a restraint on its earlier actions, maintaining the pretense might have reinforced arguments against intensifying hostilities; conversely, increasing the propaganda and influence costs of actions taken and acknowledged would have the same effect.

b. Creating countervailing force in the area [but see caveats in (1e) of Section A above]; enhancement of legal and propaganda restraints on use of great-power force.

c. International (OAS or U.N.) action to prevent inhumane treatment of prisoners.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate and Terminate Hostilities

- a. Castro had not only defeated the invasion forces but had also jailed or otherwise neutralized thousands of potential dissidents when the invasion began. There was thus little chance that internal unrest would be triggered by a continuation of hostilities.
- b. U.S. officials, including President Kennedy, had repeatedly and publicly pledged that no U.S. forces would be used to topple Castro.
- c. Castro heeded U.S. warnings that harsh measures against the captured exile forces would risk direct U.S. action.

D. PHASE IV

[This analysis ends with the termination of hostilities. The dispute that underlay the U.S.-Cuban conflict in which the Bay of Pigs hostilities occurred has not been settled.

While U.S.-Cuban hostilities have not been resumed, Cuban exile forays have continued, at times accompanied by allegations of U.S. involvement. The U.S.-Cuban conflict laid the foundations for the much more serious crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba in the fall of 1962.]

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Increasing stability of Castro control in Cuba.
- b. Reinforcement of the value of honoring these pledges: e.g., endorsement by leading world statesmen and public figures.
- c. International action to secure humane treatment of prisoners. [See (1c) of Section C above.]

III. WEAPONS ANALYSISA. Cuban Weapons Acquisition

When Fidel Castro took power in Cuba on January 1, 1959, he inherited an assortment of weapons that had been imported by previous governments; many of these arms were of U.S. origin. Rifles, machine guns, perhaps some heavier battlefield weapons, Sherman tanks, B-26 bombers, and a small number of T-33 jet trainers, all supplied under military agreements between the United States and Castro's predecessors, were at the disposal of Castro's armed forces.

During the course of his first year in power, Castro evidently applied in several quarters (especially Europe) for a supply of arms to equip his revolutionary forces. He was successful in buying a large number of NATO "FAL" automatic rifles and NATO "MAG" machine guns from Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. The price, however, was high (reportedly \$150 apiece), about twice the usual amount. When these weapons arrived in Havana harbor in early 1960, one of the three ships carrying the consignment blew up. Castro blamed the United States for this, implying that it was attempting to undermine his revolution by impeding weapons supply to his forces.¹

Another well-publicized effort on Castro's part to equip his military forces was his attempt to replace his aging piston-engine Sea Furies with more modern jet Sea Hunters. The United States is reported to have informed Britain of its disapproval of any such transaction. The transaction never took place, and Castro claimed that the United States was directly responsible for his defenselessness in the face of the aerial raids being made on Cuba, presumably by Batistiano exiles based in Florida.²

¹New York Times, March 11, 1960.

²Boston Globe, February 17, 1960.

Cuba's armed forces increased rapidly between 1959 and 1961. When Castro assumed power, there were probably only about 8,000 armed men, under some sort of loose organization, whom Castro could have regarded as military forces. By mid-1960 the Cuban army was estimated at 35,000 armed men; and a militia of perhaps as many as 200,000 men had been formed, although these were not trained or adequately armed.¹ During the next six months, the militia received weapons (mainly Soviet and Czech), and the regular army increased to between 40,000 and 50,000 men. Thus the number of armed forces available to Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion was about 250,000.²

The first significant contacts between Cuba and the Soviet Union appear to have been made in February 1960, and it was perhaps at this time that arrangements were made to supply Cuba with weapons. It can be deduced from statements made by Castro in mid-1960 that July was the time when the first shipments of small arms began to arrive in Cuba. These probably consisted of Czech and Soviet rifles, submachine guns, and machine guns. The quantities shipped during July-October 1960 were sufficient to arm the 200,000-man militia.³

It was perhaps between August and October 1960 that larger Soviet weapons began to appear in Cuba; in November 1960 the U.S. State Department reported that Soviet assault guns, antitank guns, field guns, howitzers, medium and heavy tanks, and armored cars had been shipped to Cuba in significant quantities.⁴ These had, of course, been accompanied by large amounts of ammunition. In addition, it was rumored that Cuban pilots were being trained in East Europe to fly Soviet MiG fighters. The first MiG-15s were scheduled to arrive in Cuba during the spring of 1961.⁵

¹ Jack Raymond, "A Military Embargo of Cuba?" New Republic, July 18, 1960, p. 8; Newsweek, September 5, 1960, p. 43.

² Newsweek, April 24, 1961, p. 62.

³ New York Times, November 18, 1960.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 104.

WEC-98 III

Other than about ten fast motor torpedo boats, which had been supplied to Cuba by East Germany, the Cuban navy was still limited in April 1961 almost exclusively to old U.S. equipment. As it was, the motor launches, coast-guard cutters, patrol vessels, and four frigates (which made up the bulk of the Cuban navy) were insignificant during the fighting at the Bay of Pigs.

Weapons Available to Castro in April 1961

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
cal. .30 M1903 Springfield rifle		U.S.
M1 Garand rifle		U.S.
FN NATO "FAL" 7.62mm rifle	about 65,000	Belgium
Browning machine gun		U.S.
7.62mm Model 52 rifle	45,000	Czechoslovakia
cal. .30 ZB R-2 automatic rifle	125,000	Czechoslovakia
9mm Browning automatic pistol	very few	Cuba
cal. .45 Cuban Sten submachine gun	very few	Cuba
9mm Model 23 and 25 submachine gun	10,000	Czechoslovakia
7.62mm NATO "MAG" (FN) machine gun	200	Belgium
Uzi submachine gun	1,000	Belgium
7.92mm Model 37 machine gun		Czechoslovakia
7.62mm AK47 assault rifle		U.S.S.R.
7.62mm DP,DT,DTM machine gun		U.S.S.R.
7.62mm SG-43 Goryunov machine gun		U.S.S.R.
bazooka	a few	U.S.
flame thrower	about 10	U.S.
Quad 12.7mm AA heavy machine gun DShK M 1938/46		Czechoslovakia
14.5mm KPV heavy machine gun on ZPU4 mount (antiaircraft)	80	U.S.S.R.
mortar	150	U.S.S.R.
mortar	104	
assault gun	19	U.S.S.R.

WEC-98 III

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
rocket launcher	30	U.S.S.R.
antitank gun	60	U.S.S.R.
76mm field gun	78	U.S.S.R.
122mm field gun (D-74?)	4	U.S.S.R.
howitzer		U.S.S.R.
field artillery		Italy
Sherman tank	15	U.S.
T-34/85 medium tank	50	U.S.S.R.
JS2 and JS3 heavy tanks	50	U.S.S.R.
armored car	60	U.S.S.R.
T-33 jet trainer	4 originally/ 2 in battle	U.S.
B-26 piston-engine bomber	15 originally/ 2 in battle	U.S.
Sea Fury piston-engine fighter	10 originally/ 2 in battle	U.K.
MIG-15 fighter	8 in crates	U.S.S.R.
patrol vessel (ex-subchaser)	1	U.S.
coast-guard cutter	10	U.S.
coast-guard cutter	1	Cuba
auxiliary coast-guard cutter	2	Cuba
motor launch (ex-MTBs)	3	U.S.
auxiliary patrol craft	12	U.S.
PCE-type patrol escort	2	U.S.
motor torpedo boat	10	E. Germany
cruiser (frigate rated as cruiser)	1	U.S.
PF-type frigate	3	U.S.

B. Cuban-Exile Weapons Acquisition

The brigade of Cuban exiles that invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 was armed exclusively with weapons supplied free of cost by the U.S. government. Some significance can be found in the types of weapons supplied.

The early history of military build-up on the part of the Cuban exiles is concerned mainly with organization and training. In March 1960 the decision was taken by the U.S. government to support anti-Castro forces both inside and outside Cuba.¹ This involved supplying arms and communications equipment to anti-Castro groups in Cuba by means of air drops and selecting and training guerrilla reinforcements from Cuban groups outside Cuba.

The type of training and weapons that the United States gave these Cuban exiles was determined by the mode of battle the planners thought would be most effective against Castro. During the first few months of training, the Cuban exiles were instructed in guerrilla warfare; the limited number of Cubans who received this training were then to train more of their own kind in camps in Guatemala (and eventually in Cuba, if the original plans had been followed.)²

During September 1960, as Soviet arms were pouring into Cuba, Castro was breaking the supply lines of the guerrilla groups. Lack of success in creating an effective network of anti-Castro groups in Cuba and the rapid build-up of Soviet arms were probably the two most important factors that led the U.S. planners to change their battle plans from protracted guerrilla warfare against Castro to a one-shot beach landing to be handled in a more conventional way. In response to this decision, the nature and composition of the Cuban forces being trained in Guatemala changed.³

By November 1960 the Cuban exile forces were preparing for a beachhead landing. Their numbers increased quite rapidly; and by April 1961 there were about 1,500 men in this invasion force--three times the number there had been in November 1960. Many of these troops had been recruited at the last minute and were trained poorly or not at all.

¹Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 222.

²Johnson, op. cit., pp. 37-39.

³Ibid., pp. 54-55; Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 87.

This factor does not seem to have figured heavily, however, in the outcome of the Bay of Pigs invasion.¹

There seems no doubt that the United States made a careful assessment of the weapons that would be both most effective in the hands of the Cuban invaders and common enough that they could have been bought by the Cubans themselves. In the case of the smaller weapons, such as rifles, machine guns, bazookas, and mortars, this double requirement does not seem to have affected the firepower of the invading force, the weapons of this nature available on the market being quite effective by any standards. Similarly, the Sherman tanks provided to the Cuban brigade were quite capable of meeting those Castro would send against them. Where this policy had a damaging effect was with the aircraft provided to the Cuban exiles. They were limited to old piston-engine aircraft--bombers that could carry the large fuel load needed to fly missions from Nicaragua to Cuba. Unopposed in the air, the B-26s, even with their small bomb loads, might well have been entirely adequate in this case. But the presence of two small jet trainers proved to be devastating to the B-26 bombers of the Cuban exiles and to their supply ships.²

Weapons Available to Cuban Exiles in April 1961

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
M1 Garand rifle	unlimited	U.S.
cal. .50 heavy machine gun (Browning)		U.S.
75mm recoilless rifle		U.S.
2.36" or 3.5" bazooka	70	U.S.
4.2" mortar)	30	
81mm mortar)		U.S.

¹Johnson, op. cit., pp. 63, 74.

²Bissell interview, cited above; also Johnson, op. cit.

WEC-98 III

antitank gun	18	U.S.
Sherman medium tank	5 or 6	U.S.
armored car	10	U.S.
Douglas B-26 light bomber (piston)	24	U.S.
C-47 transport	a few used for dropping paratroops	U.S.
LCI (W.W.II)	2	U.S.

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL

Preface

In many ways the Bay of Pigs was a mirror image of the situation in Iran in 1946. In the background was a wider conflict of which the case in point was merely one sector or front. The invariant factor of proximity to a superpower was paramount in both cases, and nothing could be done to change it (although neighboring superpowers do not have to intervene--vide Finland and Mexico today, not to mention Turkey, Outer Mongolia, and India, where massive intervention, which would not have been surprising, has not been undertaken by often irritated neighbors).

In both Iran and the Bay of Pigs, the neighboring superpower fomented internal conflict through subversive guerrilla forces inside, besides training and introducing additional indigenous subversives from without. In both cases, justification for intervention was found in historic precedents and frameworks (spheres-of-influence treaties in Iran, the Monroe Doctrine in Cuba). In both instances, current international law, including the U.N. Charter, expressly forbade the policies pursued by the superpowers. And in both instances the superpowers were unsuccessful in their aim of overthrowing the neighboring regime.

"Controlling" the Conflict

Prevention, here as elsewhere, is the ideal form of conflict control. In this case, prevention would have meant never permitting things in Cuba to reach a point where social, political, and economic revolution could be readily captured--and held--by Communist extremists

This had to mean, in retrospect, action during the rule of the Batista regime to encourage peaceful internal change in Cuba--and elsewhere in Latin America--toward greater liberalization. In Cuba this would admittedly have meant painful preventive policy activities: economically painful steps involving U.S. sugar policy; socially painful steps involving changing American attitudes toward darker-skinned neighbors; and politically painful steps involving roiling the smooth and comfortable diplomatic waters of prolonged coexistence with tyranny and reaction. None of this was really done in Cuba, and the conflict was not prevented.

As things were, "controlling" in fact would have meant not permitting the U.S.-Castro dispute to become viewed in predominantly military terms by the United States; discouraging the United States from actually exercising its military option; and, once the invasion began, quickly ending the fighting. Of the three, only the last was done, thanks largely to U.S. mismanagement rather than to anything else.

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. To avoid what in fact happened, the United States would have had to keep its general view of the Cuban situation political and defensive rather than military and offensive. To follow a containment policy rather than an intervention policy--as the United States now does toward Cuba--satisfies this criterion. This in turn is part of a larger issue as to whether both sides in the U.S.-Communist battles will accept continued stalemate along generally accepted truce lines or traditional influence areas, or whether they will go over to the offensive. The answer is, generally speaking, up to the Communists. But U.S. response will often determine what kind of conflict it is to be.

2. In this age, the sharp edge of unilateral interventionist policy is often dulled when others are brought in, i.e., when a direct head-butting contest is "multilateralized." Short of a direct military-security threat (as existed when missiles were secretly emplaced in Cuba

in 1962), conflict is more likely to be controlled if, as a virtually automatic policy, unilateral quarrels are made multilateral. The OAS and the United Nations are generally thought of as useful only to the extent that they support "our" side in such quarrels. But their principal values in 1961 might have been, per contra, to stay the U.S. hand. If as a result of such action Castro's propaganda was not validated by U.S. military action, it might have done far more to undermine his regime than what in fact happened. The accompaniment of such U.S. abstinence would have had to be similar restraint by Moscow, toward which end the United States ought to have applied direct pressure.

3. The OAS might have played a role that, while short of intervention, sufficiently appeared to be "policing" the region to obviate unilateral U.S. invasion plans. This might have taken the form of prophylactic action against Castro's external subversion attempts with inspection and publicity, backed by believable deterrence, plus some responsibility for training internal defense forces in the target countries. All of this would have increased the likelihood of adverse reactions to unilateral U.S. intervention, as would U.N. fact-finding machinery.

The irony of Cuba, and other places where anti-U.S. regimes rule, is that to the extent there is internal political, economic, and social health, to that extent opportunities for externally-sponsored subversion are minimized, along with temptations to overthrow the government by force. (In fact, Cuba had greater internal cohesion than U.S. intelligence estimated.) Happily, the same rule holds in the far greater number of places, where non-Communist nations are struggling, often with U.S. help, for cohesion and strength. But in these places too it will assist in averting conflict if the United States carefully limits its definition of strategic values while displaying less sensitivity to anti-Yankee sentiment.

5. Whole-hearted and rigorous application of universal rules against unilateral intervention would be, on balance, greatly to the benefit of free nations, and moreover would be supported by the growing majority of states that cherish their independence from intervention.

International organizations such as the United Nations and OAS tend to reinforce this rule.

6. It was the U.S. decision to arm Cuban exiles that signalled the election of a significant military option. A generally accepted ban on the clandestine training of exile forces for reinvasion of their homeland might go a long way toward conflict control. The United States at one time considered itself disadvantaged if unable to train "freedom fighters" to liberate East Europe, or Nationalist Chinese with the same mission on the Chinese mainland--or Cuban troops in Guatemala in 1960-1961. In the event, none of these proved useful. Hungary in 1956 showed that the United States was in fact unwilling to risk World War III by fomenting revolution in East Europe. Chiang's forces have been leashed since 1950. And the Bay of Pigs turned out to be a self-defeating adventure, its net result to confirm Communist propaganda and unify Cuban opinion.

7. Even more practical is the desirability of not encouraging others to practice subversion through exiles. With the whole experience of Communist-inspired subversion in hand, it seems self-evident that the United States--and the cause of conflict control--would benefit from more universal application of rules against this kind of activity. In 1966 and earlier years, the U.N. General Assembly passed Soviet-sponsored resolutions against intervention, modified by others to condemn the very kind that the Communists practice. Rather than being taken as purely hypocritical on the part of Moscow and purely rhetorical on our part, it might be useful to implement these with international machinery. An international human-rights tribunal would hear grievances by individuals and groups that otherwise might have no outlet. A fact-finding agency would add pressure on "host countries" to permit inspection by challenge and invitation to refute charges of preparations to intervene with exile forces. Most important, the spotlight of publicity would help keep the potential intervener off balance--as the United States was in the Bay of Pigs, the British and French were in Suez, and the Soviets were on several occasions in East Europe during the 1950s.

8. The handling of refugees and émigrés has much to do with later conflict patterns. Three prime examples today would be the Germans from the so-called lost territories to the East; the Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip and Jordan; and the Cubans in Miami. Sound preventive policy would--and does--call for encouraging wider dispersal of such groups.

9. Even though grave and ideologically unbridgeable problems existed between Cuba and the United States at the turn of the 1960s, some issues, such as expropriation, might nevertheless have been fit subjects for international procedures of arbitration, conciliation, good offices, mediation, adjudication, etc., along with U.S. guarantees for private investors against losses due to expropriation. It would seem today that only countries enjoying fundamentally good relations tend to employ these procedures. This is tragic since their value lies in isolating remediable issues from a context of potentially dangerous hostility. Somehow it appears "soft" to do so, which is undoubtedly why Britain and France would not hear of going to the International Court of Justice in 1956 on the issue of compensation for the nationalization of the Suez Canal--and why the United States did not seriously think in these categories before the Bay of Pigs.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

10. The absence or failure of conflict-control policies in the first phase often has a cumulative effect, and it did so in this case. As the United States became more firmly committed, events could probably only have been diverted by strong and influential measures by the United Nations in the form of fact-finding, publicity, time-stretching diplomatic delays, channels of communications, good offices, and peaceful-settlement proceedings; by the OAS in forms also deterring unilateral U.S. action; and by the Soviet Union in the form of effective deterrence. Even at a late stage in the pre-hostilities phase, some dramatic change in the situation might have altered the conflict.

Guatemala might have opted out as a base, particularly if determined efforts were made for more cohesion in the OAS. Great-power agreement about arms transfers could have promised to make the Cuban situation less open-ended, and blunted the U.S. thrust. (Instead, MiGs and pilots were to arrive imminently.) And the U.S. government would have to have been willing to reverse its covert policy and restrain the exile forces in training.

11. One vital factor making the conflict difficult to abort, once in motion, was the increasingly close Cuban tie to Moscow. This took a chiefly economic form, but included arms assistance. Such assistance was less than that to Egypt, but this time it was going to a country 90 miles off Florida. For the United States, what was tolerable in Egypt became a potential casus belli in Cuba. Restrictions on arms transfers would remove some of the inevitability from this kind of situation. Otherwise, a foothold acquired by a great power, particularly if it is the Soviet Union, signals the beginning of an effort to arm the client state with sophisticated weapons that create new tensions in the client's regional neighborhood. The Soviet Union has practiced this mischievous policy in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Indonesia, and Cuba. The United States, Britain, and France have created lesser local imbalances and instabilities (often in the name of stability) in Latin America. An alternative to a universally agreed regime of restricting arms transfers to those needed for internal security* is a U.S.-Soviet agreement. Of course, the same thing can sometimes be accomplished by direct and unlimited pressure to desist exerted by one power on the other. The United States applied such pressure on Moscow in 1962 in Cuba. Perhaps the United States would have been more deterred by an all-out threat from Moscow the year before.

*See Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas, Report for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Center for International Studies, September 1964).

Terminating Hostilities

12. The key policy involved in ending the fighting was U.S. restraint in withholding its power even when "its" forces were losing. A policy of victory could have been carried through, undoubtedly with local success (though with incalculable consequences for the U.S. reputation in Latin America and elsewhere). Ironically, what caused the U.S. reversal was the degree of effective internal control in Cuba, which, if realized before, might have discouraged the attempt made at the Bay of Pigs.

13. "Peace" is currently preserved by a deeply-rooted policy of restraint by both Washington and Moscow. This in turn stems from mutual strategic deterrence, specifically from the presence of weapons of irrational destructiveness. Clearly a fundamental conflict-control policy is to continue at all costs a situation of deterrence, and, given the initiatory quality of Communist policy, to continue a significant margin of U.S. strategic superiority unless and until it can be substituted for by a workable and just structure of world order. At the same time, the relative numbers and sizes of strategic forces could be substantially reduced and still maintain the deterrent situation with both its global and local effects.

14. To sum up, the key conflict-control measures here might have involved:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Peaceful liberalizing policy prior to revolution

Emphasis on political rather than military view of situation

Containment rather than intervention policy

Multilateralization of disputes

Pressure on U.S.S.R. not to intervene

Prophylactic OAS action:

Inspection and publicity

Believable deterrence

Training of internal defense forces

or

U.N. fact-finding machinery

Internal political, economic, and social health

Minimizing of external subversion

Limited U.S. definition of strategic value

Universal rules against unilateral intervention

Ban on exile military training and activity

International human rights tribunal

Dispersal of exile groups

Isolation of remediable issues

International arbitration, conciliation, good
offices, mediation, and adjudication

Guarantee of private investors from expropriation
losses

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Strong U.N. measures:

Fact-finding and publicity

Time-stretching delays

Channels of communication

Good offices and peaceful settlement procedures

OAS deterrence of unilateral intervention

Soviet deterrence of United States (sic)

Restrictions on arms transfers to internal security
needs

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

U.S. restraint*

Effective internal control (sic)*

Better intelligence

Mutual strategic deterrence*

U.S. marginal strategic superiority (preferably at low
levels)*

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

THE SOMALIAN - ETHIOPIAN - KENYAN
CONFLICT: 1960 - 1964

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.	461
A.	Background of the Conflict	461
B.	Phase II: July 1960 -- January 1964	470
C.	Phase III: January 1964 -- April 1964	478
D.	Phase IV: From April 1964	479
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.	480
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option	480
B.	Phase II to Phase III: The Outbreak of Hostilities. . . .	483
C.	Phase III to Phase IV: The Termination of Hostilities . .	487
D.	Phase IV: Post-Hostilities.	490
III.	Weapons Analysis.	491
A.	Somalian Weapons Acquisition	491
B.	Ethiopian Weapons Acquisition.	495
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.	499

THE SOMALIAN - ETHIOPIAN - KENYAN
CONFLICT : 1960 - 1964

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES


A. Background of the Conflict

1. The Somalis: Focus of the Conflict. By the end of the 19th century, Italy, France, Britain, and Ethiopia had come, by conquest and by agreement, to rule the territory occupied by the Somali people of the Horn of Africa. Fixed political boundaries were drawn to delineate the various areas of control, but they bore little relationship to the transient life of the Somali nomads who continued to follow their traditional grazing patterns.

The Somali people inhabit an arid, semi-desert land. Since there is little of the Somali Plateau that is arable, about 80 per cent of the Somali population are nomadic pastoralists. In seasonal search for water and grazing land, the Somalis follow traditional, centuries-old patterns of migration that cross back and forth over the political boundaries of the area. Because the imposed boundaries constituted artificial divisions among various Somali groups, the administering powers "found it difficult to enforce peace, adjudicate inter-clan disputes, and apprehend marauding parties."¹

The Somali people were divided among French Somaliland (which

¹Alphonso A. Castagno, Jr., "The Somali-Kenyan Controversy: Implications for the Future," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (July 1964), p. 168.



Adapted from John Drysdale, *The Somali Dispute* (New York, Praeger, 1964), with permission of the publisher.

is still a member of the French Community), Italian Somaliland (which became independent Somalia in 1960), British Somaliland (which joined with Somalia immediately after its independence), the Ethiopian province of Ogaden, and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya. The precise geographic definition of the boundaries of these various areas has been in dispute among the administering powers from time to time: for example, incidents on the boundary between Ethiopian Ogaden and Italian Somaliland were seized upon to justify the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.

Even before the independence of Somalia and its union with British Somaliland provided a focus for Somali feelings of nationality, the Somali people had a sense of identity in opposition to their rulers. During the 1920s and 1930s, Somali political organizations began to emerge in British and Italian Somaliland; and they became more active during World War II, when Britain, temporarily in control of the Ethiopian Somali areas as well as its own, lifted restrictions on political organizations. By 1948 it was estimated that there were 25,000 affiliates of the Somali Youth League in the Somali areas, including those in Ethiopia and Kenya.¹ By 1950 the Somali Youth League and the Somali National League were both calling for the unity of all the Somali people. In early 1960, when the British lifted the ban on the Somali Youth League's activity in the Kenyan NFD, the party's stated goals were secession from Kenya and unity with about-to-be-independent Somalia. Somalia encouraged Pan-Somali activity in the Ogaden, where there was strong anti-Ethiopian feeling among the Somali tribes.

The Somali people have historically been divided into clan and kinship groups that have no tradition of political unity. But their nomadic heritage offers a common moral code and a common system of damages and indemnities for wrongs;² the nomadic heritage also engenders

¹Ted Gurr, "Tensions in the Horn of Africa," Appendix iii in Feliks Green, World Politics and Tension Areas (New York, New York University Press, 1966), p. 321.

²I.M. Lewis, "Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1963), p. 147.

a strong feeling against "settled" peoples, even those few who are Somalis.¹ The Somalis are almost unanimously Sunni Moslems, whereas the Ethiopian ruling Amharics are Coptic Christians and the Kenyan government is dominated by the non-Moslem Kenyan majority. Islam is apparently a strong unifying force for the Somalis, and "some Ethiopians perceive a new 'Muslim danger' in the emergence of Somalia as a Muslim state which may receive support from other Islamic powers."² Though the Somalis are usually classified as belonging to the same general ethnic group as most Ethiopians--eastern Hamites--the Somalis regard themselves as basically different.

According to U.N. estimates, a large percentage of Somali-speaking people are not citizens of Somalia (which has a population of 2,450,000) but are divided among three other areas as follows: in Ethiopia, 1,000,000 (out of a total Ethiopian population of 22,500,000); in Kenya, 240,000 (out of a total Kenyan population of 9,336,000); in French Somaliland, 37,000 (out of a 70,000 total). The Somali-inhabited lands of the Ethiopian Ogaden and the Kenyan NFD tend to be shunned by non-Somali inhabitants of Ethiopia and Kenya; the Somalis of these two countries thus are in a physical isolation intensified by restrictive administrative regulations.

The Somalis are traditionally resistant to centralized political authority of any kind, Somali as well as non-Somali. The hard life of the nomads produces frequent tribal or clan battles over water and grass; and these clashes tend to ignore political boundaries. But though migratory movements and resulting tribal encounters may produce tension among the Somalis, "their relevance for international tension results from the conflict between nomads and non-Somali political authorities, today those of Ethiopia in particular, who have attempted

¹Castagno, an interview, March 30, 1966.

²Castagno, "Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," Orbis, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Summer 1960), p. 206.

to regulate or halt them."¹

2. Military Strength of the Adversaries.

a. Somalia

At the time of the conflict under consideration, Somalia's total armed force comprised 6,000 in the army and 1,000 in the air force. The defense budget totalled \$3.9 million or 4.8 per cent of the GNP. The army was equipped with weapons dating from World War II, trained in their use by the British, and organized in widely scattered, mobile companies equipped with trucks.² In 1962, Britain and Italy offered military aid; and the equipment, including five medium tanks, was delivered in the same year.³ In 1961 the UAR provided rifles, two trainers, and a military training group.⁴ The air force is reported to have had some F-51D Mustangs, some Dakota transports, and a few light aircraft.⁵ (See Section III for details.)

Somalia had a highly effective police force trained by the Italian Carabinieri, with highly qualified leadership. Its size is estimated to have been 4,800, and it is said to have had good U.S. equipment,⁶ including an air wing, with landing strips at police posts. Both West Germany and the United States helped in the development of the force.

¹Gurr, op. cit., p. 319.

²Edgar O'Ballance, "An African Arms Race?" African World, June 1964, p. 14.

³M. J. V. Bell, "Military Assistance to Independent African States," Adelphi Paper No. 15 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1964), p. 14.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Neville Brown and W. F. Gutteridge, "The African Military Balance," Adelphi Paper No. 12 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, August 1964), p. 9.

⁶Ibid.

b. Ethiopia

At the time of the conflict, Ethiopia's total armed forces numbered around 34,000 with a defense budget of \$18 million (1.3 per cent of the GNP). The army was composed of 29,000 men (including 9 infantry battalions of the Imperial Guard, 23 infantry-of-the-line battalions, 4 artillery battalions, an airborne rifle battalion, and an armored squadron). The 350-man air force consisted of a squadron of F-86 Sabrejets and a squadron of Swedish Saab 17s.¹ The navy had 700 men, a 1944 seaplane tender, five 100-ton ex-U.S. patrol cutters, and a pair of 60-ton ex-Yugoslav 1951 torpedo boats.²

To build its armed forces, Ethiopia used military assistance from the United States, Sweden, Norway, India, and Britain. Ethiopia received nearly \$74 million of U.S. military aid between 1953 and mid-1964, more than all other African countries combined. The Ethiopian army had U.S. weapons, and the air force used U.S. equipment. In addition, the United States provided technicians and instructors for both the air force and the army (including a Mobile Airborne Training Team).³

Sweden had been giving Ethiopia military assistance since 1934. In the early 1960s, this assistance took the form of help in training the air force. Indian instructors served at the Military Academy at Harar; Norway had a naval training mission; and Britain was offering naval training facilities in Britain. (See Section III for details.)

¹Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas, Report for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Center for International Studies, September 1964), p. V-21.

²Brown and Gutteridge, op. cit., p. 6.

³There were approximately 1,300 U.S. military personnel at the Kagnew communications station in Ethiopia. The station was established following a U.S.-Ethiopian agreement on May 22, 1953 (see Bell, op. cit., p. 10; and Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2964). Also signed on the same day was a U.S.-Ethiopian Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2787). See also the Washington Post, May 3, 1967.

The total Ethiopian police strength was generally estimated to be 28,000, plus 1,200 in a frontier guard.

A comparison of over-all military strength involved would give the predominance to Ethiopia over Somalia, despite the major maintenance and logistical problems facing Ethiopia in the Ogaden region.¹ The air force was a particular advantage for Ethiopia in the Ogaden, offering mobile striking power important in a sparsely populated, semi-desert region. Somalia's air force was generally written off as ineffective.

c. Kenya

Kenya's armed forces numbering 3,000 were supported by a defense budget of \$.6 million. The army consisted of three British-trained infantry battalions (Kenya Rifles) with light mortars and light transport.² Approximately 50 army personnel were being trained in Britain, another 30 army officers and 5 pilots in Israel.³ Before its independence in December 1963, Kenya received basic equipment for its army from Britain.

In addition to Kenyan army personnel were 100 British troops on escort duty in the disputed northern area of Kenya, and 140 British engineers building roads there.⁴ It was agreed in the terms of independence that the 5,500 British troops stationed near Nairobi would be withdrawn in December 1964 but that Britain would continue to provide air, logistical, and technical support on the northeast frontier.⁵

¹Gurr, op. cit., note 45.

²Brown and Gutteridge, op. cit., p. 7.

³Bell, op. cit., p. 11.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid. In January 1964 (a month after independence) there was a mutiny among the Kenya Rifles, evidently about the standard pay scales, and the assistance of British troops was requested by Prime Minister Kenyatta.

The total number of Kenyan police was estimated to be 11,500, equipped with a light-plane wing.¹

3. Economic Aid to the Adversaries.

a. Somalia

In the first years of its independent existence, Somalia received aid from Italy, estimated at \$5 million annually,² and had access to a protected Italian market for its cash crops. Somalia also received aid from the UAR (\$11.4 million credit in 1960), West Germany, and the United Nations.

During this period, the United States gave economic development aid estimated at about \$30 million up to 1963. There was also a Peace Corps group in Somalia. A joint Italian-West German-U.S. civil aviation project was in the process of setting up an internal air service.

In 1961 the Soviet Union signed an agreement to lend \$55 million for projects such as the construction of a deep-water harbor at Berbera. Somalia also received other Soviet economic aid and technical assistance, notably assistance in improving the roads to both the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders.

b. Ethiopia

In 1959 a long-term credit of \$100 million at low interest was advanced by the Soviet Union to Ethiopia. Ethiopia was also receiving economic development aid from several other countries, including the United States, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Israel, Czechoslovakia, India, and Britain.³ According to one estimate, the number of donors was a result of the "desire of the Emperor under all circumstances to avoid dependence upon or identification with any of the

¹Brown and Gutteridge, op. cit., p. 7.

²Castagno, "Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," p. 205.

³Also, the United States was customer for 50 per cent of Ethiopia's exports. Castagno, "Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," p. 210.

groups opposing each other in today's divided world."¹

4. Recent History. The period before the independence of Somalia and its subsequent union with British Somaliland was characterized by various unsuccessful efforts to settle the disputed boundaries with Ethiopia, by an increasing emphasis on the concept of a Greater Somalia, and by the traditional pattern of raids across political boundaries by Somali tribesmen.

Immediately after World War II, when British Somaliland, former Italian Somaliland, and the Ogaden remained under British administration, Britain gave support to the idea of Somali unification. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin proposed in 1946 that:

British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance. . . . All I want to do in this case is to give those poor nomads a chance to live. I do not want anything else.²

According to Ethiopia, strongly opposed to the inclusion of the Ogaden in any Greater Somalia, Britain's concern for the nomads was influenced by an aspiration that Britain be made the trustee of the Somali area.³

In 1949, while the U.N. General Assembly was considering the disposition of the former Italian colonies, Ethiopia claimed Somalia and Eritrea as its "lost provinces." Emperor Haile Selassie declared that "it has been clearly demonstrated that these provinces formed an integral part of Ethiopia but were torn away from her by force of aggression."⁴ Though the General Assembly voted to give Eritrea to

¹Sergius Yakobson, "The Soviet Union and Ethiopia: A Case of Traditional Behavior," Review of Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (July 1963), p. 341.

²Quoted by Mesfin Wolde Mariam, "The Background of the Ethio-Somalian Boundary Dispute," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (July 1964), p. 208.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

Ethiopia, it decided in 1949, with strong urging from the United States, to make Italy the administering power for its former colony of Somalia for a period of ten years (1950 to 1960). Ethiopia did not press its claim and called, without result, for a settlement of its long-standing boundary dispute with Somalia.¹

In 1950, when Italy assumed authority in the trusteeship of Somalia, the U.N. General Assembly suggested that Ethiopia and Italy enter into bilateral negotiations for a solution and that arbitration and mediation be tried in the event of failure. After 1950, U.N. resolutions continued to call for greater efforts toward negotiating the disputed boundary. Direct negotiations were finally undertaken in 1956 between Ethiopia and Italy, but these reached deadlock in 1957, lacking agreement on which of the many past boundary arrangements were relevant to a new settlement.

During the 1958 French Community referendum, Ethiopia moved troops to the border of French Somaliland. The latter voted to continue its connection with France, thus rejecting for the time being the pull of Greater Somalia.²

In 1959, U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie fruitlessly urged the arbitration of the Somalia-Ethiopia border dispute. Later that year his successor Dag Hammarskjöld suggested that efforts be made for a solution, again without result.

B. Phase II: July 1960 -- January 1964

The long-standing issues of a divided Somali people, marginal control of fiercely independent nomads by any central authority, and ill-defined and contested political boundaries were thus unresolved when

¹Ibid., p. 210.

²Castagno, "Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," p. 208. Ethiopia is economically dependent on the free access offered its goods in the harbor facilities of Djibouti in French Somaliland, the port terminus of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway (in which Ethiopia has a majority interest).

Somalia became an independent state in July 1960. The goal of a Greater Somalia was explicitly stated in the Somalian constitution: "The Somali Republic shall promote, by legal and peaceful means, the union of Somali territories and encourage solidarity among the peoples of the world, and in particular among African states."¹

The Somali Republic would have preferred to achieve the goal of Somali unity by peaceful means. For example, according to Somalian Prime Minister Shermarke, the union could be achieved by adherence to the principle of self-determination.² Thus demands were made for plebiscites in the Ogaden and the NFD. According to one analyst:

The aim of the amalgamation of all the Somali territories, translating cultural nationalism into political nationalism, remains the basic credo common to all the nationalist parties [of Somalia].³ Such differences as exist on this issue, and they are slight, refer merely to the means by which Pan-Somalism should be achieved.⁴

In 1960, Somalia and the then British Somaliland unsuccessfully sought U.N. help in arranging a U.N.-supervised plebiscite by which Somalis throughout the Horn might express their preference for joining a Greater Somalia.

However, shortly after Somalia's independence, clashes occurred along the Ethiopian-Somalian border between Ethiopian garrison forces, which had been reinforced in anticipation of trouble, and Somali tribesmen. These clashes led to the dispatch by Somalia of additional military forces to the border area.

¹Article VI, paragraph 4.

²The Somali Peninsula: A New Light on Imperial Motives (London, Information Services of the Somali Government, 1962), p. vi.

³At the time of the conflict with which this analysis is concerned, the Greater Somalia League and the Somali National League were more militant than the ruling Somali Youth League, and the Independent Constitutional Party less.

⁴Lewis, op. cit., p. 149.

In December 1960 and continuing into 1961, another series of clashes took place between Ethiopian border forces and Somali tribesmen in the Ogaden, near Danod. Ethiopia claimed that raiding Somali tribesmen from the Somali Republic had attacked Ethiopian security forces. Twenty Ethiopians were reported killed. Somalia charged that Ethiopian troops and planes strafing the area killed more than 100 Somali nomads in the course of attempts to raid Somali villages for supplies. The incident set off demonstrations in the Somalian capital of Mogadishu against both Ethiopia, and the United States.

From January to April 1961, charges and countercharges of mistreatment and infiltration continued, raising the public irritation level between Somalia and Ethiopia. Ethiopia justified its attempts to keep, or gain, control of dissident Somalis by citing continuing Somali raids on its police outposts. In Somalia, news of casualties, government denunciations, and public protests fed on one another.

During April 1961, occasional skirmishes between Ethiopian forces and Somali tribesmen from Somalia were attributed by Ethiopia to the infiltration of the tribesmen into the Ogaden with the purpose of inciting the Ogaden Somali to resist the Ethiopian government.

On September 16, 1961, the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned States offered an opportunity for Somalian President Osman to discuss differences with Emperor Haile Selassie and for them to agree to exchange goodwill missions. However, the two leaders disagreed on the possible basis for negotiation of their boundary dispute (for example, which of former agreements, if any, was valid) and also on the basic question of a Greater Somalia.

During 1962 and the opening months of 1963, the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia was less tense while Somalian attention was focused on the Somali nomads living in the Northern Frontier District

of Kenya.¹ In Kenya in 1960, the two Somali parties, the Northern Province People's Progressive Party (NPPPP) and the Northern Province Democratic Party (NPDP), had asked the government to allow Somalis to join the Somali Republic and had urged a referendum in the NFD under U.N. auspices. In the same year, Somali chiefs in Kenya served notice that they wanted unification with Somalia when Kenya became independent.²

In response to the growth in the area of political pressure for secession, leaders speaking for the KANU party of Kenya, one of the two major national parties, declared that secession would never be accepted by Kenyan nationalists once Kenya had become independent of Britain. They also charged that secession efforts were playing into the hands of colonial powers anxious to see dissension in the new state.

In November 1961 the Somalian National Assembly gave its blessing and encouragement to Somali secessionist efforts in the NFD. And in 1962, during the Lancaster House discussions between British and Kenyan leaders to settle the circumstances of the projected independence of Kenya in 1963, Somalia supported the demands of NFD Somalis that Britain grant secession before giving up its official responsibility for Kenya.

At this time, Ethiopia risked intensified bitterness with Somalia to warn Britain against allowing independence or a plebiscite in the NFD, and became a party to a scorching press and radio war with Somalia. Ethiopia justified its action by charging Somalia with irredentist activity (in the Italian manner of the 1930s) and claimed a need for self-defense against the threat of the Greater Somalia concept.

¹Nevertheless, Ethiopia expelled some of the Somali tribesmen under its protection on the grounds that they were sympathetic to the Somali Republic. For its part, the Republic accused Ethiopian aircraft of continuing to violate its borders and described what it called an unfriendly propaganda campaign against it by Ethiopia.

²Castagno, "The Somali-Kenyan Controversy: Implications for the Future," p. 176.

In March 1962, with the Lancaster House Conference still meeting, 31 members of the Somalian National Assembly accused the government of weakness in pressing Pan-Somali claims.

The British agreed to appoint a commission to look into popular sentiment in the NFD and to consider the commission's findings before independence. In December 1962 the commission reported that the people of the NFD, largely Somali, favored secession from Kenya and union with Somalia. To underline their dissatisfaction with the status quo, Somalis in the NFD rioted during February 1963; subsequently, sympathetic riots took place in the capital of Somalia.

On March 8, Somali hopes for secession were dashed when the British announced the planned incorporation of the Somali areas into the independent Kenyan state. In enraged reaction to this announcement (which made no mention of the commission's findings of secessionist sentiment in the NFD or any British commitment to respond to those findings), Somalia announced on March 11 a rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain.

Britain held that, because of the imminence of independence, Britain was "in no position to disavow the views of [Kenyan political parties] K.A.N.U. and K.A.D.U., which together represent at least 90 per cent of Kenya's population."¹ Somalia claimed that Britain had changed its view between 1962 and 1963, that in 1962 Britain gave NFD Somalis to believe that secession would be accepted. During the following months, riots in the NFD brought additional paramilitary police into the area. Somali chiefs protesting the British repudiation of secession encouraged a boycott of Kenyan elections.

In May 1963, Somalia made a trade agreement with Communist China, followed in August by a seventeen-year interest-free loan of \$19.6 million, a \$3 million grant, and technical assistance, presumably to offset the loss of British aid after diplomatic relations had been broken. In

¹Ibid.

the same month, Somalian President Osman presented the case for Somali unity to the Addis Ababa Conference of African Heads of State but received a notable lack of support. It was evident that both Ethiopia and Kenya had a strong voice at the Conference. But the Conference also made clear that other African states feared the question of territorial claims based on cultural identity. Notice was thus given that the Organization of African Unity would be an unlikely source of help to Somalia in the settlement of its claims.

As the Somalis continued to push, the majority of Kenyan public opinion hardened, and there were calls for more restrictive policies against the secessionists. In May 1963, Kenyan Prime Minister Kenyatta declared that there would be no compromise and invited any Somali who wished to leave to take his camel and go. Leaders of both KANU and KADU referred to the necessity of sustaining national integrity, and claimed that Somali secession might encourage other dissident tribal minorities (for example, Masai and coastal tribes) in the same pattern. Generally, they also claimed the legality of existing boundaries, though KANU leaders, apparently as a counterclaim for negotiating purposes, made a claim to the lower Juba Region in Somalia on the grounds that it was once part of Kenya.

Frustrated in Kenya and changing its focus once more to Ethiopia, Somalia charged that Ethiopia was using force to repress a so-called Liberation Government among the Ogaden Somalis. The Ogaden Liberation Government represented an underground movement of Ogaden Somalis, led by Muktal Dahir, that had flared into open rebellion on June 16, 1963, following efforts by the Ethiopian government to "Ethiopianize" them and subject them to a livestock tax. It was reported that Dahir had organized nearly 12,000 guerrillas against the Ethiopian government.

Though lightly armed, these Somali guerrillas demonstrated their ability to tie down the Third Division of the Ethiopian army, despite the fact that the Ethiopians were supplied with tanks and supported by aircraft. Ethiopia charged that Somalia was giving tangible assistance to

the guerrilla force. However, both guerrilla leader Dahir and the Somali government denied that Somalia had any control over the Ogaden rebels or that it even had officially recognized them. According to one source, though there was probably "some flow of modern weapons from the Somali Republic . . . , captured weapons have shown no single point of origin."¹

Whatever arms aid Somalia may or may not have been offering the Ogaden Somalis, it was clear that Radio Mogadishu was attempting to transform their negative opposition to Ethiopian rule into a demand for unification with Somalia. Despite this, Dahir was quoted as saying:

My people are under no one's jurisdiction and take orders from no one but me. . . . Our fight with Ethiopia has nothing to do with Somalia. We are indifferent to the Government [Somalian] position, though we still expect and hope our movement will be recognized both by Somalia and by the world.²

From August 25 to 28, 1963, representatives of Britain, Somalia, and Kenya met in Rome at Britain's request in an attempt to resolve the differences over the NFD before Kenyan independence. The conference reached deadlock on the question of Somali secession. During mid-1963, Kenyan leaders were negotiating a mutual defense pact with Ethiopia "for cooperative military action against Somali raiders and possible military action by Somalia."³ It was being made clear that neither Kenya nor Ethiopia was willing peacefully to part with territory. With elections in prospect for March 1964, with the Ogaden border skirmishes continuing,⁴ the Somalian government sought increased military assistance.

¹Gurr, op. cit., p. 329.

²New York Times, March 28, 1964.

³Gurr, op. cit., p. 326.

⁴In mid-October 1963, Somalia accused Ethiopia of having moved troops to occupy a village within the Republic; two days later, Ethiopian border villages came under attack by Somalian soldiers.

In 1963 the United States, West Germany, and Italy offered \$10 to \$15 million in military assistance provided that Somalia would accept military aid from no other source. This offer was rejected by Somalia in favor of a larger offer from the Soviet Union, estimated variously from \$20 to \$30 million.¹ The pact with the Soviets was announced on November 10, 1963. The aid was to be put toward the building of a 20,000-man army with a modern air force, and early in 1964 some MiG-15 trainers arrived in Somalia, with Soviet technicians to maintain them and engineers to build an operational base.² In addition to aircraft, there were reports of armored vehicles, artillery, infantry weapons, and instructors for the army. By February 1964 there were at least 90 Somalian cadets training in the Soviet Union,³ and at least 200 Somalian officers⁴ there for further military training, maybe more.⁵ (See Section III for details.)

Somali raids on Kenyan police and army posts in the NFD increased during this period, and the Kenyan government declared a state of emergency on December 25, 1963, thirteen days after Kenyan independence. During the first months of 1964, half the Kenyan army was sent to the NFD⁶ to support the police against secessionist violence. The Kenyan government charged that Somalia was equipping the Somali raiders, estimated to number about 1,000.

¹According to Somalian Prime Minister Shermarke, "the Soviet Union took no initiative in this matter. When we failed to get the aid we felt we needed from the West, we turned to the Soviet Union." Gurr, op. cit., note 54.

²Bell, op. cit., p. 14.

³Ibid.

⁴John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (New York, Praeger, 1964), p. 165. Drysdale was recently an advisor to the government of Somalia.

⁵New York Times, March 13, 1966.

⁶Gurr, op. cit., p. 327.

C. Phase III: January 1964 -- April 1964

In mid-January 1964, Somalia accused Ethiopia of destroying Somali border posts. On February 6, fighting between Ethiopian and Somali troops broke out at Tug Wajalleh, on both sides of the border. The Ethiopian troops were reported to have violated the Somali Republic's border in pursuit of some Somali tribesmen, and Somali troops were sent in to confront them.¹ Somalia charged armed aggression and announced a state of emergency. In the face of attack by Ethiopian jets, the Somali troops advanced into Ethiopian territory until Ethiopian reinforcements forced them back.² Ethiopia charged the invasion of 2,000 Somali troops with artillery support and declared a state of emergency. In the fighting that followed, Ethiopia claimed to have killed 307 Somali troops; Somalia claimed 300 Ethiopians dead.

On February 8, Somalia charged Ethiopia with aggression and sought, unsuccessfully, a meeting of the U.N. Security Council. On February 9, Ethiopia urged an emergency session of the OAU. On February 11, the Soviet Union urged Somalia and Ethiopia to seek a settlement; on February 12, the United States appealed to both sides. On February 14, an appeal for a cease-fire and negotiations was issued by the African Foreign and Defense Ministers meeting at Dar es Salaam. The Ministers appointed a five-man investigation commission, which reported two weeks later in Lagos. When fighting continued, however, another appeal was issued by the OAU at the end of February.

Discussions between Ethiopia and Somalia culminated in an agreement to hold formal negotiations. On March 25, negotiations began in Khartoum, and on March 30, Somalia and Ethiopia announced their agreement on a cease-fire to be effective April 1 and on withdrawal of forces from the border pending a peaceful solution of the conflict. Hostilities continued until the cease-fire deadline. On March 31, Har-geisa, in the Somali Republic, was bombed and strafed by Ethiopian

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 328.

jets. (According to one source, the Ethiopian objective was to make a show of force near an important Somalian town and to preclude any use of the Hargeisa airport for the jets just obtained by Somalia from the Soviet Union.)¹

D. Phase IV: From April 1964

A cease-fire was ordered by both sides on April 1, as agreed, and shortly thereafter both withdrew their troops from the border zone under the supervision of a joint Ethiopian-Somalian commission.

However, the sporadic clashes with Somali tribesmen continued in Kenya as well as Ethiopia; and, intermittently, there were discussions between the governmental adversaries about the possibility of settlement.

As it had from the beginning, Ethiopia held to the position that it was

prepared to negotiate for the solution of the problem only in so far as it is a boundary problem. Ethiopia objects strongly to the idea of Greater Somalia. She will not entertain any proposition which will cause her to surrender a considerable part of her territory. She stands firmly to protect her territorial integrity.²

Somalia likewise remained strongly committed to its goal of a Greater Somalia, around which the political identity and pride of a very poor nation had been built.

¹Ibid., p. 363.

²Mariam, op. cit., p. 216.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

a. As a consequence of competing 19th-century imperialisms, the Somali people of the Horn of Africa were divided under British, French, Italian, and Ethiopian control. The strong Somali sense of identity and feeling of ethnic and religious separateness from the ruling majority groups in both Ethiopia and Kenya led to the Somalis in these two areas never assimilating into the political, social, or economic life of the majorities and to their continued aspirations for a reunified Somali state.

b. The economic underdevelopment of the region in which the Somalis live (and the very low potential for development of much of it) explains in part the Somalis' nomadic way of life that ignores political boundaries. This mode of existence historically led to conflict among nomadic groups for scarce water and other resources and brought them

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. In addition to the fundamental desiderata of having avoided 19th-century imperialism, the consequences of that imperialism could have been mitigated by measures designed to integrate the Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya into the economic, social, and political life of those countries. They would have posed less of a security problem in the period covered by this analysis if they had been dispersed and resettled away from border areas. These policies would have required their complete equality with the majorities, while their minority cultural values were preserved and respected.
- b. Economic development of the entire Somali region, which would require massive international assistance and imaginative planning and technological investment in view of the limited resources of the area. Alternatively, regional agreement for mutual control of

into conflict with the nominal sovereigns of the region, who in any event exercised minimal control in the Somali-inhabited areas.

c. Somali hopes of creating a state that would encompass all Somalis were stimulated during World War II, when nearly all the Somali-speaking areas were occupied by British troops. Britain allowed Somali political organizations to operate openly.

d. These aspirations were further intensified by the decision of the U.N. General Assembly, which was charged with the task of deciding the fate of Italy's former colonies, to grant independence to Somaliland after a ten-year trusteeship administered by Italy. The impending emergence on the Horn of Africa of an independent, virtually homogeneous Somali state provided a focus for the aspirations of Somalis elsewhere in the area.

e. This was particularly true of the Somali minorities in Ethiopia and Kenya, who occupied the provinces adjacent to the future Somali state and who were treated as an unprivileged minority by the majority non-Somali population.

nomadic life would have avoided clashes with local sovereigns seeking to impose laws and regulations unsuited to the nomad's way of life.

c. Preventing the open agitation for Somali unification, or being prepared to press for a solution that accommodated Somali interests.

d. Refraining from granting Somalia's independence; making its implementation contingent on a prior settlement of the clearly existing problems of the Somalis outside Somalia; U.N. opting for a settlement that avoided the problem: e.g., a federation on the Horn of Africa including Ethiopia and Kenya; special treaty guarantees of political boundaries coupled with agreements on nomadic and minority rights.

e. Measures to disperse, resettle, and grant equitable treatment to religious and ethnic minorities [see (1a) above].

2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

- a. During U.N. debates on the future of the Italian colonies, and during the decade preceding Somalia's independence, repeated U.N. efforts were made to persuade the peoples of the area, in particular the Ethiopians and the Somalis in the trust territory, to negotiate a settlement. If the parties could not negotiate a mutually satisfactory settlement, the United Nations urged them to accept arbitration.
- b. Direct negotiations were held in 1956 but never reached a discussion of substance. Ethiopia regarded the issue as one of border delimitation, with minor adjustments; Somalia regarded the issue as self-determination for the Somalis in Ethiopia, leading potentially to the secession from Ethiopia of the province of Ogaden.
- c. The military balance in the region was sharply in favor of the status quo states--Ethiopia and, at the time, Kenya, which was still a British colony. Ethiopia evidenced its willingness to employ its force to prevent a change in the status quo when it moved forces to the borders of French Somali-land during the latter's vote on whether or not to remain in the French Union.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Stronger U.N. action to produce a negotiated settlement prior to Somalia's independence; coupling the decision for an independent Somalia with provision for compulsory settlement methods; making implementation of independence contingent on settlement of this issue [see (1d) above].
- b. Measures suggested in (1d) and (2a) above to put pressure on parties to negotiate; U.N. and other third-party pressure on Ethiopia to seek an equitable settlement.
- c. In this instance, the military imbalance favored control and maintaining it would enhance control. At the same time, its military preponderance made Ethiopia less willing to seek a political compromise. Since Ethiopia's military strength was based on external aid for both materiel and training, the suppliers of military aid could have exerted pressure for a more flexible Ethiopian stand.

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[Despite efforts to find a settlement of the issue of Somali aspirations, no progress had been made by the date, July 1960, set for Somalia's independence. Initially in Phase II, tension focused on the Ethiopian-Somalian border. As discussions progressed between Britain and Kenya concerning Kenyan independence (December 1963), tension focused on the Kenya-Somalia border areas. The switch in focus did not, however, represent an abandonment by Somalia of either its claim to the Ethiopian province of Ogaden or the Kenyan Northern Frontier District (NFD).]

483

1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. Independent Somalia was committed by its constitution to pursue the objective of reunification of all Somalis into Greater Somalia.
- b. Opposition parties in Somalia were pressing for more rapid achievement of the goal of Greater Somalia and were urging a resort to force if the goal were not rapidly achieved by peaceful means.
- c. Somalia's independence was the occasion for Ethiopia's reinforcement of its garrisons in the Ogaden and for Somalia's reinforcement of its border forces.

B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Measures suggested in (1d) and (2a) of Section A above to compel settlement before independence.
- b. Political stability and cohesion in Somalia; a richer and more varied political life: e.g., a major development effort to absorb energies focused on the Greater Somalia issue.
- c. Neutral, third-party border control, perhaps U.N.; bilateral agreement, prior to Somalia's independence, to a neutralized buffer zone, perhaps controlled and patrolled by neutral forces.

- d. Numerous clashes occurred between Somalis and government forces in both the Ogaden and the NFD. It was unclear whether the Somalis involved were local residents (as Somalia contended) or bands infiltrated by Somalia (as Ethiopia and Kenya contended), or whether they represented a continuation of the historic resistance of the nomadic tribesmen to local authority. In any event, Ethiopia and Kenya regarded their troubles with Somalis inside their own borders as having been inspired, instigated, and equipped by Somalia.
- e. Dissidence and discontent among Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya predated Somalia's independence but sharply increased after that date. Somalia's propaganda encouragement of that unrest was clear. The extent of materiel support was less certain.
- f. In the NFD of Kenya, popular sentiment, assessed by a British investigating commission, was overwhelmingly for secession and union with Somalia. Sentiment in the Ogaden province of Ethiopia, while never assessed directly, appeared to be strongly for secession but not necessarily followed by union with Somalia.
- d. A U.N. presence or other third-party fact-finding; border patrols; relocation, resettlement of Somalis away from borders; integration of Somalis into the mainstream of Ethiopian and Kenyan life.
- e. Reducing the appeal of Somalia's propaganda by measures suggested above to integrate Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya; fact-finding to ascertain extent of materiel support; border control to reduce introduction of materiel support.
- f. Once having ascertained popular opinion, failure to abide by it makes a conflict more intense. In this instance, opinion should either have been ignored or, if sought, should have been implemented. Measures suggested above to integrate Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia.

- g. Whether viewed as a call for autonomy or union with Somalia, Somali demands were strongly resisted by the ruling majorities in Kenya and Ethiopia. Kenya in particular feared that yielding to one tribal demand for secession would result in similar demands from other tribal groups and the disintegration of the state.
- h. Somalia felt that, prior to Kenyan independence, Britain had made a tacit commitment to allow self-determination for the Somalis in Kenya. The British decision not to sanction NFD secession brought angry recriminations from Somalia, which broke diplomatic relations with Britain.
- i. In both the NFD and Ogaden, as Phase II progressed, the scale of clashes between Somalis and government forces increased. In both cases, police and military reinforcements were sent to the areas by both governments. Relative order was fairly quickly restored in the NFD. In the Ogaden, the larger guerrilla force of the Liberation Government was more difficult to bring under control. While the Ethiopian government had numerical and materiel superiority over-all, logistic and maintenance problems in the Ogaden and difficulties in coping with guerrilla tactics led to a large Ethiopian force being tied down by a relatively small guerrilla force.
- g. Greater political and social cohesion in both Ethiopia and Kenya would have made Somali secession less risky to accept and would have made the Somalis less interested in seceding.
- h. Clarification and articulation of British intentions. The British policy bought time but at the expense of lessened British influence in Somalia and an even more impassioned Somali population. Conversely, other great-power endorsement of the British position would have put pressure on Ethiopia and Kenya.
- i. Measures suggested above to lessen Somali discontent; measures suggested above to disperse and resettle the Somalis; failing these, greater internal security and counter-insurgency capability on Ethiopia's part would have restored order more quickly.

- j. Great-power agreement to avoid introducing large numbers of sophisticated weapons into conflict areas.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Efforts by the United Nations and other third parties to induce all sides to discuss issues and seek peaceful accommodation.
- b. Internationally controlled, assisted population exchange. In this case massive international economic aid would have been required to finance the movement and to create a Somali economy capable of supporting the new population.
- c. OAU efforts to couple its refusal to support Somalia with pressure on the other adversaries to negotiate a settlement.
- d. Threatening to enlarge the scale/scope of potential hostilities.

- j. In an effort to redress the military imbalance in the area, Somalia sought military assistance abroad. It rejected a U.S.-West German-Italian offer in favor of a larger Soviet offer.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. While committed to pursuing the goal of Greater Somalia, Somalia's ruling party preferred to do so by peaceful means if possible. Bilateral talks were held with Ethiopia and Kenya (the latter under British auspices) but without success.
- b. While unwilling to cede territory, Kenya's leadership indicated willingness to allow the Somalis in Kenya to emigrate to Somalia if they wished.
- c. The African states, through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), sought to play down demands for border relocations along tribal lines. The vast number of such potential disputes led the majority of African states to conclude that it was preferable to abandon all such claims. OAU thus gave no support to Somalia's position.
- d. Faced with a common challenge from Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya concluded a mutual defense treaty, thus facing Somalia with the prospect

of concerted opposition from its two chief enemies.

- e. Because of its historic position in the area, Britain played a leading role in seeking to promote a negotiated settlement. However, its influence on Somalia declined as, in Somalia's view, Britain retreated first from endorsement of the Greater Somalia concept and then from support of the secession of the NFD.
- e. Stronger British pressure, supported by other third parties; measures suggested above to retain British influence with all parties.

- f. Western, particularly U.S., interest in a speedy and peaceful settlement increased as the Soviet arms agreement and a Chinese economic aid-technical assistance pact with Somalia made it appear that the Communists were utilizing the conflict to strengthen their position in a strategic part of the African continent.
- f. The introduction of Soviet arms was destabilizing; but the concrete indication of Soviet interest enhanced U.S. interest in a settlement of the conflict. [Note, however, that had Somalia been perceived as a real or potential Soviet base, the U.S. response might have been destabilizing: e.g., if it took the form of a similar U.S. commitment to Ethiopia.]

C. PHASE III TO PHASE IV: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[While many armed clashes had occurred throughout Phase II, they had involved for the most part fighting inside Ethiopia and Kenya between rival Somali groups and between the police and armed forces of those two countries and Somalis whose regular place of residence was difficult to determine. Direct clashes with regular armed units of Somalia's army

C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

were scattered and quickly broken off. Major hostilities in the form of a sustained engagement between Ethiopian armed forces and Somali armed forces broke out in January 1964 when Ethiopian armed forces, pursuing a band of raiding tribesmen, crossed the border and encountered units of Somalia's army.]

1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

- a. Somalia's pursuit of the goal of Greater Somalia had achieved no success by peaceful means. No major power had supported its cause (although the Soviet military assistance may have suggested potential Soviet support) and the OAU had not endorsed its claim.
- b. The manner in which fighting broke out suggested that neither side had planned a major military operation at that time and that the hostilities were largely accidental.
- c. Each side claimed that the other was the aggressor and that its own actions were solely in self-defense.
- d. Militarily the hostilities were inconclusive. The initial Ethiopian penetration had been pushed back and pursued into Ethiopian territory. Somalia's drive had, in turn, been pushed back across the border.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. U.N., OAU, and other third-party pressure not just for an end to hostilities but for an equitable accommodation of interests by all parties.
- b. Better command and control; better intelligence on both sides; neutral (U.N., OAU, or other) border control, perhaps with a neutrally-patrolled buffer zone; a "hot line" type of communication between political leaders.
- c. International (U.N., OAU, or other) fact-finding; U.N. or OAU presence.
- d. Although perhaps more relevant to a future possibility of resumed hostilities, a more realistic appraisal of the actual military balance to substitute

for a decisive battlefield test of the balance.

2. Factors Tending to Terminate Hostilities

a. While neither side could claim a decisive military victory, over a longer period of fighting, Ethiopia's superiority in numbers, materiel, and training gave it the military edge. Some Soviet equipment had arrived in Somalia but the bulk of Soviet arms aid to Somalia had not yet arrived nor had Somalia's army been trained to use it.

b. The hostilities had not yielded any significant advance toward Somalia's Greater Somalia goal; they had resulted in Somalia's armed forces being pushed out of Ethiopia, which was the latter's immediate objective.

c. Potentially, prolonged or intensified hostilities could bring into operation the Kenyan-Ethiopian mutual security agreement and, a more remote possibility, a Kenyan appeal for British military assistance.

d. Appeals for an immediate cease-fire came from the United States, Soviet Union, OAU, and others.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Greater appreciation of actual military balance; efforts by arms suppliers to keep the military balance on as low a level as possible. In a conflict area in which none of the parties has an indigenous arms-production capability, concerted action by suppliers can be decisive.
- b. Articulation of the limited nature of Ethiopia's goals; third-party assurances to Somalia and Ethiopia of assistance if a more massive invasion attempt was made.
- c. Threatening to intensify hostilities.
- d. Reinforcing appeals by threat of sanction: e.g., collective U.N., OAU action, threats to reduce or cut off economic and military aid; coupled with machinery for negotiation of underlying issues.

D. PHASE IV: POST-HOSTILITIES

[This analysis ends with the cease-fire of April 1964, which was agreed to by Ethiopia and Somalia bilaterally. Hostilities between regular armed forces ceased with the implementation of that agreement and the jointly-supervised withdrawal of troops from the border. However, clashes within Ethiopia and Kenya with Somali nomads have continued, Somalia's demand for the reunification of all Somalis has not abated, and mutual recriminations persist as to responsibility for continued tensions. Efforts to find an acceptable basis for negotiations or to work out a formula for third-party mediation have failed. The conflict has, therefore, remained in Phase IV, with a constant possibility of a resumption of hostilities.]

III. WEAPONS ANALYSIS

[The following analysis describes only Ethiopian and Somalian arms acquisitions. It does not, as the preceding sections have done, include the Somalian-Kenyan side of the conflict. The weapons analysis here is carried up through 1966, whereas the preceding analysis ended in 1964, in order to cover major deliveries made to Somalia under the terms of the 1963 Soviet military assistance agreement.]

A. Somalian Weapons Acquisition

Very little information is available about Somalian armaments before November 1963, when Somalia and the Soviet Union announced their first military-aid agreement. However, it is assumed that the level of arms and training were both very low. Both Britain and Italy had supplied about \$840,000 worth of military aid to Somalia by the end of 1963, including five obsolete British-built medium tanks.¹ Mention has also been found of a 1961 shipment of rifles from Egypt.² After 1963, when the Soviet Union began shipping arms to Somalia, a vast change took place in the composition and number of Somalian armed forces.

Soviet rifles and machine guns must have begun to arrive in Somalia very shortly after the agreement was made public. In November 1963 it was reported that the arrival of Soviet arms had made it possible to distribute arms to Somali guerrilla insurgents.³ By February 1964, field artillery and armored cars had been promised to Somalia by the Soviets.⁴ Sometime during late 1964 or 1965, heavy Soviet weapons

¹David Wood, "The Armed Forces of African States," Adelphi Paper No. 27 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 23.

²Bell, op. cit., p. 14.

³New York Times, November 15, 1963

⁴New Republic, February 29, 1964, p. 9.

arrived. A team of Soviet military personnel was also sent to train Somalian pilots and build facilities for the air force.¹ By October 1965, at least 100 Somalian cadets were reported to be training in the Soviet Union, and as many as 70 Soviet military instructors were in Somalia.² By early 1967, one source cited the following Soviet-supplied equipment in Somalia: 82 Soviet M-34 tanks (of which at least 30 were estimated to be beyond repair); 24 radar-operated 100mm anti-aircraft guns; 3 MiG 15s, 7 MiG 17s, 2 Antonov-24 transports; and 6 90-foot patrol boats.³ (Before 1963 the only fighter aircraft reported to have been in Somalia were four to eight piston-engine F-51D Mustangs,⁴ which the Italians had supplied upon Somalian independence.⁵)

Although the Soviet equipment supplied in accordance with the 1963 agreement has been old, Somalia has not found it easy to maintain. For example, it has been stated that many additional MiG-17s have been delivered but never removed from their crates because they are too expensive for Somalia to operate.⁶ Evidently there is also a lack of trained personnel (although the Soviets have been providing training since 1964) to handle the Soviet equipment. Soviet pilots are reported to have been "temporarily seconded" to the Somalian air force to fly the MiG-17s, and Soviet tank crews to be "helping out" with the T-34 tanks.⁷

It does not appear that the Soviets have tried to control the future use of these weapons. In fact, it seems rather that they

¹New York Times, March 13, 1966; Wood, op. cit., p. 23.

²John K. Cooley, "From Mau Mau to Missiles," African Forum, Summer 1966, p. 47.

³Washington Post, May 3, 1967. Other reports suggest higher numbers, particularly of MiGs (see, for example, Boston Globe, August 14, 1966, which says there are between 20 and 30 MiG-17s).

⁴Wood, op. cit., p. 23.

⁵Flying Review, July 1966, p. 657.

⁶Washington Post, August 18, 1966.

⁷Weekly Review, August 26, 1966, p. 5.

are making it possible for them to be used in a variety of situations. It may be that some of the Soviet weapons that have come into Somalia, especially the small weapons, are destined for trans-shipment to other African countries.

Other than a few outbreaks of fighting between Ethiopian and Somalian regulars on the Ogaden border in 1963-1964 and possibly in 1965, the fighting in this conflict has been mainly limited to guerrilla activities by Somali nomads in Ethiopia's Ogaden Province and Kenya's Northern Frontier District. Thus the arrival of Soviet small arms in Somalia has had a more direct effect on the conflict than the arrival of heavier battlefield weapons would have had. Soviet small arms have been supplied to Somali nomads in the disputed areas to replace spears and crude firearms.

There have been reports that the strategic-planning branch of the Somalian army is entirely staffed by Soviet officers. This group has decided upon an urgent need to improve the roads to both the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders, and the Soviet Union has agreed to finance the road-building program. These are, of course, military roads.¹

An interesting undercurrent to Soviet arms shipments to Somalia has been the continuous rumor of Chinese interest in the situation. It has been reported that the Soviet Union's original bid to supply arms was prompted by a similar but smaller Chinese bid. The Soviets, it is claimed, chose to supply the arms themselves rather than permit a Chinese arms agreement. The Chinese were not able to match the Soviet offer to help Somalia build a 16,000 to 20,000-man army and a modern air force.² According to another report, the Chinese hired a former Pan-Somali leader to smuggle small arms into Somalia from Saudi Arabia.³

¹Ibid.

²Boston Globe, August 14, 1966.

³Robert Counts, "Chinese Footprints in Somalia," Reporter, February 2, 1961, p. 33.

Egypt and Syria have also demonstrated sympathy for the Somali case for several years. In addition to the shipment of Egyptian rifles mentioned above, two Egyptian-built Goumhouria light piston trainer aircraft were said to have been given to Somalia in 1961.¹ Egyptians have been charged with attempts to smuggle arms into Somalia.²

The 4,800-man Somali police force has received training from Italy, the United States, and West Germany, and equipment from the United States.³ These three suppliers also made a joint offer of \$10 million in aid to build an army of 6,000, but they were refused in favor of the Soviet offer.⁴ West Germany is reported to have provided \$2 million worth of military aid to Somalia by February 1965 under a military assistance program.⁵

In numbers, the armed forces of Somalia have increased from 4,000 in 1963 to 8,500 in early 1967. There have been reports of as many as 150,000 armed guerrillas fighting for the Somali cause, but these reports may have been exaggerated for propaganda purposes.

Weapons Available to Somalia in 1966

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
.303 Enfield rifle	(used by Somali nomads)	U.K.
Sten gun	(used by Somali nomads)	U.K.
rifle	large number	U.S.S.R.
machine gun		U.S.S.R.

¹Laurence L. Ewing and Robert C. Sellers, Armed Forces of the World-1966 (Washington, D.C., Robert C. Sellers and Assoc., 1966); Bell, op. cit.

²Counts, op. cit., p. 33.

³Ewing and Sellers, op. cit.; Wood, op. cit.

⁴Jeanne Contini, "Somali Walks the Tightrope," New York Times Magazine, August 8, 1965, p. 46.

⁵Defense Management Report, Vol. V, No. 12 (February 15, 1965), p. 11.

WEC-98 III

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
rifle		U.A.R.
100mm antiaircraft artillery (radar equipped)	24	U.S.S.R.
field artillery, heavy		U.S.S.R.
mortar	a few	U.S.S.R.
medium tank (obsolete)	5	U.K.
T-34 tank	82	U.S.S.R.
armored personnel carrier	65	U.S.S.R.
F-51D Mustang fighter aircraft	4 to 8	U.S. (Italy)
MiG-15 jet trainer-fighter	3	U.S.S.R.
MiG-17 jet fighter-bomber	7	U.S.S.R.
Antonov-24 transport	2	U.S.S.R.
Goumhouria trainer	2	U.A.R.
90-foot coastal patrol boat	6	U.S.S.R.

B. Ethiopian Weapons Acquisition

When Ethiopia signed its first military aid agreement with the United States in 1953, its armed forces were dependent upon obsolete pre-World War II equipment, including Czech tanks and Swedish aircraft. This antiquated equipment, along with associated training, had been procured by Ethiopia before 1948.¹ The U.S. Military Aid Program did not provide any substantial amounts of equipment to Ethiopia before 1957.

Since 1953, with most of it coming since 1957, \$150 million worth of military equipment was supplied by the United States to Ethiopia.² Included were at least: 54 M-41 tanks, 39 armored personnel carriers, 13 F-86 Sabrejet day fighters, and five T-33 jet trainers. By early

¹Wood, op. cit., p. 21; New York Times, February 17, 1957.

²Washington Post, May 3, 1967.

1967, Ethiopia was reported to have received seven supersonic F-5s.¹ The F-86 fighters are alleged to have been a gift to Ethiopia, as was the submarine chaser presented by the United States in early 1957.² The United States also provided Ethiopia with four battalions of artillery and five 95-foot patrol boats.³

One recent analysis of Ethiopian strength rated its air force as "on a par with the Japanese and Turkish air forces and the best in Africa aside from South Africa and Rhodesia."⁴ This analysis goes on to say, however, that the Somalian build-up has been a source of serious Ethiopian concern and that Ethiopia has been seeking more advanced equipment: more modern aircraft, later-model tanks, and sophisticated antiaircraft weapons.

In addition to providing most of the equipment for Ethiopia's armed forces, estimated to number 30,000,⁵ the United States has assumed responsibility for training them. In the period from 1953 to 1964, there were probably 1,500 U.S. military personnel in Ethiopia to train its forces. However, by 1965, only about 105 of these U.S. personnel remained.⁶

¹William Green, The Observer's World Aircraft Directory (London, Warne and Co., 1961), p. 22; Wood, op. cit., p. 20; Washington Post, May 3, 1967. The Washington Post refers to F-4s; however, this is most likely the F-5 instead. See Flying Review, July 1966, p. 655.

²Robert B. Stauffer and Mulford J. Colebrook, "Economic Assistance and Ethiopia's Foreign Policy," Orbis, Fall 1961, pp. 331, 336.

³Ewing and Sellers, op. cit.; Bell, op. cit., p. 10; Washington Post, May 3, 1967.

⁴Washington Post, May 3, 1967.

⁵This early 1964 estimate includes: 32 infantry battalions, 4 artillery battalions, an airborne rifle battalion, an armored squadron, and supporting services. In late 1965, another estimate placed the number of Ethiopian armed forces at 34,000, with 30,000 police and security forces. A 1967 estimate places the size of the army at 41,000.

⁶Bell, op. cit., p. 10; Wood, op. cit., p. 21.

Several other countries have undertaken to train Ethiopian military forces. Among these, Britain and Norway have provided naval training. The poor performance of Ethiopian troops in a 1964 battle with Somalis resulted in the dispatch of an Israeli team to train commando units. West Germany has been generous with its aid to Ethiopia, providing equipment for a mobile carabinieri of from 2,000 to 3,000 in 1966.¹

As far as can be determined, Ethiopia has developed no significant level of domestic weapons production, although crude gunsmithing is common.² The Ethiopian military forces are totally dependent on weapons supply from the outside.

No information has been found on the arrangements for maintenance of U. S. equipment, nor has there been any indication of maintenance difficulties. The fact that the Ethiopians used their U. S. aircraft and tanks against Somalia in 1963-1964 suggests that the United States has put no effective constraints on the use of these weapons. It could be that the United States might try to exercise control through restrictions on spare parts and resupply if more serious fighting were to occur. In this connection it should be mentioned that Ethiopia restricted the number of forces used against Somalia to the lowest level necessary to defend the border.

The Ethiopians have not responded to the arrival of Soviet arms in Somalia by expanding their own forces, perhaps because it will take Somalia a long time and great expense to pose a real military threat to Ethiopia. Future delivery of the MiG-19 to Somalia, however, might, as suggested above, lead Ethiopia to seek a comparable aircraft.

¹Wood, op. cit.

²W. H. B. Smith and Joseph Smith, The Book of Rifles, (Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Books, 1963), p. 171.

³Boston Globe, August 14, 1966.

WEC-98 III

Weapons Available to Ethiopia in 1966

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
cal. .30 M1 rifle	for four army divisions of 8,000 men each	U.S.
1303 P-14 rifle		U.K. (?)
artillery	for four battalions	
tank	some (obsolete)	Czechoslovakia
M-41 tank	54	U.S.
armored car		W. Germany
armored personnel carrier	39	U.S.
T-33A trainer	5	U.S.
F-86F day fighter	13	U.S.
Firefly attack fighter	8	U.K.
SAAB-91A trainer aircraft	16* (phased out in 1961)	Sweden
SAAB-91B trainer aircraft	16*	Sweden
SAAB-91C liaison aircraft	10*	Sweden
SAAB-17A attack bomber	66*	Sweden
landing craft	4	U.S. (?)
95-foot patrol boat	5	U.S.
submarine chaser	1	U.S.
seaplane tender	1	U.S.
motor torpedo boat	2	Yugoslavia

* These numbers are from Green, op. cit., p. 22. They seem quite high and may represent the total shipped over a period of time rather than the number operational in 1966.

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL"Controlling" the Conflict

Controlling this conflict, unless it is to recur, still means dealing with the substantive issue of Somali minorities in Kenya and Ethiopia. In retrospect it meant: not permitting disposition of the Italian colonies without a solution for minorities; preventing Somali irredentism from developing; controlling the infiltration of Somali tribesmen; and averting the clash of armed regulars that finally took place.

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. European imperialism spawned a host of territorial and human problems in Africa, one of which was the political fragmentation of the Somali people. So long as tribalism will last, that long will there be potential conflict wherever peoples, whether Ewes, Ibos, Hausas, or Somalis, are physically divided by artificial boundaries. Independence was given to most African states along colonial boundary lines. By so doing in the Horn without at the same time establishing agreements on minority rights, federation of the region, etc., the U.N. General Assembly failed to make provision for avoiding predictable conflict and thus rated a minus in its otherwise creditable peaceful-change exercise following the Italian peace treaty. The same defects inhered in the U.N. quasi-legislative role with respect to Palestine and Jerusalem in 1947, and with respect to West New Guinea in 1962. International legislation on peaceful change, so desperately wanted, needs to be accompanied by sociologically sound human arrangements, as well as provisions for orderly arbitrament of differences.

2. Given the perpetuation of colonial boundary arrangements, one fundamental conflict-preventive is offered by the kind of population exchanges and return (in this case, relocation) that probably

avoided even worse ethnic conflict between Greece and Turkey after 1923, and India and Pakistan after 1947 (though any such exchange would preferably be far more orderly and supervised than it was in the latter case). Any population arrangement requires not only agreement between the states that are parties, but, given the nationalistic and racial passions likely to be involved, third-party (e.g., U.N. or OAU) pressures to negotiate peacefully, plus financial assistance in executing a settlement. In the Horn, self-determination would have united Kenya's northern district, and perhaps Ethiopia's Ogaden, with Somalia. Alternatively, with international help, Kenya's later offer to permit its Somalis to emigrate, whether intended as a serious proposal or not, could have been implemented. For some African states, self-determination and arbitrated boundary readjustments remain a realistic conflict-prevention policy.

3. The more realistic policy, now that independence has been gained by virtually all African states along colonial boundary lines, is probably that of the "melting pot." No other contemporary society has done this as successfully as the United States; none has more fundamental homogeneity, apart from the final problem of color. Unless there is partition, full political, economic, and social integration with equality is the only formula for eventual stability in the Horn of Africa, Nigeria, Rwanda, Cyprus, and Israel, no less than Mississippi and Rhodesia (and Belgium, Australia, Malaysia, etc., ad infinitum).

4. In the Horn, the needful halfway policy would have at a minimum dispersed and resettled the Somalis of Ethiopia and Kenya away from trans-border intimacy with their cotribalists. Ideally, the three countries would have cooperated in mutual control of the Somalis' nomadic life. The difficulties in controlling a nomadic people are formidable (although in the Middle East the Bedouin is gradually becoming urbanized and stabilized). Modernization, which in turn requires large-scale international assistance, is the key to domesticating nomads. (The social and human costs--not our particular concern here--may or may not outweigh its political and economic benefits. One

needs, however, to mention the potential human cruelty involved in ruthless minority-resettlement policies as for instance practiced by the Soviet Union.)

5. If none of these solution-oriented peaceful-change policies be followed, the only remaining conflict-suppressor (not preventor) is repression of the particular minority. The Soviet Union has managed this successfully for years; Cyprus did it less well with its Turks, as did Greece with its Macedonians, Iraq with its Kurds, and the former Ruanda-Urundi with its Bahutus. Suppression of genuine grievances is not however recommended, for other than totally controlled societies, as likely to reap anything but a whirlwind.

6. The conflict in the Horn illustrates the general proposition that the stronger side (Ethiopia, later Ethiopia plus Kenya) can avoid settlement while deterring the weaker--short-term avoidance of violence that controls potential conflict for the moment but can have two negative long-run effects: it can stimulate the weaker to enter an arms race (vide the Somalian-Soviet arms deal); and it can postpone dealing with the persisting substantive problem. To convert short-term conflict control to greater durability, those who supply the stronger with arms aid should strenuously press for peaceful settlement of differences. All recent experience vividly illuminates the vicious circle we will face in the years ahead, in which arms assistance designed to be used against leftist insurgencies and external Communist threats will invariably exacerbate non-Communist-related local conflicts. If the central problem of local conflict is to be ameliorated rather than worsened, the only rational policy for all arms suppliers is to agree among themselves to tie arms aid to concrete action for the resolution of the causes of local conflict, and to limit the arms to those genuinely needed for internal security. Only in this way can the vicious circle be broken.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

7. When Somalia became independent before any resolution of the ethnic problem, nationalist irredentism toward Ethiopia and Kenya

was inevitable. The hostilities-preventing policy at that point, short of durable solutions, was to minimize the issue. Many countries (e.g., West Germany and South Korea today) hold permanent territorial aspirations but have other interests and outlets for their energies, plus adequate internal cohesion and stability, plus strong restraining influence in the form of strong U.S. presence, plus internal defense capabilities to put down dissidence). These assets might have enabled Ethiopia and Kenya either to divert the attention of their Somali minorities, or-- if their Somali areas seceded-- to handle secession without themselves breaking up into tribalist conflict. Given the fragility of African nations, perhaps "melting-pot-ism" was the only good path to take.

8. Interstate tensions that lead to military build-ups, redeployments, and menacing gestures ought to be the prime candidates for a neutral force of some kind patrolling the borders or a neutral buffer zone, fact-finding, and reporting on violations as well as on tension-producing propaganda. Accompanying these (as the U.N. Secretary-General has consistently sought to do for example in Cyprus alongside UNFICYP) must be continuous efforts by international organizations and other third parties to move the states toward pacific settlement.

9. Superpower involvement can have contradictory effects on conflict control. To be backed by Moscow or Peking can embolden a state to act aggressively (e.g., the UAR, North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, Indonesia, Syria). London's response in Malaysia balanced Sukarno's strength and lessened potential violence. Washington's response in Korea and Vietnam prevented conquest but at the cost of a prolonged and costly local war. U.S. support of Israel in the face of Soviet-backed Arab threats has at times doubtless inhibited violence.

The cut-off is the same as with the deterrence strategy generally: superpower threats deter; if they fail to deter, violence will be that much greater. But it remains to be pointed out that Soviet involvement--as in Somalia--can awake others to the need to

take an interest and press for a settlement in order to avoid the consequences of superpower confrontation in a marginal area. It should come as no shock to realize the extent to which U.S. pacific-settlement activity since World War II has been a direct function of Soviet or Chinese troublemaking.

10. It is generally agreed that war between the superpowers is more likely to be inadvertent and unplanned than deliberate. To an extent this is true for lesser powers as well. The clash in 1964 of Ethiopian and Somalian regular forces may have been largely accidental, in which case it might have been averted by better command and control, better intelligence on both sides, better communications (e.g., "hot-line"), and a neutral interposed presence.

Terminating Hostilities

11. Ethiopia's military superiority and limited objective, plus the lateness of arrival of countervailing Soviet aid, helped terminate hostilities quickly; and again, local imbalance helps ensure a quick end of fighting. But significant imbalance had permitted Ethiopia to act imperiously; to avoid war, Soviet arms should have arrived sooner. The chief point of political interest may be that Soviet arms aid would not necessarily be unwelcome if received within the framework either of an indigenous arms-limitation agreement in the region, or of a negotiated agreement among suppliers geared to the need for local balance, low levels of arms, and pacific settlement of local disputes.

12. Stringent limitation of war aims is an extremely important conflict-limiting policy. This was true of Ethiopia in 1964 (and of the United States in Korea and, hopefully, in Vietnam). It can be reinforced by detering pressures in the form of implied sanctions by great powers, international organizations, or local alliances.

13. In sum, the conflict-control policy activities relevant here were:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Peaceful-change provisions*

or alternatively

Repression of troublesome minorities (sic)

Agreements on minority rights

Population exchanges and relocation

Resettlement of minorities away from sensitive frontiers

Federation of like groupings

Arbitration of differences

with

Third-party (e.g., U.N. or OAU) pressures to negotiate

with

International financial assistance

"Melting-pot-ism," i.e., full political, economic, and social integration with equality

Modernization, with international assistance, particularly to domesticate nomads, tribes, etc.

Agreement among suppliers to balance and limit arms aid to that needed for internal security

and

Pressure for peaceful settlement of differences

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Minimizing of local issues

through

Provision of constructive outlets for irredentist passions

Internal defense capabilities

Better command and control

Better communications (e.g., "hot-line")

Better intelligence

WEC-98 III

Neutral buffer zone

Neutral third-party presence for fact-finding and
border control

Third-party pacific settlement

Soviet involvement to stimulate settlement activity (sic)*

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Great-power, U.N., or alliance deterrence

Stringently limited war aims

Military superiority of one side (sic)*

but preferably

Arms aid given in framework of arms control-pacific settlement
regime

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

THE ALGERIAN - MOROCCAN CONFLICT :
1962 - 1963

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.	511
A.	Background of the Conflict	511
B.	Phase II: July 1962 -- October 8, 1963.	515
C.	Phase III: October 8, 1963 -- November 2, 1963.	517
D.	Phase IV: From November 2, 1963	521
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.	523
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option.	523
B.	Phase II to Phase III: The Outbreak of Hostilities.	524
C.	Phase III to Phase IV: The Termination of Hostilities	526
D.	Phase IV	528
III.	Weapons Analysis (not prepared for this case)	529
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.	530

T H E A L G E R I A N - M O R O C C A N C O N F L I C T :

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
I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES

A. Background of the Conflict

1. Historic Claims. Present-day Morocco is but the core of what was once the mighty Sherifian Empire of the Maghrib. Like many of its kind, the Empire suffered dismemberment in the colonial struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries. Parts of its core area (bled al-makhzan) fell to the Spanish, parts to the French, and parts came under international control. Those areas owing religious but only sporadic political allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco (bled as-siba) fell under the administration of the Algerian and French West African colonies. When in 1956 the core area became the independent state of Morocco, the bled as-siba remained in the domain of Morocco's southern and eastern neighbors. That the scope of present-day Morocco thus appeared diminutive in comparison with its historical predecessor lent an air of incompleteness to the task of nation-building in Morocco and disquieted many of its nationalist politicians.¹

2. Post-Independence Pressures. The incompleteness of Morocco's boundaries was not solely a fantasy of historical imagination.

¹Douglas E. Ashford, "The Irredentist Appeal in Morocco and Mauritania," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1962), pp. 641-651; also I. William Zartman, The Organization of African Unity and Territorial Disputes (unpublished manuscript, 1966).



Adapted from Patricia B. Wild, "The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict," International Organization, Winter 1966, with permission of the World Peace Foundation.

In fact, France bequeathed to independent Morocco the arduous diplomatic and legal tasks of delineating over 600 miles of southern borders, a job that, for a variety of reasons, France itself had been unable to complete. As Hassan II of Morocco phrased it:

. . . les autorités françaises, souveraines aussi bien en Algérie qu'au Maroc, avaient pris de nombreuses mesures administratives délimitant arbitrairement les territoires mais personne ne saurait les considérer comme ayant défini une réelle frontière entre Etats.¹

After the independence of Morocco, the French created a border commission but Morocco refused to attend sessions with the representatives of a colonial Algeria.²

More successful were Moroccan negotiations with the Algerian government-in-exile (GPRA). In July 1961, Morocco elicited a GPRA commitment to a common borderline, but the legal status of the agreement later fell into question.³

While Algeria was to become the chief target for Morocco's claims to border changes, Morocco's attention in the late 1950s and early 1960s focused first on Spanish and Mauritanian territories. The formation in 1961 of the Casablanca bloc of African states and the efforts of the Casablanca powers to isolate Mauritania in a variety of international organizations was evidence of Morocco's preoccupation with areas other than those of Algeria; so too were the exploits of the Moroccan Army of Liberation in Ifni and Spanish Sahara in 1956 and 1957. Nonetheless, Morocco increasingly directed its efforts toward Algerian territories as well.

¹Maroc, Revue du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, No. 10 (Rabat, n.p., November 1963), p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 2.

³Patricia Berko Wild, "The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict: A Study of New Machinery for Peacekeeping and for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among African States," International Organization, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1966), p. 21.

3. Internal Moroccan Pressures. In part, Morocco's increasingly hostile orientation was but a specific by-product of a growing, more general commitment to a policy of irredentism. This commitment was a means of creating a legitimate basis for the new national government:

Le Gouvernement de Rabat invoque tour à tour
le sentiment musulman très profond des nomades,
leur fielté d'appartenir à la "race" arabe,
aristocratie de l'Islam, aussi bien que leur
sens de particularismes locaux.¹

Equally as important, the commitment was also a means of resolving grievous internal political problems. The power to formulate the basic conceptions governing Moroccan politics had largely been captured by the party most responsible for Morocco's liberation: the Istiqlal. Having achieved the status of "liberator," Istiqlal asserted its right to elaborate the fundamental political purposes of the new Moroccan state. Increasingly, Istiqlal defined those purposes in terms of "le grand Maroc":

. . . le President du parti Istiqlal [Si Allal
al-Fassi] n'aurait pas cessé depuis . . . 1946
de parler des frontières naturelles du Maroc,
soulignant que celles-ci se situaient en réalité
au sud de la Mauritanie et englobaient le Sahara
en réalité jusqu'aux frontières du Senegal.²

Throughout the mid-1950s, Istiqlal made every effort to gain widespread acceptance of its position. In 1956, Istiqlal received the key support of the trade unions, student unions, and the Moroccan Army of Liberation. In February 1958, Mohammed V, in order to recapture the political initiative, endorsed Istiqlal's position and laid claim to vast regions of the Sahara including the Tindouf and Colomb-Béchar regions of Algeria.³

¹Philippe Husson, La Question des Frontières Terrestres du Maroc (Paris, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, 1960), p. 74.

²Ibid., p. 45.

³Ibid., p. 50.

B. Phase II: July 1962 -- October 8, 1963

Upon the independence of Algeria in July 1962, Morocco approached the Algerian government about implementing the 1961 agreement to delineate the border but agreed to postpone binding negotiations until the latter government was sufficiently secure to engage in such efforts. For over a year, the Algerian government demurred. Meanwhile the situation deteriorated rapidly. On July 1, 1962, Algeria had held its independence referendum, and in the Tindouf region ballots had been marred by many residents who had taken the opportunity to express their allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco.¹ Following this unsettling demonstration, elements of the Algerian army were stationed in the Tindouf area to watch over and control the unreliable population. Incidents multiplied between the Algerian armed forces and the residents, the police and Moroccans crossing the border, and the armed personnel stationed on both sides of the border. The reaction of the Moroccan government is suggested in the following quote:

. . . les habitants de Tindouf qui, lors du référendum constitutionnel algérien, avaient manifesté leur allégeance à Sa Majesté le Roi Hassan II, furent l'objet d'une violente répression de la part des autorités algériennes.²

Internal pressures in Morocco for an active pursuit of Morocco's claim also mounted. Hassan II, who had succeeded Mohammed V in 1961, both reaffirmed his commitment to the patriarch's internal policies and intensified his efforts to mollify and absorb dissident political elements. Forming the Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions (FDIC), Hassan II rendered Morocco a constitutional monarchy and sought to legitimize his power through electoral successes. The FDIC failed, however, to obtain a majority in the national elections of May 1963. In these elections the opposition led by Istiqlal's al-Fassi repeatedly attacked Hassan for insufficient aggressiveness in

¹Wild, op. cit., p. 23.

²Maroc, op. cit., p. 3.

asserting Morocco's territorial claims.¹ In July 1963, Hassan arrested 130 of the opposition leaders, reshuffled the cabinet, and imprisoned the heads of several labor, student, and ethnic unions.² At the same time, Moroccan claims to territory in Algeria became increasingly militant.

Particularly important in fostering the specifically anti-Algerian content of Moroccan policy was the sympathy of elements of the internal opposition for the range of political symbols fostered by Algerian politicians. Militant anti-French declarations, attacks on French neo-colonialist assistance to Morocco, radical secularism, anti-monarchism, single-party socialism--these slogans and formulations found sympathetic adherents among the Ben Barka and Ben Seddeck elements in Moroccan politics.³ The encouragement offered the political dissidents by Algeria only incensed Hassan II and his supporters and encouraged the creation of a specifically anti-Algerian aspect to Morocco's irredentist orientation.

Further reasons can be adduced for Morocco's increased hostility to Algeria. Morocco had undergone numerous sacrifices in assisting the Algerian rebellion, and Algeria's peremptory and even spiteful expressions of gratitude were deeply resented by Moroccan officials.⁴ Algeria's support of the United Arab Republic in Pan-Arab affairs further angered the Moroccans, especially when the Arab League dwelt on such matters as the neo-colonial role of Islamic monarchism and the superiority of socialist states. The discovery of manganese in Colomb-Béchar and iron ore near Tindouf increased the salience of Algerian territories among Morocco's several claims.⁵ Finally, the admission of Mauritania

¹See account in Richard M. Brace, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 150.

²Ibid.

³Reporter, October 1962, p. 42.

⁴See description of diplomatic reception accorded Hassan II in Algeria, Time, April 5, 1963, pp. 37-38.

⁵Wild, op. cit., p. 21.

into the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as a founding member in May 1963 removed whatever attraction there was in making Mauritania rather than Algeria the target for Moroccan revanchism.

Along the disputed border, incidents continued to mount. Armed tribesmen, not yet fully incorporated into the regular armed forces of the two nations, continued to disrupt military and political relations along the boundary. Tensions were further exacerbated when, in August 1963, Morocco expelled Algerian merchants from Oujda. Algeria then misconstrued Moroccan troop movements as a sign of hostile intentions, despite Morocco's disclaimer that it was merely instituting administrative changes that entailed the alteration of internal military districts and therefore the restationing of troops.¹

The situation worsened in September. Algeria was faced with a widespread revolt of the Berber armed tribesmen of the Kabylia region; on September 30, Ben Bella assailed the Moroccan government for allegedly assisting the uprisings and offering sanctuary to Mkrim Bekacem.² Ben Bella at the same time announced the full mobilization of the Algerian army.

Still anxious for some form of amicable settlement, the Foreign Ministers of Algeria and Morocco met in Oujda on October 5. They agreed to normalize relations, to prepare a meeting of heads of state, and to constitute a commission in Tlecem to study the boundary question.³

C. Phase III: October 8, 1963 -- November 2, 1963

Before the meetings of either the commission or the heads of state could take place, overt hostilities broke out. On October 8, Algerian troops captured the posts of Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub, roughly halfway between Tindouf and Colomb-Béchar, and Morocco mobilized its

¹Press conference of Hassan II, October 24, 1963, as related in Maroc, op. cit.

²Wild, op. cit., p. 24.

³Ibid.

armed forces. Algeria simultaneously asserted that Morocco had attacked the Colomb-Béchar region.¹

In the Algerian attack on Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub, ten Moroccan soldiers were killed.² During the week of October 14, the Moroccan army retook the two posts killing at least ten Algerians in the process.³ Both nations committed first-line troops to the battle.⁴ One thousand Moroccan troops armed with bazookas, recoilless cannons, heavy machine guns, and tanks were involved in the engagement. It is asserted that 3,000 Algerian troops took part in the battle.⁵ Little use is reported to have been made of air power, except for an Algerian plane that bombed and strafed Oued Zeknou.⁶

As long as the fighting was concentrated in the regions of Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub, Morocco was strongly advantaged. The front was along and within the Saharan military district of Morocco and relatively accessible to logistic support. Lying deep in the Saharan district and a full 750 miles from Algiers, it was by contrast relatively inaccessible to the Algerians. In addition, the Algerian army was inhibited by its commitment to maintain order among the Berber population. Perhaps for these reasons, on October 18 the Algerians opened a new front along the eastern border, proximate to the more highly developed Mediterranean region of northern Algeria and in a portion of the boundary not contested by Morocco. The Algerian attack on Ich on October 18 represented the first intensification of the hostilities.

On October 28 a further intensification occurred when Morocco opened yet another front to the extreme south. In a highly successful

¹Ibid.

²Time, October 25, 1963, p. 39.

³Ibid.

⁴Economist, October 19, 1963, p. 231.

⁵Time, October 25, 1963, p. 39.

⁶Ibid.

drive, Moroccan troops moved to within several miles of the administrative center of Tindouf, repelling Algerian attempts to sever their supply lines in the process.¹

A third major intensification of the hostilities was threatened on October 20, when the arrival in Algeria of Soviet equipment from Cuba and troops and supplies from the United Arab Republic was publicly disclosed. Included in the two freighter-loads from Cuba were 800 tons of ammunition, four MiGs, four field radio stations, tanks, field guns, and antiaircraft guns. From the UAR came two shiploads of arms and paratroopers.² On November 9, Soviet trucks and Egyptian soldiers reached positions on the frontier, although the latter were not deployed in the front lines but kept as reinforcements.³ It is not at all clear that these materials and troops were dispatched as a direct response to the outbreak of Algerian-Moroccan hostilities, but their arrival clearly had great symbolic importance in the context of Algerian-Moroccan relations. Indicative of this was Morocco's severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba and the UAR and its expulsion of Egyptian schoolteachers and technical personnel.⁴ The last major intensification of the hostilities took place on November 1, when Algerian troops attacked Figuig.

These several events, while representing geographic intensifications of the hostilities, failed to render the conflict a total confrontation. They were segmental rather than related and reinforcing in their effects. Hostilities declined rapidly about a week after the Figuig attack.⁵

The fighting was proving costly. "By the end of the month

¹Zartman, op. cit., p. 12.

²Time, November 8, 1963, pp. 35-36.

³Economist, November 16, 1963, p. 665.

⁴Time, November 8, 1963, pp. 35-36.

⁵Wild, op. cit., p. 25.

[October], the war was becoming a heavy burden on both states' finances and the time was ripe for negotiations."¹ However, the size of the respective forces (Morocco, 34,843; Algeria, 48,000) and of the respective military budgets for 1963 (Morocco, \$93 million; Algeria, \$66 million)² indicates that this factor alone was probably not sufficient to overcome the internal political pressures for combat.

Virtually from the moment of the outbreak of hostilities, Algeria and Morocco were subject to external pressures. Haile Selassie of Ethiopia happened to be in Morocco the week the battles began and visited both Rabat and Algiers to press for meetings between the two heads of state and the involvement in the proceedings of other Arab nations. On October 11, Bourguiba of Tunisia dispatched envoys to both capitals to prepare for a meeting of the four North African heads of state. The Secretary-General of the United Nations offered his good offices on October 18.³ And on October 20 the Arab League called for a withdrawal of troops and conciliation. All of these initiatives came to nothing.

A Mali suggestion for a smaller heads of state meeting at Bamako, excluding Arab allies of both parties, proved acceptable. The meeting of Algeria and Morocco, together with Ethiopia and Mali, was arranged for October 29.

Both the United States and France exerted pressure on the parties, particularly Morocco, to moderate and terminate the hostilities.⁴ Together with Spain they refused to give assistance to either party despite repeated appeals.

¹Zartman, op. cit., p. 12.

²Helen Kitchen, ed., A Handbook of African Affairs (New York, Praeger, 1964), pp. 213-215.

³Wild, op. cit., p. 28.

⁴Ibid., p. 25. For analysis of U.S. and French military assistance programs in Morocco, see the Reporter, October 1962, pp. 40-42.

Substantial agreements were achieved at Bamako. Hostilities were to cease on November 2. Radio "warfare" was to be suspended. A committee of Algerian, Moroccan, Ethiopian, and Malian officers was to establish a demilitarized zone that in turn was to be supervised by military personnel from the latter two countries. Lastly, the two adversaries in the conflict requested a meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers.

D. Phase IV: From November 2, 1963

The OAU Council of Ministers convened November 15 and immediately adopted the Bamako agreements as the sole basis of discussion. The Council created a seven-state Committee of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, as called for in the OAU Charter. Included in the Committee were the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, and Tanganyika.¹ On February 20, 1964, the Committee partially achieved its goals when it obtained Algerian-Moroccan agreement on several measures. The parties signed an agreement to end the conflict and to resume diplomatic relations. Algerian troops withdrew from Figuig and the highlands overlooking the oasis were demilitarized. Moroccan troops in turn withdrew to the position held before October 1, 1963--a stipulation that would suggest their withdrawal from large sectors in the Tindouf region.²

After February 20, several further steps were taken under the auspices of the OAU Committee. In April, prisoners were exchanged. On May 24, 1964, the Ambassadors of Algeria and Morocco agreed to allow

¹Wild, op. cit., p. 31.

²Zartman, op. cit., p. 15, declares: "On 20 February 1964, agreement was reached in the cease-fire commission on the location of a demilitarized border zone; . . . Tindouf was omitted from the agreement." Wild, on the other hand, views Morocco's concessions on military withdrawal in the south as its main bargaining point. The Economist (November 2, 1963, p. 459) treats Hassan II's withdrawal from the region under the terms of the Bamako agreements as the major Moroccan concession rendering the settlement possible.

the free passage of persons and property between their countries, to permit expelled nationals to return, to remove restrictions on expatriate nationals, and to compensate residents in the area of battle. In May 1965, Ben Bella and Hassan II met on the border in ceremonial reconciliation.

Despite these steps, the conflict moved to latency and not to settlement; as of the time of this writing, the question of the delineation of borders is not resolved. As analyst Zartman phrased it:

The basic issue of the border itself has not been handled by bilateral negotiations; although Ben Bella and Hassan II . . . in the presence of now President Haouri Boumedienne agreed to discuss the territorial problems, neither regime is yet strong enough to make the necessary concessions. On the other hand, the O.A.U. and its subordinate organs do not have the political power to decide who was the aggressor . . . and they do not have the technical capabilities for drawing a new border. After prestigious mediators separated the warring parties, the best the O.A.U. organs could do has been to begin an endless process of inconclusive investigations, leaving the two states to move slowly toward the political reconciliation that only they can bring about and upon which a final . . . solution ultimately depends.¹

¹Zartman, op. cit., p. 15.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

a. The rulers of Morocco were nostalgic over the historic memory of the lost empire of the Maghrib, which had once extended their hegemony over Tangiers and areas now controlled by Spain, Algeria, and Mauritania. Only a small portion of that empire became independent Morocco.

b. France, which until the mid-1950s controlled all this area (with the exception of the Spanish colonies and Tangiers) attempted to negotiate a fixed border but without success.

c. Algeria, which appears to have had no counter-claim to portions of Morocco, was preoccupied first with achieving and then with consolidating its independence. It thus delayed border negotiations.

d. Internal political divisions within Morocco led the ruling party to search for a unifying issue, and the claim to "le grand Maroc" provided an appealing choice. Having once begun to exploit the issue, the Moroccan government was under pressure from internal

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors

a. A more realistic appraisal by Morocco of the continued relevance of past grandeur; agreements among African states to abandon border claims; international guarantees of existing borders against forced change.

b. Settlement of border conflicts prior to granting independence.

c. Negotiated settlement prior to independence of either state; higher priority to border settlement; third-party auspices for negotiated settlement; third-party control pending settlement.

d. Greater political cohesiveness in Morocco; development of more positive national goals around which to unify.

critics to press vigorously for its achievement.

2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

- a. Moroccan negotiations with the Algerian government-in-exile led to agreement by both sides to settle future border disputes peaceably.
- b. Prior to Algerian independence, Moroccan territorial claims focused on the Spanish territories and Mauritania, and not on the Algerian border.

- c. Morocco gave material and moral support to the Algerian independence struggle, thus creating a legacy of good will between the two states.

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. Ideologically a deep split between Morocco and Algeria developed--reflecting and exacerbated by the profound split in the Arab League between the more conservative, pro-Western monarchies and the socialist, neutralist, anti-Western states led by Algeria and the UAR.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Finalizing these negotiations, with French cooperation if necessary; third-party auspices for negotiations; mediation.
- b. Shunting Moroccan attention elsewhere [this may, of course, have been conflict-controlling vis-à-vis Algeria but conflict-promoting elsewhere]; searching for a regional solution to Moroccan claims or a regional stand against them.
- c. Building on this good will by reaching a settlement before its deterioration.

B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Development not so much of ideological uniformity as of tolerance for diversity; restraint on Nasser's Pan-Arab ambitions.

- b. Each state accused the other, with some justification, of using its ideological allies in the other's polity to subvert the government in power.
- c. Deposits of manganese and iron ore were discovered in the areas under Algerian control but claimed by Morocco. Thus the economic value to both states was increased.
- d. During the Algerian independence referendum, a majority of residents of the area of Algeria claimed by Morocco registered their desire for accession to Morocco.
- e. Units of the Algerian army were sent to the area to maintain control, and numerous clashes occurred between them and local residents, visiting Moroccans, and Moroccan border units.
- f. In part these clashes involved armed tribesmen from both sides of the border not fully under the control of either government.
- g. Moroccan troop movements in the border area, which Morocco claimed were occasioned only by a change in the boundaries of Moroccan military districts, were perceived as a threat by Algeria.
- b. International fact-finding, both to establish real facts and by exposure to deter interference.
- c. Creation of joint companies to develop mineral deposits; agreements to share benefits; search for alternate sources outside disputed area, with international assistance.
- d. Either accommodation to this popular demand or arranging for those who wished to emigrate to Morocco to do so, with international assistance for their move and resettlement.
- e. Neutral, third-party border control; agreement not to station adversary troops in disputed area; third-party (U.N., OAU) peacekeeping force pending settlement.
- f. Greater domestic control on both sides; strengthened internal security.
- g. Exchange of information in advance on nature and purpose of maneuvers that might be misconstrued; restraint in undertaking such movements in tense areas.

h. A revolt of serious proportions broke out among the Berber tribesmen in the Kabylia region of Algeria. Algeria charged that Morocco had fomented the revolt and was giving aid and sanctuary to the rebels.

2. Factors Tending to Inhibit the Outbreak of Hostilities

a. As tension mounted along the border and the number of incidents increased, the Moroccan and Algerian Foreign Ministers met and agreed to arrange a meeting of their heads of state to explore outstanding differences and to create a joint commission to study the boundary question.

C. PHASE III TO PHASE IV: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[Before the arrangements agreed to by the Foreign Ministers could be implemented, hostilities broke out with Algerian raids on Moroccan border posts, and alleged simultaneous Moroccan raids on Algerian posts. In the fighting that followed, several geographic extensions of the area of hostilities occurred. The basis for these intensifications appears to have been tactical, but insufficient information is available on them to permit their separate analysis here.]

1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

a. The factors identified above that tended to

h. Strengthened Algerian internal security; international fact-finding to determine and deter external subversion; neutral border control to eliminate sanctuaries.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Third-party (U.N. or OAU) auspices for negotiations between adversaries; time-stretching diplomatic devices to maintain status quo during such negotiations.

C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

a. Measures suggested above to offset

introduce a military option and to promote the outbreak of hostilities continued to exist.

2. Factors Tending to Terminate Hostilities

- a. Despite the several geographic extensions mentioned above, neither side appeared to have any but very limited objectives in the hostilities. Only a small proportion of each side's forces was engaged, although these were highly trained units, and neither side made an effort to penetrate deeply into the other's territory.
- b. Despite the limited nature of the engagements and the short duration of the hostilities, the fighting proved costly to each side.
- c. Morocco appealed for U.S., French, and Spanish assistance, but no one of them was prepared to become involved; instead, all urged a speedy end to fighting.
- d. The arrival in Algeria of Soviet-made equipment from Cuba, and of men and materiel from the UAR, although most likely arranged and probably shipped before Moroccan-Algerian hostilities broke out, raised the prospect of a wider and more protracted war in which the narrow issue of border claims would become submerged in intra-Arab and East-West ideological issues.

destabilizing factors [see (1a) to (1d) of Section A and (1a) to (1h) of Section B above].

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Strong pressure from all influential third parties, states and organizations, to limit the goals and strategies of the adversaries; threats from major suppliers of economic, military, and political support to retain limits and terminate hostilities.
- b. Increasing the costs of hostilities through action by suppliers of military and economic aid and by major trading partners.
- c. Strengthening inhibitions against involving third parties; preferably clarification of third-party intent before hostilities break out.
- d. Threatening to intensify hostilities. [Note, however, that while this threat helped terminate these hostilities, introducing additional arms into a conflict situation or turning a local conflict into a regional or global one can create the threat of future hostilities of expanded scope and scale.]

e. A wide range of external pressures for termination developed almost as soon as fighting broke out. Haile Selassie, Bourguiba, the U.N. Secretary-General, the Arab League, and Ethiopia and Mali offered their auspices for settlement.

e. Stronger action by third parties, particularly the United Nations and OAU.

D. PHASE IV

[This analysis does not cover events in Phase IV in detail. After the cease-fire worked out under Ethiopian and Malian auspices, these two states supervised a demilitarized zone delimited by them and the two adversaries. Under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, troops were withdrawn and normal diplomatic and commercial relations restored. However, no progress has been achieved on arriving at an agreed fixed border.]

III. WEAPONS ANALYSIS

[This case is not among those selected for weapons analysis.]

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL

"Controlling" the Conflict

The prior condition for avoidance of this conflict would have been Pan-Arab harmony (which might, however, have engendered additional conflicts elsewhere). Failing this, controlling the conflict meant dealing preventively with the territorial dispute, while keeping Algeria and Morocco from resorting to force at any stage in the diplomatic process. Later, it meant stopping the fighting at the earliest moment (which was done) and keeping the peace (which the OAU has helped to do) while settling the territorial dispute (which has not been done).

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. As in sub-Saharan Africa, so in North Africa the new states have been legatees of borders drawn for the convenience of previous colonial rulers. The borders bore little resemblance to those of the ancient kingdoms and empires, or of trans-colony ethnic tribal areas. Future conflicts might have been avoided if border disputes had been settled prior to independence, or, failing that, firm intra-regional agreements reached to forego territorial claims--and ideally to enforce the agreements. The auspices for such diplomacy--whether bilateral or regional, U.N. or other third-party arbitration--all existed then and exist now. (In this case, third-party fact-finding, mediation, or good offices might have helped to save the abortive negotiations.)

2. Whether or not disputed territory is intrinsically valuable, national passions can still be aroused (as in Morocco vis-à-vis Mauritania). Where economic value develops, increased pressures are generated that should be met with cooperative solutions such as joint exploitation or benefit-sharing agreements.

3. In many cases, territorial claims are outlets for popular frustration. The classic remedy is greater national cohesion based on constructive internal and international projects.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

4. The presence of military formations of one or both sides in a disputed area, or in a buffer or demilitarized zone, spells trouble. If they are irregulars (as in Morocco, and like the Pathan tribesmen and Azad Kashmiris in Kashmir), what is needed is firm government control and internal security combined if necessary with international fact-finding (which might also have helped when Algeria charged Moroccan subversion of the Berbers). As for regular forces, if agreement cannot be reached and mutually enforced to keep adversary forces out of the area, or at a minimum to exchange information on troop movements, the indicated preventive is a joint, regional, or other (U.N.) international presence to observe, report, and publicize tension-creating military activities in the area. As always, this buys time usefully if accompanied by third-party (U.N. or OAU) negotiations and settlement diplomacy.

5. The will of the people remains the soundest--and most just--criterion for territorial disposition. The results of the Algerian independence referendum ought to have led to the accession of the disputed area to Morocco. Failing that, internationally-assisted emigration might have helped to defuse the burgeoning conflict.

Terminating Hostilities

6. Here, as in other local conflicts, a vexing dilemma is between conflict-terminating threats to expand the war, and the conflict-widening consequences of failure of the threats. There is no easy answer to this dilemma, which inheres in the nature of deterrence and in the international system generally. On the record, at all levels of conflict the capacity to increase cost by the threat to hurt or to destroy value has often served as a sobering deterrent to unlimited hostilities,

and moved toward the vital objective of limiting war aims. (Costs are also raised by external suppliers' cutting off military and/or economic assistance.) However, if deterrence fails, the results are so grave in prospect, particularly as nuclear capabilities spread, that in the intuition of thoughtful men today bilateral national threats to expand a given conflict represent an unsatisfactory permanent technique for running a world.

7. Once fighting starts, the needful accompaniment to such inter-party deterrence as remains is strong third-party cease-fire pressure, whether by influential neighbors, allies, a regional organization, and/or the United Nations, plus the most stringent inhibitions to third-party intervention or involvement.

8. In sum, the relevant conflict-control policy measures here were:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Pan-Arab harmony dealing with border disputes prior to independence

Intra-regional agreement to forego territorial claims and to enforce agreements under bilateral, U.N., ICJ, or regional auspices

Third-party fact-finding, mediation, good offices

Cooperative economic exploitation through joint companies and benefit-sharing agreements

Greater national cohesion and control
based on

Constructive outlets for nationalism (internal and international programs)

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

International fact-finding

Firm governmental control and internal security

Exclusion of adversary military forces from disputed areas

Exchange of information on troop movements

Joint, regional, or international presence to observe, report, and publicize

Third-party (U.N. or regional) negotiations

WEC-98 III

Self-determination and, if necessary, territorial transfer
based on it

or

Internationally-assisted emigration

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Threats to expand conflict and otherwise hurt (But these may
intensify conflict if deterrence fails.)

Cut-off of externally-supplied economic and military aid

International pressure to cease fire*

Avoidance of third-party intervention*

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

T H E A N G O L A C O N F L I C T : 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 1

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.	539
A.	Background of the Conflict	539
B.	Phase II: Early 1950s -- February 3, 1961	547
C.	Phase III: February 3, 1961 -- Fall 1961.	554
D.	Phase IV: From Fall 1961.	563
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.	565
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option	565
B.	Phase II to Phase III: The Outbreak of Hostilities. . . .	567
C.	Phase III to Phase IV: The Termination of Hostilities . .	570
D.	Phase IV	573
III.	Weapons Analysis (not prepared for this case)	574
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.	575


T H E A N G O L A C O N F L I C T : 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 1

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES

A. Background of the Conflict

1. Geographic and Demographic Factors. Angola is about 4,000 miles from Portugal. Possessing over 1,000 miles of coast line, Angola also shares extensive boundaries with the Congo (Kinshasa), the Congo (Brazzaville), Zambia, and South West Africa. Along the Angolan-Congolese border of the northwest--the area of the conflict--stretch plains of elephant grass, broken occasionally by patches of jungle; a few miles farther south, jungle predominates while the plain gives way to hills and mountains. Angola's distance from Portugal, its long borders, and its terrain increased the cost of the defensive measures undertaken during the conflict by the Portuguese and therefore restricted the potency of their reprisals. The terrain did not uniformly favor the dissident elements, however. The borders encouraged insurgencies proximate to neighboring territories while inhibiting dissidence in the interior. The topography imposed further limitations on the insurgents, favoring efforts concentrated in the areas of hills and dense foliage. Geographic factors thus operated to support the conduct of the rebellion in the mountainous jungle-covered areas along the periphery of Angola.

Angola is strategically important mainly to the Congo (Kinshasa), which controls only a narrow strip of land on either side of the Congo River as it nears the ocean, dividing the major area of Angola from the province of Cabinda. Because of its coastal location, Angola functions as an outlet for produce from the interior. In particular, the Benguela



Adapted from F. Clement C. Egerton, Angola in Perspective (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), with permission of the publisher.

railway transports Katangan copper from the Congo (Kinshasa) to the ports of Benguela and Lobito on the Angolan coast.

Demographic factors remained constant for all practical purposes during the course of the conflict. The indigenous population far outnumbered the colons: of the total population of 4,830,449, 4,657,920 were African, 172,529 were European, and 30,453 were mestiços (mixed-bloods).¹ While the population balance was significant, other demographic factors were more influential. Ethnically, the European population was more homogeneous than the African; while the Europeans were almost exclusively Portuguese, the Africans consisted of at least five major ethnic groups. The 1959 official census figures were:²

Kikongo	479,818
Kimbundu	1,083,321
Ovimbundu	1,443,742
Lundas	357,693
Cuanhamas	328,277

These groups represent some of the major language groupings. The Kikongo-speakers, for example, are a part of the Bakongo nation, which is dominant in the Kinshasa area of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and spreads into the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). In Angola, they are located mainly in the Congo district--one of the thirteen administrative districts of Angola. The Lundas of Angola have ties with the Lundas of Katanga in the Congo (Kinshasa).

For many purposes, such ethnic aggregates are meaningless, since subdivisions within these groups enjoy relative autonomy. Within the rebellious Kikongo and Kimbundu, for example, there were at least five and thirteen such subdivisions, respectively. The ethnic homo-

¹Thomas Okuma, Angola in Ferment: The Background and Prospects of Angolan Nationalism (Boston, Mass., Beacon Press, 1962), p. 7. These are 1958 figures. Okuma is regarded by many as the most outspoken critic of Portuguese policy in Angola.

²Ibid., p. 18.

geneity of the Europeans as contrasted to the fragmentation of the Africans thus rendered the former a more cohesive political grouping with power disproportionate to its size.

The relative eliteness of the Europeans in terms of income, education, and occupation was pronounced. European skilled workers earned three times as much as their African counterparts. African school enrollment was a small percentage of European.¹

2. Economic Factors. Two characteristics of the economy of Angola were significant: its agricultural base and its colonial structure. Although oil had just been located outside Luanda and Krupp of Essen was preparing to invest \$42 million in developing iron resources in the central plateau, coffee, sisal, and cotton production was still the principle source of income in the country.² Of the total tonnage of exports, 75 per cent was agricultural produce.³ The

¹It is not necessary for the purposes of this analysis to document in detail the economic and social gulf between Europeans and Africans in Angola. The fact of the elite position of the Europeans is not questioned by Portugal or by the critics of its role in Angola. Similarly the general improvement in the economic lot of all peoples in Angola is agreed to by all. Portugal has made a great effort to develop the area economically. Portugal's policy is not based on concepts of racism per se, but the net effect of some of its actions has been to maintain the gulf between the Europeans and the Africans. In the field of education, for example, Portugal's policy has the effect of severely restricting higher education for Africans and Portugal taxes heavily educational facilities for Africans that are above a basic level. This situation is further exacerbated by Portuguese efforts to restrict the Protestant mission schools because they feel (see below) that these produce the rebel leaders. On the general state of education in Angola, see James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 312-316. Duffy's is regarded by many as the most balanced treatment of Portuguese policy.

²Okuma, op. cit., p. 7.

³Ibid., p. 6.

agricultural nature of the economy, coupled with the relative poverty of the metropole, placed economic constraints upon Portugal's capacity to pursue war. In addition, the rural dispersion of the European farming population rendered defense difficult in key periods of the rebellion.¹

A second key characteristic of the Angolan economy was the relationship to the colonial power. Tariff arrangements imposed by Lisbon yielded a comparative advantage to Portuguese imports, while marketing regulations compelled the sale of Angolan exports on the relatively unattractive metropolitan market. These arrangements, highly disadvantageous to the colons, tended to undermine the loyalty of certain of the Europeans to the government in the early stages of the revolt.

3. Political Factors. Angola was ruled not as a colony but as a province of Portugal. The Council of Ministers of Portugal directly appointed the Governor General of Angola, and the central ministries in Lisbon intervened directly in the politics of the province. As a result, political events in Angola and the metropole interacted closely, and the repercussion of political incidents in the one strongly affected the other.

Although electoral figures could not be located, several factors suggest the restricted importance of participant politics in Angola. Only one party, the Uniao Nacional, was permitted to campaign. The vast African majority--96 per cent of the population--was effectively excluded from the electorate, and the powers of representative institutions were tightly circumscribed. The effect of these arrangements was clear: opposition was difficult to express and tended to take on a conspirational and extralegal cast, especially in African sectors of the population. Perhaps more important than the state structure in Angola, however, was the operation of this structure in implementing the policies of the Portuguese regime. There were few

¹Ibid., p. 46. The European population of Angola was 43 per cent rural.

provisions for appeal or redress.

Portuguese policy in Angola is guided by a deeply-held mystique that appears to be a blend of intense national pride and undoubting belief in the superiority of Portuguese Christian European civilization. Stated perhaps in exaggerated language, this mystique is reflected in the following greeting given to the President of Portugal when he visited Beira in August 1956:

Here we are after more than four and a half centuries, here we are engaged today more than ever on a great and successful work, with the help of God, raising high the banner of Portugal, taming the wilderness, building towns and making them prosper, teaching, educating, and leading to a better life the rude mass of natives, disciplining their rudimentary instincts . . . molding their soul in the superior forms of Christianity, administering them justice with affectionate understanding. . . . A task, or I should say, a mission, vast, difficult, and exhausting, but noble and dignifying as few are. It is our historical vocation emerging once again. . . . Everything indicates that we are on the verge of a new era, a decisive phase in History, of our History, that we have ahead of us a great, auspicious, and obtainable future. . . . Everything is for the common good and aggrandizement of the mother country.¹

Although their impact differed, several elements of Portuguese policy, implemented within this legitimizing framework, were highly influential. Of great significance was the regime's labor policy. All Angolans were required to be employed, and employers had

¹Cited from *O século de Lisboa*, August 13, 1956, p. 5, by Duffy, *op. cit.*, p. 277. Duffy, whose volume is regarded as the best treatment of the Portuguese perspective, goes on to say: "The parallel between the imperial mystique created by the New State, absorbed by many of its colonial administrators, and imposed, at least superficially, on a surprisingly large segment of the Portuguese population, and the nationalistic attitude of the Union of South Africa is inescapable." (*Ibid.*, pp. 277-278.)

to endorse the passbooks that all workers were compelled to carry. When unemployed, Africans could either be recruited for labor on public works projects or be hired by European firms. Critics of Portuguese policy charge numerous abuses of this system. Self-employed farmers--the majority of the African population--were often unable to prove they were breadwinners. Local administrative officers, the chefes de posto, through a desire to make a good record by undertaking ambitious public works or through a susceptibility to bribery by European plantation owners, often recruited laborers illegally and ruthlessly. The African resentment of this policy was intense and widespread and formed much of the basis for cohesive opposition to the regime.¹

A second policy of great significance was the encouragement of Portuguese migration to Angola. The rate of immigration is suggested by the following figures:²

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated European Population</u>
1900	9,000
1920	20,000
1930	35,000
1940	54,000
1950	180,000
1961	220,000

The absolute rate of immigration thus increased rapidly in the 1940s and 1950s. Some of the effects upon the African population were dramatic and adverse, and they are best represented in the following statement by one of the African revolutionary organizations, the Uniao des Populacoes de Norte de Angola (UPA):

For years the Portuguese colonialist policy had been to send to Angola all the poverty stricken, the failures from the metropolitan areas, the poor and illiterate peasant families of Portugal.

¹See below the role of contract laborers in initiating hostilities.

²Anders Ehnmark and Per Wastburg, Angola and the Mozambique: The Case Against Portugal (London, Pall Mall Press, 1963), p. 70.

. . .The influx of peasants has brought competition between Portuguese and African workers. To reduce the number of unemployed Portuguese, the colonial administration accords them a monopoly of all kinds of labor.¹

Other effects were less dramatic but equally significant. The administration was compelled to divert resources to providing service for the growing European population and was less able to defend the African interests when they competed with those of the colons.² The European population became more racially self-conscious. According to one anti-Portuguese source, the African elite--the assimilados and the near-assimilados--found themselves displaced by Europeans, their status threatened, and their position increasingly identified with that of the masses.³ Lastly, other critics of Portuguese policy contend, the rate of recruitment of forced labor and the appropriation of land for white farmers increased with the rate of Portuguese immigration.⁴

4. Religious Factors. A significant cleavage existed in Angola between the Catholic and Protestant missions. The Protestants, largely from England and the United States, appear to have harbored little affection for the Portuguese regime.⁵ The number of Protestants among African political dissidents suggests the degree to which the missionaries communicated their point of view. The association

¹UPA, The Struggle for the Independence of Angola: Declaration of the Steering Committee (n.p., n.d.), pp. 2-3.

²As in the case of labor recruitment.

³Mario de Andrade, "Literature and Nationalism in Angola," Présence Africaine, Vol. 13, No. 41 (Second quarter 1962), pp. 121-122. The author is a leading Angolan nationalist.

⁴Ehnmark and Wastburg, op. cit., pp. 30-32.

⁵See Len Addicott, Cry Angola (London, SCM Press, 1962), for the views of a British Protestant missionary.

of Protestantism and rebellion in the minds of the Portuguese exacerbated their militant repression of dissidence in Angola, while the partisanship of their opponents was increased by the equation between Catholics and repression.¹

B. Phase II: Early 1950s -- February 3, 1961

There were several developments during the 1950s that combined to set the stage for eventual violence. For the first time, indigenous political organizations began to develop; opposition to Salazar's regime became apparent in Angola and in Portugal; and, on the international scene, the decolonization of the African continent achieved an apparently irresistible momentum.

1. Indigenous Political Organizations. One of the first indigenous organizations emerged among the Bakongo peoples of the north. In the early 1950s, the post of chief of the Muxicongo--a subdivision of the Bakongo, concentrated about the key northern city of Sao Salvador--fell vacant. Two subgroups of Muxicongo, each with its complex of clan and welfare organizations, put forward candidates. One of the candidates, Holden Roberto, was sponsored by the Protestant Muxicongo, and the other by the Catholics. Eduardo Pinnoch, later a leader of the UPA, led a drive among the Protestants for funds to send Roberto abroad for further education. Upon his return from Ghana, Roberto is said to have convinced his supporters to endorse his new conviction that Angola should be liberated from Portuguese rule. Thus, in 1951, the UPA was founded. The Catholics, in the meantime, maintained their intra-tribal organizations and founded the Ngwizako party under the sympathetic sponsorship of the colonial administration.²

¹Portuguese denunciations of the Protestant role were frequent and vituperative. The numerous harassments of the Protestant missions are discussed by Addicott, op. cit.

²From the account in Angola: A Symposium (London, Oxford University Press, 1962). The contributors to this symposium offer first-hand knowledge from a variety of partisan backgrounds (missionaries, Portuguese sympathizers, African nationalists). See also Henri Larcier, "The Union of Angolan Populations (UPA), "Présence Africaine, Vol. 14/15, No. 42/43 (Third quarter 1962), pp. 37-43.

The growth of the UPA was accelerated by the fact that the Bakongo were adversely affected by the labor and land policies of the colonial regime. Coffee-growing, the most lucrative agricultural enterprise in Angola, was concentrated in the north and labor recruitment and land seizures were disproportionately frequent in that area.¹

Then in 1955 the Portuguese unseated the chief of the Bakongo on the grounds that he disqualified himself upon achieving assimilado status; they then appointed a sycophant in his place. To comprehend the impact of this measure, one must appreciate the host of cultural memories it aroused. The chief of the Bakongo of Angola is the descendant of the great chief of all the Bakongo peoples in Africa. The diminution of his stature was apparently linked in the minds of his followers to the operations of the colonial regime and to their collective subjugation. The act of the Portuguese in 1955 was thus perceived as an attack upon the cultural self-esteem of the Bakongo and redounded to the benefit of the incipient Bakongo protest movement.²

Furthermore, as previously noted, the Bakongo spill over into the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Congo (Kinshasa). With the emergence of political consciousness in these areas, notions of self-government and anticolonial protest readily disseminated through kinship organizations to the Bakongo of Angola. More importantly, with the achievement of self-government in the French Congo in 1950 and independence in 1958, and with similar attainment in the Belgian Congo, the Bakongo of Angola perceived themselves as relatively disadvantaged in comparison to their kinsmen. The UPA was thus fortified by the growing commitment of the Bakongo to its purposes and their increased acceptance of its structure as the legitimate agency of their political aspirations.

A second major organization, the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), arose from a different socio-cultural base:

¹Angola: A Symposium, p. 63.

²Ibid., p. 68.

the indigenous urban intelligentsia. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the indigenous literati, most of whom were mestiços, founded a number of cultural organizations. Most of these were located in Luanda and maintained branches in Lisbon as well. One of the leaders of these organizations, Mario de Andrade, keenly portrays the transition to political consciousness that took place within the ranks of these associations:

National and literary activities began to intermingle. The juncture itself was established between the writers and the politicians.

The young writers concentrated on the description of the social disorder under colonialism, the consequences of detribalization and the vicissitudes of the recruitment of labor. . . . Out of these writings a common attitude can be detected: the desire to assume the condition of the native, a condition which . . . corresponds to the most exploited social level. There is in these literary creations a conscious effect of identification.¹

A number of factors strengthened this process of identification. Contacts with nationalists in other parts of Africa reinforced the inchoate political orientation of the literati. The displacement of the indigenous elite, noted above, strengthened their relationship with the masses. The Portuguese repression of emergent political activists, which began on a systematic basis in the mid-1950s, accelerated their oppositionist sentiments. And, as will be described below, dissidence among the European colonists themselves afforded the literati allies among the opposition in Portuguese politics. The culmination of these trends was the emergence in December 1956 of the MPLA from the major cultural organization of the intelligentsia, the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA).² The MPLA thereafter functioned as the nationalist unit of the literati.

Other political organizations arose at this time, though none approximated in significance or size the UPA and MPLA. Andre

¹de Andrade, op. cit., pp. 121-122.

²Ibid.

Massaki and Antoine Matumona founded ALIAZO among the Zombo people of the north; this later was assimilated into the UPA. In 1958 the Movimento para la Independencia Nacional de Angola (MPINA) was founded among the intelligentsia but later joined the MPLA. Anti-UPA forces among the Bakongo, led by Angelhino Roberto, founded the NTO-Abake; later, Zombo elements split from the UPA and founded the Mouvement de Défense des Intérêts Angolais (MDIA). These last two groups, like Ngwizako, the Catholic Bakongo party, established collaborative relationships with the Portuguese. A last group, the Mouvement pour la Liberation de l'Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC) operated in Cabinda.

The emergence of political organizations among the African population reinforced the tendency of Africans and Portuguese to see their relationships in terms of force and violence. The African party organizations were predominantly agencies of protest; they therefore expressed demands and points of view at variance with colonial policy and thereby heightened the realization on both sides of the incompatibility of African and Portuguese interests. The parties, moreover, were racially distinctive and were based on cultural and tribal factors that led to an emotional approach which translated readily into militancy and violence.

Once a political leadership emerged among the indigenous populace, its interests lay in broadening and intensifying its appeal so as to secure pre-eminence. Protests were therefore amplified, thus heightening tensions. African political movements were perceived by the Portuguese as illegitimate; they were therefore repressed, which in turn excluded the use of means other than violence for the realization of their purposes. Given the Portuguese orientation toward its colonies, the rise of African political organizations was perceived as threatening. The tendency to resort to violence was therefore increased among the Portuguese.

The African political organizations themselves were fragmented by intra-tribal conflict that appeared to polarize on a "collaborationist-oppositionist" dimension; and there were divisions both along tribal lines and along cultural levels--the modern, quasi-assimilated

elites operating autonomously from the more traditional, tribally-based political activists.

2. Portuguese Political Cleavages. For reasons suggested earlier, many of the colons opposed Portuguese policy in Angola. In 1958 the extent of the opposition was revealed when General Delgado captured over 40 per cent of the official tally in Angola in his candidacy for the Presidency of Portugal.¹ Such evidence of opposition only increased the anxiety of the Portuguese over the security of their African hegemony. In addition, opposition sentiments served as a source of encouragement to those African leaders who shared them. What is known concerning the collaboration between the Portuguese and African opposition elements suggests that it involved the margin of the colonial community (trade-union and clerical-union elements, etc.) and the elite of the African community (those elements drawn to MPLA). The vigorous reprisals taken against the opposition elements of both races indicate the extent to which they were regarded as threatening by Portugal;² and the vigorous denunciation by the African elite of these measures suggests the degree to which such collaborative opposition served as a source of encouragement to their liberationist aspirations.³

A second significant cleavage existed within the upper ranks in Portugal itself. One of the defining characteristics of the domestic opposition to Salazar at this time was resistance, for a variety of reasons, to his Angolan policy. The ties between the opponents of Salazar in Portugal and the dissident colons are not entirely clear; they nonetheless were close enough that opposition to Salazar and opposition within Angola were perceived as closely bound by many significant actors. The result was to reinforce the

¹New Statesman, May 12, 1961, p. 741.

²Thus the "trial of 50" and other such repressive acts initiated by the Portuguese noted below.

³See the MPLA pamphlet FRAIN, La Repression Colonialiste en Angola, Le Procès de Cinquante (Cheratte, Belgique, n.p., n.d.).

predilection toward the use of coercion by both parties to the Angolan conflict. On the one hand, Salazar regarded the liquidation of opposition in Angola as intimately tied to the maintenance of his regime. On the other hand, dissident elements in Angola were encouraged to precipitate violence in the belief that they would be supported by opposition groups among the Portuguese.¹

3. International Events. One of the crucial factors influencing both parties to the Angolan conflict was the decolonization process in Africa during the 1950s.² The emergence of independent black states encouraged both the rebel leadership and the Portuguese administration to perceive Angolan politics in crisis terms.

The liberation of their kinsmen in the former French and Belgian Congos, however, had effects besides that of augmenting the commitment of the UPA to the policy of self-determination. The UPA was relatively certain that refuge would be provided by Congo sympathizers; the support of the UPA by Kasavubu, Lumumba, and Adoula increased Holden Roberto's confidence in his ability to undertake expanded political and military initiatives. Roberto was also confident that military support would be forthcoming from the newly-independent African regimes. The MPLA, on the other hand, federated with the MPINA and the nationalist movement of Guinea under the auspices of the All-African Peoples' Conference of Tunis in 1960 and established its headquarters in Conakry in August of that year.

The decolonization process strongly affected the Portuguese as well. There is every indication that the administration recognized the external threats posed by the liberated regimes and the internal dangers that were likely to arise.³ The Portuguese responded by

¹See interesting discussions in the Atlantic Monthly, October 1961, pp. 33-36, and March 1962, pp. 24-28.

²E.g., Libya became independent in 1956; Guinea, in 1958; sixteen African states, in 1960.

³See the speech of the Governor General of Angola quoted in Okuma, op. cit., p. 68, and the speech of Salazar quoted in Time, January 2, 1961, p. 24.

increasing their military capacity to cope with the danger posed by the ramifications of the decolonization process.

There is no available information on the military preparations taken by the UPA and the MPLA. In 1956, units of the Portuguese secret police were instituted in Angola for the first time.¹ In April 1959 the first military air-force installations were constructed in Angola, adjacent to the Luanda commercial terminal,² and the Portuguese officially sponsored the creation of rifle clubs among the Portuguese colons.³ Over the next year, the Portuguese rapidly expanded their military forces. A report of May 27, 1960, in the Times (London) indicated that 2,000 metropolitan troops, including paratroops, had been introduced into Angola in the preceding year. This action increased total forces to 20,000, consisting of the European forces and 3,000 to 4,000 Angolan whites doing two years service in their home province.⁴ The size of these forces is to be contrasted with the 1956 army of approximately 6,500 including officers, with only 1,000 European personnel.⁵

Besides increasing the size of the armed forces, the Portuguese undertook other measures as well. New equipment was introduced: Panhard armored cars, personnel carriers, artillery, spotter planes, and other aircraft. Troops were dispersed to barracks that had been recently constructed in the inland towns. Airfields, small and large, were created inland especially along the Congo (Kinshasa) border.⁶

Following the Leopoldville riots of January 1959, the Portuguese suppressed a series of disturbances in the Congo province

¹de Andrade, op. cit., p. 117.

²Ibid., p. 119.

³Okuma, op. cit., p. 68.

⁴Ibid., p. 69.

⁵Ibid., p. 64.

⁶Ibid., p. 69.

of Angola, especially in Sao Salvador.¹ In March 1959 the leaders of the MPLA and their Portuguese sympathizers were arrested; they were given severe sentences in the "trial of 50" that took place during the following year.² When in June 1960 Angolan exiles addressed a protest to the government over the conduct of the trial, mass arrests occurred in Lobito, Luanda, and Malange. Among those seized was Agostinho Neco; when representatives from his home village peacefully approached the chefe de posto, 38 were killed by the Angolan police.³ In November 1960, 28 Cabinda nationalists were executed, and in December 1960 further arrests were made among the urban intelligentsia.⁴ Relations between the Portuguese and Africans thus assumed an increasingly violent character as time passed.

C. Phase III: February 3, 1961 -- Fall 1961

Portuguese political developments made headlines all over the world in January 1961. Captain Henrique Galvao, who was under a sixteen-year sentence for "subversive" activities⁵ but had escaped to South America after serving four years, dramatically seized the liner Santa Maria to call the attention of the world to the repressive Portuguese regime.

In early February 1961, Galvao neared Luanda for a possible docking of the Santa Maria. For the first time, international attention focused on Angola, and there was little the Portuguese could do to avert it. Taking advantage of the presence of 60 foreign

¹Ibid., p. 72.

²FRAIN, op. cit.

³John Marcum, "The Revolt in Angola," New Leader, Vol. 45, No. 9 (April 30, 1962), p. 18.

⁴Basil Davidson, "Phase Two in Angola," West Africa, No. 2382 (January 26, 1963), p. 87.

⁵As a colonial administrator in Angola in the 1940s, Galvao had written a report highly critical of forced labor practices. He had later tried to form an opposition group to the Salazar regime.

correspondents in Luanda, the MPLA staged a series of riots on February 3, possibly with the assistance of sympathetic European organizations. Crowds of Africans stormed the Luanda jail, radio station, and police barracks. On February 4, mobs of whites retaliated by attacking the African quarters of the city. The violence in Luanda subsided soon thereafter.¹

During the following week, an outburst occurred in Baixa de Cassange, a cotton-growing district near Luanda in the province of Malange. Involved were contract laborers with grievances against Cottonage, a company granted labor-recruiting rights in the area. Interestingly, the district governor, Joaquin Monteiro, supported the claims of the laborers against the company; apparently as a result, he was relieved of his post.²

Sustained anti-government violence commenced in mid-March in the Congo district of the north. The precipitating incident again involved contract laborers. In a dispute with the farm management of the Primavera Cotton Plantation, March 19, 1961, several laborers were shot; the remainder then overran the plantation and killed the manager and his assistants. During the next week, similar incidents took place over a wide area in the north.

The rebellion developed rapidly. By March 25, 70 to 150 whites were dead and 3,500 Europeans had sought refuge in Luanda.³ By May 19, 600 Angolan whites had died;⁴ and at the end of six months, 2,000 more were dead.⁵ (These figures may be compared to the 23 whites killed in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising.) The geographic

¹See account in the Economist, Vol. 198, February 11, 1961, p. 543, and Ehnmark and Wastburg, op. cit.

²de Andrade, op. cit., p. 21.

³Economist, Vol. 198, March 25, 1961, p. 1172.

⁴Time, May 19, 1961.

⁵Helen Kitchen, ed., A Handbook of African Affairs (New York, Praeger, 1964), p. 13.

scope of the rebellion was also impressive. Between March 15 and March 20, the following villages were attacked: Mundinha, Mavola, villages in the Nuabuangongo and Dembos hill regions, and villages on the coast between Ambriz and Ambrizete.¹ For several weeks thereafter, action was concentrated on a 60-mile swath of border between Luvo and Kimpagna, south to Bembe, Nova Caipembe, and Mucaba, and especially in the Nuabuangongo and Dembos hills. Major elements of the Zombos to the east and of the Kimbundus to the south, however, apparently failed to join the uprising.² In late June, government arrests in Novo Redondo, 190 miles south of Luanda, and Porto Alexandre, 125 miles north of the border of South West Africa, gave one of the few indications that dissidence had spread south of the Cuanza River and among peoples other than the Bakongo, Kimbundu, and portions of the Zombo.³ Nonetheless, Congo, Malange, and Luanda provinces remained in a state of siege well into the summer of 1961.

Information on the composition, methods, and organization of the rebel forces is scarce. Several things are clear, however. The rebellion in the north, insofar as it was organized, was a UPA, not an MPLA, enterprise.⁴ Also clear is that the levels of rebel organization and the quality of the weaponry were rudimentary at best; indeed, they improved only after the rebellion had been largely repressed.⁵ Evidence concerning these matters comes solely from newspaper correspondents. In August 1961, Gavin Young declared:

The rebel force in the North . . . is pathetic in its poverty and rags; it even lacks the most basic supplies. Most of the men are shoeless . . . and militarily they are as badly off. They have a

¹"Dossier sur Angola," Tam-Tam, Revue des Etudiants Catholiques Africains, No. 304, 1961.

²Angola: A Symposium, p. 70.

³New Statesman, Vol. 64, October 19, 1962, p. 518.

⁴This was the major finding of an OAU good-will mission to the rebels in 1963.

⁵See the development of the liberation army discussed below.

number of last war Belgian rifles. . . .They have a few sporting guns. . . .They have no grenades, mortars, or light machine guns. They have no radio sets. . . .There are no signs of a force of Angolans having been disciplined, trained in tactics and molded into a modern fighting force.¹

More detailed is Richard Matthews' report on a group of 45 UPA rebels, published in September 1961. He also found little evidence of discipline and training and low levels of equipment and weaponry: twenty locally-made muzzle-loaders, nine Enfields, six Mausers, and one machine pistol. However, Matthews did observe the delivery of supplies (nineteen boxes of cartridges, a few light automatic weapons, and salt) and reported the presence of a "military commander" for Santo Antonio do Zaire (one Louis Ingles who had been a member of the MPA since its inception).² The consensus of all reports, however, is that the standard weapons of the rebels were muzzle-loaders and panga knives and their mode of organization that of marauding groups unorganized as a fighting force. The largest estimate of the size of the rebel forces is that of 7,000 "core" troops from across the border in the Congo (Kinshasa), with 25,000 occasionally-active local collaborators.³ Less inflated estimates cluster about the figures 3,000 to 4,000 and 10,000.⁴

The Angolan rebellion had reached its height by July 1961. During the remainder of the summer, the rebellion declined. Three elements served to reduce insurgency: the nature of the Portuguese response, the weakness of the rebel forces, and the reaction of the international community.

Portugal's initial response to the rebellion was rapidly to expand and deploy its military forces. Upon the outbreak of the

¹Quoted in Addicott, op. cit., p. 27.

²Reporter, September 28, 1961, pp. 41-44.

³Kitchen, op. cit., p. 215.

⁴Nearly all discussions of the war put forward some numerical estimate.

rebellion in March, 2,500 to 3,000 paratroopers were immediately airlifted to Luanda from Lisbon; in May, 3,400 additional troops with full arms and equipment were sent to Luanda by ship.¹ In April the Governor General of Angola announced the full mobilization of all Angolan NCOs and the partial mobilization of infantry, artillery, and cavalry units in Angola; simultaneously, the Minister of Defense of Portugal increased the term of service of the Portuguese armed forces from eighteen months to two years.²

Besides bringing regular troops from abroad, the Portuguese employed white "vigilantes." Irate bands of armed colons had already wreaked vengeance upon large segments of the black population when on March 31, 1961, they were entitled *Corpos de Voluntarios* and their activities deemed legal.³ As the army increased in size, however, it rapidly curtailed the function of these groupings.⁴

The tactics of the Portuguese were straightforward and ruthless. White settlers were encouraged to withdraw into such well-defended towns as Luanda, Maquela, Carmona, Sao Salvador, and Ambriz. Mobile units were then dispatched to insurgent towns and to towns thought to be insurgent. Those residents who did not flee were annihilated. Incendiary and napalm bombs were frequently used to fire such villages. All indications are that these steps were efficiently and

¹Okuma, op. cit., p. 82. According to the New Statesman (Vol. 64, October 19, 1962, p. 518), included were Humber and Panhard armored vehicles and trucks from West Germany.

²"Dossier sur Angola," p. 114. By mid-May 1962 an estimated 15,000 Angolans and metropolitan forces were deployed in Angola (according to the Economist, Vol. 199, May 6, 1961, p. 549). By 1963 the total force level was between 45,000 and 50,000, 50 per cent of which was stationed in the north (according to Kitchen, op. cit., p. 215).

³Okuma, op. cit., p. 88.

⁴Ronald Waring, The War in Angola--1961 (n.p., n.d.), p. 43. This is one of the considerable number of Portuguese pamphlets presenting that side of the conflict and documenting African atrocities.

ruthlessly executed. A deft variation was the use of indigenous troops from the southern provinces, a step that served to exacerbate inter-tribal tension among the insurgents and to frustrate efforts to expand the scope of the rebellion.¹

In addition to these measures against the dissident rural populace, the Portuguese arrested large segments of the non-insurgent population in the cities and the central and southern provinces. The focus of the purge was the educated element among the Africans: schoolteachers, assimilados, church officials, literates, etc. Luanda, Lobito, Benguela, Nova Lisboa, Porto Alexandre, Novo Redondo, and Silva Porto were the loci of massive arrests by PIDE² in April of 1961.³ Through these steps, potential leadership cadres were neutralized.

The Portuguese also rapidly established central control over the domestic and colonial political structures. In February 1961 a group of Portuguese liberals under the leadership of Acacio de Gouveia had presented a petition of grievances to the President of Portugal, Admiral Americo Thomas. Following the outbreak of the rebellion, de Gouveia was incarcerated. Liberal resistance to the exercise of power was thereby terminated for the duration of the crisis.⁴ Simultaneously, the civilian governor of Angola, Dr. Silvo Tavares, was replaced by General Deslandes and the governorships of the provinces of Luanda, Malange, and Congo transferred to military officers.⁵ In April, Defense Minister General Botelho Moniz presented the President of Portugal with a letter from General Albuquerque de Freitas, commander-in-chief of the air force, and a memorandum from several high-ranking officers expressing their doubts concerning the conduct

¹Okuma, op. cit., p. 87.

²The Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado, or security police.

³Basil Davidson in the New Statesman, Vol. 62, August 11, 1962, pp. 176-178.

⁴Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 208, October 1961, pp. 33-36.

⁵Okuma, op. cit., p. 82.

of the war in Angola. In addition, the Supreme Council for Defense passed a vote of no-confidence and asked the President to dismiss Salazar. Salazar, rallying the security police, forestalled the incipient coup, arrested and charged with treason all twelve officers involved, and replaced the ministers of the army and overseas affairs, the chief-of-staff, and the military governor of Lisbon. Andriano Moreita was made Minister of Defense.¹ In May, after receiving a memorandum demanding democratic reforms as a prelude to reform in Angola, Salazar also replaced the ministers of the interior, foreign affairs, and education and the secretaries of state for commerce, industry, and agriculture.² By June 1961, therefore, Salazar had replaced the heads of the major civilian and military agencies in Portugal and Angola; by so doing, he effectively both consolidated the power necessary to counter the rebellion and crushed resistance to his Angolan policies.³

In addition to taking these measures against the insurgents and any potential supporters, the Portuguese introduced reforms. It is difficult to distinguish between the form and substance of these reforms; as a result, a mere listing of the measures will be recorded. In September 1961, all Angolans were made Portuguese citizens and extended the full protection of the law; a restricted franchise based on tax receipts and literacy qualifications was retained, however. Pass laws were officially abolished and minimum-wage, minimum-age, and labor-inspection statutes were adopted. The range and intensity of Portugal's response was thus impressive. Power was centralized, military capabilities expanded, and repressive measures instituted with rapidity, efficiency, and ruthlessness. But the carrot of inducements

¹Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 208, October 1961, pp. 33-36; Okuma, op. cit., p. 82.

²Time, May 19, 1961, p. 30.

³It was not until July 1962 that further dissidence became evident and General Deslandes, Defense Minister Moreita, and liberal leader Marshal Lopes were arrested by the Salazar regime.

accompanied the stick of coercion.

Other factors were operating to make possible the effective containment and repression of the Angolan rebellion. The economic and social resources at the command of the African dissidents were vastly inferior. The absence of unity among them was also a major influence on the progress of the rebellion. The MPLA and the UPA did not operate in concert inside or outside Angola. Unable to coordinate their relations with external allies, they competed against one another for diplomatic support and military assistance. In August 1961 the MPLA transferred its headquarters to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) from Conakry, but proximity between the parties only increased tension and intrigue with the result that the Congolese government's enthusiasm for their cause dropped precipitously.¹ Tensions reached a new height in November 1961 when a UPA group in northern Angola executed Ferreira, a military leader of the MPLA; inter-party military strife threatened as a result.²

Apathy or actual resistance among elements of the African population also weakened the liberation movements. Collaboration with the Portuguese, by elements in the northern tribes, has already been mentioned. Equally as important to the containment of the rebellion was resistance by the central and southern peoples, especially the Ovimbundu, whose more than one million members represented a potentially determining factor in the rebellion. Tribal antipathies were not the sole factors shaping the attitudes of these peoples; the absence of proximate borders and consequent sanctuaries left them at the mercy of police and government officials, thus lessening their taste for adventurism.³

Although the vigorous response of the Portuguese on the one hand and the weakness of the African efforts on the other explain in

¹ Ehnmark and Wastburg, op. cit., p. 21.

² Ibid.

³ Okuma, op. cit., p. 94.

large part the decline in the intensity and geographic scope of the rebellion, there was another dimension to the conflict--the international response. While the limited capacity of the African nations may well have been the major deterrent to their intervention, the apparent importance of the United Nations encouraged them to act under its aegis. Several approaches were made. In March 1961, following the Luanda riots and the Malange disturbances, Liberia took "the situation in Angola" to the Security Council, where a resolution calling upon Portugal to institute reforms and providing for a subcommittee to report on conditions in Angola failed to win sufficient votes for adoption (5 in favor, none opposed, 6 abstentions). In the following month, after widespread disorders had broken out in northern Angola, the question was taken up at the resumed session of the 15th General Assembly. The same resolution that had failed in the Security Council was passed on April 20 by 73 votes to 2 (Spain, South Africa) with 9 abstentions (including France and Britain).

As fighting continued into June, the Security Council considered a draft resolution that, while calling for no U.N. action, would have found the situation to be a threat to the peace. However, this was amended to read "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" before being passed by 9 votes to 0, with France and Britain abstaining. The operative paragraphs, in essence, called merely for Portugal's cooperation with the subcommittee and for a speeding-up of its work.

The U.N. Subcommittee on Angola reported to the 16th General Assembly in the fall of 1961. It found that Portugal had frustrated the desire of the Angolan people for self-determination and had used harsh and repressive measures in quelling the revolt. The Subcommittee concluded that the best hope for a solution lay in Portuguese cooperation with the United Nations.¹

¹U.N. pressure continued subsequently through the Committee on Colonialism, the Special Committee on Portuguese Territories, and

The Western powers were faced with difficult choices. For Britain, Portugal was the oldest ally. For the United States, which identified itself with the moral position of the African nations, Portugal was the possessor of the Azores, a base considered strategically important to Western defense and for which the rights were to be renegotiated in 1962. For the Western alliance as a whole, Portugal was a NATO ally. For these reasons, though willing to abstain or even on occasion vote for resolutions condemning Portugal's colonial policies, the Western powers were not willing in 1961 either to furnish rebel forces with meaningful assistance or pressure the Portuguese other than verbally into recognizing the legitimacy of rebel claims.

D. Phase IV: From Fall 1961

This narrative concludes with the suppression of the rebellion in the fall of 1961. Violence since has been confined to sporadic clashes in the Nuabuangongo and Dembos areas. Stories filed by reporters and visitors testify that the towns of the northern districts are under effective Portuguese control. Although persons maintain armed guard when journeying between towns, none of the reporters has seen or recorded stories about actual incidents. Despite the disappearance of widespread fighting, significant changes are still taking place

the Subcommittee on Angola, as well as in the Assembly and the Council. On a wide range of matters before U.N. bodies--human rights, labor conditions, racial discrimination, world health, refugee matters, freedom of information--the African nations assailed Portuguese policies. They also sponsored resolutions calling on members to use their influence to persuade Portugal to prepare its colonies for self-government, and calling, eventually, for sanctions. Increasingly, this campaign came to be linked to the concurrent drive against apartheid in the Republic of South Africa and in South West Africa, and later with efforts to overthrow the white rebel regime in Rhodesia. For an excellent analysis of the goals and strategies employed by the African bloc against the Portuguese, see Patricia Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations," International Conciliation, No. 545 (November 1963).

in Angola--though none of them appears to offer hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Indeed, both the Africans and Portuguese have considerably strengthened their political and military positions.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

a. In Angola the Africans vastly outnumbered the Europeans, but the latter had the political, economic, and social power, and the major material benefits of the colony were monopolized by the colonial regime and the whites.

b. Portuguese colonial philosophy, while not based on concepts of racism per se, assumed the cultural superiority of the Portuguese system and the justness of Portugal's "mission" in Angola. Africans who assimilated themselves had status roughly comparable to the Europeans. The vast majority of Africans, who had not been or did not wish to be assimilated, were largely without rights. Convinced of the legitimacy of their "mission," the Portuguese regarded any dissent from it as treason.

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors

a. Greater political, economic, social equality for all the people of Angola or policies aimed at developing such equality in the shortest possible time by training and educating the Africans and creating opportunities for them in the colony's economic, social, and political life.

b. Education of the Portuguese to the values of diverse cultures; rejection of the 19th-century concept of the imperialist "mission"; increased Portuguese understanding of the inevitability of decolonization; earlier admission of Portugal to the United Nations and U.N. refusal to accept the assertion that the Portuguese system removed Angola from the category of non-self-governing territories and that no U.N. reporting responsibility applied.

- c. The constitutional structure of the Portuguese empire made Angola an integral part of Portugal. Independence or self-government was ruled out for Angola, just as it was ruled out for any other part of metropolitan Portugal.
- d. Portuguese colonial practice was particularly repressive. The rigidity of Portuguese politics in Portugal, furthermore, was transferred to Angola so that Europeans and Africans alike had few legitimate channels of protest and dissent. The largely disenfranchised Africans were cut off even from such few channels as existed.
- e. Economically, Portuguese practice in Angola was exploitative. This adversely affected even European settlers in Angola, but it bore particularly heavily on the unassimilated Africans. Especially resented was Portuguese labor policy; at best it came near to being a system of forced labor and it was widely abused. Through such practices, the inequities of the regime affected directly large numbers of individual Africans.
- f. Immigration from Portugal sharply increased. The largely unskilled white immigrants competed directly for employment with the urbanized African and mixed-blood elites. Immigrants choosing to go into agriculture--the main occupation in Angola--intensified the demand for African forced labor and increased land seizures from the Africans, particularly in northern and northeastern Angola.
- c. Recognition of the right of self-determination, even if that right led the majority in Angola to opt for independence.
- d. Political democracy, both in Angola and in Portugal.
- e. Economic and social reform; application of international standards of equitable treatment; U.N. or ILO investigation of charges of forced labor; pressure on Portugal to remedy such practices.
- f. Restrictions on massive European immigration, especially of unskilled labor; creation of economic opportunities in Portugal to relieve population pressures.

2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

- a. The Africans, while a majority in Angola, were split into tribal and sub-tribal groups that were frequently hostile toward each other.
- b. The Europeans were more cohesive. While there was dissatisfaction with Portuguese economic policies and while the political splits within Portugal were mirrored among Angolan Europeans, these divisions did not represent any significant support for African aspirations.

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[Into this situation were injected a number of factors, some of them arising outside Portugal and Angola, that culminated in the outbreak of violence in Angola between the Portuguese and a sizeable proportion of the African population.]

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Strengthening tribalism, sectionalism, and animosity among tribes.
- b. Strengthening European cohesiveness but also developing support among the Europeans for the satisfaction of African aspirations.

B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[The measures listed here include those aimed at preventing hostilities both by remedies addressed to basic grievances and by more efficient police and military control. Insofar as the objective being examined is the prevention of hostilities, either is relevant although the two are probably incompatible.]

1. Factors Tending Toward the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. In the 1950s the emergence of independent states in Africa proceeded at a rapid pace. The desire for independence stirred the Africans in Angola, just as it stirred Africans elsewhere on the continent.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Slowing down or reversing the trend toward decolonization; alternatively, readjusting Portuguese policy toward achieving this goal in Angola.

- b. Specifically, the achievement of independence by the former French and Belgian Congos brought the movement to Angola's borders. The impact was magnified by the kinship of the Africans in the portions of Angola bordering the Congos with the major tribal groups in those two states.
- c. Political organizations began to emerge among the Africans. Particularly among the Bakongo peoples of the north and northeast, these groups advocated Angolan independence. Political organizations emerged also among the urban African and mixed-blood elites.
- d. Given its colonial philosophy and practice, Portugal pursued a policy of suppression against these groups. Official Portuguese fears were magnified by anti-Salazar sentiment among Angolan whites which Lisbon took, probably inaccurately, as a sign of collusion between Portuguese liberals and African agitators.
- e. The police and military measures taken by Portugal to counter African discontent and the potential threat of violence increased the Africans' desire to rid themselves of Portuguese domination.
- b. Strict border control to minimize contact across it; alternatively, creating an environment in Angola that was more attractive to the Africans in Angola; alternatively, readjusting Portuguese policy toward eventual (not too far distant) self-determination in Angola.
- c. Suppression of such African organizations; alternatively, acceptance of them as legitimate channels by which African views and demands could be transmitted, or creation of alternate channels; accommodation of African demands.
- d. More effective Portuguese suppression; alternatively, accommodation to African and European Angolan demands, while seeking to ensure that these were compatible with each other.
- e. Employment of police and other repression measures only for goals shared by the majority; alternatively, efficient and thorough repression to eliminate or intimidate opposition.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. Rival pro-Portuguese African political organizations existed in Angola. These tended to be supported and encouraged by the Catholic missions, in contrast to the encouragement given the pro-independence organizations by the Protestant missions.
- b. Pro-independence African organizations were split along several dimensions, including personal rivalries, tribal differences, and cultural levels.
- c. The splits within the Angolan independence movement were magnified and exacerbated by the struggle among the independent states of Africa for leadership of the continent. The rival Casablanca and Monrovia groups supported rival Angolan groups.
- d. Opposition to Salazar in Portugal and among Portuguese in Angola included opposition to his policy in Angola. While it is not at all clear that this was equivalent to support for independence for a majority-ruled Angola, it probably indicated support for a less repressive, exploitative colonial system.

- e. The Portuguese government took strong measures against those, African and European, who expressed opposition. Minor disturbances were countered by mass arrests and intimidation.

- f. In terms of military and police power, the Portuguese were vastly stronger than the African dissidents. Portugal further re-

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Encouragement of disunity among Africans, along whatever tribal, religious lines existed.
- b. Encouraging disunity among pro-independence groups.
- c. Encourage disunity among African states and weak interstate organization.
- d. Strengthen opposition to Salazar and a more liberal Portuguese government and colonial policy; encourage political democracy in Portugal.
- e. Efficient, thorough repression of opposition; alternatively, accommodation to demands of Africans and Europeans (if compatible).
- f. Increasing Portuguese physical strength and control in Angola, military and paramilitary.

inforced its troops in Angola and deployed them in inland towns, particularly in the areas near the Congo border. The colonial administration also encouraged white civilians to arm themselves.

C. PHASE III TO PHASE IV: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[In early 1961, violence on a large and sustained scale broke out in Angola. The violence began in the cities and subsequently spread to the countryside, particularly in the northern areas bordering the Congo (Kinshasa).]

C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

[Terminating hostilities could mean either a quick, decisive Portuguese victory or a negotiated end to fighting that conceded to African demands. Measures designed to do both are included here, although they are incompatible.]

1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Denying access to Angola to press representatives; alternatively, earlier world attention to conditions in Angola to reduce the temptation to create incidents that would obtain it.
 - b. Border control, possibly by third parties; enforcement of international agreements against intervention.
1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities
 - a. Early in 1961, liberal Portuguese opposition to Salazar was dramatized by the Santa Maria incident. The approach of the Santa Maria to the Angolan port of Luanda focused world attention on the colony and brought correspondents from around the world to Luanda. The African dissidents had a unique opportunity to dramatize their case before the world.
 - b. The rebels in northern Angola had sanctuaries in both Congo (Kinshasa) and Congo (Brazzaville) although the former was the more crucial. The border was long and largely unpatrolled, and the terrain made it difficult to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations.

- c. The independent African states gave active encouragement and materiel support to the rebels.
 - d. The states that probably had the greatest influence on Portugal were constrained from exerting strong pressure on Portugal by the larger strategic interests represented by common NATO membership. The United States in particular regarded it as vital, in terms of these larger concerns, to maintain its base rights in the Azores--rights scheduled to be renegotiated in 1962.
2. Factors Tending to Terminate Hostilities
- a. The Portuguese moved to counter possible extended urban violence by arrests and strong reprisals among Africans and by arrests, transfers, and dismissals of dis-trusted Europeans.
 - b. Although there were incidents and arrests in widely scattered parts of Angola, major unrest was confined largely to northern Angola and the Bakongo tribe. Tribal rivalries and the efforts of pro-Portuguese African organizations played a part in this development. It was reinforced by Portugal's use of African troops from southern tribes.
 - c. The arms available to the rebels were primitive and few, and training and organization were weak. Guerrilla warfare tactics, which would have helped overcome materiel deficiencies,
- c. Enforcement of international agreements against intervention; inspection to identify and halt the flow of materiel aid.
 - d. Removal of the larger strategic considerations that caused such high value to be placed on NATO and the Azores bases (ideally, ending of Soviet threat to Western Europe); alternatively, developing alternatives to air and naval bases; effective U.S./British controls over use made of weapons supplied.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. More effective Portuguese counter-measures; more effective police action prior to the outbreak of violence.
 - b. Strengthening disunity among the Africans in Angola.
 - c. Restricting the sale or pro-vision of arms to the rebels; restriction on providing military training and advice.

were handicapped by the fact that the mountainous-jungle terrain that facilitated these tactics existed in small, relatively isolated pockets. Thus, coordinated guerrilla operations were further restricted.

- d. The Portuguese authorities used their superior military power to crush the rebellion. Relatively unresponsive to world public opinion and prepared to deal strongly with domestic critics, the Portuguese employed their quantitatively and qualitatively superior military equipment ruthlessly. Quasi-official civilian "vigilante" groups were permitted and encouraged to operate.
 - e. The availability of the Congo sanctuary was threatened by both internal turmoil in that country and by its loss of enthusiasm for the bickering Angolan liberation groups. The reliance of the Congo (Kinshasa) on railroad routes through Angola for export of copper and, to a lesser extent, Angolan control of the mouth of the Congo River, gave Portugal leverage on the Congo government to discourage larger or more direct involvement in the Angolan fighting.
 - f. Contention between rival rebel organizations grew even more bitter, leading to assassinations and threatened armed clashes.
 - g. Portuguese liberal opposition to the government's Angolan policy reached into high levels of the military, especially the air force. While the government took action to counter the threat, the existence of high-level dissatisfaction made the government anxious to end the threat quickly.
- d. Increasing Portuguese military efficiency (to terminate hostilities by a quick victory); however, restricting Portuguese armed strength in Angola by restrictions on use of NATO-supplied weapons (to encourage Portuguese accommodation to African demands).
 - e. Increase disunity and chaos in the Congo; enforcement of international agreements prohibiting intervention; increasing Congolese dependence on Portuguese good will.
 - f. Increasing disunity among rebel organizations.
 - g. Strengthening liberal opposition in Portugal.

- h. The United Nations urged an end to the fighting and Portuguese accession to African demands. The Security Council, however, was unwilling to take coercive action against Portugal.
- h. Stronger U.N. action, including coercive action against Portugal. [This would probably have entailed the presence of a U.N. force in Angola to separate the adversaries and possibly subdue the Portuguese. While this would have terminated African-Portuguese hostilities, it could well have precipitated a new round of hostilities.]
- i. Increased pressure on Portugal; much earlier world attention. [While this measure had little impact on the 1961 hostilities, its effect in the future will be stabilizing if Portugal is persuaded to yield, but destabilizing if it is not.]
- j. More general reform, including acceptance of African goal of independence; much earlier institution of such reforms.
- i. The United Nations created a special sub-committee to report on developments in Angola, thus providing a focus for world attention to developments there and a means of increasing pressure on Portugal and sympathy for the African cause.
- j. The Portuguese instituted some reforms, particularly in the labor and pass laws that had been a major focus of African resentment.

D. PHASE IV

[This analysis ends with the termination of hostilities in the fall of 1961, which was brought about by the military reassertion of Portuguese control over the rebellious areas. Clearly the conflict has not been ended and, since 1961, hostilities have been resumed on several occasions, although not on quite the 1961 scale.]

WEC-98 III

III. WEAPONS ANALYSIS

[This case is not among those selected for weapons analysis.]

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL

"Controlling" the Conflict

Conflict control meant in Angola keeping Portuguese colonial policy from playing itself out in both short-term and longer-term tragic violence. Specifically, it meant keeping the dissidents from being forced into open fighting, either by ruthless suppression, or, if longer-term violence was to be avoided, by enlightened reform.

Terminating hostilities meant either a quick and decisive Portuguese victory, or a negotiated end to fighting that accepted African demands.

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. The great historical irony of Western colonialism is that in the short term it brought order into unorganized alien areas; but in the long run it bred violence and eviction of the Western ruler. The only way to have avoided violence completely would be to have avoided colonial domination in the first place. But of course it did occur. Given that, if the prime aim is to minimize violence, in the short run the colonial ruler must be capable of total suppression. But in the long run he must get out before he is driven out. Weakness in the short run or hanging on in the long run is bound to produce violent conflict.

2. Angola was--and is--no exception. The way to avoid continuous conflict is to minimize present tensions and prepare the population for speedy self-rule. Portugal has done neither. The indicated policies would have turned on genuine political, economic, and social equality for all Angolans through programs of training and education, backed by unswerving U.N. and ILO insistence on oversight despite Lisbon's insistence that Angola was a province of metropolitan Portugal. Portugal needed education both as to the realities of African change and the essentials of democratic philosophy including the right of self-determination.

Portugal would probably have also benefited from financial and technical help in creating opportunities for idle Portuguese to avoid having to enlarge the intransigent white-settler population in Africa.

3. The United States, whose views on colonialism and liberty came through loud and clear to the British in the 1940s, has been muted with its tiny and weak ally Portugal, generally because of the U.S. use of the Azores base. This muffled tone about its deepest beliefs is unworthy of the United States (and contributes to its unfriendly image as a mindlessly powerful giant). The U.S. voice should be leading the chorus to avoid ultimate holocaust in the southern half of Africa.

Historically it is not clear that U.S. concern for the sensibilities of its French ally in Indochina and Algeria, or for the Belgians in the Congo before 1960--or for Portugal in Africa--helped either those allies or the United States, and it certainly did not benefit the people living in those unhappy regions. Conflict control happily combines with common sense and decency to suggest a vigorous and positive U.S. policy of anti-colonialism and self-determination.

4. Failing a policy of enlightened foresightedness, to keep the built-in dispute in Angola from becoming violent, a conflict-control strategy would seek to keep the Africans divided and quarrelsome, while building the cohesiveness of the white settlers. As indicated, this kind of policy usually has a rather short half-life when it comes to genuine avoidance of conflict.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

5. Given the preconditions for conflict, measures to avoid open hostilities were extensions of those mentioned before: either to strengthen the oppressive capabilities of Portugal and its settlers while keeping the Africans--and Africa--fragmented; or to reverse Portuguese colonial policy and move Angola toward freedom, accepting indigenous organizations as spokesmen instead of oppressing them.

6. With a repressive policy, several detailed measures favored short-term avoidance of violence. Given the spill-over of (e.g., Bakongo) tribesmen across the artificially-drawn colonial (e.g., Congolese) boundaries, conflict control would have involved even more efficient, forceful suppression, strict border control, and the curbing and splitting of African independence groups. Even then, more attractive conditions for the Africans in Angola might have lessened their demands, as would the placing of careful limits on police action.

7. A special problem exists where a local white minority ruling a black majority has strained relations with its European metropole. Angola in this sense has resembled Rhodesia and, in a way, South Africa. A dual conflict exists in the latter two, and potentially in Angola and Mozambique. To keep the settler-metropole tension under control while minimizing racial tension requires either complete harmony between metropole and settlers in a repressive policy, or independence plus acceptance by the settlers of black majority rule. Either metropole and settlers or settlers and Africans must have compatible goals; otherwise there will be conflict. The preferred policy for avoidance of conflict is of course the latter. In Angola it requires changed attitudes on the part of the settlers, and pressures on Portugal.

Terminating Hostilities

8. The most efficient measures to halt the violence once it broke out were on the side of suppression: effective military and police action, plus isolation of the rebels from each other and from sanctuary by means of border controls, plus pressure on the Congolese; also isolation of the rebels from African and other help by sealing the area and enforcing international agreements against intervention in such forms as arms, military training, and advice.

9. In a longer perspective on the problem of violence, as suggested earlier, genuine reform might have mollified the rebels (although

it might have been unacceptable to the white settlers). The main agency for this might have been U.S. pressure, which under the circumstances might have been easier to contemplate if substitutes (e.g., floating bases, very long-range aircraft, improved ASW technology, etc.) had been vigorously sought for the Azores base. U.S. and Allied pressure, in addition to political and moral suasion, could have limited NATO-supplied weapons to Portugal.

10. This might in turn have reinforced mounting liberal opposition within Portugal militating toward a quick end to the fighting. U.N. pressure to end hostilities would hardly have supported Portuguese suppression, and if forcibly introduced would probably have widened the scope of violence. But in conjunction with influential bilateral and internal pressures for reform, it might have helped not only to end violence but to avert later resumption of hostilities as well.

11. To recapitulate, relevant conflict-control measures were:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Avoidance of colonialism

Preparation for self-rule

Genuine political, social, economic equality

through

Training and education

overseen by

U.N. and ILO oversight of dependent territories*

Democracy in metropole

Substitute for bases

U.S. leadership in anticolonialism and self-determination

or

Efforts to keep Africans divided and quarrelsome (sic)*

and

Attempts to build cohesiveness of white settlers (sic)*

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Forceful suppression by whites (sic)*

Strengthened colonial rule (sic)*

Border controls, elimination of sanctuary and aid*

Harmony between metropole and settlers*

and

Enforcement of international agreements vs. intervention

or

Reform policy leading to independence and majority rule

Acceptance of indigenous organization leadership

and

Limitation of police activities

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Efficient military and police action (sic)*

Isolation of rebels (sic)*

Enforcement of international agreements vs. intervention

or

Genuine reform

under

U.N. moral pressure*

U.S. and allied pressure on Portugal

U.S. substitutes for Azores, e.g., floating bases,
very long-range aircraft, improved ASW technology

Help for liberal opposition

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

THE SOVIET - IRANIAN CONFLICT :
1941 - 1947

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.	585
A.	Background of the Conflict	585
B.	Phase II: August 1941 -- August 1945.	588
C.	Phase III ₁ : August 26, 1945 -- December 15, 1945.	592
D.	Phase IV ₁ : December 15, 1945 -- December 10, 1946	595
E.	Phase III ₂ : December 10, 1946 -- December 15, 1946.	606
F.	Phase IV ₂ : December 15, 1946 -- October 22, 1947.	606
G.	Settlement: From October 22, 1947	607
II.	Factors Bearing on Transition	608
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option.	608
B.	Phase II to Phase III ₁ : The Outbreak of Hostilities	609
C.	Phase III ₁ to Phase IV ₁ : The Termination of Hostilities	611
D.	Phase IV ₁ : Restricting the Scale and Scope of Potential Hostilities.	612
E.	Phase IV ₁ to Phase III ₂ : The Resumption of Hostilities.	617
F.	Phase III ₂ to Phase IV ₂ : The Termination of Hostilities	619
G.	Phase IV ₂ to S: Settlement of the Dispute	619
III.	Weapons Analysis.	621
A.	Soviet Weapons Acquisition	621
B.	Iranian Weapons Acquisition.	622
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.	624

THE SOVIET - IRANIAN CONFLICT :

1941 - 1947

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES


A. Background of the Conflict

During the century and a half preceding World War I, Iran was a battleground, virtually passive itself, on which the imperial struggles of the great powers were carried out. Russia and Britain were the constant factors: Russian policy had traditionally been to expand toward the Dardanelles, Turkey, and the Middle East; British policy had focused on the maintenance of Iran as a protective buffer for India and on the preservation of economic advantages gained in Iran during the course of the struggle against Russian expansion.

1. Previous Soviet-Iranian Conflicts. In 1920 the Red Army regained control in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, three parts of Russia that had proclaimed their independence at the time of the Bolshevik revolution. Large numbers of refugees fled to Turkey and Iran, including many who left Soviet Azerbaijan to take refuge in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan.¹

At the same time, the Soviets gave significant military aid to several local rebel governments established in northern Iran--broadly

¹George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1949), p. 26. The author was with the Polish Legation in Iran from 1942 to 1945.



Adapted from Richard W. Van Wagenen, The Iranian Case 1946 (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1952), with permission of the publisher.

speaking, in the same area that was to be involved in the 1941-1947 Soviet-Iranian conflict. In May 1920 the Soviet fleet bombarded the Iranian port of Enzeli on the Caspian as the Soviets pursued remnants of the White Russian army under British protection there. A Soviet expeditionary force, composed of regular Red Army units, sailors from Kronstadt, Soviet Azerbaijani troops, and armed Persian oil workers from Baku, soon occupied most of the coastal Iranian province of Gilan. The Soviets alleged that this was a security measure undertaken by the independent Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, over whose actions and policies Moscow had no influence.¹ In 1921 the Soviet Republic of Gilan, with the support of Soviet advisors and troops, launched an unsuccessful attack on Teheran. The Soviets subsequently withdrew their aid from Gilan and Iran easily regained control of that territory. After this period of semi-open conflict, Soviet-Iranian relations became relatively stabilized.

A Soviet-Iranian treaty that was to play a role in the 1941-1947 conflict was concluded in 1921, "a genuine 'leave-me-alone' treaty made by two very weak nations on the defensive who were both anxious to have time to recuperate."² Each nation was to prohibit activity on its territory by groups that had designs on the other. A key provision stated that if a third party attempted armed intervention in Iran or sought to use Iranian territory as a base of operations against any of the Soviet republics and if the Iranian government were not able to deal with the situation, the Soviets would have the right to move their troops into the Iranian interior.³

The tradition of the Russian threat to Iranian territorial integrity and of Iranian suspicion of Russia was fortified by the many differences between the two societies. The Moslem clergy and the devout

¹Ibid., pp. 52-53, 59.

²Richard W. Van Wagenen, in consultation with T. Cuyler Young, The Iranian Case 1946 (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1952), p. 10.

³Ibid., pp. 10-11.

in general in Iran were anti-Communist; and the difficulties faced by Moslems inside the Soviet Union increased this feeling. During World War II the left-wing Tudeh ("masses") party gained considerable strength in Iran, appealing to some real grievances and supported by many liberal intellectuals. However, the Tudeh lost strength as its connection with the Soviet Union became clearer and as Soviet and Iranian national aims came into direct conflict.

2. Geographic and Physical Factors. The Iranian province of Azerbaijan, focus of the 1941-1947 conflict, borders on the Soviet Union. Tabriz, the provincial capital, is only 60 miles from the Soviet Union. The border area is mountainous and difficult, but crossed by well-developed railways and paved roads built as lend-lease supply routes during World War II. Natural barriers between Azerbaijan and the rest of Iran do not offer serious obstacles to military movement, at least on a limited scale. The geography and terrain of the area thus offered no real advantages to either party in the conflict.

B. Phase II: August 1941 -- August 1945

Britain and the Soviet Union occupied Iran in August 1941 to prevent it from falling under pro-German control. The Soviets occupied the northern provinces, including Azerbaijan, and the British the southern and central regions, with a neutral zone including Teheran in the middle. In January 1942 the situation was formalized in a tripartite treaty among Britain, the Soviet Union, and Iran, in which Britain and the Soviet Union promised to withdraw their forces no later than six months after the end of all hostilities. It was also agreed that the occupying forces were to disturb as little as possible the internal affairs of Iran.¹

Subsequently, U.S. forces also entered Iran to handle lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union. The United States never formally

¹U.S. Army Area Handbook for Iran (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1963), pp. 174-175.

became a party to the tripartite agreement but informally operated under its provisions. At Teheran in November 1943 the Soviet Union, United States, and Britain signed a Declaration on Iran, which reaffirmed Iran's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.¹

1. Soviet Wartime Pressures. It is not clear the exact time at which the Soviet Union began to perceive its military force as being useful in achieving its postwar objectives in Iran. While the occasion for the introduction of Soviet forces into Iran arose from broad requirements of World War II strategy, the Soviets quickly began to exert pressures directly and indirectly on internal Iranian politics. For example, the Tudeh, formed in January 1942 as a legal political party, had a hard core of Moscow-trained leaders. The party played a major role in Teheran politics as well as in the attempted communization of Azerbaijan.² The Soviet military presence thus provided a shield for the development of a Communist movement which the Soviets sought to use to influence and possibly eventually control the government of all Iran.

In October 1944 the Soviet Union made broad and vague demands for an oil concession in the five northern provinces of Iran. Iranian Premier Saed announced that no concessions would be granted to any foreign parties until after the war. However, the Soviets were able to keep up sufficient pressure, through the Tudeh and a press campaign, that Premier Saed finally had to resign. The Soviet demands were not dropped until the Iranian national assembly, the Majles, passed a law making it a crime for any government official to enter any negotiations

¹Ibid., p. 176.

²During the wartime period, Iranian political life reflected the lifting of restrictions on political activity that followed the abdication of Reza Shah and the stresses of wartime occupation. Politics became a crazy quilt of parties and interest groups, with a rapid turnover of governments. However, with the exception of the Tudeh, all political parties were in agreement on the objective of regaining complete control of all the territory of Iran and on the complete evacuation of Soviet troops.

with any foreign government or oil company.¹

2. Iranian Reactions. During World War II the Iranians were concerned that the Soviets were using their position as an occupying power to pursue their long-term goals vis-à-vis Iran. The Iranians responded to Soviet pressure by utilizing the U.S. military mission in an advisory capacity to reorganize and strengthen their army and gendarmerie.

The Iranian army was generally loyal to the institution of the monarchy, although there was some infiltration by the Tudeh.² Iranian Chief of Staff General Arfa states that the army consisted of about 100,000 men (though this may be an exaggeration). There was some local production of small arms and ammunition (before the war, at least), and the Iranian forces had some modern offensive weaponry. (See Section III for details.)

During World War II, with U.S. aid, the Iranian gendarmerie became an efficient force "whose loyalty to the government often proved to be of decisive significance. . . .The calm and determined attitude of the gendarmerie at the time of the Azerbaijan crisis in 1945-1946 . . . prevented panic and riots in the capital at a most critical moment."³

During the wartime occupation, the over-all military balance

¹Benjamin Shwadrán, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, 2nd edition revised (New York, Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 65-67.

²Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (London, John Murray, 1964), p. 354. General Arfa, Iranian Chief of Staff until February 1946, claims to have uncovered a plot for a military rising in Teheran late in 1945, in which between 50 and 100 subversive officers were involved; he also states that the defense of Teheran was complicated for him because of "Communist secret agents, whose presence was suspected within the General Staff itself." There was also some defection to the forces of the Azerbaijani army during the course of the conflict.

³Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 304.

in Iran between Iranian and Soviet forces was overwhelmingly in favor of the Soviets. Before March 2, 1946, there was reported to be in Iran a "garrison force" of about three Soviet divisions--one infantry and two cavalry--with supporting armor.¹ The Soviets had a barracks area in Tabriz and presumably facilities for maintenance of their military equipment. All this personnel and materiel was brought in openly as part of the wartime occupation. (See Section III for details.)

During World War II, Iran had special relationships with both Britain and the United States. However, while the Iranians needed British support against the Soviets, they regarded it as something of a Trojan horse. Suspicion of British motives was widespread and it was feared that Britain and the Soviet Union would divide Iran between themselves.²

British military posture in the Middle East, while weakened as a result of war exhaustion, was of a continuing nature. The British were still in India and Egypt and had bases in Aden, Kuwait, and Bahrein; they also had effective control of the Jordanian and Iraqi armies.

Iran's important relationship with the United States began during World War II as an outgrowth of the presence of the Persian Gulf Command forces in Iran. U.S. backing of Iran was not vigorous in the early days of the conflict, although the Iranian Ambassador seems to have had no difficulty in being heard in Washington.³

3. The End of the War in Europe. After the war in Europe was ended, Iran made repeated and unsuccessful efforts, beginning in May 1945, to persuade the Soviet Union to cease interfering in internal

¹Robert Rossow, Jr., "The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946," Middle East Journal, Vol. X, No. 1 (Winter 1946), p. 19. Rossow was the U.S. Consul in Tabriz from December 1945 until July 1946, then chief of the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran until January 1947.

²Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran (New York, Whittier Books, 1954).

³Ibid., pp. 270, 279, etc.

Iranian politics and asked the British and the Soviets to withdraw altogether. In reply, both the British and Soviets pointed out that they were not legally obliged to leave before the agreed deadline--six months after the end of hostilities. However, in the spring of 1945 the British did begin partial withdrawal and fruitlessly sought Soviet agreement for simultaneous action. The Soviets refused but did agree to the early evacuation of the Teheran area, which meant withdrawal of air-force maintenance units and land troops by both Soviets and British. The Teheran evacuation began on August 7, 1945, but the Soviets replaced their uniformed troops with NKVD plainclothesmen, estimated at several thousand. Thus the possibility of Soviet military action in the capital remained.¹ Soviet propaganda pressure on Iran increased during this period, and the activities of Soviet agents among the tribes and among the Iranian army officers stationed in provinces under Soviet control led, in mid-August, to violent disturbances in Khorasan and Azerbaijan. The Iranian army put down the revolt in Khorasan, but was not so successful in Azerbaijan.²

C. Phase III₁: August 26, 1945 -- December 15, 1945

On August 26, 1945, the Tudeh temporarily took control of Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan. The armed partisans

under the protection of the Russian soldiers . . . first occupied the police department, opened the doors of the prison cells and freed all the criminals and convicts. Communication between Teheran and Azerbaijan was cut. The garrison of Tabriz was kept in its barracks by the Red army and the gendarmerie was not allowed to leave its headquarters.³

Despite Soviet assistance, the Tudeh coup failed to achieve its goals. One analyst describes the events as follows:

¹Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 285.

²Ibid., p. 286.

³Fatemi, op. cit., p. 265.

During the coup d'etat at Tabriz, the Communist force had shown confusion, inexperience, incompetence and lack of discipline. When they had failed to fulfill their mission, everything had to be conducted by the Soviet soldiers and officers and this had put the Russians in a difficult position.¹

Within several days, the rebel movement unilaterally relinquished the gains it had achieved, evacuated the few buildings it had seized, re-established communications with Teheran, and, officially at least, restored authority to the local governor.

In October 1945 the Tudeh in Azerbaijan was renamed the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, with the intention of dissociating the national Tudeh party from any actions in Azerbaijan. On October 23 several new divisions of the Red Army entered Iran. Meanwhile, the Soviet Consul General in Tabriz was masterminding preparation for the actual rebellion. He exercised his control through an apparatus of Town Commandants, military personnel obedient to the political rather than the military command. The rebels were covertly organized and a number of muhajirs (or "refugees") from Soviet Azerbaijan joined them. "On November 15, 1945, the Soviets began the wholesale distribution of arms to the rebels and on the following day a carefully planned revolutionary operation was launched."²

The central government sent a relief column north, but it was turned back without a fight by the Soviets on November 20.³ The Iranian garrison in Tabriz was surrounded by the rebels and eventually surrendered without fighting; the commander of the garrison, who was sent back to Teheran, reported that "the Iranian soldiers, numbering 900, had been

¹Paul E. Weaver, The Soviet-Iranian Affair, 1945-1946, Master's thesis (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University, 1951), pp. 41-42; Fatemi, op. cit., p. 266.

²Rossow, op. cit., p. 18.

³Ibid.

surrounded by ten thousand Russian troops and by the Democrats armed with machine guns, who had occupied all the hills around the barracks."¹ General fighting continued for several weeks, until on December 12, 1945, the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan was proclaimed in Tabriz.

The Soviets obstructed all movements of the Iranian army or gendarmerie against the rebels, protected all activities of the rebel forces by their own military presence, and intimidated the population by various means.² The Soviets also played on Kurdish nationalism and complicated the problem for the Iranians by sponsoring the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.³ The Republic of Mahabad was geographically contiguous with the Republic of Azerbaijan and entered an alliance with it, although there was continuous friction between the two rebel regimes.⁴

Altogether, the Iranians directed 24 notes of protest to the Soviet Embassy in Teheran between May 2 and November 23, 1945. The Soviet Ambassador to Iran, however, absented himself from Teheran during the November uprising in Azerbaijan, and the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires professed complete ignorance of the rebellion.⁵

The question of evacuation of troops was discussed without effect at the London Foreign Ministers' meeting in September-October

¹Fatemi, op. cit., p. 278.

²Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 288.

³The Republic of Mahabad declared its independence of Teheran in December 1945 and was not reoccupied by the central government until a year later. The Soviets were said to have promised the Kurds planes, tanks, and heavy weapons and to have taken some 50 Kurds to Baku for military and political training; but all that materialized was Soviet pressure on reluctant Kurdish tribesmen to fight for the rebel republic.

⁴Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," Middle East Journal, Vol. I, No. 3 (July 1947), pp. 247-269. Roosevelt was U.S. Assistant Military Attaché in Teheran from March 1946 to February 1947.

⁵Weaver, op. cit., p. 93.

1945. In November, after the rebellion had broken out, the Iranian Ambassador in Washington brought the question to President Truman's attention and publicly accused the Soviet Union of engineering the revolt in Azerbaijan.¹ The United States and Britain sent parallel notes to the Soviet Union proposing the withdrawal of all foreign troops by January 1946. In reply, the Soviet Union denied that it had interfered with the movement of Iranian troops already in Azerbaijan and claimed that the introduction of further Iranian troops would have increased rather than calmed disturbances in the province, thus necessitating the introduction of further Soviet troops.²

D. Phase IV₁: December 15, 1945 -- December 10, 1946

Except for minor and transitory episodes, hostilities did not break out again between Iranian and Soviet or Soviet-sponsored rebel forces for almost a year. This year can be divided into several distinct sub-phases.

1. Sub-Phase A: December 15, 1945 -- March 2, 1946. This was a period of relatively little military activity, considerable diplomatic activity, and a general hardening of positions. The government of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan consolidated its control over the province, instituting a number of popular reforms (such as land redistribution and the use of Turkish in the administration and schools) and using police-state terror methods of control. The new government was composed of men who were strongly linked to the Soviets or directly imported from the Soviet Union.

The Soviets made a serious effort to develop the Azerbaijani army. The Red Army uniform was used, the training of the new army was entrusted to Soviet officers, and the army cadres were heavily infiltrated

¹Fatemi, op. cit., p. 270.

²Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1948), Vol. VIII, July 1, 1945-December 31, 1946, pp. 851-853.

by Soviet agents.¹ One observer describes the objective as:

a tough little Azerbaijani army, intended to provide a backbone for the mass of Communist irregulars who had pulled off the revolt. . . .The basic weapon was a sub-machine gun of Czech manufacture, and the Russians later added a number of light tanks and artillery. Several hundred officer candidates were taken to military bases in Soviet Azerbaijan. . . for intensive training in artillery, armor, aviation, and chemical warfare. Soviet officers and troops could be seen almost daily in the training grounds just beyond the Tabriz barracks area carrying out joint maneuvers with Azerbaijani forces and training them in the use of Soviet heavy artillery, rocket launchers, and heavy armor.²

In December 1945, at the Allied Foreign Ministers' meeting in Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes told Stalin that unless the Teheran Declaration on Iran were honored, Iran would probably place its complaint before the United Nations and that, as a signatory of the Declaration, the United States would feel obliged to support Iran's right to be heard.

In response to this:

Stalin outlined what he termed the "pertinent facts" in the matter. The Baku oil fields in the south of Russia lay close to the border and this created a special problem. These fields had to be safeguarded against any possible hostile action by Iran against the Soviet Union, and no confidence could be placed in the Iranian Government. Saboteurs might be sent to the Baku oil fields to set them on fire, he continued. Since the Soviet Union had a right, by treaty, to maintain troops in Iran until March 15 [1946], it did not want to withdraw before that date. At that time, he said, it would be necessary to examine the situation and see whether or not it was possible to evacuate the soldiers. That decision

¹Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 290; Fatemi, op. cit., p. 277.

²Rossow, op. cit., p. 25.

would depend upon the conduct of the Iranian Government. He pointed out that the 1921 treaty with Iran gave the Soviet Union the right to send troops into northern Iran if there was a possible danger from an outside source.¹

This statement by Stalin is perhaps the best official definition of the Soviet claims. The Soviets relied on the terms of the 1942 tripartite treaty as a basis for refusing to evacuate before March 1946, and on the terms of the 1921 treaty, combined with alleged danger to the Baku oil fields, as a basis for a possible refusal to withdraw after the March deadline.

Despite the failure of the Moscow conference in December 1945, all U.S. troops were withdrawn from Iran by January 1, 1946.² The British did not complete their evacuation until the date prescribed by the 1942 treaty but their remaining forces were not large.

On January 19, 1946, the Iranian government (then under Premier Hakimi) lodged its first complaint with the U.N. Security Council: "Owing to the interference of the Soviet Union, through the medium of its officials and armed forces, in the internal affairs of Iran, a situation has arisen which may lead to international friction."³

The Soviet representative denied the truth of the Iranian complaint and attempted to present the issue as a purely Soviet-Iranian matter, appropriate for bilateral negotiations rather than international

¹James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, Harper, 1947), p. 119.

²Dennett and Turner, op. cit., pp. 851-852. In a note dated November 24, the United States announced that the order for complete evacuation by January 1, 1946, had been given; there is no indication that this order was withdrawn or that any U.S. forces remained after that date.

³Van Wagenen, op. cit., p. 111. The Iranian central government was faced with the presence of several thousand Soviet agents in Teheran itself. Fatemi, op. cit., p. 287.

consideration.¹ The United States and Britain, while supporting Iran, were reluctant to take an extreme position, and the Security Council finally passed a resolution calling on the parties to negotiate (but did not drop the complaint from its agenda).²

The Soviets kept up their pressure on the Iranian government, including severing all trade between Azerbaijan and the rest of Iran. According to one analyst, "the economic strain thus created was intolerable."³ In the face of this and other pressure, there was a cabinet crisis in Iran while the Security Council debate was taking place, and Premier Hakimi was replaced by Premier Qavam, "known for his flirtation with the Tudeh."⁴ Qavam took several steps directed at propitiating the Soviets, such as arresting General Arfa, who was considered pro-British. Qavam then went to Moscow for negotiations on February 19, 1946. The negotiations were not successful. The Soviets made extreme demands: for instance, that Soviet troops continue to stay in some parts of Iran for an indefinite period and that the Iranians agree to an Iranian-Soviet joint-stock oil company, 51 per cent Soviet-owned.⁵ During this period the Iranians were receiving assurances of U.S. and British support.

2. Sub-Phase B: March 2, 1946 -- March 25, 1946. This was the peak of the conflict, dominated by military developments though no actual fighting took place. The Soviets did not evacuate on March 2 and thus unambiguously violated the 1942 treaty. At this point the other party to the treaty (Britain) and the other parties to the Teheran Declaration (Britain and the United States) were drawn actively

¹Van Wagenen, op. cit., pp. 32, 36; Fatemi, op. cit., p. 276.

²Van Wagenen, op. cit., pp. 30-41.

³Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 295.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 296.

into the conflict. The United States and Britain both sent notes of protest.

After March 2 the U.S. government began receiving reports from Tabriz of a massive Soviet military build-up in the province. According to the U.S. Consul in Tabriz,¹ the movements consisted almost entirely of armor and motorized infantry with supporting artillery; at least fifteen armored brigades, composed of some 500 tanks with appropriate auxiliary forces, were brought in, in a massive, sudden offensive build-up. According to a report from Teheran dated March 22, a "responsible" source said official estimates of Soviet strength in northern Iran had reached nearly 100,000.²

The new troops were divided into three assault forces and a reserve. One assault force menaced Teheran, and the other two were directed toward Turkey and Iraq. While introducing this major offensive force into Azerbaijan, the Soviets simultaneously moved another armored force through eastern Bulgaria, deploying it along the frontier of Turkey-in-Europe. They concurrently opened a diplomatic and propaganda offensive against Turkey, while the Kurdish People's Republic of Mahabad proclaimed rights of sovereignty over the Turkish Kurds.³

On March 9 the United States sent another protest to the Soviet Union,⁴ and in British and American newspapers during the weeks that followed there were daily headlines and front-page reports on the Soviet-Iranian situation. One account speculated:

¹Rossow, op. cit., p. 20; Peter Lisagor and Marguerite Higgins, Overtime in Heaven: Adventures in the Foreign Service (New York, Doubleday, 1964), pp. 156-158.

²New York Times, March 25, 1946.

³Rossow, op. cit., p. 21.

⁴U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIV, No. 350 (March 17, 1946), p. 435.

The seizure of Iranian Azerbaijan and northern Kurdistan and the extraction of various concessions from Iran were the primary Soviet goals. Now it seems clear that these are only subordinate means toward a far larger end--the reduction of Turkey, the main bastion against Soviet advance into the entire Middle East.¹

As far as can be determined, neither Britain nor the United States threatened a direct military response.² However, during March the U.S. battleship Missouri was sent to Istanbul with the remains of the Turkish Ambassador. According to analyst Hanson Baldwin, this cruise was a response to the Soviet build-up in Iran; Baldwin also reported that plans to send the entire Eighth [sic] Fleet on a Mediterranean cruise were cancelled at the instigation of the U.S. State Department, which decided that the dispatch of such a sizeable force might be interpreted as unnecessarily provocative.³

Iranian Premier Qavam returned from negotiations in Moscow shortly before March 14, the last day of the term of the Majles. Since a law had been passed the year before that no new Majles could be elected while foreign troops were still in the country and since Tudeh-sponsored demonstrations prevented a quorum from entering the parliament building until after the date had passed when any action could be taken, Premier Qavam became the virtual dictator⁴ and remained so until elections were held the following January.

Premier Qavam remained silent when the Soviets poured in

¹Rossow, op. cit., p. 21.

²In a news conference in 1952, President Truman referred to an "ultimatum" he had sent Stalin during the Iranian crisis, giving him a "day certain in which they were to get out . . . or we would put some more people in there." New York Times, April 25, 1952. No available evidence makes it possible to confirm or refute the existence of such an ultimatum.

³New York Times, March 18, 1946.

⁴Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 297.

additional offensive forces and when the Soviets on March 16 warned Iran that resistance "might prove calamitous to her existence."¹ A complete Soviet take-over looked imminent. The U.S. Ambassador in Teheran told Qavam that if he did not submit the case to the Security Council, the United States would do so itself. "As a result of the American activities in Teheran and the pressure on the part of the Shah on March 17, Qavam decided to refer the Iranian case to the Security Council."²

On March 18 the second Iranian complaint was lodged at the Security Council,³ and Iran requested that it be put on the agenda of the next regularly scheduled Security Council meeting on March 25. The Soviet Union requested that the meeting be postponed until April 10, on the grounds that negotiations with Iran were continuing. The United States supported the Iranian position. On March 24, the day before the meeting was to take place, Moscow announced that all Soviet troops would be evacuated within six weeks, "if no unforeseen circumstances occur."⁴ This announcement marked the end of the most acute phase of the conflict.

3. Sub-Phase C: March 25, 1946 -- May 10, 1946. The Moscow announcement of March 24 was greeted with considerable skepticism. The Security Council met as scheduled and included the Iranian question on its agenda despite Soviet opposition. "In essence this represented more a vote of no confidence in the USSR than any positive knowledge of the actual situation."⁵ The Council then had to choose between several possible courses of action: delay debate until April 10, as the Soviet Union requested; delay until further information in writing from Iran

¹Fatemi, op. cit., p. 300.

²Ibid., p. 301.

³Van Wagenen, op. cit., p. 45.

⁴Ibid., pp. 46-47.

⁵Ibid., p. 49.

had been received;¹ or immediately hear the Iranian representative. On March 27 the Council rejected a Soviet motion to postpone discussion, whereupon the Soviet delegation, led by Gromyko, walked out.² After continued debate the Council on April 4 deferred further proceedings until May 6, when both Iran and the Soviet Union were requested to report to the Council as to whether Soviet troop withdrawal had been completed. The Council reserved the right to take up the matter sooner than May 6 should there be any unfavorable developments.

The Council resolution of April 4 held that troop withdrawal should not be contingent on the outcome of other matters under negotiation between Iran and the Soviet Union. But on the same day, Premier Qavam signed an agreement with the Soviet government which stipulated: that the Red Army be evacuated within six weeks after March 24; that a joint-stock Iranian-Soviet oil company be established and ratified by the next Majles; and that the matter of Azerbaijan was an internal Iranian affair to be settled between Teheran and the "government and people of Azerbaijan."³ Troop withdrawal and oil rights were thus in fact linked in the agreement. Since the oil company agreement depended for ratification on the political composition of the next Majles, it was by no means a certain Soviet gain, but it was at the time widely interpreted as such. Following the signing of the agreement, the Soviet government put even heavier pressure on Iran. It was reported that Soviet troop movements increased without evidence of preparation for withdrawal⁴ and that the Azerbaijan government began to move troops

¹During this period, Ambassador Ala of Iran was receiving contradictory instructions from Premier Qavam, who was under intense pressure from the Soviet Ambassador in Teheran, and his veracity and authority to represent his government were questioned by the Soviet representatives. There was genuine doubt as to whether an agreement between Teheran and Moscow existed or not.

²Van Wagenen, op. cit., pp. 50-54.

³Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 300.

⁴Van Wagenen, op. cit., p. 67.

in the direction of Teheran.

This threat of renewed hostilities led to further Security Council attempts to obtain Soviet withdrawal, although during the same period the Soviet Union made a concerted effort to get the matter entirely off the Council agenda. In view of reports from Iran, the Council decided to reopen discussion earlier than May 6. However, when it met on April 15, the Council learned that Premier Qavam now also requested that the matter be taken off the agenda. The Iranian request was widely thought to be the result of pressure from the Soviet Union. While the United States and Britain had no desire to see the matter off the agenda, there was a "question of principle dressed in procedural clothing"¹ since both parties had requested that the Council not consider the question. Debate on the proper interpretation of the U.N. Charter under the circumstances continued until April 23, when the Council voted against removing the matter from its agenda.

"Suddenly, on April 22, they [the Soviet troops] began coming north in droves. . . . On May 5 Tabriz itself was evacuated to the accompaniment of a brass band."² Evacuation of Soviet troops from Iranian territory was completed sometime in early May, probably by May 10.

4. Sub-Phase D: May 10, 1946 -- October 19, 1946. Despite its withdrawal of troops, the Soviet Union vigorously pursued its objectives in Iran through non-military means. On May 22 the Security Council voted to retain the Iranian question on its agenda indefinitely, in view of conflicting reports concerning Soviet evacuation. But this was the last time the Council was to discuss the conflict.

On June 14 Premier Qavam concluded an agreement with the Pish-evari regime in Azerbaijan which preserved the nominal authority of Teheran over the province but made concessions to the Azerbaijanis in many important areas--election laws, land distribution, choice of the

¹Ibid., p. 69.

²Rossow, op. cit., p. 24.

governor, and ultimate incorporation of Azerbaijan's army and irregular soldiers into the national army and gendarmerie.¹ The Azerbaijanis thus were in a position to infiltrate the Iranian army and to send Tudeh representatives to the next Majles. At the same time, for the immediate future they retained their army and de facto control over the province.²

The main Soviet effort during this period went into an attempt to gain control of the Iranian government at the cabinet level. On August 2 Qavam reshuffled his cabinet and included three members of the Tudeh; this "popular front" government was formed while violent riots provoked by the Tudeh broke out in Khuzistan.³ Then the British entered the conflict actively. On August 3, the day after the new cabinet was announced, British troops were moved to Basra "to protect British interests."

A tense period followed the British move. Soviet troop concentrations were reported north of the Azerbaijan border, and anti-Tudeh tribal unrest developed. Qavam's arrest on August 18 of a number of Tudeh leaders did not ease the tension. On September 23 an open tribal rebellion broke out in Fars. The several rebellious tribes demanded the ouster of Tudeh ministers from the cabinet, local self-government for the southern provinces, and an increase in parliamentary representation.⁴ According to General Arfa, on October 3 a confederation of western tribes joined the southern tribes in their demands, and the army was "lacking in enthusiasm for a fight on what they considered the Tudeh side." Arfa says that during the period of the tribal uprisings, the Tudeh and the government of Azerbaijan offered to assume

¹Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 302.

²Rossow, op. cit., p. 25.

³Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 303; Rossow, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

⁴Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 304-305.

garrison duties in Teheran and other towns in order to allow the regular forces to be sent to the south.¹

The Soviets accused the British of sponsoring the tribal rebellions; and in response to Soviet allegations, the Teheran government requested the recall of one British consul. It cannot be definitely established that the British instigated or supported the tribal rebellions, but there is no question that the rebellions were favorable to British policy. In mid-October the central government signed an agreement with the tribes, meeting most of their demands. Following an interview with the Shah, Qavam reformed his government on October 19, eliminating all Tudeh members.

5. Sub-Phase E: October 19, 1946 -- December 10, 1946. Following the appointment of his new cabinet, Qavam announced on November 21 that elections for the new Majles would begin on December 7. He further stated on November 23 that they would not be held unless the government could supervise them in all areas of the country, including Azerbaijan. On November 24 he announced that central government troops would march into Azerbaijan for that purpose.²

The Soviet government informed Iran that it would take a serious view of disturbances in Azerbaijan and advised that the central government troops not be sent. At the same time, in Tabriz, the Soviets informed the Azerbaijan regime that it was on its own militarily.³ At this juncture the U.S. Ambassador in Teheran made a public statement in support of Iran's right to send its troops into Azerbaijan. Premier Qavam, thus supported, notified the Security Council of the Soviet protest and of the fact that Teheran had not yet established control over Azerbaijan but intended now to do so.⁴

¹Arfa, op. cit., pp. 374-375.

²He also arrested approximately 100 Tudeh leaders in Teheran.

³Rossow, op. cit., p. 30.

⁴Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 307-308; Van Wagenen, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

E. Phase III₂: December 10, 1946 -- December 15, 1946

On December 10, hostilities broke out when forces of the central government entered Azerbaijan. On December 13 the government forces entered Tabriz and arrested several Azerbaijani leaders, although Pischevari and many of his followers had already fled across the border into the Soviet Union. On December 15 the government troops took control of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. Pischevari's army put up little resistance and the fighting ended with a complete victory for Teheran.¹

F. Phase IV₂: December 15, 1946 -- October 22, 1947

During this period there were no further hostilities or threatened hostilities, either between Iran and the Soviet Union itself or between Iran and Soviet-supported rebel forces. The issue of control over Azerbaijan was resolved though there was still the question of the Soviet-Iranian oil company agreement.

Following the re-establishment of its control over the entire country, the Teheran government took vigorous measures against the Tudeh, raiding its Teheran headquarters, arresting 150 of its leaders, and suppressing its newspapers.² In the elections held during January and February 1946, only two Tudeh members were sent to the new Majles.

On October 22, 1947, by a vote of 102 to 2, the Majles passed a bill sponsored by Qavam himself declaring null and void his earlier negotiations with the Soviet Union for an oil agreement. Before the vote, the Soviet Ambassador had pressed hard for ratification; the U.S. Ambassador had made a public statement to the effect that Iran was free to accept or reject the oil agreement and could count on U.S. support against any Soviet threats or pressure.³

¹Rossow, op. cit., p. 30; Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 308-309; Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 268.

²Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 309; Fatemi, op. cit., p. 323.

³Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 310-311.

G. Settlement: From October 22, 1947

With the refusal of the Majles to ratify the oil agreement extracted from Qavam while Soviet troops were still in Iran, the conflict passed into Settlement. The status quo ante World War II was re-established, insofar as Azerbaijan and Soviet oil interests were concerned. The opposing forces were, however, stabilized at a higher level than before the outbreak of the conflict: the Soviet army was a much more powerful instrument than in pre-World War II days and the Iranian army continued to receive direct and indirect U.S. aid and support.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

a. Larger great-power strategic concerns of World War II led to the introduction of British and Soviet troops into Iran in August 1941. These concerns included: the need to neutralize German influence on the southern flank of the Soviet Union; the need to ensure access to Middle Eastern oil; and subsequently the need to maintain supply routes for lend-lease materials to the Soviet Union.

2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

a. Historic British-Soviet rivalry in the area made each power reluctant to see the introduction of the other's forces. This factor was weakened by World War II concerns and was in part neutralized by the joint occupation, each state moving its troops into the portion of the country of greatest historic interest to it.

b. Iran was suspicious of the intentions of both occupiers and desired to avoid occupation altogether. Its military weakness left it powerless to resist.

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors

a. All these concerns would not have existed or would have had less saliency if great-power conflict had been avoided. Even with World War II, the specific concerns could have been met by: neutralization of Iran; development of alternate sources of energy (today, atomic power); and development of long-range air-lift capacity.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Introduction into Iran of troops of states without historic and continued interest in the area.

b. Strengthening Iran militarily to resist occupation. Occupation by troops neutral in this conflict.

c. Important factions within the Iranian government were pro-German.

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III₁ : THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[In August 1945, fighting broke out between Soviet-armed Azerbaijani rebels and Iranian government garrison forces in Azerbaijan.]

1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities

a. Very early in its occupation of northern Iran, the Soviet Union began to use its military presence to pursue long-range, long-held ideological, political, economic, and strategic interests in the area.

b. This policy was made easier by sectional and tribal divisions in Iran, notably in the Azerbaijani area occupied by Soviet troops. There was thus a proxy available for Soviet actions.

c. The military balance in Iran during the occupation favored the Soviet Union vis-à-vis both Iran and Britain.

d. British weakness reflected both wartime losses and the relatively low priority of Iran in terms of other wartime demands.

e. U.S. lack of partiality in the conflict at this stage reflected a preoccupation with wartime goals, an almost equal suspicion of British and Soviet intentions, and the pre-war perceptions of the nature of the proper U.S. world role.

c. Strengthening Iranian internal integrity, neutralizing Iran.

B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

a. Strengthening Iran; occupation by troops neutral in this conflict.

b. Strengthening Iran internally both politically and militarily.

c. Retaining adequate great-power or third-power counterforce in the area; strengthening Iran.

d. Avoiding great-power conflict; occupation by troops neutral in this conflict.

e. More active, vigorous U.S. counterpressure.

- f. Wartime strategic requirements also placed a high priority on avoiding a situation in Iran that would interfere with wartime cooperation and lend-lease routes.
 - g. In these circumstances, the proximity of the Soviet Union to the conflict area and its overwhelmingly greater national power vis-à-vis Iran (quite apart from its occupation forces) had great influence.
 - h. Finally, as the end of the war approached, the time was growing short during which the opportunity created by the wartime situation could be exploited.
2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities
- a. International agreements existed to which the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union were parties that prohibited intervention in Iranian internal affairs.
 - b. While pursuing an active policy in support of the Azerbaijani rebels, the Soviet Union appears to have wished to keep the Soviet role covert and indirect.
 - c. Although weak, there was countervailing force in the area. In addition to British forces and a small U.S. military contingent, the British controlled the Iraqi and Jordanian armies.
- f. Avoiding great-power conflict; developing technical alternatives to bases.
 - g. Renunciation of concept of spheres of influence.
 - h. Time-stretching devices: "stand-still" agreements, diplomatic delays, etc.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Strengthening nonintervention agreements by provision for inspection, fact-finding, guarantees, sanctions, etc.
 - b. Encouraging the Soviet Union to keep its role covert where the alternative is overt intervention.
 - c. Creating a military counterforce or conveying clear intention to do so, by strengthening Iran's forces, adding to U.S. forces, and deploying available third-party forces.

C. MEASURES TO MODERATE AND PREFERABLY
TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

C. PHASE III₁ TO PHASE IV₁ : THE TERMINATION
OF HOSTILITIES

[Fighting between Soviet-backed Azerbaijani rebels and Iranian garrison forces in north Iran ended quickly in victory for the former. The issue was, therefore, to accept the new status quo or to continue hostilities. In the circumstances then prevailing, this latter course would have meant intensifying the hostilities, at a minimum involving direct clashes between Soviet and Iranian forces. It is possible that it would have meant clashes between Soviet and British/U.S. forces and perhaps involvement of other areas of Iran and the Middle East.]

611

1. Factors Tending to Continue or Intensify Hostilities

- a. The factors that had tended to inhibit the outbreak of hostilities tended, once they had broken out, to encourage their continuation and intensification.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Treaty commitments should not be taken seriously or enforced; third-party force available in the area should not be strong enough to intervene; Soviet involvement should be overt. [Clearly such policies would have disserved U.S. interests. The question here is, however, "If you want to suppress hostilities, what would you do?"]

2. Factors Favoring Termination of Hostilities

- a. The factors that had favored the outbreak of hostilities favored, once hostilities occurred, their termination.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Promoting distracting great-power conflict outside the area of this particular conflict; weakening

Iran politically and militarily (perhaps including formal partition); keeping great-power and other third-power force out of the conflict area; introducing additional Soviet troops into the area or strengthening pro-Soviet forces; U.S. noninvolvement; strengthening and formalizing spheres of influence; insisting on settlement while the issue is most acute.

D. MEASURES DESIGNED TO RESTRICT THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES AND PREVENT THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

D. PHASE IV₁ : RESTRICTING THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF¹ POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES

[Phase IV₁ went through a number of sub-phases in which¹ the conflict threatened to expand to involve additional adversaries and a wider geographic area. The factors in these sub-phases that pressed for restricting or for expanding the scale and scope of the conflict and of potential hostilities will be examined here. The following section will deal with the actual resumption of hostilities, but on a small scale, unexpanded.]

SUB-PHASE A: SOVIET FAILURE TO WITHDRAW
ON DATE SPECIFIED BY TREATY

1. Factors Favoring Expansion of Scale/Scope of Potential Hostilities

- a. Factors that had earlier tended to lead to the outbreak of hostilities continued to exist.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Strengthening Iran; occupation by troops neutral in this conflict; retaining counterforce; avoiding

great-power conflict; great-power counterpressure; renunciation of spheres of influence; time-stretching devices.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Restriction of the scale/scope of potential conflicts can be achieved by withdrawing counterforce available in the area. [Note, however, that this can be interpreted as a signal that pursuit of expansionist policy objectives (in this case, Soviet designs on Iran) will not be resisted. Should that prove not to be the case (and in Iran it was not), such a policy can generate later pressure toward expanded hostilities.]
- b. Strengthening nonintervention agreements; supervising adherence to them.
- c. The restricting impact of U.N. action could have been enhanced by stronger U.N. action: e.g., creation of a U.N. presence in Iran, adoption of more substantive resolutions.
- d. Stronger U.S. pressure.

2. Factors Favoring Restriction of Scale/Scope of Potential Hostilities

- a. At the same time, factors that had tended to prevent the outbreak of hostilities were weakened by the removal of the U.S. military mission and the reduction of British forces.
- b. A new factor in the conflict, brought into operation by the end of the war, was the treaty obligation to withdraw within a specified period.
- c. Another new factor arose with Iran's appeal to the United Nations for assistance in obtaining Soviet compliance. While Security Council action was moderate and U.N. involvement was not major, it focused world attention on Soviet action in Iran.
- d. The United States publicly endorsed the Iranian case at the United Nations and in bilateral

communications with the Soviet Union and Iran.

- e. The Soviet desire to keep its role indirect and covert continued to exist but was made more difficult and perhaps less salient by (b) and (c) above.

SUB-PHASE B: SOVIET AGREEMENT TO
WITHDRAW

1. Factors Tending to Expand the Scale/Scope of Potential Hostilities

- a. The military balance in Iran shifted more markedly in favor of the Soviet Union with the introduction of additional Soviet troops and the completion of British withdrawal.
- b. The deployment of Soviet troops, furthermore, suggested a potential threat not just to north Iran or even all of Iran but also to Turkey and Iraq.
- c. Internal political division in Iran had led to the formation of a government ready, if not eager, to accommodate Soviet demands.
- d. The United States made what could have been interpreted as veiled threats to reintroduce its military force into the area. If this had indeed been done, it would have constituted a factor in this category. Similarly, an ultimatum, if actually sent, belongs here.

- e. Encouraging Soviet Union to keep its role covert, where the alternative is to make it overt.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Creation of counterforce by strengthening Iran or introducing friendly forces. [However, see caveats in (2a) of Sub-Phase A above and (1d) and (2a) of Sub-Phase B below.]
- b. Strengthening militarily other potentially threatened states in the conflict area.
- c. Strengthening Iran.
- d. While great-power counterforce already in the area, or threats to introduce it, can deter expansion of a conflict situation, the action or threat to act must be restrained and limited or it can have the reverse effect.

2. Factors Tending to Contain the Scale/Scope of Potential Hostilities

a. All the factors mentioned above that threatened to expand the scale and scope of potential hostilities served to deter actions that would make the threat a reality.

b. Public opinion in the United States and Britain was becoming intensely anti-Soviet and public attention to events in Iran was high. This conveyed a greater sense of determination to the Soviets but also compelled the United States and Britain to take active steps to counter Soviet actions.

c. The U.N. Security Council continued to keep the issue on its agenda, and thus before world attention, despite Soviet objections.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Threatening to expand the scale/scope of potential hostilities; threatening great-power involvement. [This set of factors and measures, appearing as it does on both sides of this equation, represents the classic dilemma of deterrence policy where deterrence depends on threatening to create a larger and more costly conflict out of a smaller one. If the deterrent is not successful, the potential hostilities may be much expanded in scale and scope.]

b. Aroused public opinion can increase the effectiveness of control measures; but unless it is also enlightened, it can have the reverse effect.

c. U.N. action could have been stronger: e.g., threats of sanctions, U.N. presence in Iran, resolutions on the substance.

SUB-PHASE C: WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET
FORCES

1. Factors Tending to Expand the Scale/Scope of Potential Hostilities
 - a. Following its announced intention to withdraw its forces, the Soviet Union introduced additional forces into Iran.
2. Factors Tending to Contain the Scale/Scope of Potential Hostilities
 - a. All the factors listed above continued to operate. In addition, the Iranian government yielded to a key Soviet demand for a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company.
 - b. Iranian internal weakness, particularly the strength of the Tudeh party, appeared to offer a good prospect of an even more amenable Iranian government.

SUB-PHASE D: FAILURE OF THE "POPULAR
FRONT" GOVERNMENT IN IRAN

1. Factors Tending to Expand the Scale/Scope of Potential Hostilities
 - a. While Soviet forces were withdrawn from Iran, they were just across the Soviet-Iranian border and reinforcement of and maneuvers by these forces maintained military pressure on Iran.
1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Border patrols, controls; similar maneuvers by opposing great powers. [But see (2a) of Sub-Phase A and (1d) and (2a) of Sub-Phase B above.]

1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Strengthening of Iran; creating great-power counterforce. [However, see caveats in (2a) of Sub-Phase A and (1d) and (2a) of Sub-Phase B above.]
2. To Reinforce These Factors
 - a. While in this case complete Iranian concession to Soviet pressure would likely have expanded the scale/scope of potential hostilities, limited concessions on non-vital issues, particularly ambiguous concessions, can facilitate settlement.
 - b. The availability of alternatives to military means of obtaining political goals.

- b. British forces landed at Basra in Iraq, just across the Iranian border.
2. Factors Tending to Contain the Scale/Scope of Potential Hostilities
- a. Counterpressures on the pro-appeasement Iranian government were developing, some indigenous, some perhaps externally inspired. The Iranian army remained anti-Tudeh while anti-Tudeh tribal unrest developed, perhaps with British encouragement.
- b. During the period, the United Nations continued to claim a role in the conflict, although it took no action. Its right to continued cognizance of the matter was challenged by both the Soviet Union and the "popular front" government of Iran.
- E. PHASE IV₁ TO PHASE III₂ : THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES
- [With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and the return of an Iranian government prepared to reassert its authority over the rebel Azerbaijani regime, the scene was set for renewed hostilities.]
1. Factors Promoting the Resumption of Hostilities
- a. The outcome of the developments within Phase IV₁ was to diminish greatly the credibility
- b. Creation of great-power counter-force. [But see (2a) of Sub-Phase A and (1d) and (2a) of Sub-Phase B above.]
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Promoting internal unrest against a government whose actions are likely to expand the scale/scope of the potential hostilities.
- b. Stronger U.N. action, including border patrols and discussion of the substantive issues.
- E. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES
1. To Offset These Factors
- a. To the extent that U.S. deterrence policy during Phase IV₁

of the threat to expand the scale and scope of the conflict to cover a greater part of the Middle East or to involve additional great powers.

successfully avoided a potential U.S.-Soviet clash in Iran, it also removed one inhibition on the Iranian government against renewing hostilities against the rebels. Thus mutual great-power deterrence can stimulate lower-level hostilities. However, the offsetting measure--reducing the credibility of mutual deterrence--can stimulate hostilities of expanded scale/scope.

- b. The outcome, furthermore, was a unified government in Iran, determined to reassert its control over its entire territory.
- c. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the lack of Azerbaijani military strength without them, the Iranian government became the dominant military force in Iran.
- d. U.S. and British perceptions of the intentions of the Soviet Union had been made hostile by Soviet actions in Iran and elsewhere. U.S. and British interests in seeing the Azerbaijani rebellion ended quickly and decisively were high.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Resumption of Hostilities

- a. While the Soviet forces were no longer in Iran, they were just north of the border and constituted the major military force in the area.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Threatened or actual reintroduction of Soviet or pro-Soviet forces.

b. U.N. cognizance of the conflict continued.

F. PHASE III₂ TO PHASE IV₂ : THE TERMINATION
OF HOSTILITIES

[Hostilities ended quickly in a victory for the Iranian government forces. The issue was, therefore, to accept the new status quo or to continue hostilities. In the circumstances then prevailing, the latter course would have meant intensification of hostilities by the reintroduction of Soviet forces, which might also have led to the reintroduction of other great-power forces in opposition.]

1. Factors Favoring Continued or Intensified Hostilities

a. Long-range Soviet interests, proximity, and domination of the regional military balance, factors that had been present throughout the conflict, continued to be valid.

2. Factors Favoring the Termination of Hostilities

a. The factors that had favored the outbreak of hostilities favored their termination, once hostilities had resulted in a government victory.

G. PHASE IV₂ TO S: SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE

1. Factors Tending Away from Settlement

b. Strong U.N. stand against resumed hostilities; creation of a U.N. presence.

F. MEASURES DESIGNED TO KEEP HOSTILITIES MODERATE AND TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

a. Creating counterforce; renouncing spheres of influence; creating U.N. presence.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Threatening to intensify the hostilities; promoting internal weakness; interposing forces; U.N. or Soviet pressure.

G. MEASURES DESIGNED TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. The factors just mentioned--Soviet interests, proximity, and military strength--continued.
 - b. While the Azerbaijani rebellion was crushed following its military defeat, tribal unrest among the Azerbaijani and other tribes continued.
 - c. Furthermore, the Azerbaijani rebel leaders fled to the Soviet Union and continued from there to call for Azerbaijani autonomy or independence.
2. Factors Tending Toward Settlement
- a. U.S./British deterrence policy; unified government in Iran; Iranian military strength vis-à-vis rebels; U.S./British hostility to Soviet expansion in Iran and elsewhere.
 - b. The Tudeh party was defeated in the Iranian elections, thus removing or weakening one source of internal pressure on the Iranian government.
- a. Creating counterforce; renouncing spheres of influence; creating U.N. pressure.
 - b. Political development; strengthening internal cohesion.
 - c. Enforcement of agreements against hostile acts by exile groups against their home country.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Threatening to expand the scale/scope of potential hostilities; promoting internal political and military strength; containment.
 - b. Strengthening Iranian internal integrity; stronger measures against dissident groups.

III. WEAPONS ANALYSIS

[Very little data have been found on arms available in Iran to the Soviet Union and Iran. The following account presents what few facts have been found in the open literature.]

A. Soviet Weapons Acquisition

Between 1941 and 1945, while the Soviet army was occupying Iran, there were reported to be about three Soviet divisions in Iran. Their supporting armor consisted of about sixteen Sherman tanks, provided under lend-lease, and four self-propelled guns. During this time, Soviet troops also confiscated some 100,000 rifles and submachine guns from Iranian forces and subsequently handed these weapons over to Communist insurgents in Azerbaijan.

By October 1946 there were reports that several new divisions of the Red Army had entered Iran. The Soviets added a number of light tanks and artillery pieces to the weapons of the Azerbaijani rebel forces.

After March 2, 1946, the date for evacuation of occupying troops from Iran, the Soviet Union moved a large amount of armor, artillery, and mechanized infantry into Iran. Tanks, for example, were reported to total 500.

Most of the Soviet weapons were produced by Soviet industry, although some are known to have been provided by the United States under lend-lease.

Weapons Available to Soviet Forces in Iran in 1946

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
7.92mm ZB Mauser 98/29)	100,000 confiscated	Iran
7.92mm Mauser Gewehr)		Iran

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
rifle		U.S.S.R.
submachine gun		Iran
submachine gun		U.S.S.R.
light machine gun		U.S.S.R.
heavy machine gun		U.S.S.R.
light artillery		U.S.S.R.
heavy artillery		U.S.S.R.
self-propelled gun	large number	U.S.S.R.
Sherman tank	at least 16	U.S.
tank	500	

B. Iranian Weapons Acquisition

During the entire period of time covered by this conflict, Iran was poorly equipped in relation to the Red Army. Before World War II, the Shah had accepted German aid in building a small-arms factory as part of his program of modernization. This industry produced a number of 7.92mm Mauser rifles and machine guns of German design. Large quantities of rifles and submachine guns were also bought from Czechoslovakia. In addition, Iranian armed forces claimed to have two batteries of artillery, one battalion of light tanks, a squadron of Avro Anson bombers, and some Hurricane fighters.

During the years of occupation, the Iranian gendarmerie received considerable aid from the United States in reorganizing, training, and equipping their forces. After occupation, Iran continued to receive military aid from the United States.

WEC-98 III

Weapons Available to the Iranian Government in 1946

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
7.92mm ZB Mauser 98/29		Czechoslovakia
7.92mm Mauser Gewehr		German license to Iran
machine gun		German license to Iran
artillery	2 batteries	
light tank	1 battalion	
Hurricane fighter		
Avro Anson bomber	1 squadron	U.K.

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL

"Controlling" the Conflict

Once portions of Iran were occupied by Soviet troops during World War II, the basic preventive stage had been passed. Under the circumstances, controlling the hostilities that broke out in 1945 would have meant, in the first instance keeping the dispute non-military and then, in subsequent stages, preventing the Tudeh party from offering tempting prospects for Moscow, deterring the Soviets from directly intervening, and ending the fighting quickly once it broke out.

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. The first transition in 1941 from "dispute" to "conflict" involved the creation of a foreign military presence in Iran that became the prime cause of the later outbreak of hostilities. To have prevented this precondition for 1945-1946 would have required that there be no such presence in the first place. More fundamentally, if there had been no World War II, no pressures making the dispute military in nature would have been created by the strategic need for foreign military presence.

2. The above seems obvious and even trite to say. Yet once the larger pressures are set in motion--World War II, Cold War, thermo-nuclear arms race, imperialist drive, or whatever--powerful forces are at work to generate local conflicts. It goes without saying that most contemporary conflicts have to be dealt with within the framework supplied by the larger strategic scene. But it is wholesome to keep in mind that a list of conflict-control measures, to be comprehensive, must begin by addressing itself to the larger causative factors, whether anyone feels they are beyond change or not.

3. Even with World War II, the naturalness of the move into Iran by Soviet troops might still have been offset by three policy measures, two of them technical, aimed at obviating the need for a foreign power to occupy its smaller neighbor. The first would have been neutralization of Iran, requiring an international agreement. (An international agreement recognizing British and Russian spheres of influence in Iran was made in 1907.) This kind of policy is possible and may be increasingly valuable. In modern times an international agreement has neutralized Austria. It may turn out to be important to neutralize the Indo-chinese Peninsula. Agreements to forego spheres of influence for the benefits of lessened conflict may appeal increasingly to the Soviet Union, and the United States should give high priority to seeking such agreements.

4. If nuclear power had been available, the pressure for oil access would have been lessened. The same thing was true later in Iran in the Mossadegh crisis, and in the Suez war of 1956. Technical developments such as alternative energy sources can remove major areas of the Middle East from great-power contention.

5. Similarly, as demonstrated currently in Europe, long-range air-lift capability can obviate the need to station ground forces on foreign soil. Perhaps this fact will lighten the future U.S. load in Asia. Both 4 and 5 illustrate the conflict-control pay-offs that might come from technology.

6. If local weakness creates a dangerous vacuum tempting others to intervene, clearly the relevant conflict-prevention activities call for strengthening the internal social, political, and security fabric of the country. If, nevertheless, outside help is required to restore law and order, etc., troops from relatively disinterested countries are obviously preferable to those with direct interests; the U.N. Congo operation rested on this eminently sound principle. For the future, this suggests a most important continuing reason to favor international rather than unilateral military presences when required.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

7. Accepting the fact of foreign (Soviet) military presence in Iran during World War II, the next question would be: What actions would have been relevant to avoiding what in fact happened? If one wished, for whatever reason (fear of intensification, preoccupation elsewhere, etc.), to prevent such a potential conflict situation from exploding into violence, what could have been required?

8. Apart from the central requirement of a stronger and healthier Iran, the relevant counterpressures would have included, first, a potent countervailing force that by presence and believed intention would have deterred a power such as the Soviet Union from believing that its take-over attempt could be pursued with impunity. In this case, U.S. and British power in the area backing up clearly-expressed Allied opposition would have fitted the need.

9. Second, international jurisdiction of the issue could have introduced the whole array of peace-settlement modalities, many of which were in fact involved later. International (and later U.N.) cognizance would have spotlighted the Soviet role and bought time by "stand-still" agreements and diplomatic delays. Above all, it could have reinforced existing nonintervention agreements concerning Iran by providing for fact-finding, inspection, border-watching, guarantees, and conceivably sanctions. The combination of U.S. and U.N. pressures might have encouraged Moscow even further to minimize and conceal its role.

Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

10. Special problems arise when one considers the implications of a determined conflict-suppression policy after the fighting broke out in Azerbaijan. To have stopped the fighting at that point, given the relative position of the sides at that moment, clearly would have meant victory for the pro-Soviet faction. To have avoided such victory would have meant enhancing the pressures for intensification of the conflict,

or at least its continuation. Put differently, the factors that the United States would presumably have favored in the pre-hostilities phase as inhibiting the outbreak of hostilities would all, once fighting started, have tended to keep it going and intensify it, since the anti-Soviet side would then have seen to it that Moscow's puppets did not bring off a quick victory.

11. For analytical purposes, let us however assume that suppression is favored despite Soviet advantages from this form of suppression (i.e., Communist victory). The following policy measures would by this logic be involved in the suppression of this conflict: assuring the rebels' clear-cut military superiority on the ground; introducing third-party (Soviet) backing with armed forces on the ground; keeping the country disunited; not taking treaty commitments seriously; reducing the availability of a counterforce in the area.

12. Clearly, if the result would be Communist penetration or take-over, the United States would be unlikely to favor policy activities aimed at this kind of conflict suppression. The prime exception might be if a profound danger of superpower intensification were involved.

13. It will be noticed that the measures listed in 11 are precisely those the United States would favor (and has favored), mutatis mutandis, in a situation where U.S. interest is focused on winning a conflict, or in overturning a hostile regime. The above list then reads plausibly if one imagines Cuba instead of Iran. The factors needed to ensure local victory of pro-Soviet factions in Iran were precisely those necessary to the victory of pro-Western factions in Cuba. It is currently absurd to think of taking such actions in any purposeful way in the name of conflict control. But analytically, they represent the policy activities that might have been required to fulfill the theoretical requirement of terminating hostilities quickly.

Preventing the Resumption of Hostilities

14. Following the termination of the first hostilities phase of the Iranian conflict, the external and internal situations both began to change, and some of the policy activities that were needed--and lacking--earlier came into play. With the end of World War II, U.S. and British policy began to run explicitly counter to Moscow. And Iran went to the United Nations. The strongest offsets to renewed hostilities in Iran lay in making U.S. contingent threats more explicit and upgrading the specificity of U.N. actions in terms of more substantive resolutions, a U.N. presence, the threat of sanctions, etc.

15. It should be understood that actions taken during the first Phase IV to deter Soviet intrusion, by raising the stakes and the potential cost to Moscow, would also by definition have had the effect of making it a bigger war if it broke out. Of course, the expectation would be that such a threat would serve as a deterrent to outbreak. The most interesting point here lies in an examination of the reverse proposition. Not to deter in the sense stated is not necessarily to cause war. If measures such as arms limitations or reductions were taken during Phase IV to limit the scope and scale of any renewed hostilities, this would not necessarily promote the resumption of hostilities.

16. There may then be an inconsistency between measures taken in Phase IV to limit the scope of any renewed hostilities (e.g., cutting down arms) and measures inhibiting the resumption of such hostilities (e.g., increasing arms). The attempt to inhibit the resumption of hostilities by threatening heightened retaliation cannot easily be accompanied by arms-control measures. The only way to reconcile this anomaly would be to have the deterrent threat center on strong international machinery, or in any event some type of collective-security action. This would then be consistent with local and even international arms limitations.

17. In the sub-phases of Phase IV, when the issue was whether hostilities would resume and if so at what scale, or whether the dispute would be settled, the success of a conflict-inhibiting policy would have been perhaps advanced by further limited and non-vital Iranian concessions, along with perceived ways for Moscow to achieve influence without fighting.

18. This is an extremely dicey game, and many play it badly (although Nasser and Tito at times have done it well). To be too soft invites unexpected responses from a third party (vide the United States in Laos in 1960 and 1961) with sudden unpleasant prospects for intensification. Thus, conflict control cannot always mean any action designed to avoid conflict, but must take into account the critical limits of policies of appeasement, coalition, concession, and even disarmament, beyond which a backlash is set up leading to potentially worse intensifications.

19. During the sub-phase of the Iranian conflict when Soviet troops had withdrawn just across the borders, more could have been done to secure the Iranian frontiers, including U.N. observation and patrol activities.

Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

20. When the second round of fighting began, it was in part caused by the success of the Iranian government in establishing its writ. One would hardly wish to prescribe a weak government, particularly since earlier it was Teheran's weakness that created conflict out of the Tudeh party's relative strength. In fact, this was not a conflict one would wish to control by freezing the positions of government and rebels to inhibit the resumption of hostilities. The danger of future conflict is far greater if a rebel movement is left untouched than if it is defeated; obvious examples, each illustrating a different side of the point, are Katanga Province in the Congo and the Kurds in Iraq.

21. However, once hostilities were resumed in Iran, their continuation might have led to serious intensification in the form of re-introduced Soviet troops. They were, in fact, quickly terminated, due to the presence of policy measures lacking earlier, such as a strong Iran and deterrence of the Soviets.

Settling the Dispute

22. To enhance settlement of a dispute such as this one, the key once more is in a strong and cohesive polity for the country in question. It may or may not, however, be true that measures directed against dissident groups at home will minimize the chance of violence. Everyone knows by now that repressive policies, unless accompanied by total social controls as in Communist countries, lead often to new and more widespread political revolution (cf., 1776, 1789, 1848, not to mention such contemporary instances as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Ghana). Political democracy and civil rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and dissent outweigh conflict-control considerations--unless the fear of intensification is great enough to overcome all, as in Hungary in 1956 and Cuba in 1962.

23. To sum up, the key conflict-control measures here might have involved:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Avoidance of great-power war

Avoidance of presence of foreign troops

Neutralization of Iran

Renunciation of spheres of influence

Development of alternative energy sources

Long-range air-lift capability

Strengthening of internal political, social, economic fabric

International military presence

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Stronger, healthier Iran

Strong countervailing force in area*

Believed great-power deterrence

International jurisdiction for:

 "Stand-still" agreement

 Diplomatic delays, fact-finding

 Border watch

 Sanctions

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Acceptance of pro-Soviet victory (sic)

Encouragement of country's disunity (sic)

Disregard of treaty commitments (sic)

Reduction of locally available counterforce (sic)

PREVENTING RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

More specific U.S. deterrence*

More specific U.N. actions*

Local arms limitation

 backed by

Multilateralized deterrent

Limited and non-vital concessions

Ways for interested powers to achieve influence
 without war (sic)

Secure frontiers

U.N. observation and patrol

TERMINATING RESUMED HOSTILITIES

Stronger national fabric*

Effective Western deterrence*

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

T H E S U E Z - S I N A I C O N F L I C T S : 1 9 5 6

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.637
A.	Foreword637
B.	The Separate Conflicts Deepen: Mid-1950s -- July 1956 . .	.639
1.	The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV ₁ -X639
2.	The British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase I.645
C.	The Conflicts Converge: July 1956 -- December 1956.649
1.	(July 1956 -- October 1956) The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV ₁ -Y; the British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase II.649
2.	(October 29, 1956 -- November 7, 1956) The Arab- Israeli Conflict: Phase III ₂ ; the British-French- Egyptian Conflict: Phase III662
3.	(November 7, 1956 -- December 23, 1956) The Arab- Israeli Conflict: Phase IV ₂ -A; the British-French- Egyptian Conflict: Phase IV.670
D.	The Conflicts Diverge: From December 23, 1956671
1.	The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV ₂ -B671
2.	The British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase V.672
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.673
A.	The Separate Conflicts673
1.	The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Movement Away from Settle- ment.673
2.	The British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option. . .	.677
B.	The Conflicts Converge679
1.	The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV ₁ -Y to Phase III ₂ : The Resumption of Hostilities; the British-French- Egyptian Conflict: Phase II to Phase III: The Out- break of Hostilities.679
2.	The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase III ₂ ; the British- French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase III.682

3.	The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase III ₂ to Phase IV ₂ -A; the British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase III to Phase IV: Termination of Hostilities686
4.	The British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase IV to Phase V: Ending the Conflict688
C.	The Conflicts Diverge.689
1.	The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV ₂ -A to Phase IV ₂ -B: The Withdrawal of Israeli Forces.689
III.	Weapons Analysis.691
A.	Arms Acquisition Prior to the Sinai Campaign691
1.	Egyptian Weapons Acquisition.691
2.	Israeli Weapons Acquisition697
B.	Arms Acquisition Since Sinai702
1.	Israeli Weapons Acquisition702
2.	Egyptian Weapons Acquisition.707
3.	A Special Problem of Control.713
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.716

THE SUEZ - SINAI CONFLICTS : 1956

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES


A. Foreword

This analysis deals with two distinct lines of conflict that had differing histories but that, at critical junctures of each, came together and overlapped, and subsequently diverged again. The existence and development of each conflict was profoundly influenced by the existence and development of the other. Each, in a sense, formed part of the background of the other and provided a set of critical factors that influenced the other's growth.

One thread of conflict--between the Arab states and Israel--entered Phase II as the Zionist dream of a Jewish national home in Palestine appeared about to become a reality after World War II. The Arab-Israeli conflict went through Phase III₁ in 1948-1949 and was, at the time this analysis begins, in Phase IV₁. Throughout the conflict, Israel's primary adversary was Egypt, and it is only Israeli-Egyptian relations that will be examined here in any detail. For purposes of clarity and convenience, the period of worsening Israeli-Egyptian relations from 1953 onward will be handled as sub-phases X and Y of Phase IV₁ of the broader Arab-Israeli crisis.

A second thread of conflict was that between Britain and France on the one hand and Egypt on the other. Conflict and dispute among the three states had existed at times since the early 19th century, but acquired renewed virulence in the middle 1950s.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SINAI-SUEZ CRISES



These two threads became interlaced in mid-1956, when the British-French-Egyptian (Suez) conflict entered Phase II and the Israeli-Egyptian (Sinai) conflict entered sub-phase Y of Phase IV₁. The hostilities that broke out in October 1956 were common to both.

Since hostilities ended in November 1956 and Israeli troops were withdrawn from the Sinai, the Israeli-Arab conflict has continued precariously in Phase IV₂. Withdrawal of British and French troops meant the rapid transition of the British-French-Egyptian conflict into Phase V.

B. The Separate Conflicts Deepen: Mid-1950s -- July 1956

1. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV₁-X.

a. Background

The Arab-Israeli conflict arose from the establishment of the Jewish national state on the territory of Palestine. The war that resulted in 1948 (Phase III₁) reached a stalemate in 1949, and U.N. mediation produced a series of armistice agreements (Phase IV₁) that set the Israeli borders at the present points.

For the first several years after the 1949 armistice, Israeli-Egyptian relations were relatively peaceful; and both states cooperated with the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization to limit border clashes even as controversy continued over issues such as the Israeli refusal to readmit Arab refugees and the Arab boycott and blockade of Israel.

In the aftermath of the 1952 Free Officers' Revolution that ousted King Farouk, there was a serious attempt at a limited rapprochement between Israel and Egypt. On the Israeli side this attempt resulted from the belief that Arab hostility to Israel had been based in part on the need of reactionary rulers to divert attention from domestic problems. The nationalists would presumably be more "progressive" and thus friendlier to the most "progressive" state in

the area. Egyptian authorities in turn hoped for a period of peace in order to accomplish their domestic reforms. Both adversaries reported considerable U.S. pressure to adjust their differences, and both were highly dependent upon U.S. economic aid at the time. Initial Israeli overtures outlining a basis for negotiations were made in August 1952; the Egyptian government responded in March 1953, and in December 1953 the militant Israeli government of Premier David Ben Gurion was replaced with a more moderate administration under Moshe Sharett.¹

b. Deteriorating Egyptian-Israeli Relations

Gradually this conciliatory climate deteriorated. Negotiations came to a halt as impasses were encountered on some of the major substantive issues. For example, Israel, while willing to consider granting land access rights across the southern Negev between Egypt and Jordan, balked at what it regarded as excessive and suspicious demands for a broad corridor.² And Egypt refused to consider lifting the ban it had maintained since 1948 on use of the Suez Canal by Israeli ships. In fact, in 1953 the ban was extended to all goods moving to and from Israel. In addition, the Egyptian government blockaded Israeli ships from using the Strait of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, which linked the Israeli port of Elath with the Red Sea.

During this time, in response to prolonged Egyptian pressures (and the urgings of the United States), Britain began negotiations for the evacuation of its Suez base.³ Initially, as part of its generally responsive attitude toward Egypt's new leaders, Israel had endorsed Egypt's efforts to see Britain evacuate the Canal zone. But in the

¹See Earl Berger, The Covenant and the Sword: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1948-56 (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 165-172. Much of the detail in this section is taken from this excellent concise summary.

²Ibid., pp. 172-173.

³Kennett Love asserts (in an unpublished manuscript, The Politics of Force at Suez, p. 3) that Israel began contemplating war when these negotiations opened.

cooling climate of Israeli-Egyptian relations, the prospect of Britain's withdrawal looked less appealing to Israeli leaders, who felt that the presence of British soldiers in a band separating the Sinai Peninsula from the rest of Egypt was a deterrent to Egyptian attack on Israel. Also, any Egyptian move to send large numbers of troops and materiel past the British would be readily observed and the information supplied to Israel. British control of the Canal area had not prevented Egypt from stationing some 60,000 troops in the Sinai Peninsula. Still, the British presence may well have acted as a brake on aggressive Egyptian tendencies.¹ Most importantly, Israeli officials believed it so acted.²

Soon after the agreement between Britain and Egypt calling for British departure from the Canal area was initialed on July 27, 1954, an organized campaign of terrorism against Israel was launched, the so-called fedayin raids. During the following eight months the scale of incidents increased and saboteurs penetrated deep into Israel, killing military personnel and civilians and blowing up key installations, notably water pipes. In December 1954 a high Egyptian official stated that the ruling military junta did not intend then to make peace with Israel and never would.

Israeli activists became united in their demands for an end to the terrorism, and Ben Gurion, who had never agreed with the attempts at reconciliation with Egypt, returned to the Israeli government in charge of the Defense Ministry. Soon after, on February 28, 1955, the Israeli army penetrated the Gaza Strip, killing 38 and blowing up key military installations. The Gaza Strip, an area under Egyptian control that had a large population of Arab refugees from Palestine, was believed to be the point from which many of the fedayin raids were launched. If Israel took its cue from the growing aggressiveness of Arab propaganda and the expanded scale of sabotage and terrorism,

¹Erskine B. Childers, The Road to Suez (London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1962), pp. 286 ff.

²Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill (London, Secker and Warburg, 1960), pp. 267-272.

Egypt took its cue from the Gaza raid in February. And as a result of spiralling events, both countries returned to a state of suspended war.¹

Both Egypt and Israel took their cases to the U.N. Security Council--the former asking that Israel be deemed the aggressor and punished for the Gaza raid and the latter asking the Council to condemn Egypt's sponsorship of the fedayin attacks. The pattern of small Arab probes and incursions and massive Israeli reprisal raids was--and remains--a common one along the armistice lines between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In this instance--as had been and by and large continues to be the case--the Security Council's response was to condemn Israel's reprisal action without dealing substantively with the Arab actions in any but the most general terms. The Council, however, also urged both adversaries to cooperate in implementing some of the measures proposed by the head of the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization to make border violations by either side more difficult to carry out and easier to detect--barbed wire, and joint patrols, for example.

During the months that followed the Gaza raid, the scale of fedayin attacks increased, and terrorists penetrated as far as the suburbs of Tel Aviv. In response to this continued provocation, the Israeli army raided the Gaza town of Khan Yunis on August 31, 1955, killing 36. At the same time, Israeli military units, organized as agricultural settlements, were being established at the important Negev crossroads of El Auja; and they resisted attempts, including pressures from U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, to remove them from that demilitarized zone.

Then, on September 27, 1955,² Colonel Nasser announced that

¹Love, op. cit., pp. 173-174, 178-180.

²In a forthcoming book on Soviet military aid policies, Professor Uri Ra'anani of M.I.T. and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy cites substantial evidence for a much earlier date. It

the Egyptian government would buy important quantities of Soviet bloc arms, tanks, and military aircraft from Czechoslovakia. One authority has commented:

The Czech arms deal stands as one of the most important single events in recent Arab history. Intended originally as a counterstroke to the Baghdad Pact and to the humiliation of the Gaza Raid, and as a means of strengthening Arab neutralism, it developed into a brilliant assertion of Egypt's independence and right to lead the Arab world.¹

The imminent arrival of Soviet bloc arms in Egypt would clearly upset the military balance that had been maintained between Israel and Egypt for a number of years, and Israel began an urgent search for additional arms, in particular for more modern tanks, artillery, and jet fighters. (See Section III for details on the Israeli and Egyptian inventories prior to the Czech deal and on Israel's response to its announcement.) Israel was ultimately successful in purchasing these items from France. Israel also sought security guarantees from the West.

During the period from September 1955 to July 1956, there were a number of events that served to reinforce Israel's conviction that military action was necessary for survival. British Prime Minister Eden issued a statement in November 1955 calling for peace in the Middle East and urging Israel to seek a compromise with Egypt on borders somewhere between the existing truce lines and the U.N. partition-plan boundaries. Israel refused, since this would involve surrender of some of its territory. There was an end to Israeli hopes for a Western security guarantee when the British Foreign Office announced in December 1955 that the provisions of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, by which Britain, France, and the United States agreed to consult on arms

appears that the preliminary arrangements for the arms deal date back to the opening months of 1955. In any event, some Soviet bloc arms had arrived in Egypt as early as July 1955.

¹Berger, op. cit., p. 192.

deliveries to the eastern Mediterranean did not commit Britain to supply arms to Israel to compensate for Soviet bloc arms in Egypt in an effort to maintain an arms balance in the area. Also in late 1955, rumors circulated about discussions between Britain and Iraq that suggested the division of Jordan between Iraq and Israel, which would have brought a military power instead of a weak, British-dominated state to Israel's eastern border.¹

While the U.S. government did not adopt a hostile attitude toward Israel during this period, the pronounced neutrality of the Eisenhower government was viewed by Israelis as threatening, given their great dependence on U.S. aid. In response to the Czech arms deal, Secretary of State Dulles asserted, paralleling the British position, that the United States would not contribute to an arms race in the Middle East by providing arms to Israel. Furthermore, he emphasized, Israel should look for protection not to the United States but to the United Nations.²

Egyptian actions also contributed to growing Israeli unease. In September 1955 the Egyptian government expanded the scope of its blockade of Israel to make it more effective and also banned flights of Israeli planes, which were generally on a commercial run to Africa, over the Strait of Tiran.³ While the magnitude of these Egyptian actions was relatively small compared to existing limitations on Israel's trade, the actions were taken as an indication of future efforts to isolate the Jewish state totally.

In response to the deepening crisis, Israel adopted a more aggressive posture toward Egypt. Moderate Premier Moshe Sharett was replaced in November 1955 by Ben Gurion. Sharett retained the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until June 1956, when he was replaced by another

¹Ibid., pp. 194-196.

²Ibid., pp. 203-209.

³Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Suez Campaign (New York, Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 10-12. Major-General Dayan was Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Force during the period of the conflict.

activist, Mrs. Golda Meir.

Finally, during the period March-June 1956, the number of border skirmishes, sabotage incidents, and killings by fedayin increased dramatically. In response to these provocations, the Israelis shelled the market place in Gaza, killing more than 60 Arabs. In the first ten months of 1956, some 200 Arab deaths resulted from Israeli actions, as compared to 58 Israelis killed by Arabs. However, the impact of the violence was greater in Israel than in Egypt since the Israelis felt that their whole country was threatened.¹

2. The British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase I.

a. Background

Egypt lies at the meeting point of the Indian Ocean (through its extension, the Red Sea) and the Mediterranean; and since the 17th century, Britain has had important military and economic commitments in the Middle East. The importance of Egypt in British strategic and economic calculations increased enormously in the late 19th century when the Suez Canal was completed--on territory nominally under the sovereignty of Egypt but in reality controlled for most of the history of the Canal by Britain.

Prior to World War II, the Canal (and, as a consequence, Egypt) was more than just one in a long chain of staging points in the Middle East: it was the linch pin, the key to Britain's position in the whole Middle East and the vast lands "east of Suez." These strong British interests in the Canal led on three occasions to British occupation of Egypt to ensure the stability of the Canal area and the security of this vital waterway.

Following World War II, and particularly as the Cold War deepened, Egypt and the Canal and the Middle East generally acquired

¹Ibid., p. 207. Unlike the surrounding Arab states, Israel does not have buffer zones between its main centers of population and enemy borders. Israel could be quickly divided in two or more parts and overrun in a matter of hours, if surprised and unprepared.

an added significance in Western strategic thinking. As part of the series of military alliance systems being developed under U.S. leadership to contain Soviet expansionism, Britain and the United States attempted to build an alliance structure in the Middle East around a Western pact with Egypt--the so-called Middle East Command. This was rejected by Egypt in late 1951, and the West turned instead to the concept of a defense arrangement with the "northern tier" states bordering the Soviet Union. Out of this grew the Baghdad Pact, which later became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Two consequences of this development are important here. First, CENTO reduced, at least for the moment, the importance of Egypt in global Cold War strategic terms.¹ Second, the injection of the Cold War into the Middle East challenged growing neutralist-nationalist sentiment there and also strengthened Iraq, Egypt's chief rival in the Arab world.

While the strategic and military importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal to the West in general and Britain in particular was changing, the economic importance of the area to Western Europe was increasing. At the base of this change was European reliance on Middle Eastern oil, which became of growing importance as Europe recovered from the war and modernized and expanded its economy. It was estimated that by 1956 15 per cent of British energy requirements and 17 per cent of those of Western Europe were supplied by oil. Some 75 per cent of Western Europe's oil came from the Middle East, and fully 50 per cent of it was shipped through the Suez Canal, with much of the remaining 25 per cent reaching Mediterranean ports via pipeline.²

British investments in the region were also substantial. British companies held a 50 per cent interest in Kuwaiti oil production, a 40 per cent interest in oil production in Iran, and 23 per cent

¹John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, revised edition (New York, Harper, 1960), pp. 42-46.

²Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez (Chicago, Ill., Quadrangle Books, 1964), pp. 12-13.

in Iraq and the Persian Gulf shiekhdoms.¹

France and the United States also had economic interests in the area that, though large, tended to be dominated by other considerations. For the United States, the strategic concerns of the Cold War have already been mentioned. A parallel and at times conflicting concern was a genuine sympathy with nationalist revolutions and a desire not to be identified, in the Middle East or elsewhere, with those who sought to preserve overlong the perquisites of imperialism.

b. Deteriorating British-French-Egyptian Relations

Arab nationalism had been waxing since the end of World War II. But it found its leader only with the rise to power in Egypt of Colonel Nasser. In many ways, Arab nationalism, particularly under Nasser's leadership, appeared to be a threat to the many Western interests in the Middle East.

Economically, Nasserism appeared to endanger the security of Europe's oil supply--both through the threat of nationalization and because of its control of both pipelines and shipping routes. Europe ran the risk of seeing a commodity vital to its economic health dominated by a distrusted movement and a leader widely regarded as an unreliable demagog.

Politically, the appeal of Nasserism throughout the Middle East threatened to remove from European--mainly British--influence such bulwarks of Western influence as Jordan, where local Nasser supporters forced the removal of Sir John Glubb as commander of the Arab Legion in April 1956.

In terms of global politics, Nasser's acceptance of Soviet bloc arms enabled the Soviet Union to leap over the "northern tier" and establish its influence in the heart of the strategic Middle East.

¹Royal Institute of International Affairs, British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 27.

To the west, Nasser's open and direct support of the Algerian rebellion against France encouraged France to see Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism as a direct threat to French interests. Initially, the government of Premier Guy Mollet attempted to negotiate with Nasser. But when in April 1956 Foreign Minister Pineau failed to obtain Nasser's agreement to halt aid to the Algerian rebels, French policy became openly hostile toward Egypt.

For Britain and Egypt, the Suez Canal quickly became the focus of dispute. To most Egyptians, British occupation of the Canal zone and operation of the Canal by an entirely foreign-owned company were visible symbols of foreign domination. After a period of terrorist activities against British forces, and with strong U.S. urging, Britain agreed in 1954 to withdraw its forces. The withdrawal took place gradually over a period of some months and was finally completed in June 1956. While the withdrawal was in progress, Nasser announced that he wished to revise the agreements with the Suez Canal company regarding income from the Canal's operations,¹ of which Egypt had received a share only since 1936.

At the same time, Egypt was engaged in negotiations for international assistance in building the Aswan High Dam, which would cost a total of \$1.24 billion. Of this amount, \$760 million would be labor and materials supplied by Egypt; the balance had to be obtained from external sources. A formula was worked out with Western governments and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that would provide \$70 million in grants and \$480 million in loans over a period of fifteen years.²

During the early loan negotiations, the Egyptian government rejected Western demands for supervision of its finances. By the time

¹Terrence Robertson, Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (New York, Atheneum, 1965), p. 6.

²Finer, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

the Egyptian position was softening on this point, U.S. policy began to harden. Secretary of State Dulles was reportedly angered by Nasser's recognition of Communist China and by his hints that he might accept Soviet help.¹

Thus, when Egypt announced its acceptance of the U.S.-British-International Bank offers in July 1956, the acceptance was turned down by Secretary of State Dulles. Not surprisingly, the Nasser government was angered by the rejection and by what it regarded as insulting reference to its ability to repay. In immediate reaction, Nasser announced in a violently anti-Western speech the nationalization of the Canal company. The move was partly in retaliation and partly because the Canal company was a profitable property that could contribute toward the costs of constructing the Aswan Dam, the Canal company having earned more than \$56 million in profits in 1955.²

C. The Conflicts Converge: July 1956 -- December 1956³

Nasser's nationalization of the Canal thus precipitated Britain's and France's growing quarrel with Egypt into a conflict at the same time that Israeli-Egyptian relations were approaching a crisis point. For the period during which the two conflicts converged, they will be described here as a single conflict.

1. (July 1956 -- October 1956) The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV₁-Y; the British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase II. Coming as it did at the end of a period of worsening relations among Britain, France, and Egypt, Nasser's nationalization of the Canal cast the next months of the British-French-Egyptian conflict in terms of who should control and operate that vital waterway, although the real dimensions of the conflict were broader, as has been noted. The Canal became for Britain and France the visible symbol of their conflict

¹Ibid., pp. 40-42.

²Childers, op. cit., p. 165.

³The following account was completed in late 1966, before the publication of such volumes as Hugh Thomas, Suez Report (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, April 1967) and the recent article by Anthony Nutting which shed considerable light on the exact nature of British-French-

with Nasser, just as it had been the symbol of foreign domination for Egypt. For Israel, the British-French-Egyptian conflict presented an opportunity for the support it felt it desperately needed to counter Egypt's growing military strength and aggressiveness and rapidly increasing predominance in the Arab world.

Nasser asserted that he had no intention of interfering with Canal operations beyond continuing to bar Israeli ships and cargoes, to which the old Canal company had never objected. But the possibility of interference with the smooth functioning of the Canal was a particularly serious threat to Europe. As was noted earlier, a high proportion of Europe's oil came through the Canal; and substituting Venezuelan, Canadian, or American oil or shipping Middle Eastern oil via the Cape of Good Hope would cost Britain and France an estimated additional \$500 million in 1956 alone.¹ On the other hand, experience during World War II had demonstrated that use of the Cape route was possible, though costly.²

The Western governments all condemned the nationalization. But while the U.S. government expressed concern over the "far-reaching implications" of the act,³ Britain and France reacted with strongly worded protests and concrete acts. Terming the nationalization totally unjustifiable, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden froze all Egyptian assets in Britain. French Premier Guy Mollet denounced Nasser as another Hitler. Other European countries did not take the British and French view. What interested them was assurance from Egypt of their right to unhindered passage. Similarly, American oil companies indicated that they were prepared to cooperate with the Egyptian authorities.

Toward the end of July, both British and French cabinets

Israeli coordination prior to the outbreak of hostilities. No effort has been made to expand the following description to include the details the Thomas and Nutting publications contain.

¹Finer, op. cit., p. 245.

²Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 126.

³U.S. Department of State Bulletin, August 6, 1956, p. 221.

met and the Defense Ministers were instructed to prepare plans immediately in the event military action against Egypt was decided upon.¹ The larger historic terms in which the British and French saw the issue were clearly set forth in a telegram to President Eisenhower from Prime Minister Eden, who was determined neither to repeat the errors of appeasement nor to yield British primacy:

We are all [the cabinet and chiefs of staff] agreed that we cannot allow Nasser to seize control of the Canal in this way, in defiance of international agreements. . . .If we do not [take a firm stand], our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will . . . be finally destroyed.

The immediate threat is to the oil supplies of Western Europe, a great part of which flows through the Canal. . . .

It is, however, the outlook for the longer term which is more threatening. . . .

We should not allow ourselves to become involved in legal quibbles about the rights of the Egyptian government to nationalize what is technically an Egyptian company. . . .I feel sure that we should take issue with Nasser on the broader international grounds.

As we see it we are unlikely to attain our objectives by economic pressures alone. . . .My colleagues and I believe we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses.²

Meeting with Eden in July, Secretary of State Dulles reportedly asked the British Prime Minister if the British and French had weighed carefully the risks of using force. "He said--and [Foreign Minister] Selwyn Lloyd repeated it often--they'd rather risk a world war than sink to the level of a third-rate power with a depleted economy."³

¹Childers, op. cit., p. 62; New York Times, July 29 and 31, 1956.

²Quoted in Finer, op. cit., p. 63, from Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 476.

³Robertson, op. cit., p. 81.

It is difficult to determine the date on which Israel became set on a policy of preventive war. It seems clear that the decision was not made earlier than November 1955 (when Ben Gurion resumed leadership of the Israeli government) and not later than July 1956 (when the possibility of substantial British and French support became apparent). The first serious discussions with French officials regarding military assistance are reported to have been held in the fall of 1955, when Israel began its urgent search for arms to counter-balance the Soviet bloc arms just promised Nasser. By January 1956 this contact was expanded to the point where secret talks were reportedly held in Paris, including, on the French side, Foreign Minister Christian Pineau. One source states that it was at that meeting that France agreed to meet Israeli arms requests to the extent possible, to coordinate military planning, and to continue talks between military officials.¹ However, until July 1956 no concrete coordinated military moves were considered seriously. The French were militarily tied down in Algeria and in NATO commitments, and were not in a position to carry out a major military action against Egypt unilaterally.

Another analyst argues that the key date for the Israeli decision was April 1956; after that time the only important considerations were tactical.² Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan suggests a number of interim decisions leading to a decision to act in July 1956. He notes a speech by Prime Minister Ben Gurion to the Knesset on November 2, 1955, in which the government's intention to halt terrorism and remove the blockade at Tiran was made clear. Dayan comments:

Widening the scope of the blockade of Suez and Tiran, and extending it to our air link with Africa, was the last straw. . . . There could have been no clearer statement from the Prime

¹Ibid., p. 49.

²Berger, op. cit., p. 206.

Minister before the Knesset forum on his intention to instruct the army to cross the border if the anarchic situation continued.¹

Dayan also notes that the need for preventive action was brought about by the fear of Egyptian attack: "The decisive intimation to Israel of approaching Egyptian attack was the arms deal concluded between Czechoslovakia and Egypt in September 1955."² Finally, he notes the importance of British and French support: "If it were not for the Anglo-French operation, it is doubtful whether Israel would have launched her campaign; and if she had, its character, both military and political, would have been different."³

Thus, Britain, France, and Israel each came separately to consider a military solution to its conflict with Egypt. Israel, concerned particularly with a lack of air and naval cover, did not begin serious planning for action until French aid was assured. And France, lacking landing equipment and heavy bombers, did not move until Britain indicated willingness to cooperate.

British and French military leaders had been instructed immediately after the nationalization to prepare plans for possible military action. French Defense Minister Bourgès-Maunoury reported that it would take at least one month for France to prepare if acting alone, or six weeks if in coordination with the British. The most important needs were for training of paratroops, for landing craft, and for use of the British base in Cyprus for the short-range Mystère fighter squadrons.⁴ British Defense Minister Monckton reported that British forces were quite unprepared. The paratroop units needed retraining; there were no landing craft in Cyprus (they would have to come from England and Malta); the nearest supporting artillery units were under NATO command in Germany; and large numbers of troops would

¹Dayan, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

²Ibid., p. 4. See, however, p. 558, note 2, on the date of this agreement.

³Ibid., p.3.

⁴Robertson, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

be required.¹

In consultation, the British and French defense ministries prepared an initial contingency plan calling for 50,000 British and 30,000 French troops, a combined British-French naval fleet, bombing of Egyptian airfields by British Canberra bombers, and a target date for invasion of September 15. It was reported that the landing would be first at Alexandria, later proceeding to Cairo, and only afterwards moving to the Canal zone.² A joint command structure was elaborated under British Minister of War Antony Head, with headquarters in London. Throughout the structure, British officers were in command with French deputies.

While these developments were taking place, Foreign Ministers Pineau and Lloyd conferred in London with the representative of Secretary Dulles, Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy. When Murphy reported the extent of French and British concern and their pressure for immediate action,³ Dulles joined the discussion to demonstrate the high priority the United States placed on restraining its allies from hasty and violent action. With some reluctance, Britain agreed to Dulles' proposal for a conference of signatories to the 1888 Convention under which the Canal had been operated and present Canal users; France went along in order to retain British support.

The story of U.S. diplomacy in the events that unfolded rests first on British and French expectations at the outset that Washington would support them,⁴ growing disillusionment on their part at what they construed as U.S. betrayal, and increasing irritation and concern in Washington at what seemed ill-conceived, archaic, and potentially dangerous illusions in the minds of its closest allies when it came to Egyptian policy. London and Paris were paving the way for war, while Washington was seeking to defuse the crisis.

¹Ibid., pp. 76-77.

²Ibid., pp. 77-78.

³Finer, op. cit., p. 68.

⁴For example, see Love, op. cit., p. 60.

At the mid-August Canal-users' conference in London, the United States introduced a proposal calling for an international operating authority for Suez in which Egypt might participate but over which it would not have final control. Britain and France agreed to go along with the attempt to obtain Egypt's agreement to the plan. Important elements in Britain, including the entire Labour Party, had demanded that all peaceful methods of settlement be attempted before resorting to force. In any case, as the Defense Ministers had made clear, no military action was possible before mid-September. The Scandinavian states at the conference were not enthusiastic in their support of the resolution, feeling that an accommodation with Nasser might be possible if the issue were limited to the right of free passage. The non-Western powers opposed the resolution, upholding the right of the Egyptian government to nationalize an Egyptian company.¹

In early September, the Western proposals were taken in person to Cairo by a mission headed by Australian Prime Minister Menzies. Not surprisingly, since they would have repealed nationalization, Nasser declined to accept them. One factor that may have been partially responsible for the Egyptian rejection was the statement by President Eisenhower² that on no account would the United States support the use of force in the conflict. Britain believed that this statement virtually eliminated what little bargaining power the Western states may have had to wrest concessions from Nasser.

It is also possible, however, that concrete results might have been obtained if the mission had been freer to negotiate. Nasser had already indicated a willingness to make concessions to allay the fears of the world community, proposing a conference to draw up a new treaty to replace that of 1888, which would reaffirm the right of free passage and which would authorize U.N. arbitration in case of disputes.³

¹Ibid., pp. 85-92.

²At a news conference on August 31, 1956.

³Finer, op. cit., pp. 126-129.

This was, however, unacceptable to Britain and France.

The British and French adopted a policy of noncooperation with the new Egyptian Canal authority in the hope, some observers contend, that this might lead to a breakdown of Canal operations and provide an excuse for intervention. British and French ships refused to pay tolls to Egypt, depositing them instead in the Canal company's accounts in Paris and London. In mid-September 1956 the Canal company instructed its pilots to leave, and it was widely believed in some Western circles that this would demonstrate the dependence of Egypt on skilled Westerners. However, by that time Egyptian authorities had been able to recruit enough foreign pilots to supplement the Egyptian pilots who remained. As a result, the Canal operation continued smoothly, and it was reported in late September that Egypt was collecting more tolls than before nationalization. (The Egyptian authorities did not refuse passage to British and French ships that did not pay tolls.)¹

With Nasser's rejection of the proposal of the first Canal-users' conference, Britain and France continued their military preparations. At the Paris NATO Council meeting in early September, they apparently hoped to gain support for the possible use of force if Western demands were not met. However, the U.S. delegate remained silent, explaining privately that he had been instructed not to create any appearance of NATO solidarity in the use of force.² The Soviet Union added to the uncertainty by veiled threats of intervention. A Soviet diplomat, for example, was quoted as saying in London that "if war broke out over Suez the Arabs would not stand alone; 'It will be a just war for the Arabs, and there will be volunteers.'"³ Nevertheless, British and French military preparations proceeded, and by mid-September the units on Cyprus were ready for action.

¹Ibid., pp. 178-179.

²Robertson, op. cit., pp. 98-103.

³Quoted in Finer, op. cit., p. 179, from the Times (London), August 28, 1956.

Concerned about the possibility of hostilities, Dulles tried yet another tactic that would keep the conflict at the conference table, if only temporarily. It took the form of a proposal to form a Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA). Because of continuing concern over the danger of U.S.-British disunity in foreign policy, Eden agreed to try this device. France again agreed to cooperate in order to retain British support for the military action it considered necessary. The Users' Association plan was announced on September 13. It was stated that the Association would employ pilots to take ships through the Canal, and if Egypt refused then "other appropriate" action would be taken. At this point Eden suggested that the other appropriate action would be force; Dulles, however, stated that U.S. ships would be instructed to sail by way of the Cape of Good Hope. Once again the United States seemed to Britain to be undermining Western bargaining power, weakening Western efforts to make Nasser "disgorge his spoils."¹

On October 5, as a result of the growing British and French disillusionment with U.S. delaying tactics, London and Paris took the matter to the U.N. Security Council. This step had reportedly been opposed by the United States since it seemed likely that the Soviet Union would veto any action that would satisfy the British and French. However, Eden and Mollet wanted to be able to argue that they had exhausted the possibilities for peaceful settlement before they resorted to force. There were also domestic political reasons that induced the British, at least, to go to the United Nations. Both Defense Minister Monckton and Deputy Prime Minister Butler opposed the use of force except after the failure of U.N. mediation, as did the majority of the Labour Party and substantial segments of public opinion.²

¹Finer, op. cit., p. 234.

²Robertson, op. cit., pp. 130-133. In the left wing of the Labour Party, sentiments were strongly anti-imperialist, frequently pacifist, and, on occasion, pro-Soviet. There were a few members of the Labour Party, however, who felt that it had been hurt by its postwar identification with the break-up of the Empire and should adopt a strong line against Egypt.

The Security Council was requested by Britain and France to consider the "situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal." Simultaneously, Egypt, referring to the British-French military build-up in the eastern Mediterranean, asked the Council to consider "actions against Egypt by some powers, particularly France and the United Kingdom, which constitute a danger to international peace and security."¹

The Foreign Ministers of France, Britain, Israel, and Egypt attended the U.N. Security Council sessions. After the public debates, private meetings were held in the office of U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld during the second week in October. In these meetings between Foreign Ministers Pineau, Lloyd, and Fawzi (Egypt), a strong possibility seemed to be developing that some compromise might be arranged; Fawzi and Lloyd, in particular, seemed eager to find areas of agreement.² Fawzi agreed to the pledge of a certain percentage of Canal income to Canal improvements, an agreement fixing tolls for a number of years, recognition of a Users' Association, and a new treaty reaffirming rights of free passage. This preliminary agreement was announced in the form of six vaguely-worded principles that all parties understood to represent the more concrete items mentioned above. Thus, when the Security Council meetings ended on October 14, it was generally expected that further negotiations would be held around October 30.³

¹The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1957), p. 43.

²Robertson (op. cit., p. 129) quotes French Foreign Minister Pineau as saying: "I felt that if we did not do something [to counter Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal company] we would put ourselves in an inferior position in Algeria, that we would give the FLN rebels a major trump." At the same time, the Socialist Foreign Minister stated that his government was embarrassed to be acting apparently on behalf of the private Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, which had its seat of operations in Paris, and several thousand French stockholders.

³Finer, op. cit., pp. 308-315.

The Secretary General did in fact pursue the discussions with the Egyptian Foreign Minister and achieved a broad area of agreement; but when Israeli operations against Egypt began, the discussions were suspended.¹

While the United Nations was dealing with the problem, final plans were being made for the joint French-Israeli action and possible British-French operations. There are differences of opinion as to the degree to which British officials were fully informed of Israeli-French plans; in any event they seem to have been aware that some consultation was taking place.²

On September 23 the Israeli officials in charge of coordinating plans with France are reported to have arrived secretly in Paris to talk with French and, possibly, British officials.³ French deliveries of AMX tanks and new Mystère jets had been proceeding rapidly since early August, and Israeli personnel were being instructed in their operation. For apparently the first time, Israel is said to have explicitly proposed a preventive war involving all three nations. Eden and Lloyd, consulted in London, were fearful of possible Arab reactions, but agreed to further discussions. By September 26 a plan was elaborated by the British-French joint command calling for an attack through Port Said to the Canal zone. In deference to British military opinion, French arguments for a paratroop action were dropped, and a massive seaborne assault combined with heavy air support was agreed upon. On September 29, Moshe Dayan visited Paris, and during the next four days the details of a three-power coordinated operation were worked out with the French.⁴

Under the revised plan, the Israeli attack would come between

¹Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956, p. 47.

²Merry and Serge Bromberger, Secrets of Suez (London, Pan Books, 1957), p. 42.

³Dayan, op. cit., pp. 24-25; Robertson, op. cit., p. 134.

⁴Dayan, op. cit., pp. 29-31.

October 29 and November 5, a time picked primarily because it would coincide with the U.S. elections. It was hoped that the elections would make decisive U.S. action more difficult, in case Eisenhower actively opposed the invasion. It is reported that on October 3 Eden agreed to these plans in principle. Further meetings were scheduled with French officials later in the month.¹

On October 10 Israel made a heavy reprisal raid against Jordan. Britain announced the next day that it would honor its obligations to defend Jordan and warned Israel against future raids. According to one source, the Israeli raid was a feint designed to create the impression that Israeli mobilization was aimed at Jordan rather than Egypt.² Another source adds that the British had been previously informed by the French of the possibility of such a raid and had seized upon it as an opportunity to demonstrate the pro-Arab bias of British foreign policy.³


By October 16 the French were becoming worried that the operation was slowing down, and Eden and Lloyd flew to Paris two days earlier than planned in order to finish arrangements. Earlier, Eden had taken control of the defense ministry from Monckton, who was opposed to intervention; subsequently, Antony Head was placed in charge of the whole defense ministry (in addition to the joint British-French command that he had formed). During the October 16 meetings, decisions were reportedly made on the timing and circumstances of British-French intervention.⁴

¹Robertson, op. cit., pp. 134-140.

²Childers, op. cit., pp. 231-232. Pro-Nasser groups won the Jordanian elections in October, and there was an immediate realignment of Jordanian foreign policy to support Nasser.

³Robertson, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

⁴Several sources report that the Israeli government requested a secret treaty to bind the parties to the Suez undertaking (Childers, op. cit., pp. 174-175). They indicate that meetings began on October 22 with the secret arrival of Ben Gurion at the Paris suburb of Sèvres (Love, op. cit., p. 83). One of the sources directly attributes information on this to Pineau and Bourguès-Maunoury (Bromberger, op. cit.,



Adapted from Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York, Harper & Row, 1966), with permission of the publisher.

2. (October 29, 1956 -- November 7, 1956) The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase III₂; the British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase III.

a. Sub-Phase A: October 29, 1956 -- October 31, 1956

Hostilities broke out when Israeli forces launched a three-pronged attack into the Sinai Peninsula, aimed at the two ends of the Suez Canal and Egyptian fortifications dominating the Strait of Tiran.

On October 29 Israel dropped a paratroop battalion close to the southern end of the Canal, at the Mitla Pass. The unit took up position and awaited supporting troops, which, because of transportation difficulties, did not arrive until late on October 30. With the advantage of effective air cover, Israeli troops secured the Mitla Pass despite heavy opposition and some strafing by Egyptian planes, but they did not proceed to the heavily fortified Canal area.¹

In the second area of Israeli attack, the central region of the Sinai Peninsula (near Quesima), one Israeli brigade moved north to probe the heavily fortified positions around Abu Ageila. On October 31 another brigade attempted to take the Abu Ageila fortifications from the west but was stopped by heavy fire.²

After consultation with France and Britain as parties to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, the United States requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The Council met on October 30

p. 43). The only public statement by the leaders involved has come from Guy Mollet, who asserts that meetings with Ben Gurion were held but does not say when (Childers, op. cit., pp. 174-175). Moshe Dayan, reportedly a participant in the meetings, leaves those days blank in his published diary (Dayan, op. cit., p. 60). The role of Britain remains unclear. No claim has been made that Eden was at the alleged October 22 meetings; one source claims that Lloyd was present and that Eden's agreement to the treaty was obtained by sending a copy to London (Robertson, op. cit., p. 154).

¹S.L.A. Marshall, Sinai Victory (New York, William Morrow, 1958), pp. 65-93.

²Ibid., pp. 94-127; Dayan, op. cit., pp. 101-106.

and heard from the chief of staff of the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization, who reported that the Israelis had attacked and had ignored his call for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal. The United States offered a resolution calling on Israel to withdraw and on all U.N. members to refrain from the use of force or from giving assistance of any kind to Israel.

The British delegate announced that his government and that of France had that day (October 30) presented an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt to cease hostilities and withdraw to within ten miles of the Suez Canal.¹ Also, in order to separate the belligerents and guarantee free transit through the Canal, Egypt had been asked to permit British and French forces to move temporarily into Port Said, Ismailia, and Port Suez. Both Israel and Egypt had been given twelve hours to respond, after which British and French forces would intervene in whatever strength necessary to ensure compliance.

When the U.S. resolution was put to the vote, it was vetoed by Britain and France. The Council then adopted, over British and French objections, a procedural resolution asking that the General Assembly be called into emergency session under the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950.²

b. Sub-Phase B: October 31, 1956 -- November 5, 1956

The hostilities in the opening days were confined to Israeli and Egyptian forces. But they intensified dramatically on October 31 when Britain and France, nominally following up their ultimatum but most likely as a result of pre-planning with the Israelis,³ committed

¹Israeli forces were not that close to the Canal at the time.

²Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956, pp. 47-49.

³Robertson, op. cit., pp. 162-163. The British government has consistently denied all accusations of collusion with Israel, and Prime Minister Eden, in his memoirs, claimed that British actions from October 29 only responded to Israeli moves. However, inconsistencies in Eden's account confirm for many analysts that Britain and France

their air power and, in the case of France, some naval units. The uses made of British-French air power, in any event, were hardly calculated to apply force equally to Egypt and Israel. The primary British targets were Egyptian airfields, and the primary French role was in providing tactical support for Israeli ground operations and air cover for Israel.

While Egypt's inventory of modern jet aircraft exceeded that of Israel (see Section III), the Egyptian air force was operationally weaker. In large measure this was a consequence of the lack of an adequate number of trained Egyptian pilots for the sophisticated planes received from the Soviet bloc. The combined threat of Israeli-French air operations over Sinai led Nasser to ground most of his fighters. And the additional threat of British bombing led him to evacuate many of them to bases in Syria and Saudi Arabia.¹

On the ground, the key item of military equipment in the fighting was the tank. (See Section III for details on Israeli and Egyptian tank inventories at this stage.) Studies of the hostilities make it plain that effective use of Sherman tanks and the fast French-built AMX light tanks was the key to the defeat of the several important Egyptian fortified positions. The Israeli tanks were never seriously challenged by Egyptian tanks during the fighting.

Concerning manpower, one report states that Egypt's normal force in the Sinai was 60,000 men, but that at the time of the Israeli

had been planning a joint invasion of the Canal zone with prior knowledge of the timing of the Israeli attack. There is also controversy as to how much of the British-French pre-hostilities planning was known to the Israelis. According to a later statement by a confidant of President Nasser (New York Times, October 9, 1966), Egyptian leaders had not anticipated British cooperation with Israel, though they were expecting British military intervention in Egypt as a reprisal for nationalization of the Canal.

¹Leo Heiman, "Moscow's Export Arsenal; The Soviet Bloc and the Middle Eastern Arms Race," East Europe, Vol. 13, No. 5 (May 1964), p. 9.

attack only 30,000 were in position (the others having been withdrawn to the Canal zone in August). Against this force, Israel reportedly deployed approximately 45,000 troops. Moreover, some two-thirds of the Egyptian force were support troops, rather than combat, compared to half or less of the Israeli forces.¹ On the other hand, Israeli-based accounts of the war give the impression of small, highly-mobile and well-equipped Israeli units defeating very large Egyptian troop concentrations centered on fortifications and fixed artillery.

The air strikes that began on October 31 against the fortified Egyptian elevations were coordinated with heavy attacks by tanks and with the shelling of Egyptian defenses by French naval vessels.² Egyptian positions in the northern area around Rafah were defeated between 3 and 9 a.m. on November 1. By the evening of November 1, all Egyptian armor was withdrawing rapidly toward the Canal area.³ Hundreds of military vehicles clogged the roads, offering targets for bombing and strafing by Israeli and French planes. On November 2, Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip, acting under orders,⁴ surrendered after minor skirmishes. In the central area, Egyptian troops from Abu Ageila left their positions, all armor retreated to the Canal, and the air bases at Bir Hama and Bir Gafgafa were deserted. Subsequently, from November 3 to 5 the Israeli southern forces and a brigade proceeding from Elath advanced upon and took Sharm el Sheikh at the southern tip of Sinai, a post that controlled the Strait of

¹Childers, op. cit., p. 282.

²Dayan (op. cit., p. 132) notes the shelling of the Rafah positions but does not indicate who was responsible for it. Also, in contrast to Marshall, who notes the contributions of air attacks in the taking of the Rafah fortifications, Dayan discounts their effectiveness as well as that of the naval bombardments. Marshall does not mention naval bombardments at all. Merry and Serge Bromberger (op. cit., p. 24) stress the significance of the French navy in neutralizing the Egyptian navy. (See Section III for a comparison of Israeli and Egyptian naval strengths and equipment.)

³New York Times, November 2, 1956; Marshall, op. cit., pp. 189-191.

⁴New York Times, November 2, 1956; Childers, op. cit., p. 292.

Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. In the southern thrust, as in the central area, the French contributed to Israeli success by flying supplies from Cyprus aboard Nordatlas transports.¹

The 1st Special Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly met on November 1. U.S. Secretary of State Dulles characterized "the violent armed attack by three of our members upon a fourth" as "a grave error." He offered a resolution for a cease-fire that was adopted in the early hours of November 2 with the Soviet Union concurring.²

This conjunction of U.S. and Soviet policy took place against the counterpoint of the Hungarian rebellion and its suppression. At this particular moment, however, it appeared that Soviet armor was withdrawing from Budapest following an October 30 announcement of Soviet readiness to negotiate the stationing of its troops in Hungary with the members of the Warsaw Pact. The Hungarian situation was therefore outwardly headed toward a peaceful resolution.³

The U.N. General Assembly met again during the night of November 3 against a background of deepening crisis. Disregarding the November 2 call for a cease-fire, the British and French continued to bomb Port Said and the Israelis to decimate whatever Egyptian forces

¹Childers, op. cit., p. 288; Marshall, op. cit., p. 69. Marshall does not indicate the nationality of the planes.

²Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956, p. 50.

³Ibid., p. 84. However, the Security Council was called into session again on November 2 on receipt of news of large-scale Soviet troop movements into Hungary. The Council met again on November 3 and at 3 a.m. on Sunday, November 4, as the scale of Soviet military intervention became apparent. The Council's attempted call for withdrawal of Soviet forces was vetoed by the Soviet Union and the matter was referred, again under the Uniting for Peace resolution, to a special emergency session of the General Assembly. See ibid., pp. 84-86. There were thus two special Assembly sessions meeting in New York, each dealing with an outwardly separate conflict but with the tensions of one reinforcing the tensions of the other.

they could catch in the Sinai. The Canal had been closed by sunken shipping, and oil pipelines in the Middle East had been cut in reprisal against Britain. Hanging over the U.N. proceedings was the clear threat of further intensification of hostilities, involving British and French invasion of the Canal zone with unknown implications of spiralling interventions on opposing sides by other great powers.

The Canadian delegation under Lester Pearson had been working on the notion of a U.N. peace force that would separate Israeli and Egyptian forces. Since the declared purpose of any British-French landing was to separate these combatants, such a U.N. force would serve to make the presence of landing forces unnecessary.¹ The Secretary-General was able to inform the Assembly on November 3 that Britain and France had agreed to halt their military action if, among other conditions, both Egyptian and Israeli governments would accept a U.N. force to maintain the peace until an Arab-Israeli settlement and a Suez Canal settlement were reached. The proposal was strongly supported by the United States and approved, by a vote of 57 to 0 with 19 abstentions, just after midnight of November 4.²

c. Sub-Phase C: November 4-5, 1956 -- November 7, 1956

Despite strong pressure from the United Nations, the United States, and many others, the British and French land operations in the Suez Canal area commenced on the night of November 4-5. The British and French had been bombing pre-landing targets in Egypt (including the Cairo airport) around the clock. After several delays--the force itself took longer than expected to assemble, and the highly selective pre-landing bombings of the area had been protracted in order to cut later ground casualties to a minimum--the British-French airborne

¹Robertson, op.cit., pp. 183-203, 212-222; William R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York, Oceana Publications, 1957), pp. 6-21; Finer, op. cit., pp. 407-408.

²Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956, pp. 52-53.

assault on Port Fuad began on the night of November 4-5,¹ and the city surrendered by that afternoon; there was heavy fighting in Port Said, and the local Egyptian commander initiated discussions for a surrender. At the same time, French and British forces moved south of the two ports and began to move up the Canal. Surrender negotiations in Port Said were broken off, and on November 6 the seaborne troops pressing toward the occupation of Suez encountered considerable Egyptian resistance, including that of an armed civilian population. By midnight of November 6, the allied forces had reached El Cap, 23 miles up the Canal from Port Said.

At this point, when Egypt's military plight was becoming extremely grave, strong diplomatic support was received from the Soviet Union and, indirectly, from the United States. The Soviet Union on November 5 sent a series of diplomatic notes. To the United States it was proposed that Soviet and U.S. troops "crush the aggressors and restore peace."² To Britain and France there were references, imprecise but ominous, to "countries" which "could have used" rocket weapons against London and Paris.³

The Soviet Union also requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council on November 5 to consider a draft resolution calling on all member states, in particular the United States and the Soviet Union, to give military and other assistance to Egypt if an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops were not effected. The Security Council refused to inscribe the Soviet item. The U.S. representative commented on Soviet "cynicism" in making such a request on top of the "butchery which Moscow was in process of carrying out against the people of Hungary under cover of so-called 'negotiations.'"⁴

¹Frye, op. cit., p. 8.

²Ibid., p. 10.

³Ibid. The next day there were reports of Soviet jets over Turkey and of Soviet surface craft and submarines passing through the Dardanelles. For details, see Finer, op. cit., pp. 420-421.

⁴Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956, pp. 54-55.

Domestic pressure for a cease-fire was impinging heavily on the British government during this period. The November 5 debate in the House of Commons reflected the fact that the Suez hostilities were highly unpopular with the majority of the Labour Party and many other British subjects. A large number of Conservative Members of Parliament had indicated that they were giving serious consideration to refusing support for the government policy in Suez.¹ British oil interests feared disruption of their supply; some British feared the continuation of stress within the Atlantic alliance; others were disturbed by the fact that Canada was clearly opposed to the Suez action, as were African and Asian members of the Commonwealth; it was clear that world opinion was almost unanimously unfavorable to British actions; and Soviet pronouncements raised fears of a world conflagration growing out of continued hostilities.

In addition, the British financial situation was deteriorating rapidly, as other countries converted their sterling holdings. Estimating that \$1 billion were required to offset the run on sterling aggravated by continuing British involvement in the Suez campaign, Britain on November 6 asked the United States for financial support. The support was promised on the condition that Britain declare a cease-fire by the end of the same day.²

By the early hours of November 6, the U.N. Secretary-General had produced proposals for implementing the November 4 Assembly resolution for an international peace force. The proposed force would not be used to exert political pressure on Egypt; the great powers would not participate; political control was to be placed almost entirely in the Secretary-General's hands.³

The proposed U.N. peace force offered the British a face-

¹Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 427. According to Kennett Love (*op. cit.*, p. 9), Prime Minister Eden was both "isolated and autonomous," drawing his support from a Tory group that itself became bitterly isolated within the Conservative Party.

²Finer, *op. cit.*, pp. 428-429.

³Frye, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-12.

saving way to withdraw from an increasingly untenable position. To the neutralists and Egypt, the peace force offered a means for getting rid of the British and French. While they might have hoped for a more unequivocal solution, it was considered to be the strongest measure the United States would support, as well as the only way to avoid long, drawn-out fighting. To the United States it was a way of keeping a direct Soviet presence out of the Middle East. The French preference was to carry the operation through to its end, toppling Nasser or, at a minimum, regaining control of the Canal. However, the French government recognized the impossibility of continuing without British support. Israel, on the other hand, had already achieved its immediate goals--destruction of Egyptian positions in the Sinai, capture of war materiel, the opening of the port of Elath, and a dramatic blow to Arab prestige--and had been willing to accept the cease-fire, even before the beginning of the British-French landings.¹ Israel, however, made it clear that a U.N. force would not be permitted on Israeli territory.

Britain and France accepted the cease-fire called for by the General Assembly on November 2; Egyptian and Israeli acceptance had already been received. The cease-fire went into effect at midnight of November 6.

3. (November 7, 1956 -- December 23, 1956) The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV₂-A; the British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase IV. With the conclusion of the cease-fire, there remained the task of obtaining agreement on the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces. Two resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly on November 7: the first completed the groundwork for the establishment of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF); the second, sponsored by nineteen African-Asian members, called for immediate withdrawal of the invading

¹New York Times, July 9, 1966; also Dayan, op. cit., pp. 180-182; Robertson, op. cit., p. 237. In the confusion of the moment, the Israeli delegate at the United Nations had announced acceptance of the November 2 cease-fire resolution soon after it was adopted, only to withdraw it the next day with the claim that there had been a misunderstanding.

forces. Britain refused to withdraw forces prior to the positioning of U.N. troops, alleging that the separation of the parties would break down and hostilities be resumed.

UNEF observers were admitted immediately into the area of military operations. The movement of UNEF troops to Egypt began on November 10. Four days later the first UNEF contingent arrived in Egypt. By November 22, 869 UNEF troops were in Egypt, at which time final agreement was reached with the Egyptian government on the presence and functioning of the force. No British withdrawals had yet taken place, but about one-third of the French forces deployed on November 7 had been withdrawn. Some pullback of Israeli forces had occurred along the entire battle line.

On November 24 the Assembly voted by 63 votes (including the United States) to 5, with 10 abstentions, a resolution regretting that withdrawals had been so limited. Thereafter, however, the phased take-over by UNEF proceeded steadily, and by December 22, 1956, British and French troops completed their withdrawal.

D. The Conflicts Diverge: From December 23, 1956

1. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV₂-B. While British and French forces evacuated Egyptian territory with relative dispatch, Israeli forces were pulling back very slowly--no more than fifteen miles a week. By year's end, the Sinai was almost cleared but Israeli troops still occupied the Gaza Strip and were deployed along a belt to the west of the Egyptian-Israeli demarcation line and along the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba. The Israeli government said that it would agree to clear these areas only if measures were taken to prevent a renewal of the blockade of the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, and to ensure that Gaza could not again be used as a base for raids against Israeli territory.

Israel held firmly to this policy despite strong U.N. pressure culminating in two Assembly resolutions of February 2 deploring the failure of Israel to withdraw and authorizing the place-

ment of UNEF troops on the Egyptian side of the armistice line. Israel held firm until March 1, 1957, when assurances were received from the major maritime powers that free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba would be maintained, and when Israel was confident that UNEF would maintain full responsibility in the Gaza area until a peace settlement was reached. The withdrawal was completed on March 8, 1957.

The Arab-Israeli conflict remained in Phase IV₂ until June 5, 1967, when Phase III₃ broke out with hostilities between Israel and the UAR, Jordan, and Syria.

2. The British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase V. The net effect of the 1956 Suez hostilities was to remove the element of force from the calculations of Britain and France in reference to settlement of their differences with Egypt. These differences, defined in the narrow terms of the control of the Suez Canal, vanished very quickly. The broader issues took a longer time to disappear. Relations among the three states are normal, if not cordial.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

[The format of this section will vary from the pattern followed with other cases in order to handle the two conflicts separately from the middle 1950s until July 1956, jointly from July 1956 until December 1956, and separately after December 1956.]

A. THE SEPARATE CONFLICTS

1. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Movement Away from Settlement

[For a brief period after the overthrow of the monarchy in Egypt, cautious movements were made by both adversaries toward ending their conflict; these collapsed in late 1953. This section will examine the factors between late 1953 and July 1956 that were pressing the conflict closer to resumed hostilities and those pressing toward settlement.]

a. Factors Tending Away from Settlement/Promoting the Resumption of Hostilities

- (1) Despite the armistice agreements that had been signed between Israel and its Arab neighbors in 1949, basic political problems remained unsettled; permanent borders, return or resettlement of refugees and compensation for their losses, etc.

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

1. Measures Designed to Settle the Dispute/Inhibit the Resumption of Hostilities

a. To Offset These Factors

- (1) Stronger pressure on all parties to resolve these problems bilaterally or accept compulsory third-party settlement; reinforcement of this pressure by external suppliers of economic and military aid, trade partners, etc., with threat of sanction for non-compliance.

- (2) Egypt continued to deny passage through the Suez Canal to Israeli ships and extended this ban to all goods to and from Israel. Despite U.N. urgings, Egypt refused to lift the ban.
- (3) Egypt blocked the Strait of Tiran at the Gulf of Aqaba, thus denying Israel access to the Red Sea. Coupled with the Suez Canal restriction, this barred Israel from the Indian Ocean and the Pacific except around Africa or through the Panama Canal.
- (4) The withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone, in accordance with British-Egyptian agreement, removed a potential third-power force from the area and a form of early warning system for Israel.
- (5) Terrorist raids (the fedayin raids) were carried out in Israel with what Israel claimed was official Egyptian sanction and encouragement, but by what Egypt claimed were discontented Palestine refugees from Gaza.
- (2) Refusal by all Canal users to tolerate the situation; economic reprisals; challenges by major powers; U.N. insistence; exploration of alternate canal routes (through Negev?).
- (3) Insistence by maritime powers of open access to international waters.
- (4) Substitution of neutral-force presence; alternate technical surveillance systems for early warning. [Note that this same factor, here seen as conflict-producing, was conflict-controlling in the British-French-Egyptian conflict--see entry 2.b.(1) of Section A below.]
- (5) Fact-finding to determine responsibility; joint or third-party border control (such as that proposed by the head of UNTSO but rejected by the adversaries); strong sanctions against such infiltration and sabotage.

- (6) Israeli military forces carried out several large-scale incursions into Egyptian territory, mainly in Gaza, aimed, Israel contended, at bases from which the fedayin operated in order to deter further fedayin raids.
- (7) Official and quasi-official sources in Egypt made threats of eventual annihilation of Israel.
- (8) Egypt announced that the Soviet bloc had agreed to supply Egypt with modern military equipment. This threatened to upset the military balance that had existed between Egypt and Israel.
- (9) Egypt banned Israeli commercial flights over the Strait of Tiran.
- (10) Pressure on the Israeli government mounted from those favoring a stronger policy toward Egypt. The moderates were forced out of office and the groups favoring more extreme policies returned.
- (6) Border-control measures mentioned in entry (5) above; third-party border patrol; strong sanctions for such armed incursions.
- (7) Bilateral agreement to tempt propaganda campaign; development of positive set of goals around which to rally Egyptian and Arab nationalism and aspirations. [See entry 2.a. (3) of Section A below.]
- (8) Agreement among arms suppliers to restrict sale of arms to states engaged in conflicts.
- (9) Clarification and enforcement of international agreements on peaceful uses of national air space; reprisals against Egypt by other commercial airlines.
- (10) Strengthening Israeli moderates and weakening the extremists.

b. To Reinforce These Factors

b. Factors Tending Toward Settlement/Inhibiting the Resumption of Hostilities

- (1) As part of the agreements ending Phase III₁ hostilities in 1949, the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) existed and was responsible for investigating alleged truce violations and recommending measures to prevent them.
- (2) The U.N. Security Council explicitly condemned Israel for its military forays into Gaza and called on the adversaries to avoid actions likely to disturb the peace of the region.
- (3) The UNTSO proposed and the U.N. Security Council commended to the adversaries measures to tighten the armistice line--barbed wire, joint patrols, etc.
- (4) Nasser had a high interest in Egypt's economic development and needed time for these programs as well as to consolidate his regime.
- (5) Britain urged Israel and Egypt to compromise on a permanent border somewhere between the U.N. partition-plan lines Egypt wanted and the armistice line Israel claimed.
- (6) The United States and Britain refused to supply arms to Israel following Egypt's acquisition of Soviet bloc arms.
- (1) Enhanced powers for UNTSO, increased numbers, technical capability, authority.
- (2) Threat of U.N. sanctions.
- (3) Insistence by United Nations, other third powers that states comply with UNTSO recommendations; threat of economic, political reprisals against adversary refusing cooperation.
- (4) Enhancing value of internal development goals as rallying point for state and regime.
- (5) Other third parties displaying a willingness to incur international and domestic criticism by insisting both adversaries make concessions toward settlement.
- (6) Preferably agreement among all suppliers to restrict arms to conflict areas; refusal to become engaged in competitive

local arms races; substitution of workable credible guarantees for added arms shipments.

2. Measures Aimed at Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

2. The British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option

[During roughly the same period discussed above, disputes developed between Britain and Egypt and France and Egypt. Factors described here bear on the transition of those disputes into a conflict that aligned Britain and France on one side and Egypt on the other.]

a. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

(1) The Middle East generally and the Suez Canal in particular had been for centuries of great strategic and economic importance to Europe. Britain in particular relied on the Canal to tie together its dispersed empire. Europe's reliance on Middle Eastern oil (much of it shipped through the Canal) was growing.

(2) Cold War considerations led to the CENTO security arrangement, which Nasser regarded as a barrier to his brand of Arab nationalism and a strengthening of his chief rival Iraq.

(3) In his search for support in the Arab world, Nasser exploited the theme of

a. To Offset These Factors

(1) Development of long-range air-lift capability for both military and commercial purposes; investigation of alternate canal routes; development of alternate energy sources; international ownership of vital waterways.

(2) Ideally, ending the Cold War; alternatively, building stable countries on the Soviet periphery to resist subversion; guarantees against Soviet aggression; sea-based missile and air alternatives to land bases.

(3) Developing a positive set of goals and aspirations for

anti-Westernism (as well as that of anti-Zionism). Britain thus saw Nasserism as a threat to its political position in the Middle East.

Arab nationalists. [See also entry 1.a. (7) above.]

(4) Nasser's acceptance of Soviet bloc arms was seen by the West as fully as much anti-Western as anti-Israeli. The move diminished the value of CENTO as a barrier to Soviet influence in the Middle East and potentially opened the way to the establishment of Soviet military power in the eastern Mediterranean as well.

(5) Nasser openly gave materiel and other support to the Algerian rebels in their struggle for independence from France.

(4) Agreement among arms suppliers not to send arms to conflict areas; strong measures to deter Soviets from attempting to establish bases in area.

(5) Either, measures to cut off and halt Egyptian aid to Algeria; or, acceptance by France of Algerian independence or, alternatively, of the internal Algerian genesis of the independence movement so that Nasser would not appear the cause of French difficulties.

(6) After long negotiations for international financial support for the Aswan High Dam, Nasser agreed to conditions laid down by the United States, Britain, and the International Bank. The United States abruptly and publicly withdrew its offer.

(6) Disbursement of economic assistance through non-political international agencies; greater awareness of high emotional value placed on major symbols of progress; greater finesse in handling delicate diplomatic problems.

b. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

(1) Britain agreed, in the face of mounting Egyptian terrorism and strong U.S. pressure, to evacuate its forces from the Suez Canal area.

(2) Britain declined Israel's request for arms following Egypt's agreement to acquire Soviet bloc arms. In general, Britain sought to pursue a neutral policy on the issues of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

(3) Nasser was concerned with Egypt's economic development and needed and was prepared to accept substantial Western aid for this purpose. The symbol of the growth of modern Egypt was to be the Aswan High Dam.

B. THE CONFLICTS CONVERGE

1. Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV, -Y to Phase III₂ : The Resumption of Hostilities

British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase II to Phase III: The Outbreak of Hostilities

b. To Reinforce These Factors

(1) Earlier, more amicable British-Egyptian agreement.
[Note: this was a conflict-producing and not a conflict-controlling factor in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict--see entry 1.a. (4) above.]

(2) Pursuing a more pro-Egyptian policy (which might, however, have generated a different conflict); unilateral British or joint British-U.S. guarantees to victim of aggression.

(3) Enhancing value and symbolism of internal development goals; extensive economic aid.

1. Measures Designed to Inhibit the Resumption/Outbreak of Hostilities

a. Factors Promoting the Resumption/Outbreak of Hostilities

(1) British and French leaders saw the situation in the Middle East as analogous to Europe in the late 1930s and felt that now, as then, appeasement of dictators would only whet their appetites and precipitate larger hostilities eventually.

(2) The existence of the British-French-Egyptian conflict opened for Israel a chance for more major action against Egypt than it could undertake alone. The existence of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and particularly the state of Israeli-Egyptian relations, gave Britain and France an opportunity to develop a cover story for their military intervention. First France and Israel and France and Britain discussed bilateral action; subsequently, these discussions developed into trilateral planning.

(3) Britain and France saw little hope for a negotiated settlement with Nasser and felt that the U.S. reiteration of its unwillingness to endorse the use of force undermined what little bargaining power they had.

(4) The availability of the British base in Cyprus made British-French military action in the Middle East easier to carry out quickly.

a. To Offset These Factors

(1) Learning all the lessons of history which include both the dangers of appeasement and the dangers of refusal to accommodate to what others see as their vital interests and needs.

(2) The elimination of one or another of the conflicts. [Note: either conflict alone might have led to hostilities but their nature would certainly have been different and their timing probably so.]

(3) Articulation of U.S. position as not just non-endorsement of the use of force in these conflicts but determination to react vigorously against those, including its closest allies, who did use force.

(4) Elimination of Britain's Cyprus base; international air and sea blockade of it to prevent its use as a staging area

against Egypt.

- (5) The coming U.S. election was probably calculated to make rapid U.S. decision-making on Suez-Sinai difficult.

- (5) Insulation of major foreign-policy issues from election politics; bipartisan statement of U.S. position.

b. Factors Inhibiting the Resumption/Outbreak of Hostilities

- (1) Nasser offered assurance that he would keep the Canal open. He offered to negotiate a new treaty guaranteeing this, fixing rates, guaranteeing maintenance, etc.

- (2) Despite the fears expressed by Britain and France, the Canal continued to function smoothly under Egyptian control.

- (3) The United States exerted strong diplomatic pressure on Britain and France not to resort to force in their conflict with Egypt. The United States refused to agree that force was required if Nasser rejected the various alternate arrangements for Canal management being considered.

- (4) The United States initiated two major efforts to devise a new system for operating the Canal, both of which involved lengthy negotiation. These were

b. To Reinforce These Factors

- (1) U.S., U.N. endorsement of Nasser proposals; offer of good offices for negotiations; guarantee of resulting agreements.

- (2) Clear intention of other users of the Canal not to tolerate British-French use of force so long as the Canal was operating smoothly and without politically inspired disruptions by Nasser.

- (3) Equally firm U.S. statement of its position if force were nonetheless resorted to. [Note: the conclusions the British and French drew from the U.S. position were conflict-producing--see entry 1.a. (3) of Section B above.]

- (4) Additional time-buying devices; pressure on Britain and France to continue efforts to negotiate a solution; pressure on

designed both to be responsive to the expressed concerns of Britain and France and to keep Britain and France at the conference table.

- (5) The Soviet Union uttered thinly veiled threats to intervene on Egypt's behalf, with "volunteers," if Britain and France opened hostilities.
- (6) The Hungarian crisis, occurring simultaneously, distracted Soviet attention but it also raised the likelihood, U.S. officials in particular feared, of hasty Soviet reactions in the Middle East.
- (7) Private negotiations under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General appeared to be making progress toward a negotiated settlement of the expressed substance of the conflict.
- (8) Domestic pressure was mounting, in Britain in particular, against the use of force against Egypt except as a last resort.

2. Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase III₂

British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase III

[The hostilities in the combined conflicts, while brief, included two specific intensifications. These will be analyzed in the following sections.]

Sub-Phase A: Israel Invades Sinai

Egypt to seek a negotiated compromise.

- (5) Threatening to intensify potential hostilities with highly credible threats.
- (6) Threats of uncontrolled, accidental intensification into global nuclear war.
- (7) U.S., other pressure not to countenance force while negotiations were in progress.
- (8) Strengthening opposition in Britain; undermining government in office; seeking to oust Eden.

2. Measures Designed to Moderate and Terminate Hostilities

[In this sub-phase, only Israeli and Egyptian forces were engaged and hostilities were confined to the Sinai Peninsula. The threatened intensification was the commitment of British and French forces to the hostilities and their extension to the Suez Canal area. Although the British-French ultimatum was phrased as an effort to terminate hostilities, its effect--and probably intent--was to intensify them.]

a. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

- (1) All the factors outlined above as promoting the outbreak/resumption of hostilities continued to operate.
- (2) Britain and France sent an ultimatum to Israel and to Egypt demanding a cease-fire and a pull-back ten miles from the Canal; the demand was further made of Egypt that it admit British and French troops to separate the belligerents and guarantee free transit.

a. To Offset These Factors

- (1) Measures suggested above to offset factors promoting hostilities and reinforce those inhibiting hostilities.
- (2) Counter-ultimatum to Britain, France from the United States, the Soviet Union, and others threatening to block attempted intervention; U.S. articulation of intended response to intervention; pressure on Israel, Egypt to comply with terms of ultimatum with neutral or U.N. force instead of British-French force interposed along the Canal.

b. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities

- (1) Although Britain and France vetoed the resolution in the U.N. Security Council that would have called for an immediate

b. To Reinforce These Factors

- (1) Increased pressure from allies, trading partners, and Cold War adversaries.

cease-fire and for all members of the United Nations to refrain from assisting either belligerent, the debate showed united opposition to the Israeli action and the British-French ultimatum from Britain's and France's European allies, most of the Commonwealth, the neutralists, and both the United States and Soviet Union.

(2) To the extent that the fictions of French and British action independent of Israel were important, the fact that fighting had not reached the Canal area when the ultimatum was delivered, and that this was generally known to the various governments involved, may have served as a moderating force.

(3) The procedures of the Uniting for Peace resolution enabled the Special Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly to be convened in very short order. U.N. pressure was thus maintained.

(4) The United States was especially fearful that the Suez-Sinai conflicts would grow into a much wider war. The United States brought strong diplomatic pressure to bear on Britain and France.

Sub-Phase B: The Commitment of British-French Air Power

[Despite multilateral and bilateral pressures, the British and French, at the expiration of the ultimatum, began to bomb Egyptian airfields and potential

- (2) Wide publicity to gaps in British-French credibility.
[Note, however, that accepting in particular Britain's public statement of objectives at face value probably provided a key to early termination of hostilities by making a face-saving retreat possible.]
- (3) Preserving the U.N. Charter's evolving flexibility and exploring techniques to enhance it still further.
- (4) Increasing threat of Soviet involvement and intensification of the conflict.

invasion points and French air power directly supported the Israeli land operations in Sinai. The threatened further intensification was the actual landing of British and French ground forces in Egypt.]

a. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

- (1) The British and French were publicly committed to the terms of their ultimatum.
- (2) The one area in which Soviet bloc arms had most significantly increased Egypt's strength vis-à-vis Israel was in air power (although in terms of pilot training, maintenance, etc., this was only potential power at this time). Israel was anxious to eliminate as much of this potential threat as possible.

b. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities

- (1) Israel had achieved its primary goals--defeating Egypt in Sinai, capturing or destroying the recently acquired Soviet bloc equipment, humiliating Nasser, and opening the Strait of Tiran.
- (2) A strongly worded resolution calling for an end to hostilities and British-French intervention was adopted by the General Assembly--again with Soviet-U.S. concurrence.

a. To Offset These Factors

- (1) Increased opposition to announced policy, especially in Britain, to make cost of consistency higher than cost of policy reversal.
- (2) Restraint by arms suppliers in shipping arms to conflict areas; provision of anti-aircraft defenses to Israel.

b. To Reinforce These Factors

- (1) Seeking to separate the two conflicts by seeking to persuade Israel to agree to cease-fire.
- (2) Coupling U.N. condemnation with threat of sanctions.

- (3) The General Assembly also decided to authorize the creation of a U.N. force to perform the task for which Britain and France claimed their intervention had been undertaken--to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces and protect the Canal.

3. Arab-Israeli Conflict)
Phase III₂ to Phase IV₂-A) Termination
British-French-Egyptian Conflict) of
Phase III to Phase IV) Hostilities

[Despite the factors noted above, British and French airborne and seaborne forces landed in Egypt and began to fight their way up the Canal. Hostilities in the Sinai had virtually ceased.]

- a. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

- (1) Egyptian resistance in the Sinai had collapsed--in part as a consequence of defeat by Israeli military action and in part as a consequence of the British-French threat. In the Canal area, Egyptian resistance was steadily weakening.

- (3) Prior General Assembly creation of such a peacekeeping force, or studies of the organization of one.

3. Measures Designed to Terminate Hostilities

- a. To Offset These Factors

- (1) More effective British-French action to complete military mission. [Note: rapid British-French "victory" would have terminated hostilities but may have been found intolerable by the United States, Soviet Union, United Nations, etc. The opposite course toward rapid termination--detering or defeating the intervention attempt--seems more likely to achieve conflict control.]

- (2) Strong Soviet diplomatic support for Egypt's position led Egypt to break off local surrender negotiations and continue fighting. Arms were distributed to civilians in preparation for possible guerrilla warfare.

- (2) U.S. counterpressure on Soviet Union not to encourage Egyptian resistance; actions to reduce credibility of Soviet threat to intervene.

b. Factors Tending to Terminate Hostilities

- (1) The Soviet Union threatened or proposed a variety of kinds of intervention--direct unilateral in Egypt, joint with the United States, missile attacks on Britain and France.

b. To Reinforce These Factors

- (1) Active U.S. expressions of interest in Soviet proposals (if objective was termination by Britain-France); active steps to counter and reduce credibility of Soviet threats (if aim was to induce Egypt to give in).
- (2) Explicit statement that the United States would not bail out Britain and France in Egypt so long as Soviet action was confined to scene of hostilities and kept to conventional arms.
- (3) Strengthening internal opposition; seeking to topple government; seeking to oust Eden.

- (2) The United States refused to assure Britain and France that it would regard itself obliged to come to their assistance if the Soviet Union attacked their forces in Egypt.

- (3) Heavy domestic pressure was being generated in Britain to cease hostilities. Not only members of the opposition Labour Party but also important segments of the majority Tory Party opposed the Eden government's policies. This opposition was magnified by fears generated by Soviet threats.

- (4) A serious run on the pound sterling developed. The United States agreed to help stabilize the situation only if Britain agreed to an immediate cease-fire and withdrew.
- (5) France was not prepared to proceed alone, without British assistance.
- (6) The plans for the U.N. force--UNEF--were elaborated and contingents committed.
- (4) Increasing and stimulating the economic costs of hostilities.
- (5) Seeking to break up the coalition acting against Egypt. [Note: this clearly was being done, for most U.S. and U.N. pressure fell upon Britain.]
- (6) Either a standing U.N. peace force; or developed contingency planning for one.

688

4. Measures Designed to End the Conflict

4. British-French-Egyptian Conflict: Phase IV to Phase V: Ending the Conflict
- [With the termination of hostilities, it remained to obtain the withdrawal of British and French forces. The portion of the Arab-Israeli conflict that overlaps with the period of British-French withdrawal belongs in this general section dealing with the converged conflicts. However, since Israeli withdrawal was delayed three months longer than British-French withdrawal, and since the issues that delayed it were related solely to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is treated as a whole in the following section.]

a. Factors Tending Away from Ending the Conflict

- (1) None of the stated or unstated objectives of the British-French intervention had
- a. To Offset These Factors
- (1) Stronger indications, if such were possible, of the high

been accomplished.

- (2) UNEF was a novel instrument and had to be assembled piecemeal. While in the circumstances the speed of its arrival was astounding, it was some weeks before it was fully operational.

b. Factors Tending Toward Ending the Conflict

- (1) UNEF's eventual arrival allowed the British and French to withdraw with some saving of face and without what otherwise might have been dangerous clashes with the armed Egyptian populace.

- (2) The United Nations repeated its demand for a speedy withdrawal of intervening forces.

C. THE CONFLICTS DIVERGE

[With British-French withdrawal, only Israeli troops remained on Egyptian soil.]

1. Arab-Israeli Conflict: Phase IV₂-A to Phase IV₂-B: The Withdrawal of Israeli Forces

a. Factors Tending Away from Settlement

cost, and unlikely prospect, of achieving British-French goals.

- (2) Standing U.N. peacekeeping force; developed contingency plans for rapid development and deployment.

b. To Reinforce These Factors

- (1) Avoiding creation of a situation in which national pride and prestige are committed to a conflict-producing course by leaving open a face-saving line of retreat; accepting an avowed purpose as genuine even in the face of evidence that it is not; avoiding the cornering of either adversary.

- (2) More rapid deployment of UNEF; potential U.N. force to compel compliance (not to be confused with UNEF type of peacekeeping force).

a. To Offset These Factors

- (1) While Israeli forces had accomplished their military objectives, the failure of the British-French intervention meant that these gains could not be regarded as secured. Before agreeing to withdraw, Israel demanded assurances that the blockade at Aqaba would not be reimposed and that Gaza would not again become a base for fedayin raids.

b. Factors Tending Toward Lowered Tensions

- (1) Strong U.S. and U.N. pressure for withdrawal continued.
- (2) The implied risk of a clash between Israeli forces and UNEF existed in the General Assembly's instruction to the latter to proceed to take up positions on the Egyptian side of the armistice line.
- (3) The major maritime powers undertook to guarantee that the Strait of Tiran would remain open to Israeli shipping.
- (4) The United Nations gave assurance that UNEF would maintain the full responsibility for the Gaza area until a peace settlement had been reached.

[This analysis ends at this point. The Arab-Israeli conflict remained in Phase IV₂ until June 5, 1967, when Phase III₃ began, with hostilities between Israel and the UAR, Jordan, and Syria.]

- (1) Recognition that, even though aggression is condemned, the aggressor may have legitimate grievances that, while not a justification of its actions, need to be accommodated in the interests of future conflict control and settlement.

b. To Reinforce These Factors

- (1) Threat of military, economic sanctions.
- (2) Backing up peacekeeping forces with potent political support, deterrence, etc.
- (3) Accommodation of legitimate grievances, even of condemned aggressor.
- (4) Accommodation of legitimate grievances, even of condemned aggressor.

III. WEAPONS ANALYSIS

[This section will examine only the arms available in the Sinai--i.e., Egyptian-Israeli--conflict and not include, as did the preceding sections, the Suez--i.e., British-French-Egyptian--conflict that converged with it. Furthermore, this section will look at the post-Sinai arms build-up by Israel and the UAR, whereas the preceding sections stopped with the termination of hostilities between the UAR and Israel-Britain-France and the withdrawal of the latter's forces.]

A. Arms Acquisition Prior to the Sinai Campaign

1. Egyptian Weapons Acquisition. Egypt's arms before the Sinai campaign were acquired in three fairly distinct phases. The first period ended in 1950, when the British placed a ban on arms exports to Egypt; the second began in 1954, when British and French arms shipments to Egypt resumed with the signing of the agreement to evacuate British forces from the Canal zone; the third began in 1955 with the signing of the first agreement for Soviet bloc arms.

Before 1947, when the British military mission left Egypt, enough .303 Lee Enfield rifles had been supplied for probably as many as 100,000 troops.¹ The British had also provided the Egyptian army with a variety of other battlefield weapons, although no exact determination can be made here of their types.² Spitfire fighters, Halifax bombers, and Lancaster bombers were among the aircraft supplied to the Egyptian air force by Britain. Although the British military mission ended its training program in Egypt in 1947, it is known that free-lance

¹The Egyptian national guard was equipped with Lee Enfield rifles by 1956. See Alan Barker, Suez: The Seven Day War (New York, Praeger, 1964), pp. 61-64.

²Major Edgar O'Ballance, "The Egyptian Army," Royal United Service Institution Journal, February 1958, pp. 82-88.

British pilots were finding training positions with the Egyptian air force up to the time of the Suez attack in late 1956.

It appears that Egypt bought a considerable amount of British and French equipment between 1954 and 1955. The heavier battlefield weapons from Britain included 50-60 Valentine Archers with 17-pounder guns, a number of Valentine tanks without the 17-pounder guns, about 120 25-pounder howitzers, and at least 30 Centurion Mk.3 tanks; from France, some 155mm howitzers, a few AMX-13 light tanks, and perhaps 150-200 reconditioned Sherman tanks.¹ About 70 Meteor jet fighters went to the Egyptian air force from Britain.²

Before the beginning of Soviet aid in 1955, there was a large assortment of foreign hardware in Egypt. Some 50,000 7.92mm FN rifles had been purchased in Belgium before the end of the Egyptian monarchy,³ and 7.92mm Alfa heavy machine guns were purchased in Spain.⁴ Three antiaircraft brigades were equipped with Swedish Bofors 40mm light anti-aircraft guns and 30mm Hispano Suiza guns.⁵ About 30 Vampire fighters, built by Macchi/Fiat in Italy under license to DeHavilland of England, were purchased through Syria after 1951.

At one point, plants were set up in Egypt to manufacture the Swedish Model 42 Ljungman 7.92mm rifle (or modifications thereof) and the Swedish Model 45 9mm submachine gun.⁶ It was announced in August 1956 that Egypt had achieved self-sufficiency in small-arms production and intended to begin production of heavier arms. The factories were

¹Captain Stuart Beckley, "Operation Kadesh--Mobility Masterpiece," Armor, March-April 1962, pp. 6-7; Commander H.B. Seim, "Middle East Powder Keg," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1956, p. 47.

²Barker, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

³W.H.B. Smith and Joseph E. Smith, The Book of Rifles (Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Books, 1963), p. 117.

⁴Joseph E. Smith, Small Arms of the World (Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Books, 1966), p. 613.

⁵Barker, op. cit., pp. 61-64.

⁶Smith, Small Arms of the World, p. 613.

said to have begun rifle production in 1952. Whether these were the Swedish weapons produced under license is uncertain, but some of the Egyptian arms were supposed to have been modeled after the British Bren and Sten guns. It appears that this was the extent of Egypt's success in domestic arms production before 1957, and it is probable that the number of arms being produced in Egypt was small.

During 1955, Egypt negotiated with the United States for military aid, including some piston-engine fighters, small artillery pieces, and automatic weapons. The United States, it is reported, stipulated that Egypt sign a mutual security agreement whereby the United States would have control over the use of the arms, and payment for them would be in dollars.¹ These negotiations ended abruptly in September 1955, when the Egyptian-Czech agreement was announced.

The agreement for Soviet bloc aid, announced in September 1955, was probably signed much earlier.² During the year following the announcement of the agreement, there was a sudden build-up in the might of the Egyptian armed forces. The Egyptian regular army was re-equipped with 7.62mm Soviet weapons, and older Egyptian weapons were supplemented with 82mm recoilless rifles, 57mm antitank guns, 122mm and 152mm artillery, SU-100 self-propelled guns, T-34 medium tanks, JS-3 heavy tanks, BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, and Czech antitank guns, antiaircraft guns, and 122mm field guns. The prestige of the Egyptian air force was greatly enhanced by the 150 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters and the 40-50 Il-28 bombers that the Soviet Union had supplied by late 1956.³

¹Finer, op. cit., p. 26.

²In a forthcoming book on Soviet military aid policies, Professor Uri Ra'anani of M.I.T. and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy cites substantial evidence for a much earlier date. It appears that the preliminary arrangements for the arms deal date back to the opening months of 1955. In any event, as his study documents, Soviet arms began to arrive in Egypt as early as July 1955.

³Barker, op. cit., pp. 61-64; Bernard B. Fall, "Two Sides of the Sinai Campaign," Military Review, July 1957, pp. 4-23; Dayan, op. cit., p. 101.

In 1956 the Egyptian army, at an estimated strength of 100,000 with another 100,000 in the national guard, was said to have been composed of eight infantry brigades, one reconnaissance and two armored battalions, five artillery battalions, two antitank battalions, and one coastal defense and three antiaircraft brigades.¹

The rapid build-up of Soviet bloc equipment was also reflected in the Egyptian navy. The British motor torpedo boats, corvettes, and frigates that show up in the 1956 inventory had all been built during World War II and transferred to Egypt between 1948 and 1951. There were, at the time of the Sinai battle, two ex-British destroyers being refitted and modernized in Britain for the Egyptian navy. In 1956 Soviet aid provided twelve motor torpedo boats, four fleet minesweepers, and two destroyers. Furthermore, there were reports in mid-1956 that two Soviet submarines were sailing from Poland, bound for Egypt. Yugoslavia also contributed six motor torpedo boats to the Egyptian navy in 1956.²

The Egyptian army, having been trained, supplied, and maintained by the British until 1947, probably found it increasingly difficult during the next eight years to maintain an acceptable level of readiness. There can be little doubt that Egyptian military equipment deteriorated during the period when France and Britain were banning military exports to the Middle East.

There is no information available on the terms under which British weapons were supplied to Egypt. Weapons obtained between 1950 and 1954 by circumvention of the ban on military exports to the Middle East were, of course, purchased outright, and probably for a high price.

¹Seim, op. cit., p. 47.

²Janes Fighting Ships, 1965-1966 edition (London, Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1965), pp. 71-73.

When the Soviet bloc signed its first military aid agreement with Egypt, the terms of payment are believed to have been for barter over a period of ten to twelve years, probably with very favorable prices.¹ As far as can be determined, these terms in themselves had no appreciable effect on Egypt in the short period of time that ensued before the Sinai campaign. Similarly, maintenance and resupply do not seem to have presented problems to Egypt. Undoubtedly, Soviet technicians accompanied the weapons to Egypt to maintain them; but lack of operational training must have been a greater obstacle to effective use of the Soviet weapons by Egyptian forces. This is most evident in the case of the MiG fighters and Il-28 bombers in the Suez crisis. There were no Egyptian pilots who were willing or able to fly the MiG fighters to attack or escape, and the Il-28 bombers were apparently flown to safety by Soviet or Czech pilots. It is most likely that no Soviet controls over the use of the weapons supplied to Egypt were included in the contract. If control were to have been exercised through the supply of spare parts and ammunition, this would only have been effective in a conflict extending over a longer period of time than the Sinai campaign.

Weapons Available to Egypt in 1956

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
.303 cal. No. 1 Lee Enfield rifle		U.K.
7.92mm FN Model 1949 semiautomatic rifle	50,000	Belgium
7.62mm rifle		Czechoslovakia/ U.S.S.R.
7.92mm Model 42 Ljungman rifle (Hakim)		Egypt, license from Sweden
9mm Model 45 submachine gun (Port Said)		Egypt, license from Sweden
7.92mm Type D automatic rifle		Belgium
9mm Beretta submachine gun		Italy

¹David Wood, "The Armed Forces of African States," Adelphi Paper No. 27 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1966), p. 25.

WEC-98 III

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
9mm Sten submachine gun		U.K.
Lewis machine gun		U.K.
Bren machine gun		U.K.
Vickers machine gun		U.K.
7.92mm Alfa heavy machine gun		Spain
.82mm recoilless rifle		Czechoslovakia
85mm bazooka		U.S.S.R.
120mm coastal defense gun		U.S.S.R.
120mm heavy mortar	(12 batteries)	
6-pounder antitank gun	about 100	U.K.
antitank mortar	(30 platoons)	
57mm antitank gun	140-150	U.S.S.R.
17-pounder antitank gun mounted on Valentine/Archer	50-60	U.K.
122mm gun	about 30	Czechoslovakia
152mm gun		U.S.S.R.
25-pounder howitzer	about 120	U.K.
155mm howitzer	about 30	U.S.S.R.
.40mm Bofors antiaircraft gun		Sweden
.30mm Hispano Suiza antiaircraft gun		
flame thrower mounted on "Wasp"		U.K.
rocket launcher		U.S.S.R.
Bren carrier	over 300	U.K.
SU 100 self-propelled artillery	100	U.S.S.R.
M4 Sherman tank (modernized)	150-200	U.S.
T-34 medium tank	200-250	U.S.S.R.
JS-3 tank with 122mm gun	50	U.S.S.R.
Valentine tank without 17-pounder gun		U.K.
Charioteer tank		U.K.
Centurion Mk.3 tank	30	U.K.
BTR-152 six-wheel troop carrier	100	U.S.S.R.

WEC-98 III

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
AMX-13 light tank	a few	France
Spitfire fighter aircraft	more than 20	U.K.
Meteor fighter aircraft	60-70	U.K.
Vampire fighter aircraft (Mk.5)	20-30	Italy/Syria
MiG-15 fighter)		
MiG-17 fighter)	150-200	U.S.S.R.
Halifax bomber	30	U.K.
Lancaster bomber		U.K.
Il-28 bomber	40-50	U.S.S.R.
corvette	2	U.K.
motor torpedo boat	2	U.K.
motor torpedo boat	12	U.S.S.R.
motor torpedo boat	6	Yugoslavia
coastal minesweeper	6	U.S.
fleet minesweeper	4	U.S.S.R.
frigate	7	U.K.
destroyer	4	U.S.S.R.
destroyer	2 (on order)	U.K.

2. Israeli Weapons Acquisition. When the state of Israel was established in 1948, its forces were armed with a wide assortment of old weapons, many presumably left behind by the British. With the aid of Czechoslovakia, Panama, Yugoslavia, and pilots of various nationalities, the Israelis purchased a number of small arms and aircraft in 1947-1948. A secret Israeli transport command, perhaps an adjunct of the Israeli air force but composed of U.S., British, South African, and Israeli pilots, operated throughout the world acquiring arms for Israel. Among other things, this command has been credited with: transporting to Israel quantities of small arms, presumably Czech-built Mausers and ZB-37 heavy machine guns, purchased in Czechoslovakia in mid-1948; causing the disappearance from Britain of 40 aircraft, including fighters, bombers, and transports, without export licenses and delivering them to Israel;

operating LAPSA airlines in Panama, which was ostensibly "surveying a route across the South Atlantic"; and purchasing a number of aircraft for Israel, including Boeing B-17 bombers, Vickers Spitfire fighters, Avro Lancaster bombers, North American Harvard attack trainers, Bristol Beaufighters, and Czech-built Messerschmitt ME-109 fighters.

By October 1948 the inventory of the Israeli air force was said to include six C-46 transports, a handful of Harvards, P-51 Mustangs, Beaufighters, DC-3s, Rapides, twelve Messerschmitts, three B-17s, two Mosquitoes, two Norsemen, and a DC-4. At this time, Israeli mechanics were quite adept at repairing and rebuilding these assorted aircraft.¹

Between 1948 and 1951, Israel bought a large number of Sherman Mark 3 tanks from war-surplus dealers in Europe and reconditioned them, equipping them with larger guns, wider tracks, or whatever modification Israel's needs required. Some 500 war-surplus half-tracks were secured from the United States in 1948.² There were also a number of old British Cromwell tanks in Israel.

Most of Israel's artillery also seems to have been acquired early in the nation's existence. British 25-pounders and some 105mm and 155mm guns made up a total of about 400 artillery weapons by 1956. Israel began to develop its own design and production facilities for a family of mortars ranging from 61mm to 120mm; and by 1956 the Israeli forces were amply equipped with these weapons.³ Israel also had a smaller number of 6-pounder and 17-pounder antitank guns.

¹Lawrence Lader, "From Junk Heap to Air Might," New Republic, November 8, 1948, pp. 10-12; Robert H. Luttrell, "I Flew for Israel," Flying, May 1949, pp. 23, 58, 60; Rabbi Samuel Burstein, "Israel Aviation," Flying, February 1962, p. 44.

²Beckley, op. cit., p. 9.

³Ibid.

The wide variety in Israeli small arms during the early days of independence must have created problems with ammunition supply. However, after 1948, Israel tried to standardize on the 7.92mm cartridge for rifles and machine guns and the 9mm cartridge for pistols and sub-machine guns. A large number of 8mm M40 Mausers were bought from Sweden and rebarrelled. Israel had purchased the machinery from Switzerland to manufacture the 7.92 Mauser, but the decision was later taken to standardize on the 7.62 NATO cartridge. No Mausers were ever produced in Israel, though there was an Israeli ammunition factory producing the 7.92 Mauser cartridge. An Israeli general developed the Uzi submachine gun, suited to the needs of the Israeli forces, and it went into production in Israel. Fabrique Nationale of Belgium began to supply 7.92mm NATO automatic rifles and light machine guns to the Israeli forces before 1956.¹

In the early 1950s, France appears to have become a supplier of more modern arms to Israel. By September 1956, Israel was in possession of some 100 AMX-13 light tanks with 75mm high-velocity guns,² Nord SS-10 antitank missiles,³ some 30 Ouragan jet fighter aircraft,⁴ and about 24 Mystère IVA jet fighters.⁵ It has been reported that, when Israel was drawing up its plans for the Sinai attack, a request was made to the French government for "100 tanks (Super Shermans), 300 half-track vehicles, 50 tank-transporters, 300 trucks with four-wheel drive, 1,000 bazookas, and a squadron of transport planes."⁶ Of this number, 200 half-tracks, 100 Super Shermans, 20 tank-transporters,

¹Smith and Smith, The Book of Rifles, p. 296; Smith, Small Arms of the World, pp. 264-267.

²Beckley, op. cit., p. 9.

³Richard Ogorkiewicz, "Missiles Against Armor," Marine Corps Gazette, January 1959, pp. 53-54.

⁴Fall, op. cit., p. 10.

⁵U.S. News and World Report, October 26, 1956, p. 104.

⁶Dayan, op. cit., p. 30.

and 300 trucks were supplied by France in October 1956.¹ In addition, there may have been as many as 36 Mystère IV aircraft flown into Israel on the eve of the Sinai attack; but it is unlikely that there would have been enough Israeli pilots to fly all of them, because the Israeli air force had found it difficult to train the necessary pilots for the 37 Mystère IV fighters that General Dayan claims were available to the Israelis when they attacked.² Thus, by late October 1956, the Israeli air force had available for combat about 64 piston-engine aircraft, mostly of World War II vintage, and 79 jet fighters.³

It is estimated that in 1956 Israel was maintaining a standing army of about 50,000 that could be expanded within 48 hours to as many as 125,000. According to General Dayan, ten brigades were committed to fighting in Sinai: six infantry, three armored, and one airborne. Assuming that the Israeli brigade is composed of 5,000-6,000 men, then 50,000-60,000 would have been engaged in Sinai. Apparently, the total Israeli armored strength was used, because there was only enough armor for three brigades.⁴

It appears that, before 1956, Israel paid outright for imported weapons. Various funds, contributed to by Jewish sympathizers all over the world, went far toward making this possible.⁵

It is clear from the history of Israeli arms acquisition before 1956 that no supplier (except possibly France) could have held any control over the use of the weapons by Israel. France does not seem to have been concerned with limiting their use, and was in fact aware that French-supplied weapons would be used by Israel against Egypt.⁶

¹Ibid., p. 34.

²Ibid., p. 80.

³Ibid.

⁴Beckley, op. cit., pp. 7-9.

⁵John C. Ross, "Air War in Palestine," Flying, October 1948, p. 74.

⁶Dayan, op. cit., pp. 30, 34.

WEC-98 III

Weapons Available to Israel in 1956

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
.303 No. 1 and No. 4 Lee Enfield rifle		U.K.
7.92mm Kar 98K Mauser		Czechoslovakia
8.0mm M40 Mauser		Sweden
7.92mm FN automatic rifle		Belgium
7.92mm FN light machine gun		Belgium
0.5 Browning		
9mm Sten submachine gun		U.K.
9mm Uzi submachine gun		Israel
7.92mm ZB-37 heavy machine gun		Czechoslovakia
Beza medium machine gun		U.K.
106mm recoilless rifle		
61mm platoon mortar	(amply equipped)	Israel
81mm mortar	(amply equipped)	Israel
120mm heavy mortar	(amply equipped)	Israel
multiple rocket launcher		
6-pounder antitank artillery)		U.K.
17-pounder antitank artillery)		U.K.
25-pounder field gun)	400	U.K.
105mm self-propelled field gun)		
155mm field gun)		
Cromwell tank	perhaps up to 50	U.K.
Sherman Mk3 tank	perhaps 100-150	U.S. war surplus
Super Sherman	100	France
AMX-13 tank with 75mm gun	100	France
armored half-track	up to 500	U.S.
armored half-track	200	France
SS-10 antitank missile	a few	France
Mosquito fighter-bomber aircraft	13	U.K.
P-51 Mustang fighter	25	Sweden

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
Spitfire fighter	some for training	
Meteor jet fighter	12	U.K.
Mystère IVA fighter	37 (only 16 operational)	France
Ouragan fighter-bomber	30	France
B-17 bomber	2	U.S. or Canada
Harvard bomber	21	U.S.
landing craft	several	U.S.
patrol vessel (subchaser)	1	U.S.
motor torpedo boat	3	U.K.
motor torpedo boat	6	France
coast guard cutter	1	W. Germany
destroyer	2	U.K.

B. Arms Acquisition Since Sinai

1. Israeli Weapons Acquisition. Having achieved relative success in the Sinai campaign,¹ Israel has spent ten years maintaining military parity with Egypt, not so much by acquiring equal amounts of military equipment as by concentrating on fewer numbers of men and arms backed by adequate training and maintained in a high state of operational readiness. Israel has made an effort to equal Egypt's offensive and defensive capabilities.

Israel's supplies still come from a variety of sources, but France stands out as the major one. Since 1956, France has sold Mystère subsonic fighters, Mirage III supersonic fighters (armed with Matra air-to-air missiles), Ouragan fighter-bombers, and Vautour II fighter-bombers

¹That is, having achieved the objectives of ending Egyptian fedayin terrorism, neutralizing the immediate threat of an Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian attack on Israel, and breaking the shipping blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba.

to the Israeli air force.¹ French-Israeli cooperation in the missile field is now well established and may have a great impact on future events in the Middle East. For example, the Nord SS-10 antitank missiles, which are said to have proven themselves well in the Sinai campaign, have been superseded by SS-11 antitank missiles.² Early in 1966 it was confirmed that French aerospace companies were cooperating with Israel in research that might lead to the development of a medium-range, two-stage missile based on the French SEREB Topaze test vehicle. There are indications that the project may be military in nature.³ An earlier report that France had sold surface-to-surface missiles to Israel was denied by both the French and the Israelis, but the evidence does suggest that France is prepared to support Israeli MRBM procurement.⁴

Since 1962 the United States has become of growing importance to Israel as an arms supplier. The 1962 agreement for the transfer of Hawk surface-to-air missiles from the United States to Israel was an important factor in the Middle Eastern arms race. This apparently followed a Soviet military assistance agreement with Egypt that included the provision of MiG-19s and MiG-21s.⁵ In 1965 about 200 M-48 Patton tanks were acquired from West Germany under U.S. agreement.⁶ In early 1966 the United States agreed to supply Israel with a number (possibly 18 to 24) of A-4 Skyhawk light attack bombers. The agreement, however, is said to have been accompanied by strict controls on future Israeli arms acquisitions.⁷

¹William Green, The World's Fighting Planes (New York, Doubleday, 1965), pp. 18, 21, 24.

²The Military Balance: 1966-67 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 38.

³Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 19, 1966, p. 27.

⁴Missiles and Rockets, January 17, 1966, p. 13.

⁵Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance (New York, Praeger, 1965), p. 45.

⁶Time, February 25, 1966, p. 39.

⁷Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 30, 1966.

Britain's contributions to Israeli military power since 1956 have been Centurion tanks and a few submarines.¹ West Germany signed an agreement with Israel, presumably in 1964 and with the approval of the United States, for the supply of large quantities of military equipment,² as part of Germany's reparation to the Jewish people. Before delivery could be completed, Egypt was successful in pressuring West Germany to discontinue supplying Israel with arms. However, 70 to 80 per cent of the original consignment is reported to have arrived in Israel, including 200 M-48 Patton tanks, five motor torpedo boats, several fighter-bombers, and a number of antitank guns.³

In small arms and certain battlefield weapons, Israel appears to have achieved relative self-sufficiency. Belgium, in particular Fabrique Nationale, has played a large role in this process. By 1961, Fabrique Nationale was licensed by Israel to manufacture the Uzi sub-machine gun, and Israel in return had licensing agreements for the production of parts for the 7.62mm FN automatic rifle.⁴ It is now reported that Israel is licensed by Fabrique Nationale for the entire production of the 7.62mm FN automatic rifle for Israeli troops.⁵ In addition, Israel is known to produce its own LTH flame throwers, Soltham 81mm mortars, and Metol 92mm bazookas, which play an anti-tank role in Israeli strategy in place of medium artillery.⁶ In the case of tanks, the AMX has been combined with the Sherman M4 to produce light and medium tanks with high-velocity 75mm guns and

¹J.C. Hurewitz, "The Role of the Military in Israel," The Military in the Middle East (Columbus, O., Ohio State University Press, 1963), p. 97.

²New York Times, January 31, 1965.

³Manchester Guardian, February 13, 1965.

⁴Times (London), December 1, 1961.

⁵Leo Heiman, "Israeli Infantry," Infantry, May-June 1964, p. 46.

⁶Ibid., pp. 46-47.

good maneuverability.¹ Also, 155mm howitzers have been placed on Sherman chassis and 105mm on AMX chassis to produce at least 250 self-propelled guns.² The Israeli aircraft industry has developed a great capacity for supplying aircraft with spare parts and thus maintaining a high operational percentage. Under license to Potez of France it also manufactures the Fouga Magister jet trainer and has begun exporting this aircraft.³

Israel's navy, though small, has received considerable amounts of new equipment. Motor patrol boats have been acquired from France and Italy, coast guard cutters from West Germany, and submarines from Britain.⁴

The total number of regulars in the Israeli armed forces is 71,000, but this can be expanded to about 275,000 in two to four days.⁵

In recent years there have been recurrent indications that Israel, through the construction and operation of its power reactor at Dimona in the Negev desert, has procured the option to produce nuclear weapons. It is not clear to what extent the Dimona reactor is viewed in this manner by Israel. In any event, there is no evidence that Israel has launched on a program to build on this option.

¹Armor, May-June 1962, p. 41.

²The Military Balance: 1966-67, p. 37.

³Economist, March 21, 1964, p. 1139.

⁴Janes Fighting Ships, pp. 137-138.

⁵The Military Balance: 1966-67, p. 37.

WEC-98 III

Weapons Available to Israel in 1966

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
9mm Beretta M1951 pistol		Italy
7.62mm FN automatic rifle	standard	Israel/Belgium
Uzi submachine gun	standard	Israel
7.62mm Kar.98k Mauser (rebarrelled)		Czechoslovakia
9mm Sten submachine gun		U.K.
.303 Lee Enfield rifle	limited	U.K.
.303 Bren machine gun	limited	U.K.
.303 Vickers machine gun	limited	U.K.
7.62mm NATO FN general-purpose machine gun	standard	Belgium
.30 cal. Browning M1919 A4 machine gun	(on armored vehicles)	
.50 cal. Browning heavy machine gun	(on armored vehicles)	
106mm recoilless rifle (jeep-mounted)		
LTH flame thrower		Israel
81mm Soltham medium mortar		Israel
82mm Metol bazooka		Israel
155mm howitzer on Sherman chassis)		
105mm howitzer on AMX chassis)	250	
M4 Sherman tank	about 200	U.S./France
M-48A Patton tank	about 200	U.S./W. Germany
AMX-13 light tank	150	France
Centurion Mk. 5 and 7 tank	250	U.K.
armored bulldozer		
armored half-track		U.S.
Meteor F-8 fighter	14	U.K.
Mystère IVA fighter	50-60	France
Super Mystère B.2	18-24	France
Mirage IIICJ (with Matra R-530 a-a missiles)	72	France

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
Ouragan fighter-bomber	45-55	France
Vautour IIA fighter-bomber	25	France
Magister trainer	60-100	Israel/France
Hawk s-a missile	2 battalions	U.S.
s-s missile (under development)		Israel/France
landing craft	several	U.S.
motor torpedo boat	5	W. Germany
patrol vessel	1	U.S.
motor torpedo boat	3	U.K.
motor torpedo boat	6	France
motor torpedo boat	3	Italy
coast guard cutter	2	W. Germany
frigate	1	Egypt
destroyer	2	U.K.
submarine "S" class	2	U.K.
submarine "T" class	2	U.K.

2. Egyptian Weapons Acquisition. Egypt suffered severe losses of equipment in 1956. In the Sinai campaign about 7,600 small arms, 290 pieces of artillery and heavy mortars, and 200 tanks and self-propelled guns (of these, the majority were U.S. and British models) were claimed by the Israelis to have been captured.¹ An estimated 50 per cent of the Egyptian aircraft inventory was lost in the British-French attack.²

The Soviet Union responded quickly with new arms supplies to Egypt, reportedly resuming the shipments no later than February 1957. The build-up was most readily noticeable in the Egyptian air force. Within six months after Suez, the Soviet Union sent 100 MiG-17 fighters

¹Dayan, op. cit., pp. 227-228.

²John H. Hoagland, Jr., and John B. Teeple, "Regional Stability and Weapons Transfer: The Middle Eastern Case," Orbis, Vol. IX, No. 3 (Fall 1965), p. 716.

to Egypt and enough Il-28 bombers to make a total of 60 by late 1958. In 1961 and 1962, 80 to 110 MiG-19 fighters were delivered.¹ Israel claims that a new Soviet-Egyptian agreement was reached in 1960, providing for the supply of MiG-21 fighters and Tu-16 medium bombers.² Since 1962 about 130 MiG-21s, including 40-50 MiG-21D all-weather fighters, have been supplied to Egypt.³ The arrival of the Tu-16 bomber, capable of carrying a 10,000-pound bomb load over a range of about 3,000 miles, marked a radical departure from customary export procedures of the main supplier countries.⁴ Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles have been deployed in Egypt for air defenses.

In armor, the Soviets supplied additional T-34/85 tanks, JS-3 heavy tanks, and SU-100 self-propelled guns, and contracted in 1960 to supply up to 500 T-54 tanks.⁵ In 1966 a type of Soviet tank new to Egypt was seen there, with infrared lights and radar. It is difficult to determine the full extent of Soviet artillery supplied to Egypt since 1956. A West German source states that 1,500 guns of all sorts have come into Egypt from the Soviet Union, which would mean a 300 per cent increase over the 1956 level.⁶ These artillery forces include heavy howitzers and a Soviet field gun new to the Egyptian arsenal. A variety of Soviet rocket launchers, one capable of firing 32 rockets in rapid succession, have been displayed in Egypt.

It is said that the development of its own industry is allowing Egypt to become less dependent on imported small arms. Whereas the original Egyptian small-arms industry (which was established by Swedish technicians before the end of the monarchy) produced copies of foreign

¹Major Edgar O'Ballance, "Middle East Arms Race," United Service Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3 (January-April 1965), pp. 11-12.

²Ibid., p. 10.

³The Military Balance: 1966-67, p. 41; New York Times, July 24, 1966.

⁴The only other reported case of Soviet transfers of the Tu-16 to the developing world was to Indonesia. No comparable transfers have been made by the United States.

⁵U.S. News and World Report, November 7, 1958, p. 67.

⁶Manchester Guardian, February 20, 1965.

models, Egypt is now beginning to produce weapons of Egyptian origin, including the Rashid rifle, the Hakim rifle (a modification of the Ljungman), and the Port Said submachine gun (a modification of the M45 Carl Gustaf). The ammunition for all Egyptian service weapons is produced in Egypt.¹ The lack of information on Egyptian production of heavy arms suggests that there is no significant industry for these weapons.

The missile and aircraft programs in Egypt employ German and Austrian technicians. Having been initially developed in Spain, the HA-300 supersonic fighter project was transferred to Egypt in 1960, where it was continued under the direction of Ferdinand Brandner, an Austrian engineer. By 1965, two HA-300 aircraft were flying in Egypt under the power of the Orpheus 703 engine. The plan is, however, to power the HA-300 with the Egyptian E-300 engine, now being tested.² The Egyptian missile development program has been actively pressed. In 1962 the first two Egyptian missiles, Al Kahir (325-mile range) and Al Zafir (200-mile range), were displayed in Cairo. The next year, another Egyptian missile, Al Ared, with about a 500-mile range, appeared.³

The Egyptian navy has received the majority of its equipment from the Soviet Union. Its inventory in 1966 included 36 motor patrol boats, 10 motor gunboats with Komar guided missiles, 6 submarine chasers, 8 minesweepers, 4 destroyers, and about 10 submarines, all provided with Soviet aid. Some recent purchases were made in Britain, but it is clear that the Egyptian navy's equipment is to remain preponderantly Soviet. Egypt has recently announced the successful completion of tests on an Egyptian-built submarine and an Egyptian-built motor torpedo boat.⁴ No further information is available on these projects.

¹Smith, Small Arms of the World, p. 613.

²Hoagland and Teeple, op. cit., p. 718.

³Ibid., p. 218.

⁴Janes Fighting Ships, pp. 71-73.

The main trend in Egyptian military acquisition since 1956 has been toward complete dependence on Soviet supplies. Many Egyptian pilots and officers have been trained in the Soviet bloc, and many Soviet military advisors and technicians have accompanied Soviet arms to Egypt. One important effect that such dependence on Soviet supplies could have on Egyptian strategy would be the need for a fast, decisive military victory in any major battle, unless the Soviets were prepared to cooperate with rapid and expanded supplies of spare parts and ammunition. If Egypt were to embark on a lengthy campaign, for instance against Israel, it might well find that its conventional weapons lacked sufficient amounts of ammunition to continue the battle for more than a few weeks. Reports indicate that the Soviet Union has limited its supplies of artillery ammunition to Egypt.¹

The Egyptian regular forces now number some 190,000 men, which is almost double the number of regular forces in 1956.²

Weapons Available to Egypt in 1966

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
9mm Beretta M1915 pistol		Italy
7.62mm SKS carbine		U.S.S.R.
7.62mm AK assault rifle		U.S.S.R.
7.62mm M52 rifle		Czechoslovakia
7.92mm Hakim (modified Ljungman) rifle		Egypt/Sweden
7.62mm Rashid rifle		Egypt
7.92mm FN rifle		Belgium
7.92mm Type D automatic rifle		Belgium
9mm Port Said (M45 Carl Gustaf) submachine gun		Egypt/Sweden
9mm Beretta submachine gun		Italy

¹Major Edgar O'Ballance, "Egypt Four Years Later," United Service Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 39.

²The Military Balance: 1966-67, p. 41.



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<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
9mm Sten submachine gun		U.K.
7.62mm RPD machine gun		U.S.S.R.
7.62mm Model 52 machine gun		Czechoslovakia
7.62mm SG 43 machine gun		U.S.S.R.
7.62mm SGM machine gun		U.S.S.R.
12.7mm DShK M1938/46 heavy machine gun		U.S.S.R.
14.5mm ZPU-2 and ZPU-4 heavy machine gun		U.S.S.R.
.303 Lee Enfield No. 1 rifle)		U.K.
Lewis machine gun)	in service with reserves	U.K.
Bren machine gun)		U.K.
Vickers machine gun)		U.K.
82mm recoilless rifle		U.S.S.R.
107mm recoilless rifle		U.S.S.R.
85mm bazooka		U.S.S.R.
RPG-2 antitank rocket		U.S.S.R.
mobile rocket launcher	at least 24	U.S.S.R.
57mm antitank cannon		U.S.S.R.
85mm antitank cannon		U.S.S.R.
122mm field gun		U.S.S.R.
105mm howitzer		U.S.S.R.
155mm howitzer		U.S.S.R.
160mm howitzer		U.S.S.R.
"new" field gun		U.S.S.R.
85mm antiaircraft gun		U.S.S.R.
SU-100 self-propelled gun	150	U.S.S.R.
T-34/85 tank	350-400	U.S.S.R.
T-54 tank	450-500	U.S.S.R.
T-55 tank	120	U.S.S.R.
JS-3 tank	60-100	U.S.S.R.
M4 Sherman tank	less than 50	U.S.
Centurion Mk. 3 tank	less than 30	U.K.
AMX-13 light tank	20	France
armored personnel carrier	350-700	U.S.S.R.



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
<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
MiG-15 fighter	50	U.S.S.R.
MiG-17 fighter	100	U.S.S.R.
MiG-19 fighter	80	U.S.S.R.
MiG-21 fighter with a-a missiles (including MiG-21D fighter)	130	U.S.S.R.
HA-300	prototypes	Egypt
Il-28 bomber	60-90 (possibly 40)	U.S.S.R.
Tu-16 bomber (some with a-s missiles)	30	U.S.S.R.
SA-2 missile	20 batteries	U.S.S.R.
Al Kahir s-s missile	more than 30	Egypt
Al Zafir s-s missile	more than 20	Egypt
Al Ared s-s missile		Egypt
landing craft	18	U.S.
motor torpedo boat	36	U.S.S.R.
motor torpedo boat	2 (for disposal)	U.K.
motor torpedo boat	8	Yugoslavia
motor gunboat with "Komar" class missiles	10	U.S.S.R.
corvette	2	U.K.
motor gunboat	1	Egypt
coastal minesweeper	6	U.S.
submarine chaser	3	U.S.S.R.
inshore minesweeper	2	U.S.S.R.
fleet minesweeper	6	U.S.S.R.
frigate	4	U.K.
destroyer	4	U.S.S.R.
destroyer	2	U.K.
submarine	9-11	U.S.S.R.
submarine	1	Egypt

3. A Special Problem of Control. One feature of Israeli and Egyptian arms acquisition that has special implications is that both, while still heavy arms importers, have become arms suppliers in their own right. Israel has licensed the production of the Uzi sub-machine gun to Fabrique Nationale of Belgium and has sold small arms to other countries. It has also supplied to Uganda the Magister trainer aircraft, which was produced in Israel under license to Potez of France. Egypt's arms exports have mostly been Soviet weapons, although a few have been other types of obsolete weapons in the Egyptian arsenal. When the Soviet Union agreed to supply Egypt with MiG-21 fighters, Egypt began to sell its MiG-17 aircraft to help pay for the MiG-21s.




EGYPT AND ISRAEL FORCE LEVELS, ARTILLERY, TANKS, AND JET AIRCRAFT
1950 - 1956






FORCE LEVELS


(ISRAEL WOULD SHOW GREAT INCREASE IF RESERVES WERE CHARTED)



ARTILLERY



TANKS



JET FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS

EGYPT AND ISRAEL FORCE LEVELS, ARTILLERY, TANKS, AND JET AIRCRAFT 1956 - 1966

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL"Controlling" the Conflicts

The Suez-Sinai war represented a convergence of two otherwise distinct conflicts--the protracted Arab-Israeli cold war and the British-French quarrel with Nasser. To control the first meant, realistically, to seal off a highly inflammable and volatile substance and keep it from bursting into flame. To control the second meant lessening the strategic importance of the Suez Canal, arbitrating the Canal issue after its seizure, maintaining sufficient rationality in London and Paris to preclude a preventive war policy, and deterring their action up to the moment it took place.

Controlling the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Preventing the Resumption of Hostilities

1. It goes without saying that movement toward the settlement of the underlying dispute would have been the best means of preventing resumed hostilities. In theory, this would have involved action on fundamental substantive issues such as borders, refugees, resettlement, and compensation. Toward this end one could, again theoretically, envisage unified pressure by the United Nations, the great powers, and other suppliers of external economic and military assistance. Even given the intractability of the conflict, perhaps if the Soviets had sufficiently shared Western anxiety to the point of cooperating by not introducing destabilizing arms and not trying to frustrate U.N. diplomacy, this might have inhibited the renewed outbreak of hostilities in 1956 or at least limited their potential scale and scope.

2. Given the profound, deep-seated ethnic-religious basis for the Arab-Israeli quarrel, it seems doubtful that even unified great-power pressure would have forced the Arabs toward settlement, i.e., acceptance of Israel's continued existence. It is not even likely that such pressure could have succeeded in forcing one of the

basic preconditions for such Arab reversal, i.e., Israeli agreement to repatriation and/or substantial compensation of Arab refugees. Nevertheless, some action might have been open to outsiders to make the resumption of hostilities less likely. Intense pressures on Israel might have resulted, even at this late stage, in readmission of at least a symbolic number of Arab refugees and compensation of others, particularly given international financial help. The pressure of international help on the Arab states might have brought about a start on resettlement of refugees, although this is more doubtful.

3. The threat of a unified boycott on the part of the Suez Canal users might have moved Egypt from its refusal to permit Israel's shipping through the Canal. The Egyptian blockade of the Strait of Tiran might have been countered with the threat of military action by the maritime powers to enforce their right of free access to international waterways, and by airways users to force open a closed international air space.

4. British troops in the Suez Canal area might have served as a deterrent to aggression as well as a source of international intelligence about warlike preparations. If, for political reasons, British forces had to leave the region, one possible surrogate for them might have been an expanded international presence to fill the vacuum. As for the existing U.N. truce supervision in the area, the United Nations was not as effective as it ought to have been in identifying, verifying, and condemning the fedayin raids, or in following through on condemnation of Israel's Gaza incursions in reprisal. As a preventive of this kind of activity, the 1956 UNEF border watch was one war too late, so to speak. The clearly indicated preventive measure, both with respect to the raids and to the subsequent Israeli attack across the Sinai, was joint or third-party border patrols backed by strong international support and sanctions.

5. In this connection there was really no substitute (nor is there today) for sealing the border. Greater pressure ought to have been put on Israel to permit the United Nations within its boundaries.

The United Nations should have physically sealed the border with barbed wire, ditches, etc., on all the land boundaries of Israel. The moats of the Middle Ages existed for good purpose.

6. Propaganda warfare by Radio Cairo ought to have been severely condemned as violating a variety of U.N. resolutions about incitement to war. This should have been accompanied by efforts to increase the flow of factual information in the area, preferably U.N. news broadcasts--a good argument for considering a substantial strengthening of U.N. information facilities, preferably with their own communications satellite facilities, in order to reach a maximum world-wide audience and to counter the sort of inflammatory propaganda in which Radio Cairo and others specialize.

7. It is clear that the ethnic-religious conflict was fundamental, and the accelerating resort to small-scale forays against a background of propaganda warfare was the pathway to resumed hostilities. The Soviet arms deal and the U.S. attempt to create an anti-Soviet alliance in the "northern tier" of Middle Eastern states (the former being a response to the latter) were also contributing background factors. Perhaps the chances are better today for a Soviet policy of restraint. But China may move in as a destabilizing factor as soon as it is able to. Priority belongs to agreements among suppliers to restrict the sale of arms to states engaged in conflict. Perhaps more weight would attach to seeking such agreements if they were seen as one of the truly crucial problems of our times for which a high price should be paid if need be, and high risks run to enforce.* If none of these measures was possible, the 1950 tripartite guarantee of borders needed to be enforced impartially and effectively.

8. The governments on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict contributed to the acceleration of the slide toward renewed hostilities.

*See Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas, Report for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Center for International Studies, September 1964), for suggestions along these lines.

Whatever private assurances both adversaries gave to the United States and other parties, the public posture of both was increasingly belligerent and intransigent. Perhaps manipulation of and involvement in the domestic affairs of both governments could have affected the personalities that eventually led both sides over the brink.

Controlling the British-French-Egyptian Conflict:
Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

9. The basic strategic values involved in the Suez-Sinai war could have been mitigated by developing strategic substitutes more appropriate to a post-imperial and post-colonial era. The need for alternative energy sources for oil might have called forth more aggressive development of nuclear energy; there might have been further efforts to develop: long-range air-lift capabilities, sea-based and land-based long-range missile alternatives to foreign land bases; relocation of canal routes; and international regimes for vital waterways. These are policy measures that still have relevance to some of the strategic needs and political possibilities of the present.

10. Basic Western political strategy in the Middle East was, in retrospect, faulty--both Britain's strategy in Egypt and France's strategy vis-à-vis Algeria (for which France came to blame Nasser and thus acquire a strong desire to overthrow him). This all gave to Soviet policy ready ways in which to exploit the situation. The combination of a traditional pattern of cultivating friendly relations among aristocratic feudal rulers and the attempt to tie them publicly to anti-Communist Western treaties seems guaranteed to excite negative popular passions in an age of resurgent national independence. The preferred strategy would seem to be the recognition of a sense of regional identity and independence, and a policy that favors popularly-supported regimes.

11. Another major component of such a policy is to encourage constructive internal--and regional--development goals, while helping to strengthen the internal political, social, and economic fabric of a

country to enable it to resist external blandishments and penetration attempts. In this connection, the effects of Secretary Dulles' cut-off of U.S. aid to Egypt for the Aswan High Dam, which in turn was a reaction to Nasser's blackmail attempts, seems a powerful argument for multilateralizing significant aspects of external economic assistance. Such a program might even diminish the lure of a local demagogue by depriving him of identifiable foreign devils.

12. Postwar U.S. policy in such regions as the Middle East has tended to accept rules of the game that take as given the existence of non-popular regimes. The vicious conflict cycle often moves from there to a supportive policy involving the offering of arms to stave off threats to unpopular local rule. The essentially unhappy experiences of the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union (and perhaps even China one day) rationally suggest the value of a serious agreement among all external influences to abstain from securing special privileges or exacerbating local quarrels--a sort of "open-door policy," backed by penalties, that would equalize the nonintervention of external states. It is difficult to think of a general approach that is more likely to be favored by the people who live in the countries concerned.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

13. The only thing more dangerous than forgetting the lessons of history is to misremember them. To Anthony Eden and Christian Pineau, Nasser was Hitler reincarnate--just as to some today Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh are Hitler's contemporary facsimiles. Given his political brilliance, the danger of appeasing Nasser was not to be minimized. In retrospect, however, a greater evil was created by the Bourbon mentality blinded to the genuine forces of change that Nasser represented despite his charisma and demagogy. Given all this, the opposition to Eden, Pineau, and Ben Gurion might have been strongly, if clandestinely, encouraged.

14. Although the United States tried to act as a peacemaker, arbitrator, and inventor of time-stretching devices, U.S. diplomacy in fact contributed to the outbreak of the hostilities. For if all the other parties were made myopic by various cultural and character defects of their own, they themselves came to believe that the U.S. Secretary of State was in fact misleading them and moving the situation from one ambiguity to another, to the point where U.S. credibility and, consequently, influence had virtually vanished. The results of the Dulles style would seem to suggest that some rather different qualities--chiefly candor in making explicit one's aims as well as the limits to one's intentions--might help to prevent catastrophic diplomatic miscalculations. Given such candor in a case such as Suez, the underlying U.S. refusal to countenance a forceful solution could be believed, and thus serve as the deterrent it is intended to be.

15. A strong case can be made that if Secretary Dulles had been less certain of his personal diplomatic style, some possible avenues to peaceful settlement might have opened up. For example, at one stage during the summer of 1956, the UAR gave indications that portions of the contested issues might be open to adjudication, perhaps by the International Court of Justice. Dulles chose to ignore the signal, as well as other possibilities that might have involved multi-lateralizing the essentially Western front against Nasser. U.S. diplomacy--as well as world peace--was thus deprived of important portions of existing diplomatic agencies and tools of action. In retrospect, Britain and France went through the U.N. exercise of October 1956 purely pro forma; but the United States even then could have done more to reinforce the efforts of the U.N. Secretary-General. In retrospect, good offices, negotiations, compromise, and international guarantees of any resulting agreement would have been an infinitely preferable road to the one followed.

16. The capacity of powers to make mischief for others is normally a function of the physical leverage they possess. Nasser straddled a vital Western artery that under international law represented in Western eyes a "servitude" (mot juste for the Egyptian sentiments). Britain's ability to launch a fundamentally irrational assault was improved because it still had an imperial base in Cyprus. With full recognition that in some cases such bases are needed for self-defense or for protection of friends or allies, in principle the sooner overseas colonies are abandoned and foreign bases eliminated, the sooner some classic stimuli to conflict will have been lessened.

17. Typically, the Soviet intervention threats in Suez became thoroughly vocal and explicit only after the first really dangerous stage of the crisis had passed. Ironically, it might have been a helpful deterrent if Moscow had made its threats both early and credible.

Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

18. The British-French ultimatum, ostensibly aimed at halting hostilities, in effect broadened the war. More pointed deterrent threats by the great powers and the United Nations might have been useful, particularly if a U.N. force had been sent in promptly.

19. In retrospect, however likely renewed Israeli-Egyptian warfare may have been, its intensity was clearly increased by both the fact and the threat of growing stocks of arms supplies in the region--most particularly by Soviet-supplied aircraft in the hands of the UAR. A balancing policy (such as the United States has been following) would have sought to increase Israel's antiaircraft defenses. But a more fundamental conflict-controlling policy would have pursued high-priority agreements for restraint among suppliers to the Middle East.

20. U.S.-Soviet convergence of interests continues to emerge as the prime conflict-control policy to be sought. Such convergence of

interests needs to be qualified by the availability of counterpressures to prevent Soviet intervention threats from being taken seriously. It was probably U.S. pressure more than any other factor that turned the tide in this case, particularly U.S. leverage at the moment of the run on the pound (generally acknowledged as having been the crucial turning point).

21. The second most potent agency for conflict control is the availability of U.N. machinery to give form and unity to pressures from states to control conflict, and also actually to create conflict-control apparatus. Certainly, the ability to create UNEF and to perform miracles in fielding it provided both a pressure and a cover for a cease-fire and eventual withdrawal. Nothing could argue more eloquently for better stand-by peacekeeping capabilities or, at a minimum, better developed contingency plans for rapid recruitment and deployment of the force.

Settling the Dispute

22. Terminating the Suez-Sinai hostilities and removing British and French troops both ended the British-French-Egyptian conflict and settled the dispute over the Canal. The measures to end the Arab-Israeli conflict--which end is certainly not in sight as of 1967--are outlined in Paragraph 1 above.

23. In summary, relevant conflict-control measures were:

FOR THE BRITISH-FRENCH-EGYPTIAN CONFLICT

KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Development of strategic substitutes for oil and land bases:

Nuclear energy

Long-range air-lift capabilities

Sea-based and land-based missile alternatives

Relocation of canal routes

International regime for vital waterways

Recognition of sense of regional identity and independence

Support of popular regimes

Encouragement of constructive internal and regional developmental goals*

Strengthening of internal political, social, and economic fabric

Multilateralizing of significant aspects of economic assistance

Agreement by third parties to abstain from special privileges or exacerbation of local quarrels

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Encouragement of internal opposition to war-makers

Candid explanation of parties' aims and limits of intentions

Compromise, good offices, negotiations, accompanied by guarantees

Abandonment of overseas colonies

Elimination of foreign bases

MODERATING/TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Early and credible superpower and U.N. deterrent threats*

Balancing of arms in region

Restraining agreements among external arms suppliers

U.S.-Soviet convergence of interests*

Stand-by U.N. peacekeeping force*

with

Contingency plans for rapid recruitment and deployment

FOR THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

PREVENTING RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

Settlement of the underlying dispute, on borders, refugees, settlement, etc.

with help of

Unified pressures by the United Nations, great powers, and
other external suppliers

Readmission by Israel of symbolic number of refugees and
compensation of others with international financial
help

Resettlement of refugees with international help

Threat of unified Canal boycott by users

Threat of military action by maritime and air powers to
reinforce rights*

Retention of third-party troops for deterrence and
intelligence

or

Expanded international presence

More effective identification, verification, and condemnation
of raids and reprisals

Joint or third-party border patrols backed by strong inter-
national support and sanctions

Physical sealing of the Israeli border, permission to admit
the United Nations

Condemnation of propaganda warfare

accompanied by

Increase in flow of U.N. broadcasts

with aid of

Strengthened U.N. information facilities with satellite
facilities

Agreements among suppliers to restrict sale of arms to
states likely to be engaged in conflict

Enforcement of border guarantees

Manipulation of and involvement in internal affairs

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

T H E G R E E K I N S U R G E N C Y : 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 4 9

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.731
A.	Foreword731
B.	The Phase Structure.732
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.735
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option.	.735
B.	Phase II to Phase III ₁ : The Outbreak of Hostilities737
C.	Phase III ₁ to Phase IV ₁ : The Termination of Hostilities .	.740
D.	Phase IV ₁ to Phase III ₂ : The Resumption of Hostilities. .	.742
E.	Phase III ₂ to Phase IV ₂ : The Termination of Hostilities .	.746
F.	Phase IV ₂761
III.	Weapons Analysis.762
A.	Insurgents' Weapons Acquisition.762
B.	Greek Government Weapons Acquisition766
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.770

THE GREEK INSURGENCY : 1944 - 1949

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES

A. Foreword

Other cases analyzed in this volume have started with a narrative reconstruction of the events and development of the conflict which has sought to identify its phase-structure. In this analysis of the Greek Insurgency, that summary description will be omitted and, in its stead, a brief statement of the structure of phases and sub-phases will be substituted. This modification is being attempted to see whether a thorough history of the crisis that was not prepared for the purpose of identifying phases and transitions can, nonetheless, serve as a basis for an analysis of phases, transitions, and factors bearing on control.


The volume used for the following analysis is W. C. Chamberlin and J. D. Iams, Rebellion: The Rise and Fall of the Greek Communist Party.¹ There is a large literature on the Greek Insurgency, but this study, with its parallel history of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and the military aspects of the Insurgency, seemed especially rich in the kinds of material this analysis requires. The only aspects of the conflict for which supplementary material appeared necessary were the role of the United Nations and the details of U.S. and Soviet policy statements. Materials on these have been drawn from David W. Wainhouse and others,

¹ Foreign Service Institute, Fifth Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, June 2, 1963 .

International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast,¹ and A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49.²

B. The Phase Structure

The structure of phases, sub-phases, and transitions in the Greek Insurgency is illustrated in the following diagram.



1. Transition from Phase I to Phase II: March 10, 1944. The decision of the wartime resistance coalition--the National Liberation Front (EAM), which was dominated by the KKE--to challenge the royalist government-in-exile for the control of postwar Greece led to the creation

¹(Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins Press in cooperation with The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School for Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1966), pp. 221-241.

²U. S. Congress, 81st, 1st sess., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Document No. 123 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1950), pp. 765-782.

of the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) on March 10, 1944. This marked the conjunction of available force--the EAM's war-time guerrilla resistance force, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS)--and a political decision to employ it in a struggle for control of Greece. This decision signalled the introduction of a military option into the long-standing political dispute between the Greek government and the KKE.

2. Transition from Phase II to Phase III₁: December 3, 1944.

In a bid to seize power in Athens (virtually the only part of Greece not under ELAS control) from the returning Greek government forces and the British, the KKE initiated major hostilities in Athens between ELAS and the Greek government-British forces.

3. Transition from Phase III₁ to Phase IV₁: February 13, 1945.

Militarily defeated, the KKE agreed at Varkiza on February 12, 1945, to cease fire, disband its forces, and surrender its weapons.

4. Transition from Phase IV₁ to Phase III₂: February 1946.

While the KKE actively sought to rebuild its organization and expand its political base, hostilities broke out in the Greek countryside, particularly in the northern regions near the Yugoslav, Albanian, and Bulgarian borders.

5. Intensifications within Phase III₂.

a. Sub-Phase A: February 1946 -- September 1946

Hostilities during this first part of Phase III₂ took the form of actions between small, isolated, largely uncoordinated bands, not all of them under KKE control, and the Greek government gendarmerie. During this sub-phase, guerrillas who had fled to Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria following the Varkiza Agreement began to re-enter Greece, using territory north of the border as a sanctuary.

b. Sub-Phase B: September 1946 -- October 1947

After September 1946 the guerrilla bands grew larger and their operations more coordinated. Markos Vafeiadis became military leader of the guerrilla movement. On the government side, the main arm of action shifted from the gendarmerie to the armed forces.

c. Sub-Phase C: October 1947 -- July 1949

Up until October 1947 the KKE continued to function as a legal political party, endorsing the rebels' aims but denying sponsorship of the Insurgency. In October 1947 the KKE came out in open endorsement of the revolt and assumed open leadership of it. Shortly thereafter, the KKE formed a Provisional Democratic Government. Militarily these events signalled the emergence of large, coordinated guerrilla units and a formal military command structure. During this sub-phase, one threatened intensification--the involvement of the cities in the Insurgency--failed to materialize.

d. Sub-Phase D: July 1949 -- October 1949

The closing of the Yugoslav border with Greece to the guerrillas and their supplies forced a major tactical decision on the guerrillas: whether to continue the type of hostilities involving large guerrilla units and to hold the mountain strongholds of Grammos and Vitsi as sanctuaries and depots within Greece or to revert to the tactics pursued in Sub-Phase B. The guerrillas chose the former course.

6. Transition from Phase III₂ to Phase IV₂: October 1949.

In an effort to defend the Grammos and Vitsi strongholds against conventional assault by the Greek National Army, the guerrillas were decisively defeated and their remnants driven into exile in Albania. On October 16, 1949, the Provisional Democratic Government declared that it had, for the moment, put aside its arms.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option
 - a. In January 1942, after the German attack on the Soviet Union, ELAS was formed as a resistance force against German, Italian, and Bulgarian occupation forces. In December 1942, KKE decided to take over control of ELAS.
 - b. ELAS quickly came under KKE control, but it included non-KKE elements. KKE used the issue of anti-monarchism to rally to ELAS non-Communist groups that shared that sentiment, one widely held among Greek liberals who equated the monarchy with the prewar Metaxas dictatorship.
 - c. ELAS managed, during the wartime period, to liquidate or absorb most of the non-KKE-dominated resistance groups.
 - d. The largest non-Communist force that ELAS did not succeed in liquidating was EDES. While initially anti-monarchy as well as anti-Communist, EDES was persuaded by the British to support the cause of the monarchist

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Avoiding great-power hostilities that create the situations in which resistance forces develop; specifically in this instance, facilitating the Nazi-Soviet pact's continuation to neutralize local Communist groups; encouraging anti-Communist resistance forces.
 - b. Pressure on the Greek government-in-exile to submit the question of the monarchy to popular vote; liberalization of the political composition of the exile government.
 - c. Active assistance to non-Communist resistance groups; denial of materiel and other aid to Communist-dominated groups.
 - d. Major assistance to EDES; encouraging EDES to follow a popular, liberal policy to give non-Communist liberals a democratic alternative.

government-in-exile. This helped further to reinforce ELAS' appeal to the entire spectrum of liberal, anti-monarchist sentiment in Greece.

e. Factors related to the strategic requirements of World War II led Britain in particular, and subsequently the United States, to give support to the resistance forces in money and materiel. As the largest and most effective resistance group, ELAS received the bulk of this aid. Strategic considerations leading to Allied support for ELAS included: the need to disrupt supply lines through Greece to German forces in North Africa; diversion of attention from Sicily as the point of Allied landings in southern Europe; and later harassment and delay of German withdrawal from Greece.

f. In addition to the arms given the resistance by the Allies, ELAS captured or took over large stores of arms and ammunition at the time of the Italian surrender.

2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

a. Under the prewar Metaxas dictatorship, KKE had been thoroughly infiltrated by Greek security police--so much so that at one point there were rival Politburos, one made up almost exclusively of Greek police. Party leaders were in jail or exile, the party structure destroyed or discredited.

e. Ideally, avoiding World War II; alternatively, seeking other means to secure strategic objectives; tighter control on use made by resistance of assistance given.

f. Measures to control disposition of arms left over from great-power conflicts.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Vigorous measures, draconic if necessary, to destroy KKE structure and its leadership.

- b. Anti-KKE resistance forces existed. The largest was EDES which, although reduced in size and confined to a small part of Greece, was never eliminated by ELAS.
- c. The British gave some money and materiel assistance to EDES as well as ELAS.
- b. Large-scale assistance to non-Communist resistance forces.
- c. Restricting materiel assistance only to non-Communist groups; control over use of assistance given.

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III₁: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[As early as September 1943, KKE decided to create in occupied Greece the nucleus of a political structure that would make Allied reoccupation of Greece militarily and politically unnecessary. This decision culminated in the creation on March 10, 1944, of PEEA, which assumed administrative responsibility in areas under ELAS control. Despite this, ELAS did not contest the landing in Athens in October 1944 of British and Greek government troops. By December, however, this position was reversed and KKE initiated a battle for Athens. This section will look first at the factors bearing on the potential outbreak of hostilities in October that did not occur--the so-called First Round--and subsequently the Second Round in December 1944 that did occur.]

THE ABORTED FIRST ROUND

- 1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities
 - a. In addition to the arms acquired from the British and Italians, ELAS captured large quantities of arms and ammunition from the retreating German forces.
- 1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Measures to control disposition of arms left over from great-power conflicts.

- b. With the withdrawal of German troops on October 12, 1944, ELAS was in unchallenged control of almost all of Greece.
2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities
- a. King George of Greece agreed to submit the constitutional question of restoration of the monarchy to a postwar plebiscite.
- b. PEEA had a significant following among exiled Greeks, including members of the Greek Army of the Middle East--the British-trained and equipped army of the government-in-exile. This sympathy for the anti-monarchy cause among exiled political leaders led to the formation of a coalition Government of National Unity in which the KKE-dominated National Liberation Front (EAM) had a part. Such political successes led KKE to believe that it could gain control through political means.
- c. Initially, EAM repudiated the concessions made by its representatives at the meeting that created the Government of National Unity. However, reportedly at the urging of the Soviet Union, EAM reversed its position and agreed to participate.
- b. Immediate introduction of massive counterforce--Greek government, friendly ally, or neutral.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Neutral supervision, administration of proposed plebiscite; guarantees as to its fairness and implementation.
- b. Creation of government reflecting all segments of popular opinion; enabling all parties, including KKE, to compete in open political forum; alternatively, strong measures to reduce, eliminate KKE. [Note: while KKE's belief that it could "win" by legitimate political means helped at this time to avoid hostilities, KKE was not prepared to abandon its goal of "winning" and later resorted to force when political avenues appeared closed. The measures noted here need to be coupled with preparations to inhibit the temptation to try any but a political course.]
- c. Encouragement of Soviet attitude toward KKE. [See, however, note to preceding measure.]

- d. Immediate steps to take over and disband ELAS in particular.
- e. Strengthening formalizing agreement that placed Greece outside Soviet sphere. [Note: this however would have required a reciprocal strengthening of Soviet control within its sphere.]
- f. Keeping real strength concealed; more realistically, making balance in reality what EAM thought it was.

- d. Both EDES and ELAS agreed to place their resistance forces under the orders of General Scobie, GOC Allied Forces in Greece.
- e. In Moscow on October 9, 1944, the Soviet Union and Britain agreed to respective spheres of influence in the Balkans by which Greece was placed in the sphere of British predominance.

- f. ELAS and EAM appear to have underestimated their own military strength and overestimated that of the British and Greek government forces.

THE SECOND ROUND

[While the factors identified above combined to abort the threat of hostilities in October 1944 and to permit unopposed landing by British and Greek government forces, the decision not to use force was reversed by KKE between October and early December, when KKE contested British-Greek government control of Athens--regarded by both sides as the key to control of all Greece.]

1. Factors Favoring the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. The factors favoring the outbreak of hostilities listed above still applied. In addition, KKE recalculated the balance of strength and concluded that it favored KKE's chances. In particular, the small size of the British contingent was taken

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Clarification of British intention both by formal statement and, more importantly, by actual force on the scene.

as an indication of a limited commitment to the Greek government's cause.

- b. U.S. policy at this time appeared to be friendly to EAM's aims--generally distrustful of both the British and the Greek government's efforts to force an unpopular, undemocratic government on an unwilling Greek people.
- c. U.S. public opinion also was generally more sympathetic toward EAM than toward the Greek government. U.S. press coverage of events in Greece reinforced the view of EAM as liberal anti-monarchists with a romanticized resistance past and of the Greek government as both a tool of British conservatives and the heir of the discredited pro-Fascist prewar Metaxas dictatorship.
- d. EAM had agreed to demobilize ELAS by December 10. Once disbanded, it would be difficult and time-consuming to reorganize.

C. PHASE III₁ TO PHASE IV₁: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

[Hostilities broke out in Athens on December 3, 1944, when violence arose out of a prohibited KKE-sponsored demonstration. It seems clear from the sequence of events that the incident was deliberately provoked and staged by KKE. After over a month of fighting in Athens, EAM agreed to a cease-fire, which

- b. Clarification of U.S. policy; greater understanding of nature of EAM and its objectives; articulation of support for liberal aims but rejection of autocratic means.
 - c. Public education as to the nature of EAM and its rejection; greater public information on events, if necessary through neutral fact-finding in the credibility of which the public has confidence; vigorous steps by the Greek government to liberalize its policy and disassociate itself from prewar dictatorship.
 - d. Introduction and rapid deployment of force necessary to ensure compliance with demobilization order.
- #### C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

was signed at Varkiza in mid-February 1945. From the point of view of conflict control, the most interesting question is why, given its virtual control of Greece outside Athens, KKE declined to make the struggle nation-wide and, instead, accepted defeat in Athens as terminating the Second Round. The issues to be analyzed here, therefore, are "moderation and termination" versus "intensification and continuation" of hostilities.]

1. Factors Favoring Intensification and Continuation of Hostilities

- a. The factors favoring outbreak of hostilities listed earlier continued to apply.
- b. By resorting to force, KKE had revealed its hand and alerted the British and Greek government to its intention to seize power if possible. Some, but by no means all, of EAM's non-Communist supporters, in Greece and elsewhere, were alienated by the effort. EAM's pose as a political force not dominated by KKE and KKE's posture as a legitimate political party were thus already compromised.

2. Factors Favoring Moderation and Termination of Hostilities

- a. KKE won a further political concession when King George agreed not to return to Greece until the promised plebiscite on the monarchy had been held.
- b. No materiel assistance to the insurgents was forthcoming from either the Soviet Union or

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Measures listed earlier to control and counteract KKE power.
- b. Vigorous public information campaign on KKE's role and nature, through neutral, believable channels, if possible by neutral fact-finding.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Neutral auspices to organize and supervise plebiscite; guarantee of its fairness and implementation.
- b. Encouraging Soviet disinterest in Greece by observing an equal

its satellites on Greece's borders. The Soviet Union was preoccupied with its own domestic affairs and with the consolidation of its new East Europe satellite systems. It furthermore hoped to solidify into a longer-term arrangement the spheres-of-influence agreement with Britain.

c. Many members of KKE and EAM were fearful of Yugoslavia's intentions toward Greek Macedonia. It was feared that the price of Yugoslav aid might be the movement of Yugoslav forces into Greek Macedonia, under the guise of aid to the insurgents but equally in pursuit of Yugoslavia's hope of uniting all of Macedonia under its control.

c. Strengthening historic Balkan linguistic rivalries, which were much older, and perhaps even stronger, than new-found ideological affinities; strengthening both Greek and Yugoslav chauvinism, revanchism.

D. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

D. PHASE IV¹ TO PHASE III²: THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

[For nearly a year, relative peace prevailed in Greece while EAM played the role of a political party. There were some small bands operating in the mountains, but these appear to have been independent, local bands.]

1. Factors Promoting the Resumption of Hostilities

- a. While ELAS agreed at Varkiza to surrender its arms and, in fact, turned in larger quantities than it was required to, it kept its best arms and equipment.
- b. The elite ELAS forces did not surrender and disband, as agreed at Varkiza, but fled instead to Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria,
1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Supervision, inspection, and control, by joint groups or neutral authority, of arms surrendered and arms retained.
 - b. Border control to prevent guerrilla movements into neighboring territories

where they received training in guerrilla warfare. The main base for this training was in Yugoslavia.

c. The Greek government, while allowing EAM and KKE to operate openly, punished and harassed former ELAS-EAM members, who were thus driven back into the KKE fold.

d. The Greek government was unable to control-- or in the view of EAM made no effort to control--the activities of right-wing terrorist groups. The national guard, which the government created to restore order, operated more vigorously against suspected left-wing than right-wing groups.

e. Soviet expressions of hostility toward the Greek government increased. British protests over Soviet actions in Romania may have weakened the value to the Soviet Union of the wartime British-Soviet spheres-of-influence agreement for the Balkans.

f. KKE estimated that, despite government efforts to exclude it, KKE influence in the Greek armed forces and police was high. (In September 1945, KKE estimated it as 15 per cent of the army, 17 per cent of the air force, 5 per cent of the navy, and 2 per cent of the police.) KKE thus felt that the Greek armed forces would be ineffective in engagements with it.

initially or to keep them from returning; vigorous steps to deny guerrillas unmolested sanctuary in neighboring states.

c. Measures by the Greek government to weaken and restrain KKE while appealing to its non-Communist and non-hard-core following (i.e., just the opposite of the policy pursued).

d. Vigorous, unbiased enforcement of public order.

e. Strengthening and formalization of spheres of influence.

f. Improving the political reliability of government forces.

g. Massive economic and financial assistance, bilateral or multilateral.

g. The Greek economy had been severely damaged by invasion and occupation--agricultural production was much below standard, industry was at a stand-still, and the transportation system was virtually destroyed. Inflation was out of control and the measures Greece could take on its own to begin reconstruction only added to inflation. The occupation period had produced thousands of displaced people. All these problems were exploited by KKE and aggravated by KKE-inspired urban unrest and continued, low-level rural tension.

h. Vigorous government measures to control KKE operations; active government development and security programs to reduce the appeal and pressure of KKE in towns and villages.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Public information on KKE excesses; neutral fact-finding to establish facts.

b. Government accommodation to legitimate political demands endorsed by but not exclusive to KKE; creating a liberal, democratic alternative.

h. KKE organized an extensive information and supply net in the towns and villages--the Self-Defense Forces (MLA). MLA was not primarily a military force, except for operations in the immediate vicinity of a town or village.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Resumption of Hostilities

a. KKE lost much support in Greece as a result of its action, at the close of the Athens hostilities (Phase III₁), in taking large numbers of hostages as it withdrew from the city and in mass killings of alleged "traitors" and "enemies."

b. The Varkiza Agreement that ended Phase III₁ included further government political concessions--Allied supervision of the plebiscite on the monarchy and of the purge from the civil service, police, and gendarmerie of wartime collaborators and members of the German-sponsored occupation security force.

- c. EAM changed its name (while retaining its initials) to National Anti-Fascist Front and announced it would act purely as a political party. It initially instructed its members to participate in the coming Greek elections. (Subsequently this position was changed and EAM, charging the government with using right-wing terrorists to control the election, decided to boycott them. The Soviet Union had urged EAM to participate but apparently its instruction did not reach Athens until after the boycott decision had been announced. In any event, EAM did not reverse its stand to accord with the Soviet decision.)
- d. Britain, which had initially seen its role as a limited one of helping the government restore itself to Athens, agreed to assist in organizing, equipping, and training the Greek army and gendarmerie.
- e. KKE leadership was split on a range of personal and policy issues. Its rapid wartime expansion had been the rise to power in ELAS and EAM of many younger men who challenged the older, prewar leadership for control of the party. Even more serious was the perennial split on the Macedonian question. In an earlier period (1920s, 1930s), KKE endorsement of Macedonian autonomy had almost destroyed KKE's following in Greece, where Macedonian autonomy was equated with Bulgarian aggrandizement. Practical considerations of its position in Greece, as well as nationalist sentiments among KKE leaders themselves, therefore counseled against endorsing any separation of Macedonia
- c. Encouraging keeping the conflict in the political arena by protecting right of dissenters to engage in legitimate modes of dissent; this coupled with strengthened internal security to close off other alternatives.
- d. External assistance to develop internal security forces.
- e. Strengthening and exploiting divisions within KKE by appealing to Greek nationalism and, at the same time, Macedonian separatism; measures by Greek government to accommodate to legitimate Macedonian demands within framework of Greek Macedonia's remaining within the Greek state.

from Greece. At the same time, Soviet pressures and both Yugoslav and Bulgarian interests in Macedonia, coupled with KKE's need for the support and assistance of its northern neighbors, created pressure on KKE to clarify its position on Macedonia's future. KKE's response was to seek to straddle the issue--a position that led to persisting tensions within KKE and between it and its Communist mentors.

- f. The Soviet Union took to the U.N. Security Council in January 1946 the charge that British forces in Greece represented a potential threat to peace.

E. PHASE III₂ TO PHASE IV₂: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES²ES

[Phase III₂, the Third Round, lasted from early 1946 until late 1949, when the guerrillas were decisively defeated by the Greek armed forces. (The opening of Phase III₂ coincided roughly with KKE-EAM's decision in January-February 1946 to boycott the Greek elections.) During these nearly four years of hostilities, three distinct intensifications took place. The first two represented deliberate KKE decisions and correspond to the classic three stages of guerrilla warfare--sporadic violence; coordinated larger-scale guerrilla warfare; large-scale guerrilla-conventional operations. The third intensification was, in a sense, forced on the guerrillas by the closing of the Yugoslav-Greek frontier to them. This section will examine these sub-phases

- f. U.N. fact-finding; creation of U.N. presence in Greece's replacement of British forces by international force.

E. MEASURES DESIGNED TO MODERATE AND TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

[In the Greek Insurgency, as in some other cases examined in this study, the conflict-controlling goals of keeping the hostilities moderate and terminating them were related to each other in complex and frequently competing ways. In general, the focus of this analysis will be the moderation of hostilities. For this reason, any factors that tended to intensify hostilities--even if their rationale were the termination of hostilities--are regarded as conflict-promoting factors to be countered. A quite different picture would emerge if the goal of termination

separately.]

were placed at first rank. In the last sub-phase of these hostilities, termination was the end product of intensification.]

SUB-PHASE A: THE PERIOD OF INCREASING
BUT NOT LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE

[Beginning early in 1946, violence in the mountainous and border regions of Greece increased sharply. More formally organized groups entered Greece from the Yugoslav camps and attacked isolated gendarmerie posts. The units sought to avoid clashes with Greek army units and concentrated, instead, on consolidating their hold on the mountain areas. During this sub-phase, however, EAM and KKE continued to function as open, legal political groups and denied responsibility for the violence, which they blamed on government and right-wing terrorist repression. In this sub-phase, the relevant questions concern which factors favored intensification and which favored moderation; either course might lead to termination.]

1. Factors Favoring Intensification of Hostilities

a. KKE's hope for further political gains was not fulfilled. In the March 1946 elections, which KKE boycotted, the Populist party won handsily. KKE estimated its strength, represented by abstentions, as over 50 per cent; the Allied commission that supervised

1. To Offset These Factors

a. Keeping conflict in the political arena while closing off alternative paths--including resort to force--by enhanced government internal security capability.

the election put it at less than 10 per cent. Similarly, in the September 1946 plebiscite on the return of the King, nearly 70 per cent voted yes although KKE instructed its followers to vote no.

- b. Preparations required to counter guerrilla activities, as well as those activities themselves, further weakened the economic, social, and financial situation in Greece and, as yet, adequate international assistance had not been found.
- c. Training of guerrillas in Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia (particularly the last) continued, and bands operating from this area succeeded in gaining control of the mountainous areas of Greece on the northern borders. Greece's military, police, and administrative authority in the border regions was destroyed.
- b. Major external assistance in economic reconstruction and in developing internal security capability.
- c. Pressure on Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia to refrain from providing refuge and assistance to the Greek insurgents; threat of sanctions, multilateral or bilateral; neutral or other third-party border controls; threat to extend hostilities to include sanctuaries. [Note, however, that if the threat to extend hostilities did not succeed, the result could have been a further broadening of the war.]

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Strengthening and exploiting divisions within KKE, especially where the moderates could be strengthened; making it possible for the moderates' approach to achieve positive goals while taking steps to close off the

2. Factors Tending to Moderate Hostilities

- a. The splits within KKE continued and added to them was a difference over whether to begin large-scale hostilities immediately or to exhaust political avenues first. This latter position prevailed and included among its adherents the head of KKE, Zakhariadis.

course advocated by the extremists.

- b. The U.S. government loaned Greece in early 1946 \$25 million to import reconstruction goods and \$10 million to purchase surplus army equipment.
- b. Massive bilateral or multilateral economic and financial assistance to aid Greek reconstruction and development; at this stage, strengthening Greek government forces to inhibit KKE resort to more intense hostilities.
- c. In mid-1946 the government took strong measures to counter insurgent operations and reduce KKE freedom of action--the right to strike was restricted, habeas corpus suspended, and permission granted for arrest and search without warrant. Local security committees were created with authority to exile anyone suspected of activities "dangerous to the state." Initially these committees were to be created only in areas of guerrilla operations, but they soon extended to all of Greece.
- c. Strong measures to restrain and, if possible, break up KKE structure. [Note, however, that if such measures were not applied equitably, they could have had the effect of driving non-Communist dissidents into the KKE's camp.]
- d. In August 1946 the Ukrainian S.S.R. brought before the U.N. Security Council a complaint about incidents along the Greek-Albanian border. The United States proposed an investigating commission to look into the whole border situation, but the Soviet Union vetoed the proposal.
- d. By-passing Security Council and acting through General Assembly; action by the Assembly or by the Secretary-General on his own initiative to create a U.N. presence in the area of conflict; action by the Assembly to create a U.N. observation group, U.N. force to control borders, etc.

SUB-PHASE B: ORGANIZED GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

[In the early fall of 1946, the character of the military operations on both the guerrilla and government sides changed. Guerrilla operations were coordinated under the control of Markos Vafeiadis and took place on a larger scale. The organization of the guerrilla forces and command structure was made more formal. On the government side, responsibility for internal security was transferred to the army. The relevant questions here are which factors favored intensification and which favored moderation; either course could have led to termination of hostilities.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

a. The Greek government armed forces had been rapidly expanded to meet the growing guerrilla threat. But in the process of such rapid growth, the quality and period of training had been sacrificed. Throughout most of this sub-phase, the guerrilla forces were better trained, better equipped, and better led than the Greek National Army.

b. Britain, which had been chief source of external support for the Greek government, found the continuing and expanding financial burden too great to bear, particularly given the war-weakened state of its own economy.

1. To Offset These Factors

a. Since in this instance the greater strength of the guerrilla forces, as compared with the government forces, encouraged the guerrillas to intensify the hostilities, development of stronger government forces might have deterred the intensification. At the same time, this course would have enabled the government forces to intensify their response to the guerrilla attacks.

b. Expanded U.S. and other economic assistance; restraint on building up military forces of either adversary; introduction of neutral force to interpose itself between

It therefore announced that it would relinquish its role in Greece. Greece officially requested U.S. assistance. The outcome was the Truman Doctrine, a program of massive U.S. economic and military aid to Greece as well as Turkey.

the adversaries.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate Hostilities

a. KKE continued to operate as an open political party and to deny any connection with the insurgency, although it was under increasing government pressure. During this sub-phase, its preoccupation was with strengthening its underground operations--a fact most observers took to indicate an impending worsening of the conflict.

b. While the United States began large-scale military assistance to Greece during this sub-phase, the U.S. role was defined as limited to giving materiel aid and assistance in planning for its arrival and use. Initially, no U.S. role was seen in providing advisors or observers in operations. And no U.S. forces were to be committed in actual hostilities.

c. The military tactics pursued by the Greek government tended to restrict the scale and scope of hostilities at that time. A large push was made to clear the valleys of guerrilla forces and to garrison army units in vulnerable towns and cities. The result was to disperse the government forces and reduce them to a static defensive role while

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Encouraging keeping conflict in political arena; alternatively, swift, decisive government action to eliminate KKE.

b. Assumption of U.S. role by neutral party; strong stands by the United Nations, the Soviet Union, and others against expansion of U.S. role; threat by others to take reciprocal action in support of guerrillas.

c. Inadequate counterinsurgency strategy by the government helped keep hostilities moderate; hence, weakening government counterinsurgency doctrine and capabilities. [However, this inadequacy also prolonged hostilities.]

initiative passed to the guerrillas. (The government created the National Defense Corps, a type of home guard, to free the regular armed forces for combat duty. But during this sub-phase, the move had little effect.)

d. While Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, Albania and Bulgaria provided the guerrillas a sanctuary and materiel assistance, their own armed forces did not become involved in the hostilities.

e. Greece took its charge that the three northern neighbors were aiding the guerrillas to the U.N. Security Council. The Council unanimously agreed to create a Commission of Investigation, composed of all eleven Council members, to conduct an on-the-spot investigation. The Commission visited the respective capitals and heard many witnesses. However, its observations on the border itself were confined almost exclusively to the Greek side because the other states declined to cooperate. The Commission's report corroborated the Greek charges and proposed border conventions and continued U.N. border observation. In the Security Council the Soviet Union vetoed resolutions designed to put these recommendations into effect. The majority of the Council then voted to remove the item from the agenda, thus opening the way for General Assembly action.

SUB-PHASE C: FULL-SCALE INSURGENCY

[On October 8, 1947, the character of

d. Strong measures and pressures to prevent the introduction of military forces of involved neighbors, by threatening reciprocal action in support of the government.

e. Creation of U.N. force to patrol, control borders; threat of sanctions against intervening neighbors; arbitration, good offices.

the Greek Insurgency changed dramatically, in both its military and political aspects. On that date, KKE issued an open call for revolt--in contrast to its earlier denials of any connection with the hostilities. What KKE sought to spark was a full-scale civil war, but in this, for reasons noted below, it was unsuccessful. This sub-phase saw large-scale conventional clashes between government forces and the insurgents (who at the same time continued guerrilla operations) and altered tactics on the part of the government forces, who were seeking a definitive military victory over the insurgents. In the following analysis, the relevant questions are: which factors favored intensification (including those factors that tended to make it possible for either side to achieve a military victory) and which favored moderation (including those that tended to make it impossible for either side to employ its force effectively in search for victory).]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

- a. The scope of the U.S. military mission in Greece expanded from its initial role of logistic support and supply to advice on and observation of military operations.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. In this case, expanded great-power involvement enabled the Greek government to intensify the hostilities in an effort to terminate them; avoiding intensification meant restricting or withdrawing U.S. assistance.

- b. On December 24, 1947, the insurgents declared the creation of a rival government--the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece.
- c. The National Defense Corps, created to relieve the Greek army of garrison duties and increase its flexibility and offensive strength, had some limited success in this mission. During 1948 campaigns, however, the lack of training and low quality of leadership of the Greek forces became evident. While the armed forces succeeded, after a two-month assault, in overrunning the guerrilla bastion in the Grammos area on the Albanian border, the largest part of the refugee force escaped into Albania. The army was unsuccessful in its efforts to storm the guerrilla bastion at Vitsi, at the junction of the Greek, Albanian, and Yugoslav borders. Following the appointment of General Papagos as commander-in-chief in January 1949 and the granting to him of sweeping authority within the military, hard-fought campaigns in southern and central Greece in the spring and early summer of 1949 succeeded in driving the guerrillas back into the border areas.
- d. During this sub-phase, materiel assistance and sanctuary continued to be offered to the insurgents by Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria and financial assistance, propaganda, and diplomatic support by the other states of the East European bloc. Committees for Aid to Democratic Greece were formed in all the
- b. International agreements to withhold recognition from insurgent governments; pressure on other countries, especially the bloc countries, not to recognize.
- c. In this case, the inadequacies in training, materiel, and leadership in the Greek armed forces helped to keep the hostilities moderate; hence, avoiding intensification meant keeping the Greek forces weak and their leadership poor.
- d. Threats to extend the hostilities to sanctuaries and/or to introduce third-party forces on the Greek government side; neutral or third-party border control.

Soviet satellites and in West European countries with large Communist parties (e.g., France and Italy). There were periodic rumors of volunteer brigades being formed, but, if the rumors had any substance at all, the volunteers were not observed in Greece. Aside from periodic but infrequent clashes between Yugoslav border guards and Greek forces pursuing guerrilla bands, the fighting was confined to Greek fighting Greek--with Soviet bloc-supplied weapons on one side and Western-supplied weapons on the other.

- e. Following the 1948 campaigns in the Grammos-Vitsi areas, Markos was relieved of all but the title of commander of the guerrilla forces--and in January 1949, he was formally discharged. Markos opposed conventional stands such as the guerrillas waged in that campaign and advocated instead continuation of rural--mountain warfare. [Part of Markos' argument was based on the potential loss of the Yugoslav sanctuary as relations between KKE and Yugoslavia deteriorated following the Tito-Cominform split. See below.]

- e. Seeking to strengthen more moderate elements on guerrilla side.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate Hostilities

- a. The U.N. General Assembly created the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) with the authority formerly exercised by the Security Council's Commission of Investigation, which a Soviet veto had prevented being made permanent [see above]. The Soviet Union and Poland did not accept membership on UNSCOB, so it was composed

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Increasing UNSCOB's authority by expanding its capabilities for border observation, placing a U.N. force on the borders, etc.

of Brazil, China, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Britain, and the United States. With headquarters in Salonika and observation posts on the border, UNSCOB operated chiefly on the Greek side of the frontier. It was able to verify Greek charges that the guerrillas were making active use of bases in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria and that most materiel for the guerrilla forces came over these same borders.

- b. In part as a result of UNSCOB's verifications and in part as a result of generally altering perceptions of the Soviet bloc's postwar policy goals, both public and governmental opinion in the West became much more hostile to the guerrillas and more sympathetic to the Greek government's cause.
 - c. In renewing UNSCOB's mandate in November 1948, the U.N. General Assembly openly condemned Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria for interference in Greece's internal affairs.
 - d. Although there is some evidence that the Soviet Union endorsed KKE's plan to set up a rival Provisional Democratic Government in Greece, neither the Soviet Union nor any satellite, including the three northern neighbors of Greece, recognized the new government. UNSCOB issued a sharply-worded warning to the latter three that such a step
- b. To the extent that this weakened the guerrillas' external support, it tended to moderate the conflict and could have been enhanced by further exploitation of the bad press they were receiving. [Note: this same factor also helped to strengthen the determination of the government to intensify and continue hostilities.]
 - c. Threat of sanctions against states **openly** intervening; threat to extend hostilities to sanctuaries.
 - d. International agreements not to recognize insurgent governments before free supervised elections to determine popular will.

could lead to a much wider involvement by other states on the government's side. The guerrilla forces were never able to seize and hold a city or town in Greece worthy of becoming their capital city and, throughout this sub-phase, the headquarters of the Provisional Democratic Government remained in Yugoslavia.

e. When KKE issued its call for open rebellion, it set in motion a network of organizations in the cities of Greece that were to embroil them, along with the countryside, in the struggle. The plans failed to materialize: KKE overestimated its city following and did not realize the extent to which its actions in Phase III₁ and subsequently had lost it support; and the Greek security forces had effectively infiltrated the city organizations. The failure of KKE to retain a foothold in the cities cut the guerrillas off from recruits, money, and supplies and freed government forces for operations outside the cities.

f. Despite the relative security of the cities, there was strong political pressure on the government forces to retain garrisons in cities and towns because of potential adverse reaction from frightened city populations. (This and other political interference in the military command structure was largely overcome under the strong leadership of General Papagos.)

e. Vigorous government action to deny cities to insurgents and to extend this denial to towns and countryside; government measures to deny insurgents sources of recruitment and financial and other support.

f. Pressing for strategies that minimize the possibility of offensive use of military force.

- g. Ideological splits within KKE continued to polarize around the Macedonian issue. Prior to the Tito-Cominform split, the pressure on KKE was to endorse a position on Macedonia that would, in effect, have led to its detachment from Greece and domination by Yugoslavia. After the split, the issue became more complex because both Tito and the Soviet Union-Bulgaria called for Macedonian autonomy and self-determination (which, as far as Greece was concerned, meant secession); but the Yugoslav formula would have united Greek Macedonia with Yugoslav Macedonia under Yugoslav control, while Bulgaria saw it united with Bulgarian Macedonia under Bulgarian control. Neither course was palatable to KKE. But the need for assistance from the north pushed it constantly toward one or another of these solutions. The role of Macedonian nationalists within the guerrilla leadership grew, and their numbers in the guerrilla forces increased.
- h. The Tito-Cominform split of July 1948 did not have an immediate impact on the Greek Insurgency, although relations between KKE and Tito began to deteriorate shortly thereafter. The split did, however, accentuate a variety of tensions within KKE--the Macedonian issue just mentioned as well as the strategic debate about the type of warfare to be waged. The issues became intermixed: on the one hand were
- g. Exploiting and strengthening splits within KKE, encouraging Macedonian separatism, encouraging KKE nationalism.
- h. Encouraging divisions within the Communist bloc by emphasizing ideological, historical, linguistic divisions.

those who felt the Yugoslav bases to be indispensable and who wanted to make concessions to Yugoslavia, on Macedonia and other issues, in order to retain the bases; on the other hand were those who felt that the guerrillas could wage successful conventional warfare without Yugoslav aid and pressed for a united anti-Tito stand.

- i. On several occasions during this sub-phase, the insurgent government, or the Soviet Union on its behalf, indicated a willingness to discuss an end to hostilities; but the Greek government and its supporters doubted the sincerity of the moves and felt KKE wanted only time to recoup and prepare for the Fourth Round. In May 1948 and again in January 1949, the insurgents announced that they were always ready to explore ways to peace. In April 1949 the Soviet Union proposed withdrawal of all foreign military materiel and personnel, general amnesty for all insurgents, and new elections in Greece in which the insurgents would participate. The United States and the Greek government countered that the key step was to halt assistance from the north. The Soviets supplemented their proposal by saying they would participate in supervising new elections and in a commission to control the frontiers.

SUB-PHASE D: THE LAST BATTLE

- i. Seeking a formula that met basic demands of each side re: pre-conditions for negotiation--e.g., replacement of U.S. forces by neutral, U.N. force and control of border by this force; U.N. supervision of new elections; U.N. and other guaranties of internal and external security.

[In July 1949, Yugoslavia closed its border to the Greek insurgents, who were thus cut off from their main sanctuaries and supply routes. While Albania and Bulgaria were prepared to continue to assist the Insurgency, the isolation of the former from the rest of the bloc and the remoteness of Bulgaria from the parts of Greece where hostilities were being waged made their help inadequate. The choice faced by the guerrillas was to seek a quick victory with the resources at hand or to moderate hostilities and prepare for a long struggle. They chose the former course.]

760

1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

- a. The insurgents had not achieved their goals and, in the process of trying for them, KKE had revealed its willingness to use force to gain power. The prospects of rebuilding the party following in any near future were slim indeed.

2. Factors Tending to Terminate Hostilities

- a. The Greek government forces, greatly improved in morale, training, and leadership, won a decisive victory over the insurgents who tried to wage a conventional defense of the Grammos and Vitsi strongholds. The insurgents defeat was swift and complete, and the scattered survivors fled to Albania.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. More decisive defeat of insurgents; or accommodation to their demands.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Pursuit of fleeing insurgents to complete decimation of their forces; sealing border to prevent their return.

b. Threat to extend hostilities to neighboring or other third states seeking to intervene on insurgents' behalf.

b. For practical and political reasons, Albania and Bulgaria were unprepared to intervene on a scale necessary to turn the tide, and the Soviet Union did not--and had not throughout the Insurgency--become directly engaged.

F. PHASE IV₂

[This analysis ends with the declaration by the Provisional Democratic Government on October 16, 1949, that it had temporarily put aside its arms. This action was echoed by KKE in November when it formally called off the armed struggle. Both blamed the Greek government's material superiority and Tito's "treachery" for their decisions.]

III. WEAPONS ANALYSIS

[The following analysis deals only cursorily with the pre-Varkiza period.]

A. Insurgents' Weapons Acquisition

Following their unsuccessful effort to seize power in Athens in December 1944-January 1945, ELAS agreed to disband and to surrender its arms. The Varkiza Agreement which terminated the fighting specified the following numbers and types of arms that ELAS was to turn in:¹

- 41,500 rifles
- 650 submachine guns
- 1,050 light machine guns
- 315 heavy machine guns
- 108 light mortars
- 55 heavy mortars
- 32 artillery pieces
- 15 radio sets

In fact, ELAS turned in even more than this number. But it quickly became clear that not all--perhaps not even most--of ELAS' arms had been surrendered. Large numbers were secreted in mountain caches for possible future use. For example, in the ten months following the Varkiza Agreement, over 25,700 more arms were discovered, including 166 heavy mortars.² These arms represented in type and numbers the materiel supplied to the wartime resistance by the Allies (primarily Britain), as well as the materiel captured by ELAS from the Italians at the time of their surrender in 1943 and from the Germans upon their withdrawal

¹Chamberlin and Iams, op. cit., p. 154.

²Ibid., p. 157.

from Greece in 1944.

These wartime-supplied weapons remained in the insurgents' inventory throughout the Insurgency. In addition, the insurgents received large quantities of materiel support from Greece's northern neighbors, Albania, Bulgaria, and primarily Yugoslavia.

It is extremely difficult in any insurgency situation to identify the actual supplier with the original source of a given type of weapon. Several factors make this doubly difficult in the Greek Insurgency. For one, the Allies had also supplied large numbers of arms to the Tito partisans in Yugoslavia during the war, for the most part the same types supplied the Greek resistance. For another, the Germans had captured numbers of Soviet arms which were frequently used by the German forces that occupied Greece. The Soviets, in turn, had captured much German equipment which was made widely available to the Soviet Union's wartime allies. The Soviets also had in the Balkans weapons from their own inventories, some of which were also doubtless given to the insurgents.

The numbers of individuals in the insurgent forces also varied over time. In addition to violating the provisions--the spirit if not the letter--of the Varkiza Agreement about surrender of arms, ELAS disregarded the provision about disbanding. Around 3,000 guerrillas fled to sanctuaries in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria rather than disband, as Varkiza specified. These guerrillas, whose numbers were augmented by subsequent arrivals, concentrated in training camps in Yugoslavia. They constituted the core of the insurgent forces, although throughout the post-Varkiza period smaller groups continued to operate in the mountainous area of Greece.

Official Greek General Staff estimates of numbers of guerrillas operating in Greece (i.e., exclusive of those in rest and training areas north of the border) were as follows:

WEC-98 III

	1946	1947	1948	1949
January		10,820	22,350	23,900
February		14,850	24,110	20,150
March		16,250	26,000	20,020
April		17,050	24,300	19,780
May		16,450	25,600	19,000
June	2,600	16,900	23,300	17,490
July	3,150	16,900	22,090	17,400
August	3,620	16,700	21,100	3,710
September	4,490	17,400	23,700	2,150
October	5,930	18,600	25,480	1,760
November	7,450	18,600	25,450	1,275
December	9,285	20,350	25,000	815

Putting together accounts of specific engagements, information on arms captured by government forces, arms known to have been available in the area, and the numbers and varying equipment of insurgent groups in the course of the hostilities, one arrives at the following list of categories, types, numbers, and likely sources of weapons available to the insurgents:¹

¹The sources used to compile this information were *ibid.*; Major Edgar O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War: 1944-49 (New York, Praeger, 1966); George B. Johnson and Hans Bert Lockhoven, International Armament, (Cologne, International Small Arms Publishers, 1965). Also Colonel J.C. Murray, "The Anti-Bandit War," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 1954), pp. 14-23; No. 2 (February 1954), pp. 50-59; No. 3 (March 1954), pp. 48-57; No. 4 (April 1954), pp. 52-60; No. 5 (May 1954), pp. 52-58.

WEC-98 III

Weapons Used by the Greek Guerrilla Forces During the Insurgency

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
German Mauser 7.63mm automatic pistol)		captured
German Luger 9mm automatic pistol)		captured
German Walther 9mm automatic pistol)	about 700, all types	captured
Canadian/Belgian FN Browning 9mm automatic pistol)		U.K. in W.W. II/ captured
Soviet Tokarev 7.62mm automatic pistol)		sponsor countries*
German Mauser 98K 7.92mm rifle)	12,000 -	captured, Yugoslavia
Mannlicher Model 1888 rifle)	15,000, all types	Yugoslavia
Soviet Moissin-Nagant 7.62mm rifle)		sponsor countries*
British Sten 9mm SMG	about 1,500	U.K. in W.W. II to Greek and Yugoslav partisans
German MP 40 9mm SMG	about 2,500	captured, Yugoslavia
Soviet PPSH 41/PPs 43 7.62mm SMG	500-1,000	Albania
German MP 43/44 7.92mm automatic carbine	about 100	captured, Yugoslavia
Czech ZB 26/30 7.92mm LMG	about 200	sponsor countries*, possibly Romania
Soviet Degtyarev DP 7.62mm LMG	about 200	sponsor countries*
German MG-34 7.92mm LMG	about 400	captured, sponsor countries*
British Bren (special model) 7.92mm LMG	about 100	U.K. in W.W. II to Greek and Yugoslav partisans
Soviet 12.7mm antiaircraft MG	over 25	sponsor countries*
Soviet Maxim 7.62mm HMG	300-400	sponsor countries*
light mortar (probably Soviet or German make)	300-400	sponsor countries*
medium mortar (probably Soviet or German make)	75-100	sponsor countries*

* Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria

WEC-98 III

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
Czech Skoda 75mm field gun	at least 45	sponsor countries *
German or Soviet 105mm field gun	at least 15	sponsor countries *
German or Soviet rocket launcher	over 140	sponsor countries *
antitank gun (possibly Soviet make)	over 20	sponsor countries *
antiaircraft gun (possibly Soviet or Swedish Bofors 37mm used by Soviets)	at least 19	sponsor countries *
German or Soviet mines, AT and AP type	several thousand	sponsor countries *

No combat surface vessels except one ex-Italian pre-World War II submarine, furnished by Albania, which was converted to transport and ferry duty. Its operational capability is doubtful. No combat aircraft.

*Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria

B. Greek Government Weapons Acquisition

The Greek government forces also came out of World War II with a force size, structure, training, and equipment determined by its wartime role and experience. Only the Greek Royal Navy (whose role in the Insurgency was to be minor) had escaped the German invasion relatively unscathed; the army and air force had been virtually destroyed as fighting forces. When Greek forces returned to Greece in late 1944, after the German withdrawal, they included: a navy of approximately 12,000 equipped with ships returned to Greek control from the British forces, in which they had been integrated during the war, and additional British vessels loaned temporarily to meet current requirements; the Third Brigade of 2,100 officers and men; and the air force Sacred Squadron of 600 to 800.

The British accepted initial responsibility for training a new Greek military establishment. After the December 1944-January 1945

fighting in Athens, this role was stepped up and expanded. By late 1946, the Greek army had grown to 100,000 men, equipped mostly with British materiel. But the rapid growth, which the insurgents' challenge made essential, had been bought at the expense of inferior training; and the resulting defects showed up in the poor performance of the Greek government forces during the first years of the Insurgency.

By late 1946-early 1947, the economic strain on Britain of the greatly enlarged burden in Greece and Britain's own postwar recovery effort led to a much reduced British role in Greece. The major burden of building and supporting Greek military force was assumed by the United States.

During the wartime period and the first two postwar years, the bulk of materiel supplied the Greek armed forces was British. As the U.S. role became predominant, increasing amounts of U.S. materiel were supplied. However, substantial amounts of British equipment continued to be purchased by the United States for the Greek forces, both because of the great expense that would have been involved in totally re-equipping the Greek forces and because some types of British equipment were found more suitable to the special type of warfare being fought. For the most part, the equipment supplied, both British and U.S., was war surplus. Total U.S. military aid in FY1948-FY1950 was \$476.8 million, while the British component from October 1944-June 1947 amounted to \$152 million.

The expansion of the size of the Greek forces may be seen in the following:

WEC-98 III

	Army	Air Force	Navy	Gendarmerie, National Defense Force	Total
1946					
	100,000	5,000	12,000	30,000	147,000
1947					
	110,000	5,000	12,000	30,000	157,000
	120,000	6,500	12,000	35,000	173,500
1948					
	132,000	7,200	13,500	47,500	200,200
1949					
	132,000	7,200	13,500	50,000	202,700
	160,000	7,200	13,500	50,000	230,700
1950					

The following tabulation of weapons used by the Greek armed forces during the Insurgency is compiled from information available on weapons supplied and the organization and standard equipment of different military units, as well as accounts of Greek government military operations.¹

Weapons Used by the Greek Government Forces During the Insurgency

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
Webley .38 revolver)	U.K.
Canadian FN Browning 9mm automatic pistol) about 3,000	U.K.
Colt M1911 .45 pistol)	U.S.
German Lugers and Mausers)	Allies
Enfield .303 rifle	over 50,000	U.K.
Springfield .30 Model 1903 rifle	about 125,000	U.S.
U.S. M1 Garand rifle	about 10,000	U.S.
Sten 9mm SMG	about 3,000	U.K.
Thompson M1 .45 SMG	about 5,000	U.S.

¹The sources used were those listed in the preceding note.

WEC-98 III

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
German Schmeisser 9mm SMG	few	
Bren .303 LMG	about 1,000	U.K.
US .30 BAR	about 5,000	U.S.
US M1919A4 .30 LMG	about 2,100	U.S.
Vickers .303 MMG	over 300	U.K.
2" mortar	about 350	U.K.
3" mortar	81-108	U.K.
4.2" mortar	1-2 batteries	U.K.
60mm mortar	about 500	U.S.
81mm mortar	about 170	U.S.
3.7" howitzer	about 8 batteries	U.K.
75mm pack howitzer	about 32	U.S.
2.36" rocket launcher	over 70	U.S.
75mm recoilless rifle	several	U.S.
25-pounder gun	about 8 batteries	U.K.
5.5" gun	about 2 batteries	U.K.
Centaur light tank	30-40 in 3 units	U.K.
M4 Sherman medium tank	about 50	U.S.
Supermarine Spitfire IX	about 36	U.K.
US AT-6 Harvard	about 12	U.K.
US C-47 Dakota	about 6	U.K.
US SB2C Curtiss Helldiver	49	U.S.
destroyer	8	transferred from U.K.
destroyer	2	on loan from U.K.
submarine	6	transferred from U.K.
submarine chaser	1	transferred from U.S.
corvette	8	transferred from U.K.
minesweeper	25	U.S./U.K.
cruiser, light	1	Italy, war prize
motor gunboat	6	transferred from U.S.
landing craft	12	on loan from U.K.

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL"Controlling" the Conflict

Controlling the Greek conflict--like that in Vietnam--meant not allowing a Communist-led movement to dominate wartime resistance; not permitting civil war to break out, and sealing off the country from external intervention through international-organization mechanisms; and bringing hostilities to an early end, through a combination of firm counterinsurgency measures and political, economic, and social reforms, particularly in the countryside, that would win popular support for moderate non-Communist rule. (Alternatively, the aim of early termination of hostilities could have been obtained by ensuring a rapid Communist victory.)

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. Like so many other postwar conflicts, the Greek Insurgency had its roots in great-power war and Communist organizing skill that enabled the party to take over control of wartime resistance movements. Short of avoiding great-power war, later political-ideological conflict may be averted by avoiding Communist take-over of legitimate nationalist and patriotic resistance movements. This in turn implies the need for effective non-Communist organizations that can compete with an ELAS (or a Vietminh or Viet Cong) for popular support in the "sea" in which, in Maoist terms, insurgent "fish" swim.

2. The difficulties with this prescription--so important to U.S. policy in the postwar era--are both obvious and chronic. The chief one is ideological--the tendency for the non-Communist left to share many Marxist ideas and thus alienate powerful supporters of anti-Communism such as the United States; and the tendency of the anti-Communist right to represent unpopular forces of wealth, corruption, landlordism, militarism, and, as in wartime Greece, monarchism. Given this tendency of the political extremes to polarize, a strategy for the

United States in such insurgencies that is both conflict-controlling and "winning" is to recognize and support popularly based non-Communist elements that work for stability and democratic reform, while eschewing both blind support for unpopular status quo powers and the romanticizing of what are in effect Communist take-over movements.

3. In wartime Greece this meant the desirability of active support of non-Communist resistance groups, notably EDES, plus pressure on the Greek government-in-exile to liberalize its composition, submit the question of monarchy to a popular vote, and generally appeal to popular sentiments while providing a democratic alternative. Strategic considerations that led to all-out Allied support for ELAS should have given equally high priority to avoiding the strengthening of political enemies and the creation of new postwar conflicts by short-sighted "purely military" wartime policies.

4. As in so many wartime situations, stores of surplus arms (such as those from the Italian surrender as well as later from retreating Germans) should be prevented from falling into the hands of potential conflict-makers (such as ELAS in Greece).

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

5. Impulses toward reform in an atmosphere of suspicion and conflict (such as the Greek King's agreement to a postwar plebiscite on constitutional questions--or elections in Vietnam) can benefit from being implemented in ways that lend them maximum confidence, i.e., through neutral (U.N., etc.) administration or supervision providing guarantees of fairness.

6. It is essential to convince radical take-over movements of two things: that they will not be permitted to succeed in their ends through violence; and that there is a legitimate role they can play in the political process. Experience with Communist coalition governments is an unhappy one, particularly when the Communists remain convinced of the usefulness of violence and also when they are allowed to appear to retain a monopoly on popular issues of economic

and social reform. Given this, the third essential ingredient for the success of political moderation is of course that described in Paragraph 2 above--support for popular non-Communist elements of genuine reform. These three factors are central to a successful strategy of internal conflict control--and today Vietnam and much of Latin America bespeak their relevance.

7. The element of deterrence and discouragement of radical minority take-over requires clearly stated intentions on the part of the deterrer (which the British did not offer at first in Greece), plus the will and strength to carry them out--a policy profoundly misunderstood by many Western liberals. But that will is of course sapped when the action seems entirely repressive and anti-democratic. Thus--the lesson is still not well learned by the hawks of the world--military power is only useful in counterinsurgency when harnessed to reform and popular consent.

Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

8. In the Athens round of fighting, Communist forces might have been more deterred by the threat of U.S. intervention, as well as by emphasis on traditional Balkan rivalries such as that between Yugoslavia and Greece over Macedonia. (This, like all deterrents, is a two-edged sword; as in the later full-scale insurgency, a greatly expanded U.S. presence might have tended to intensify hostilities.)

9. Acceleration of insurgent guerrilla action may be avoided by discouraging diplomatic recognition of insurgents and urging free elections under international supervision.

10. In Greece as in many other contemporary cases, conflict control in the sense of violence-minimizing might have been achieved either by moderating hostilities--which might have allowed them to drag on--or intensifying them with a view to a rapid end to the fighting. This trade-off represents possibly the central dilemma of Vietnam in early 1967, and has no easy answer. The crucial variables are

probably the perceived danger of intensification vs. the pressures of public opinion--both able to act in either direction.

Preventing the Resumption of Hostilities

11. Strong measures are required in an age of competitive intervention to keep internal wars from spreading across national frontiers. The provision of sanctuary and guerrilla training in Greece's northern neighbors of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria was countered by some international cognizance, investigation, fact-finding, and reporting. This international spotlight function was of great value in Greece (and Korea), and might have played a deterrent role in Vietnam if the value of international assistance had been recognized earlier, notably by the United States. The role of U.S. and allied power in backing such multilateral action should include pressure on potential external mischief-makers not to intervene, backed by meaningful threats from the responsible powers.

12. Further hostilities might have been inhibited in Greece by joint or impartial supervision, inspection, and control of the agreement by which ELAS was to disband (for ELAS in fact violated both the letter and spirit of the agreement by sending its hard-core cadres to the northern countries with a substantial number of arms).

13. As Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill so clearly recognized, a policy of reconciliation, even-handed justice, and incorporation of dissenters into legitimate modes of dissent is the only sound one to follow after victory in a bitter war, particularly a war between brothers. Conflict-control strategy at Versailles in 1919 might have avoided a conflict-breeding punitive treaty. (The Greek government of 1945, like other right-wing governments, tended to drive non-Communist leftists back into the Communist fold.)

14. The economic distress that Greece was experiencing in late 1945 resembled that existing in such other conflict-prone situations

as Germany in the early 1930s. Given the political-strategic-ideological place of Greece in 1945 (as of Korea in 1953, and, say, Brazil or Indonesia), conflict control indicated economic and financial assistance on a substantial scale. (In the contemporary cases, perhaps multilateral means would be politically preferable.)

15. Vigorous internal security operations to preserve law and order, particularly in villages and hamlets, is essential to conflict control; foreign military assistance is frequently needed to this end. Tactics designed to split Communist opposition and isolate the irreconcilable radicals are advisable, but these are made effective only if popular consent can be won through accommodations of legitimate political demands--or with totalitarian measures. Moreover, repression should only follow efforts to encourage all political elements to employ the political process to pursue their program.

16. There is no necessary reason why bilateral military assistance should preclude an international presence. Before major insurgency developed in Greece--as during the whole 1946-1949 period--a preventive international peacekeeping capability should have been introduced, going beyond fact-finding and, ideally, replacing British and later U.S. forces with an international force interposed between adversaries and along the border.

17. Surely one lesson of both Greece and Vietnam is that splits within the Communist world diminish the capacity of Communist movements to take over on the basis of unified external support. At the same time, the Sino-Soviet competition can mean rivalry to champion the indigenous Communists in various parts of the world. This particular point remains moot.

18. In sum, relevant conflict-control measures might have included:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Avoidance of great-power war

Avoidance of Communist take-over of legitimate nationalist

WEC-98 III

and patriotic resistance movements

Efforts not to create postwar conflicts by short-sighted
wartime policies

Recognition of and support for popularly-based non-
Communist elements to provide democratic alternative

Pressure on autocratic governments to liberalize

Plebiscite on form of government

Prevention of the acquisition of surplus arms by potential
conflict-makers

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Neutral administration of plebiscites with guarantees of
fairness

Support for popular non-Communist reform elements

Clearly-stated intentions on part of deterrers

MODERATING HOSTILITIES

Discouragement of diplomatic recognition of insurgents*

Urging of free elections under international supervision*

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Threat of U.S. intervention

PREVENTING RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

International cognizance including investigation, fact-
finding, reporting*

Pressure on potential mischief-makers not to intervene
backed by

Meaningful threats*

Joint or impartial supervision, inspection, and control
of arms-surrender agreements

Postwar reconciliation, even-handed justice, and
incorporation of dissenters into legitimate
modes of dissent

Economic and financial assistance,* preferably multilateral

Vigorous internal security operations, with foreign
military assistance*

Splitting of Communist opposition, isolation of irreconcilable
radicals

WEC-98 III

Accommodation of legitimate political demands
Preventive international peacekeeping capability
interposed between potential adversaries

*measure actually taken

WEC-98 III

THE CONFLICT ON CYPRUS :
1952 - 1964

C O N T E N T S

I.	Identification of Phases.	781
A.	Background of the Conflict	781
B.	Phase II: July 1952 -- April 1, 1955.	789
C.	Phase III ₁ : April 1, 1955 -- February 11, 1959.	798
D.	Phase IV ₁ : February 11, 1959 -- December 21, 1963	812
E.	Phase III ₂ : December 21, 1963 -- March 27, 1964	818
II.	Factors Bearing on Transitions.	829
A.	Phase I to Phase II: The Introduction of a Military Option.	829
B.	Phase II to Phase III ₁ : The Outbreak of Hostilities	831
C.	Phase III ₁ to Phase IV ₁ : The Termination of Hostilities	834
D.	Phase IV ₁ to Phase III ₂ : The Resumption of Hostilities.	841
E.	Phase III ₂ : Hostilities	842
III.	Weapons Analysis.	847
A.	The Enosis Struggle: 1955 -- 1959	847
1.	Arms Available to the EOKA.	847
2.	The British Military Response to the Enosis Struggle.	854
B.	The Greek Cypriot -Turkish Cypriot Struggle: 1963 -- 1965.	858
IV.	Lessons for Conflict Control.	874

THE CONFLICT ON CYPRUS :

1952 - 1964

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES


A. Background of the Conflict

1. Geography. Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean, has an area of 3,572 square miles; its maximum length is 140 miles, and greatest breadth 60 miles. Two mountain ranges, the Troodos Massif and the Kyrenia Range, run from east to west, separated by a broad, fertile plain, the Mesaoria. The island has a 486-mile coast line, featuring both rocky indentations and sandy beaches. It lies about 60 miles west of Syria, 40 miles south of Turkey, and 500 miles from Greece.

Cyprus has been dominated successively by the Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Alexander and the Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Moslems, Crusaders, Venetians, Turks, and British. As is suggested by its history of occupation by major powers, Cyprus holds a strategic position at the eastern end of the Mediterranean as a focal point for naval and, more recently, air power.

Looking at the island with an eye to action against the British administration in the late 1950s, guerrilla leader Grivas remarked:

The island's major disadvantage was its size: no more than half that of Wales, with scarcely enough inhabitants to fill an average British city, it



Adapted from U.S. Army Area Handbook for Cyprus (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1964).

boasted an excellent communications system. Good roads linked Nicosia, the capital, with the five main coastal towns and the British could, without great difficulty, control the four main features. The Troodos range, a haphazard jumble of mountains spread across the south-west of the island, was, though sparsely inhabited, criss-crossed by roads which allowed rapid troop movement and would prevent guerrillas from working in complete safety. The Kyrenia range, a narrow strip of mountains running for a hundred miles along the north coast, offered even poorer prospects, while on the great central plain of the Mesaoria . . . the only cover is provided by white-washed villages of mudbrick. Finally, there was the Karpass, a narrow tongue of land which could easily be severed from the rest of the island. It was also obvious that the British Navy could create a blockade without much difficulty: any gun-running vessel making the 500-mile journey from Greece would be lucky indeed to escape the radar net.¹

2. Population. Previous to the conflict, the estimated population of Cyprus was 524,000 (or 147 per square mile) of which nearly 80 per cent were Greek Orthodox Christians and the rest nearly all Turkish Moslems. Approximately 22 per cent of the population was urban. Nicosia, on the Mesaoria, had about 53,300 inhabitants; Limassol, Famagusta, and Larnaca (the main ports) had respectively 22,800, 16,200, and 14,800; Paphos and Kyrenia, the next in size, had 5,800 and 2,900.²

The two main communities of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish, lived

¹George Grivas, The Memoirs of General Grivas, ed. Charles Foley (London, Longmans, 1964), p. 16. These memoirs offer a first-hand account of the conflict, including the strategy of the insurgents.

²These estimates were made in 1946. There was considerable migration to the towns from the agricultural areas in subsequent years. The 1960 census showed a population of 571,225, of whom 77.4 per cent were Greek Cypriots, 17.4 per cent Turkish Cypriots, and the rest Maronites, Armenians, Britons, and others. Two-fifths of the population at that time lived in the six district capitals. Nicosia, capital of the island, had 95,682 persons or about half the total urban population.

virtually in cultural isolation. Within the Greek community, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus took leadership in both religious and political affairs. The Turks, most of whom were Sunni Moslems of the Hanafi sect, looked to the Mufti in matters of religion.

The cultural division of the two groups was accentuated and fostered by separate school systems, teaching different curricula in different languages. The Greek schools emphasized the Greek heritage of the Cypriots, and were "run as Greek schools with text-books sent from Athens, the students working to pass examinations approved by the Greek Ministry of Education."¹ News was also available separately: there were four Greek-language newspapers and two Turkish (as well as two English) on the island. Athens Radio and Ankara Radio broadcast to the two communities. While the Greek Cypriot leadership traditionally called for union with Greece (Enosis), "the Turkish Cypriot [felt] strongly that both historically and geographically the island is linked to Turkey."²

3. History.³ As a result of a secret agreement between Britain and the Ottoman Porte, Britain occupied Cyprus in 1878. The purpose of this occupation was purportedly to offset the pressures of Russian expansionism at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, while serving also to protect the British route to India. Even at this point, Britain was made aware of the pressure toward Enosis that had flourished on Cyprus under the leadership of the Orthodox Church since the middle of the 19th century. Under Ottoman rule, the Archbishop of Cyprus, as Ethnarch, was given the power to speak officially for the island's Christian population. From that time, the Church took the lead in the Enosis movement.

¹Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: The Closed Issue," World Today, Vol. 10, No. 9 (September 1954), p. 375.

²Ibid., p. 378.

³The major part of this section is drawn from Cyprus: The Dispute and the Settlement (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959).

In 1914, after the Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I against the Allies, Britain annexed Cyprus. In 1915 Britain offered Cyprus to Greece if Greece would support the Allies, but Greece refused. Under the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the annexation of Cyprus by Britain was recognized by Turkey, and after 1925 Cyprus was ruled as a British Crown Colony.

During the post-World War I period, the drive for Enosis grew stronger. The British rejected the idea, contending that the time was not appropriate and that, in any event, Enosis was the creation of an urban minority of Greek Cypriots and did not have the backing of the majority of the people. Nevertheless, the emotions aroused by this issue led to serious riots in October 1931 following the resignation of the Greek members of the Legislative Council (among them high officials of the Orthodox Church), and the British brought in troops to put down the disturbances. Altogether about 400 arrests were made, 6 civilians were killed, 30 civilians and 38 police wounded. As a result of the disturbances, Britain abolished the Legislative Council and vested power to legislate in the Governor alone. Restrictions were laid on public meetings and the press was censored. A new Council was established, to be appointed by the Governor for consultative rather than legislative purposes.

During World War II, perhaps as many as 30,000 Cypriot volunteers fought on the British side, especially against the Italians and Germans invading Greece; but both the Reform Party of the Working People (AKEL) and the middle-class, Church-supported National Party continued to call for Enosis, as well as for an end to restrictive laws on speech and assembly. Though Enosis was a goal common to the right-wing and left-wing Greek Cypriot political groups, they had other points of difference, and conflict between them was suppressed by the police in 1945. In the same year, the new British Labour government announced its intention to move toward the creation of elected legislative bodies, first on a local level and eventually island-wide.

In the following year, Britain announced specific liberalizing changes in the Cypriot administration and plans for economic development. These were rejected by a national delegation of Greek Cypriots, including the Ethnarch, a representative of the right-wing National Front, and a member of the left-wing National Cooperation Front. The rejection was based on the grounds that Cypriots were in every respect Greek and therefore resistant to the pattern Britain would impose on them. Representatives of the Turkish Cypriot minority protested the right of the Greek Cypriots to speak for all the people of Cyprus.

The Church continued to encourage opposition to British policy. The Constituent Assembly, which met in November 1947 to recommend the terms of a constitution under continued British rule, lacked 22 of its planned 40 members because of a Church boycott on participation.

In May 1948 the British announced proposals for a new constitution under which Cyprus would remain within the British Commonwealth but would have liberal powers of self-government exercised through a predominantly elective legislative body. The Constituent Assembly rejected the British constitutional proposals, and the Greek members subsequently withdrew from the Assembly. Next day a widespread strike took place. Further demonstrations followed when it was learned that Britain was putting diplomatic pressure on Greece not to foster or encourage the idea of Enosis. Later in 1948, demonstrations by AKEL also protested any build-up in the strength of British military bases on Cyprus.

The pressures increased markedly after 1950. On January 15 of that year, Archbishop Makarios, patriarch of the Orthodox Church, sponsored an unofficial "plebiscite," i.e., a signature collection, among the Church's communicants over eighteen years of age. The reported result was that 95.7 per cent of those polled expressed themselves as being in favor of union with Greece. Before the plebiscite, according to one analyst, "Greek Cypriots were told in the

Archbishop's encyclical . . . that they must vote for 'Enosis and only Enosis'. . . .As a guide to the real political feeling of the Cypriots the 1950 plebiscite was worthless; as a propaganda weapon in the hands of the Church it was invaluable."¹

When the results of the plebiscite were formally presented to the Greek Chamber of Deputies by the leaders of the Church, the Greek Prime Minister was reluctant to have open discussion of Enosis. In 1951, however, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos openly demanded that Cyprus be united with Greece and in October, on joining NATO, Greece pointed out that NATO bases could remain on Cyprus if it were part of Greece, and thus not jeopardize the strategic interests of the West.

4. New Directions of Cypriot Leadership. In the campaign for Enosis, the decision to turn from civil protest to terrorism was largely due to the initiative of Colonel George Grivas, formerly an officer in the Greek army who had led Xhi, a right-wing guerrilla group in Greece during the German occupation in the early 1940s and during the Greek Communist-led insurgency from 1945 to 1949.² Although Grivas recognized that Cypriots could not hope to match or even challenge British military strength, the example of Palestine suggested that Britain, in dealing with colonial peoples, would respond to domestic violence. Grivas was confident that even a small force, supported by good training, leadership, public sympathy, and surprise, could create a powerful harassment and eventually make the cost of sovereignty too high for Britain to pay. In such an operation, sound advance planning was necessary since Britain, once it became aware of the scope and intent of the movement, could use its superior land and naval forces to isolate and destroy its opposition. Britain's effort would, of course, have to be modified by its desire not to alienate the whole population in the course of destroying the terrorists.

¹Stanley Mayes, Cyprus and Makarios (London, Putnam, 1960), p. 19.

²Much of the following discussion of Enosis strategy is derived from The Memoirs of General Grivas, cited above.

Though Grivas recognized only such problems as a lack of trained men, Archbishop Makarios, political as well as religious leader of the Greek Cypriots, was apparently reluctant to resort to force against the British, still having faith in the ability of the Cypriot cause to inspire support and in the power of international public opinion. For a time, Makarios held out against the pressure that Grivas was creating for developing a terrorist force, preferring to limit anti-British activity to sabotage. In part the disparity of views was the result of the different backgrounds and experiences of the two leaders, but in part it may have been the result of different estimates of Britain's vulnerability to international public pressure.

Diplomatic efforts to date had been notably unsuccessful in convincing Britain to relinquish its interests in Cyprus. International attention such as the U.N. forum might provide was hard to achieve. Around 1950, the "domestic jurisdiction" provisions of the U.N. Charter were still being interpreted by the majority of U.N. members as removing colonial conflicts from the U.N. agenda unless they became sufficiently violent to threaten the peace. And there was no Committee on Colonialism eager at all times to listen to and encourage the aspirations of those still ruled by others. Leaders of the Enosis movement concluded that it might be necessary to create a threat to the peace in the eastern Mediterranean before the United Nations would focus on the question. On the other hand, it would be important not to lose the sympathy of world opinion, particularly U.S. opinion, which might be presumed to be torn between anticolonialism and desire for NATO solidarity. A judicious amount of military action, however, might serve to call Cyprus to the attention of world opinion and remove it from Britain's domestic jurisdiction by reason of its potential for making trouble.

Military action, it was reasoned, might also be the point around which Cypriot opinion could be rallied against British constitutional proposals offering self-government under British sovereignty.

A liberal constitution might satisfy the general public and make it willing to continue under British control; terrorist activity might provoke Britain into alienating people otherwise content with a moderate advance toward self-government.

The Cypriot public accordingly must be made angry enough to forget the economic advantages of British rule. The relatively high standard of living on Cyprus was dependent on British investment and protection; union with Greece would mean more taxes, required military service, and probably less competent administration. Of course, Enosis would also mean an end to the de-Hellenizing influence of alien rule, and an end to the bitterness of frustrated nationalism that many but by no means all Greek Cypriots felt.

Though Greece's major contribution to the gaining of Enosis probably lay in the diplomatic area, Grivas was also anxious that Cypriot terrorist action have Greek sympathy and support. Reluctant to antagonize a powerful ally and still hoping for progress through diplomacy, Greece was not enthusiastic about proposals for violence. However, pressures on Greek public opinion, particularly through the Church leadership, encouraged Greek political leaders to offer support.

B. Phase II: July 1952 -- April 1, 1955

On July 2, 1952, a committee was formed in Athens, under the chairmanship of Archbishop Makarios, which included Colonel Grivas, George Stratos, the Loizides brothers, General Papadoulos (who was a Cypriot), Colonel Alexopoulos (formerly of Xhi, Grivas' right-wing Greek guerrilla group), two Athens University professors, and a lawyer.¹ Later in the month, it was decided to split the committee into two, a political section and a military section both to be under the chairmanship of George Stratos whenever Archbishop Makarios should be unable to leave Cyprus for meetings. Archbishop Spiridon of Athens,

¹Grivas, op. cit., p. 18.

Primate of all Greece, promised all possible help to the committee and encouraged Grivas to return to Cyprus to make detailed plans for the military effort.¹ In October, Grivas set up his headquarters there, identified possible arms depots, and organized personnel.

The Greek government was under considerable pressure from Archbishop Makarios to raise the cause of Cypriot self-determination at the United Nations. From October 1952 to March 1953, Makarios traveled to the United Nations, the United States, Britain, France, and Greece, using press conferences and meetings with government officials to publicize and gain support for Enosis.

In April-May 1953 Makarios approached the British Governor of Cyprus with the request that he sponsor a plebiscite on the island. The proposal was rejected. Then in Nicosia on June 28, the Ethnarch publicly attacked the British for trying to de-Hellenize Cyprus, berated Greece for trying to remain friendly with Britain, and called for action to gain Enosis. In August 1953 Makarios appealed to the U.N. Secretary-General and to the Greek government to bring the question of Cyprus before the United Nations.

On September 21, 1953, Greek representative Kyron declared at the U.N. General Assembly that bipartite negotiations over Cyprus were for the time being preferable but that eventually the United Nations might be needed. According to one observer, the character of the traditional struggle for Enosis changed at this point, with the acceptance by Athens of Enosis as an international question.²

On January 28, 1954, the Panhellenic Committee, a Greek pro-Cypriot political group, decided that action was necessary to back up the diplomatic moves the Greek government was making or could

¹Ibid.

²Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons (New York, E. P. Dutton, 1957), p. 146. Durrell was in Cyprus from 1953 to 1956 as a visitor, teacher, and press advisor to the colonial administration.

be persuaded to make in the future. Violence was not to be an alternative to diplomacy, but a support for it.¹ Toward this end, the Committee shipped arms by small caique from Greece to Cyprus during March. (See Section III for details on the Cypriots' arms acquisitions.) The first load of arms included: 3 Brens, 3 Beretta machine guns, 4 Thompson submachine guns, 17 automatics, 47 rifles, 7 revolvers, 32,150 rounds of ammunition, 290 hand grenades, and 20 kilos of explosive, with fuse. The cost of the heavy goods, plus packing and transport, came to about £600.² Some of the arms were made available to Grivas from stores hidden since the end of Xhi's activities, and others were bought in Greece from people who had hoarded them since the end of the Greek Insurgency in 1949.³ Since 1952 the leaders of the Christian Orthodox Union of Youth (OXEN) and the Pancyprian National Youth Organization (PEON) had been selecting and organizing young men for the coming battle. This budding organization in Cyprus was ready to receive and store any arms sent from the mainland. Later, the youth groups were a major pillar of Grivas' force.

The Greek government, "constantly appealed to by the Cypriots and urged on unceasingly by public opinion,"⁴ continued to make approaches to Britain for bipartite negotiations on Cyprus. But the British government remained adamant:

At the same time, . . . [it] indicated that it was ready to grant self-government to the Cypriots, with the possibility left open to them to decide their own future after a period of ten to fifteen years. Foreign Secretary Eden [on March 15, 1954, in the House of Commons] . . . clearly rejected the Greek line of "either bipartite negotiations or recourse to the United Nations."⁵

¹Stephen G. Xydis, "Toward 'Toil and Moil' in Cyprus," Middle East Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1966), p. 10.

²Grivas, op. cit., p. 22.

³Ibid., p. 19.

⁴Doros Alastos, Cyprus in History (London, Zeno Publishers, 1955), p. 382.

⁵Xydis, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

After futile attempts at initiating negotiations, Premier Papagos, on May 3, 1954, announced that Greece was prepared to go to the United Nations with the Cyprus case.¹

The question of Britain's intentions for Cyprus was brought to a head on July 28, 1954. British Minister of State for the Colonies Hopkinson, in the course of describing in the House of Commons a new constitution that was to be proposed for Cyprus under British rule, commented that "there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent." Labour members of the House were quick to seize upon this statement as an apparent repudiation of British policy of encouraging self-determination among colonial peoples. Subsequently, in October 1954 the Labour Party Conference passed a resolution condemning the government's Cyprus policy. In December 1954 the Liberal Party Council called for a democratic election on Cyprus and an eventual opportunity for Cyprus to decide its future international status. It was apparently Hopkinson's statement, seeming to rule out both Enosis and independence, that convinced Grivas of the necessity for opening violence as soon as possible.²

Also on July 28, 1954, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles sent a note to Greece pointing out the need for talks between the British and the Cypriots, and also noting that Turkey had a strong interest in the future disposition of Cyprus. Greece replied, making reference to the pressures of its own public opinion for action on Cyprus and offering guarantees to the Turkish minority on Cyprus in the eventuality of Enosis. Greece was anxious to keep the United States neutral in any future Greek-Turkish-British dispute.³

¹Ibid., p. 12.

²Hopkinson later resigned as a result of the protest against his statement.

³Xydis, op. cit., p. 13.

At the end of July, Archbishop Makarios protested to the U.N. Secretary-General and members of NATO about Hopkinson's remarks and also about the British decision made in the previous month to move the Middle East Land and Air Headquarters from Suez to Cyprus.¹ This move appeared to underline the British determination to hold on to Cyprus.

On August 2, 1954, in the face of increasing public agitation on the island, the British Governor of Cyprus decreed that public advocacy of Enosis or of any change in Cypriot sovereignty would in the future be regarded as sedition and would be punishable accordingly. In protest against the law, the Greek Cypriot newspapers ceased publication, and there was a 24-hour general strike. The British press also registered a strong protest against the restrictive action. Archbishop Makarios subsequently made strong public attacks on British rule of the island, but the law was not invoked against him.²

On August 16, 1954, the Greek government requested the following inclusion on the agenda of the 9th General Assembly: "Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus." According to Grivas, Makarios and Greek Foreign Minister Stefanopoulos were eager for him to trigger terrorist action in Cyprus before the anticipated U.N. debate in the hope of persuading the United States that "an adverse attitude would start trouble in Cyprus, and thus in the Middle East."³ If the alleged official Greek encouragement of terrorism actually occurred, it was in sharp contrast to the view expressed by the Greek Foreign Ministry four months earlier--that violence would cause "incalculable damage"

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 14.

³Grivas, op. cit., p. 23. Grivas also reports the suspicion that the United States had already been approached by Turkish leaders, who feared for the safety of the Turkish Cypriots in the event of Enosis.

to the diplomatic efforts since it would be regarded as blackmail.¹

Before the U.N. debate, Britain is reported to have made two informal approaches to Premier Papagos, and there were talks (by-passing the Greek Foreign Ministry) in which Britain offered to recognize the principle of eventual self-determination for Cyprus (in not over eight years) and suggested that there be a liberal constitution for Cyprus subject to Greek approval. Papagos cut off the contacts without any agreement.²

At the United Nations in September, the Assembly approved the inclusion of the Greek agenda item over British objection. Britain opposed U.N. involvement in the question of Cyprus on the grounds that: it was a domestic affair; it would set a precedent of U.N. tampering with treaties (e.g., Treaty of Lausanne); the Turkish Cypriots were opposed to Enosis; the United Nations should not encourage public quarrels between friends.³

According to British Minister of State Selwyn Lloyd, Greece was "in effect asking the United Nations to interfere in the domestic affairs of a foreign power in order to effect a territorial change favourable to herself."⁴ Enosis, he said, was an impediment to the self-government of Cyprus. Mr. Lloyd also underlined the island's strategic importance:

The strength of my country in that part of the world is still one of the main bulwarks of peace. We have treaty obligations to the Arab States; we are vitally interested in the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the defence of Turkey, and of Greece itself. We have great responsibilities under the Charter. Cyprus is vital

¹Ibid., pp. 21, 22.

²Xydis, op. cit., p. 16.

³Mayes, op. cit., p. 128.

⁴Quoted in Cyprus: The Dispute and the Settlement, p. 12.

to the discharge of those responsibilities. . . .There is no acceptable alternative in the circumstances to sovereignty. Full administrative control is necessary because leases expire, treaties have a habit of being whittled away and . . . Greek governments, like other governments, change.¹

During the U.N. debate on the merits of the case in December, the Greek representative denied that his government was pressing a direct territorial claim at the expense of Britain.² Rather, he said, Greece was championing what it believed to be the rights and wishes of an island having linguistic, cultural, and religious ties with Greece; the majority of Cypriots desired an end to colonial rule and wished union with Greece. The Turkish delegate asserted his country's interest in the island and emphasized the harm that pressing the issue might do to his country's friendship with Greece.

It became apparent that any substantive action or even prolonged debate would serve only to disrupt relationships and embitter feelings among three NATO allies at a time when, as the U.S. representative asserted, "the larger interests of all concerned are best served by strengthening existing solidarity among freedom-loving nations."³

¹Quoted in ibid., p. 13. By treaty, Britain was obliged to assist Iraq and Jordan (until 1957) if either were attacked, and Libya in case of conflict. Britain had additional obligations under the 1950 Tripartite Declaration with France and the United States regarding the sale of arms to Israel and the Arab states, and the preservation of frontiers and armistice lines. Nevertheless, the Middle East still remained a weak spot in the fence with which the Western powers hoped to contain the Soviet Union, and at this time Britain was actively encouraging Turkish initiatives toward erecting a Middle East security structure. On February 24, 1955, Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement which subsequently came to be known as the Baghdad Pact. Great Britain adhered on April 5, Pakistan on September 23, Iran on October 12, 1955. The signatories pledged to coordinate their efforts in matters of defense and security.

²Summaries of continuing U.N. debate on Cyprus may be found in the issues of International Organization, published by the World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass.

³The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1954 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1955), pp. 61, 62.

The Assembly then resolved "not to consider further" the Cyprus item and that "for the time being it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution."¹ Greece, keeping in mind perhaps the phrase "for the time being" and certainly under great pressure from other Western powers, joined Turkey, Britain, and the United States in voting for the resolution. There were eight abstentions but no negative votes.

In Cyprus, where anticipation of U.N. action had been keen, stimulated by the local Greek press, the Church, and broadcasts of Athens Radio, violent demonstrations followed news of the U.N. vote: "The students received the news with spontaneous strikes and demonstrations, during which the army opened fire on a crowd [in Limassol] and wounded three young boys. There were bitter feelings in Cyprus and Greece over this incident."² There was also a 24-hour general protest strike, and Makarios promised continuation of the struggle for self-determination. In the violence that followed the U.N. resolution, some Turkish Cypriots smashed stores and inflicted other damage on Greek Cypriot property in Nicosia.

Grivas had arrived on Cyprus on November 14, 1954, to begin organizing and training young men selected from the youth groups. His secret organization, as yet unnamed, was bound together by an oath of allegiance and purpose. The objective at all times was quality rather than large numbers. Headquarters were established at Nicosia with district leaders at the provincial capitals who reported directly to Grivas.³

On January 10, 1955, Grivas met in Larnaca with Archbishop Makarios, just returned from the United Nations. According to Grivas, Makarios put heavy emphasis on the fact that the United States had "opposed" Cypriot interests during the debate and subsequent vote,

¹U.N. Document A/2881, December 16, 1954.

²Grivas, op. cit., p. 29.

³Ibid., pp. 24-28.

and on the fact that Papagos and Kyron were now fully in accord with the plans for action on Cyprus against the British. (The secret support of the Greek government was reportedly reaffirmed on February 7, 1955, and Grivas received Greek government funds until the death of Premier Papagos in October.)¹

At the January meeting, Grivas' secret action organization was given a name--the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)--and the date for the start of the "revolution" was discussed, though not decided. Grivas was anxious for it to be soon, to take advantage of the element of surprise: "So far the British had taken no precautions whatsoever and army camps and Government offices were almost unguarded."²

As a result of the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954, by virtue of which Britain agreed to evacuate the Suez Canal, the British Middle East Land and Air Forces were by early 1955 in the process of becoming established at the Episkopi cantonment, on the south coast of Cyprus fifteen miles west of Limassol. It was planned to house 5,000 troops at Dhekelia, seven miles east of Larnaca; and a large airfield was to be constructed at Akrotiri, near Limassol.³ Until the completion of the bases at Episkopi and Dhekelia, the Land Forces Headquarters was stationed in Nicosia. Many of the troops were doing construction or administrative work, and had few security precautions.

The Cypriot police, in Grivas' view, were during this period "of low standard, thanks to poor pay and conditions; they were unarmed, short of transport, without radio, while many village police stations did not even have a telephone."⁴

¹Xydis, op. cit., p. 18.

²Grivas, op. cit., p. 29.

³It was estimated that the presence of British armed forces was bringing an annual revenue of £12 million. See Cyprus Report for the Year 1955 (London, Colonial Office, 1956).

⁴Grivas, op. cit., p. 31.

C. Phase III₁: April 1, 1955 -- February 11, 1959

1. Sub-Phase A: April 1, 1955 -- October 1, 1955. On the night of March 31-April 1, 1955, there was a coordinated series of explosions near government, police, and military installations in Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Limassol. Colonel Grivas, under the name of Dighenis (a legendary Cypriot hero), issued the first EOKA proclamation to the people of Cyprus. EOKA encouraged the Cypriot Communists to refrain from getting involved in the liberation struggle, no matter how much they might be in favor of Enosis; and it asked the Turkish Cypriots to be brothers in the struggle for freedom, with the assurance that in a free Cyprus "Cypriots, Greeks and Turks, would live all together in peace and friendship."¹

To support the sabotage effort, the first major demonstration was called on May 24, 1955, "when some 700 pupils threw themselves into the struggle with such determination that the police bolted before them, pursued by a hail of stones, and the army had to be called out."² Within three months the British army forces were being reinforced by regiments from Suez and commandos from Malta, a "mobile reserve" for the police was formed, and searches, curfews, and detentions were being used to combat the work of EOKA. (See Section III for details on the build-up of British forces.) Grivas continued to receive small shipments of arms, despite the British efforts to block them, in preparation for the next big attack. This was being arranged for the fall of 1955, to coincide with the expected U.N. debate on Cyprus, Greece having requested inclusion of the item as early as June 20. That attack was being planned to paralyze the police, dissipate the strength of the army (which was guarding government buildings and doing riot duty), and open the operation of the mountain guerrillas.³

¹Xydis, op. cit., p. 19.

²Grivas, op. cit., p. 34.

³Ibid., p. 39.

The upsurge of violence in Cyprus encouraged the Opposition in Britain to call for an end to the impasse created by the conflicting goals of Britain and the Enosists. It was suggested that more attention be paid to the economic development of the island, and that more account be taken in the administration of the island of the non-British character of the Cypriots. The Opposition also called for a clear statement that there would be a free election after an agreed-upon time limit. It also suggested that in the interest of NATO solidarity Britain, Greece, and Turkey should confer to find a solution agreeable to all three.

Subsequently, Britain invited Greece and Turkey to confer, and the Tripartite Conference began in London on August 29 against a background of increased violence in Cyprus. Britain proposed a new constitution designed to lead eventually to self-government with safeguards for all the communities on the island; it also asked that the question of sovereignty be set aside for further consultations among the parties, with the addition of a Cypriot representative elected under the new constitution.

The sovereignty question that the British would delay to further consultations was the main issue for the Greek delegation, though the Greeks expressed satisfaction at the signs of British willingness to make changes on Cyprus. On the other hand, the Turkish delegation was anxious that the British reaffirm their intention of retaining sovereignty in Cyprus or of seeing that it reverted to Turkey. Mr. Macmillan, speaking for Britain, stated that there was no question of Britain's renouncing its sovereignty over Cyprus.

The meeting closed on September 7 with a communiqué revealing no agreement at all but stating that the British proposal would be studied by the Greek and Turkish governments.¹ Subsequent replies of

¹The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1955 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1956), p. 47.

the two governments only confirmed their differences, which had been severely aggravated by violent anti-Greek riots in Turkey on September 6 and 7 and by continuing acts of terrorism in Cyprus.¹

The constitutional proposals offered by Britain during the Tripartite Conference were rejected by Archbishop Makarios, who declared that Cypriots would never accept proposals that denied self-determination. Some days later, on September 23, the U.N. General Assembly voted (28 to 22, 10 abstentions) against inscribing the Greek item on the agenda,² and Makarios called for the people of Cyprus to participate in "a new stage of passive resistance" by refusing to participate in the established governmental bodies of the island. This announcement was paralleled by continued violence by Enosists and a general strike on September 25. Government attempts to curb the violence by limiting freedom of activity and assembly were unsuccessful.

2. Sub-Phase B: October 1, 1955 -- August 5, 1958. At the beginning of October, Sir John Harding (formerly Chief of the Imperial General Staff) took over the post of Governor and tried to reconcile the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Though Harding

¹According to Durrell (op. cit., p. 203), "Turkish public opinion was now in the grip of a hysteria which . . . was as strong as that which was gripping Athens. . . .The shocking [anti-Greek] riots . . . in September [1955] in Turkey . . . revived in a flash the ancient barbaric animosities which lie buried in the hearts of Turks and Greeks, and which both until now believed dead for ever."

²Speaking for the United States, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge stated that the Assembly had concluded the year before that a resolution on Cyprus was not appropriate, and that, in a more inflamed situation, the considerations which activated the Assembly then applied even more strongly. See U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, No. 849 (October 3, 1955), pp. 545-546. The United States was, however, becoming increasingly alarmed about developments on Cyprus, and in particular about their effect on Greek-Turkish relations. Identical notes urging an amicable negotiated settlement were sent to Greece and Turkey in mid-September 1955. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, September 26, 1955, pp. 496-497.

publicly announced that any further steps toward self-government were dependent on an end to violence, the violence in no way decreased. In fact, the scope of the unrest increased, as students began to form a major core of the rioters. Finally, on November 26, 1955, Harding declared Cyprus in a state of emergency. On December 13, 1955, the Communist-controlled AKEL and three satellite organizations were proscribed, 129 Communists were detained under the Emergency Regulations, and the daily newspaper Neo Demokratias and other AKEL publications were banned.¹

Harding also moved to increase the effectiveness of the police, by reorganization and increased military support. By the end of 1955, there were 10,000 British troops active in police support, anti-riot, and search activities. (See Section III for details.) Contrary to normal procedure, the police began to carry arms. The authorized establishment was substantially increased, a contingent of British policemen was recruited (by July 1957 there were 355 of these), police dogs were imported, auxiliary police were recruited for guard duty, and an attempt was made to reorganize a special constabulary. The plan was to build the police force of approximately 1,800 to 3,500.² However, the successes of antiterrorist action by the police and army had to be "weighed up against the risk of alienating sectors of the population which as yet . . . played no active part in the conflict."³

After discussions in London, Harding informed Makarios that Britain ruled out immediate self-determination "on account of the present situation in the Eastern Mediterranean," but was anxious to proceed with the development of constitutional self-government. Further correspondence,

¹Cyprus Report for the Year 1955, p. 6. Grivas considered this, in reality, an attempt to save the Communists from the violence of EOKA, and he charged (op. cit., p. 61) that Communist activities continued relatively unhampered.

²Cyprus Report for the Year 1955, p. 58.

³Nancy Crawshaw, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," World Today, Vol. 12, No. 4 (April 1956), p. 149.

however, failed to establish a mutually satisfactory definition of the form of self-government to be set as the goal. On February 26, 1956, British Colonial Secretary Mr. Lennox-Boyd offered: first, an amnesty for Cypriots convicted under Harding's Emergency Regulations "except those involving violence against the person or the illegal possession of arms, ammunition or explosives";¹ second, a constitution including a democratically elected assembly, but reserving to the Governor the management of foreign affairs, defense, and the control of public order for as long as necessary. Makarios objected both to the limited scope of the proposed amnesty and the allocation of security control to the Governor.

In March, Archbishop Makarios was deported from Cyprus to the Seychelles Islands (along with the Bishop of Kyrenia) on the grounds that he was involved in sedition and had inspired and encouraged the stepped-up terrorist campaign by EOKA. During a subsequent debate in the British House of Commons, the Opposition held that the deportation would enrage the Greek-speaking majority of Cyprus and make negotiation impossible by removing the only viable Cypriot leader. In one observer's view, Makarios' deportation also "left the field open to the extremists. Though his complicity in EOKA was obvious, nevertheless he was the only brake to terrorism and the only person who could curb it."² After the deportation, Grivas "saw no reason for further restraint."³ Greece protested the deportation, recalled its Ambassador to London, and appealed once again to the U.N. General Assembly for consideration of the Cyprus question.

All through the spring of 1956, and indeed for a year, terrorism raged throughout Cyprus. The British used the army in an attempt to curb the Greek Cypriot terrorists under Grivas' direction. Grivas' forces were very small in number and relatively few were full-time,

¹Quoted in Cyprus: The Dispute and the Settlement, p. 21.

²Durrell, op. cit., p. 244.

³Grivas, op. cit., p. 69.

paid terrorists; most were men who gave service part-time, free. (See Section III for details on numbers and arms.) But the violence during this period was not altogether directed against the British; there were also some clashes between left- and right-wing Greek Cypriots, and a series of incidents between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, initially opened by the murder of a Turkish policeman and subsequent attacks by the Turks on Greek property. Up to March 15, 1956, casualties due to terrorist action were: British forces--17 killed, 100 wounded; Cyprus police--8 killed, 27 wounded; civilians--20 killed, 55 wounded. Cypriot casualties due to action by security forces were: 11 killed, 15 wounded.¹ Then, "the execution of 10 May of two young Cypriots, Karaolis and Demetrius, the former for the murder of a Greek Cypriot policeman and the latter for wounding a British businessman, increased bitterness as well as tension in Cyprus and caused riots in Athens."²

Throughout this period, spokesmen for the British government held to the position that: self-determination was a legitimate (if long-run) goal; immediate self-government in Cyprus could not be implemented until civil peace had been restored; the question of a British base remaining in Cyprus was not negotiable, being necessary protection for the oil line from the Middle East. This last point assumed even greater importance following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July.

At the end of August, there was a temporary lull in hostilities. The British responded to an offer of truce from the terrorist leadership by offering terms of surrender and amnesty that continued in force the restrictions against carrying arms or possessing arms and explosives. Grivas rejected the terms offered by the British, "these wretched orders for surrender." The British terms were not modified and a new wave of terrorist violence broke out a few days later.

¹Crawshaw, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," p. 146.

²Cyprus: The Dispute and the Settlement, p. 23.

Expanded efforts of repression were made by the British, but although these efforts resulted in the capture of relatively large numbers of terrorists, the repressive character of the attending regulations caused resentment among the Cypriot population as did the attempt to impose city-wide collective fines after terrorist activities.

As murders of British personnel continued, the Governor, on November 22, assumed further powers. The use of firearms and the use, possession, or manufacture of bombs carried the death penalty. There was a new prohibition against any publication serving to delay an end of the state of emergency, "inciting to violence or disobedience of the law, or containing matter likely to lead to a breach of the peace or to violence or ill-will between the public and the security forces."¹ An instance of enforcement of this law against The Times of Cyprus brought a protest from the other papers.

Despite the new restrictions, violence increased even more during November 1956, while Cyprus-based British troops and materiel were being dispatched to Suez during the abortive attempt to retake the Canal. During that month, 416 acts of violence were recorded, and 693 people were detained under the Emergency Regulations. There was some decrease in the number of incidents by the start of 1957, however, and by February the Governor agreed to modify some of the Emergency Regulations. According to Grivas:

December 1956 and January 1957 were hard for EOKA.
 . . . While . . . raining blows on our front line
 the British were also attacking behind our backs,
 with the Turkish mob as their weapon. Large-scale
 riots by Turkish Cypriots were engineered to begin
 on 23 January, to coincide with the period of
 maximum pressure on our ranks by the army, and they
 lasted until ³ February, without the arrest of a
 single Turk.²

¹Ibid., p. 26.

²Grivas, op. cit., pp. 107, 110-111.

On December 19 the British House of Commons received the so-called Radcliffe Proposals providing for Cypriot self-government in all areas except foreign affairs, defense, and internal security. The Proposals further suggested that when the international and strategic situation might permit, the government would undertake to "review the question of the application of self-determination."¹ Any exercise in self-determination would, however, permit freedom of choice to both Turkish and Greek elements of the population. This was interpreted as establishing that partition was one of the possible options for Cyprus.

Greece rejected the Radcliffe Proposals outright, objecting to the restrictions on Cypriot self-government (under British sovereignty), and to the lack of a fixed date for self-determination (or opportunity to end British sovereignty). Turkey accepted them as a reasonable basis for negotiation. Archbishop Makarios, still in the Seychelles Islands, refused to comment while under detention. The Opposition in the House of Commons welcomed the proposals as a possible way out of an increasingly untenable British position in Cyprus, which called for British troops to enforce a police state on an island they felt was no longer necessary to British interests.

In February 1957 the U.N. General Assembly, after wrestling unsuccessfully with several substantive proposals, voted 57 to 0 with 1 abstention a resolution expressing the hope that a "peaceful, democratic, and just solution" be found through the resumption of negotiations.² Though Greece, Turkey, and Britain all voted for this resolution, they disagreed on the kind of negotiations it called for. While Britain and Turkey anticipated talks among themselves and Greece, Greece saw them as taking place between Britain and the leaders of

¹The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1957), p. 78.

²General Assembly Resolution 1013 (XI), February 26, 1957.

Cyprus. In accord with the Greek interpretation of the resolution, EOKA on March 14 offered to call off terrorist activities once Archbishop Makarios was freed to enter negotiations with Britain as the true representative of Cyprus. Makarios was released, but banned from Cyprus. The state of emergency remained in effect, at the discretion of the Governor.

Britain next announced its intention to take advantage of an offer by the Secretary-General of NATO to conciliate the differences among Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Greece, however, refused, claiming that it was not in accord with the intention of the U.N. resolution and that Turkey was not entitled to an equal footing in a discussion of Cypriot affairs. However, Greece subsequently resumed normal diplomatic relations with Britain and the cooperation with NATO powers (especially Britain and Turkey) that had earlier been withdrawn.

Terrorist activities against the British on Cyprus fell off markedly on Makarios' release in March (though violence against pro-British Greek Cypriots continued); but there was continuing agitation for permitting Makarios to return from Athens to Cyprus and for ending the state of emergency. In fact, many restrictive regulations were gradually lifted over the next six months. There was some tension over reports that Cypriots in detention camps were being badly treated by the British. Though Governor Harding and other British officials denied the charges, Greece appealed to the European Commission on Human Rights, which decided, on the Greek evidence, to conduct an investigation of the facts.¹

Still in Athens during the summer of 1957, Archbishop Makarios raised the possibility of placing Cyprus temporarily under U.N. mandate. Also, while refusing NATO mediation, he encouraged discussions between

¹By May 1959, British troops had been cleared by the Commission of most charges; but by that time agreement had been reached on independence for Cyprus and, according to Mayes (op. cit., p. 136), there was reluctance to bring the matter up again.

British and Cypriot representatives. He continued to maintain that Turkish representatives could be included when the particular question of minority rights was discussed, but could not be considered an equal in negotiation.

The British expressed themselves willing to discuss informally with Greece and Turkey any solution for Cyprus:

Enosis, self-determination with a fixed time-limit, self-government leading to self-determination at an unspecified time, guaranteed independence, condominium with plural nationality, partition, the maintenance of full British sovereignty, or any other suggestion which might be put forward.¹

After the release of Makarios from the Seychelles, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, for the first time demanded openly that the island be partitioned to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriot minority which was by now thoroughly aroused at the prospect of Enosis. A Turkish Cypriot terrorist organization, VOLKAN, had been formed to stop cooperative contact between Greek and Turk on Cyprus.

Turkey itself was becoming apprehensive of the possible direction of growing sentiment in Britain for a solution to the Cyprus problem. In November 1957 the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party called for a policy which would guarantee self-determination for Cyprus after a fixed period of self-government. The Turkish fear of the effect of British Labour in power was reinforced by the freeing of Makarios, the later relaxation of the Emergency Regulations, and the fact that the new Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot--who succeeded Harding in December--was known to be sympathetic to Greece.²

The annual U.N. General Assembly debate in December followed predictable lines, with the Western powers attempting to keep the United Nations from getting in the way of direct negotiations, with

¹Cyprus: The Dispute and the Settlement, p. 38.

²Mayes, op. cit., p. 94.

Greece insisting that the only negotiations could be between the British and the people of Cyprus, and with Turkey charging that the Greek desire for Enosis was the sole question and one that could be solved only by negotiation among the three powers involved. A Greek resolution calling for negotiations with a view to applying self-determination was unable to muster the required two-thirds majority (31 for, 23 against, 24 abstentions). Specifically, "all Greece's allies in NATO voted against her, America led the abstainers."¹ Chances of getting U.N. endorsement of self-determination thus appeared remote.²

At about the same time, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey took the occasion of the NATO Council meeting in Paris to discuss the Cyprus problem further, without any publicized result.

Against a setting of renewed demonstration, strikes, and violence in December, the newly appointed Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, arrived in Cyprus and announced his intention of encouraging the conciliation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and relieving the bitterness between them and the government. To the latter end, he modified some of the restrictive regulations that the former Governor had imposed, and encouraged British military and police to develop an attitude of "positive friendship" toward Greek and Turkish Cypriots.³

As talks were being held in London, Ankara, and Athens in January 1958 to develop proposals for an eventual end to hostilities, terrorism increased between the various Cypriot factions; between left-wing and right-wing Greek Cypriots, and between the police and Turkish Cypriots fearful that their interests were not being adequately protected in the settlement talks. Encouraged by protestations of support from Turkey, Turkish Cypriots continued to demand the protection of their

¹Grivas, op. cit., p. 131. It was Makarios' view that the United States wanted a solution to be arrived at through NATO.

²Mayes, op. cit., p. 32.

³Cyprus: The Dispute and the Settlement, p. 42.

interests and to call for the partition of Cyprus as a solution to the problem. Demonstrations by Turkish Cypriots, by now much more militant than earlier, were stepped up, also the activity of the Turkish terrorist organization. And, in addition, there were generalized outbreaks of violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

In Turkey, partition was taken up officially as the only answer to the Cyprus problem satisfactory to Turkish interests. Demonstrations underlined the strength of Turkish public opinion on the question, and the Greek minority in Turkey was villified, if not attacked. The Turkish government took precautions against an uncontrolled overflow of popular sentiment in a desire to avoid a repetition of the September 1955 anti-Greek riots.¹ During this period, Greece withdrew its NATO personnel from Izmir, on the Turkish coast.

Reports of the demonstrations in Turkey reached the Turkish minority on Cyprus through Ankara Radio, and Turkish Cypriots developed the belief that their cause would be supported, if necessary, by the dispatch of Turkish troops to the island.² Outward signs of Turkish Cypriot enthusiasm for and dedication to partition as a solution appeared on the island--e.g., posters, leaflets, and more incidents resulting from the work of the Turkish Defense Organization (TMT), successor to VOLKAN.

The months of June and July 1958 were a high-water mark in ethnic tension on Cyprus, while Cypriots waited for new British proposals for settlement. After a bomb exploded near the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia (June 7, 1958), Turks in Nicosia poured into the Greek section of the city, causing two deaths and extensive property damage. Similar and even more destructive riots followed throughout the island. The Turks used violence and intimidation to force a physical

¹Nancy Crawshaw, "Conflict and Resolution," World Today, Vol. 15, No. 4 (April 1959), p. 138.

²Ibid.

separation of Greek and Turk. Fearful Greeks evacuated predominantly Turkish areas and Turks, some unwilling, left homes in Greek sections of the cities. By July EOKA was retaliating against the Turks with ambush and assassination.

Though leaders of both the Greek and Turkish communities joined the Governor in calling for calm, the violence continued through July with increasing signs of impending civil war. Casualties since June rose to 95 dead and 170 wounded.¹ On July 22 the Governor imposed a 48-hour curf on civilian activity, and widespread arrests were made. Nevertheless, terrorism continued, Greek against Turk and Turk against Greek. Village, town, and city life was disrupted; normal professional and economic transactions were curtailed. In the face of the communal fighting during the summer, Archbishop Makarios, who during the previous summer had suggested a U.N. mandate, now called for a U.N. police force.²

The British troops (numbering more than 30,000) that were charged with maintaining peace and order on Cyprus during this period came under criticism from both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Most widely circulated was the criticism that the British troops, reflecting the policy of the British government, were partial to the Turkish Cypriots. And Greek Cypriots complained, for instance, that Ankara Radio was allowed to broadcast its pro-partition views while pro-Enosis Athens Radio was jammed. One observer substantiates the apparent partiality:

[It was] dictated by political expediency and operational necessity. At policy level it could be traced to the importance which Britain and the United States attached to Turkey as the last reliable bastion of Western policy in the Middle East. . . .The natural sympathies of the Army as a whole were inevitably with the Turks, who were seen as loyal, courageous allies, sharing the same dangers in the pursuit of the common enemy--EOKA.³

¹Mayes (op. cit., p. 90) offers another estimate for June-July 1958: 127 killed, 300 injured.

²Ibid., p. 140.

³Crawshaw, "Conflict and Resolution," p. 142.

On July 19 the new British plan was unveiled. It proposed an "experiment in partnership," providing for representatives of Greece and Turkey to cooperate with the British Governor and eventually, perhaps after seven years, for a possible Greek and Turkish sharing of sovereignty with Britain.

Turkish Cypriots saw the proposed plan as leading eventually to Enosis; Archbishop Makarios rejected it as a denial of the right of self-determination; Greece opposed the idea of a tripartite authority including Turkey; and Turkey saw no clear sign for partition in the proposal. "The British objective at this time, however, was to leave the question of a final solution open until passions had cooled and conditions were more favourable to a compromise."¹ At the end of July the Prime Ministers of Britain, Greece, and Turkey appealed for a cessation of violence. On August 4, EOKA called a five-day cease-fire, provided there was no provocative action by TMT. That organization responded that it would restrain itself as long as Turkish persons and property were not molested. Communal strife came to a sudden end.

3. Sub-Phase C: August 5, 1958 -- February 11, 1959. Following a visit to Athens and Ankara by British Prime Minister Macmillan, it was announced on August 15 that initial preparations would be started on October 1 to implement the British proposals, now somewhat modified. On August 20, Greece rejected the modified proposals, in particular the inclusion of Turkey in the administration of Cyprus. Turkey, for its part, softened its former criticism in the belief that partnership did not necessarily preclude eventual partition.² Efforts to continue the discussions under the aegis of NATO came to nothing.

In late September, Britain received word from Archbishop Makarios to the effect that he would be willing to see Cyprus achieve independent status (after an interim period of self-government), which status could be changed (presumably to Enosis) only with the approval

¹Ibid., p. 144.

²Ibid.

of the United Nations. Britain was wary of any immediate move in this direction, fearing increased tension on Cyprus between Greek and Turk.¹ Preparations were thus continued for the experiment in partnership.

Makarios' position was reflected in the changed position of Greece at the United Nations in November 1958. For the fifth time, Greece brought the Cyprus problem to the General Assembly, but on this occasion the appeal was for independence rather than self-determination. The U.N. Political Committee (31 for, 22 against, 28 abstaining) passed a resolution recommending a conference of British, Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot representatives to discuss both interim arrangements and a final solution. The United States supported the resolution. Greece voted against it in the Political Committee but in the plenary session of the Assembly supported a compromise resolution that merely expressed confidence that continued efforts would be made by the parties to reach a "peaceful, democratic, and just" solution.

The changed emphasis from self-determination to independence enabled Greece and Turkey to agree to negotiate at Zurich. An agreement in principle was reached between the two on February 11, 1959, and was subsequently approved by Britain, by Archbishop Makarios, and by Dr. Kutchuk.

D. Phase IV₁: February 11, 1959 -- December 21, 1963

Under the terms of the Zurich Agreement of February 11 and the London Agreement of February 19, three committees were formed to work out details of the arrangement by which Cyprus would become an independent republic within a year. There was to be a draft constitution and three treaties relating to the international status of Cyprus.

According to the Treaty of Guarantee, Cypriot independence and territorial integrity and security would be assured by Britain, Turkey, and Greece. Both Enosis and partition were ruled out, and

¹Ibid., p. 145.

any guaranteeing power had the right to take action to ensure this provision. Under the Treaty of Alliance, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus would cooperate for common defense and the training of the Cypriot army; both Greek and Turkish contingents (850 and 650 men respectively) would be stationed on the island. By the Treaty of Establishment, Britain was to have two Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus.

Cyprus was to be a republic, with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, to be elected by universal suffrage by the respective communities for a term of five years. Both the President and the Vice-President would have the power of veto. There was to be a Council of Ministers, including seven Greek and three Turkish Cypriots, to be appointed by the President and Vice-President respectively. The civil service was to consist of 70 per cent Greek and 30 per cent Turkish Cypriots. The legislature was to be a unicameral House of Representatives--with 70 per cent of the legislators elected from the Greek community, 30 per cent from the Turkish community. Both Greek and Turkish would be official languages of Cyprus.

The Communal Chambers would represent the Greek and Turkish communities in matters of religion, education, culture, and personal status; and there would be separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca, and Paphos. The Cypriot army was set at 2,000 (60 per cent Greek, 40 per cent Turkish Cypriots); the police also at 2,000 (70 per cent Greek and 30 per cent Turkish Cypriots).

Economic aid was pledged to the Cyprus Republic by Britain, Turkey, and Greece.

Following the signing of the London Agreement, Cypriots under detention by the British were released in March. A call by Archbishop Makarios and the British authorities for a voluntary surrender of EOKA arms yielded a total of 600 guns (including old shotguns and new machine guns) as well as 3,000 bombs, 2 tons of explosives,

and 20,000 rounds of ammunition. "Wanted men" numbering 284 appeared.¹ The Zurich and London Agreements were greeted generally with relief on Cyprus; Makarios returned from London in March to a welcoming crowd in Nicosia estimated at 200,000. But this view was not unanimous among Greek Cypriots, and feeling against the settlement ran high among Grivas' followers, who regarded Makarios' acquiescence as a betrayal of Enosis and waited for the day that the Agreements would be overturned.

Some EOKA scores continued to be settled against Greek Cypriots, and there were incidents between Greek Cypriots and British soldiers. Despite the appeals of Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk, there were also violent incidents between the Greek and Turkish communities. In July the local press was enjoined by Makarios and Kutchuk to encourage a restoration of peace. But intercommunal violence continued into September.

Tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was not eased by the discovery on October 18 of a boat allegedly carrying ammunition from Izmir to Cyprus. This discovery by a British naval patrol boat served to feed Greek Cypriot suspicions that TMT was still active on the island, waiting and preparing for an opportunity to strike against the Greek Cypriot population. Another general appeal was made for the surrender of arms and ammunition, but it engendered little response. (See Section III for Cypriot arms acquisitions during this period.)

The Turkish Cypriots, fearful of their future status, could take little comfort from the formation in April 1959 of EDMA, a political organization of former EOKA fighters. Though EDMA was dedicated to support of Makarios and the London Agreement, it was also

¹Charles Foley, Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War (Baltimore, Md., Penguin, 1964), pp. 152, 154.

aggressively Hellenistic.¹ Against this new right-wing nationalist organization, the Communists created EDON, a youth movement, which attacked Makarios, the London Agreement, and the political prominence of EDMA. The left-wing took particular exception to the provision permitting British bases and Greek and Turkish troops on the island. Though the left-wing eventually announced acceptance of the settlement, it resented Makarios' apparent favoritism of the right-wing for positions in his cabinet.²

In May Makarios also came under attack from former supporters on the issue of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities. Nationalist mayors, as well as Communist mayors, demanded an amendment but Makarios insisted on adherence to the Agreement. During the summer of 1959, another attack on Makarios and the London Agreement came from Grivas, who called on Cypriots to reject them both. In particular, Grivas was opposed to the settlement on British bases, separate municipalities, the sacrifice of Enosis, and the continued connection of Cyprus with the British Commonwealth.³ Grivas received support against Makarios from the Bishop of Kyrenia, who saw Grivas as the eventual leader to bring about Enosis. Violence in the name of Enosis was threatened by the Cyprus Enosis Front (KEM), an organization that came to light by publicly attacking Makarios during May. In September, KEM was reputed to be planning to assassinate Makarios.

An attempt was made in October to smooth over the growing divisions between Grivas and Makarios. Talks were held between the two men on Rhodes, but the substance and outcome of their discussions were kept secret.

¹Nancy Crawshaw, "The Republic of Cyprus: From the Zurich Agreement to Independence," World Today, Vol. 16, No. 12 (December 1960), p. 528.

²Mayes, op. cit., p. 79.

³Ibid.

On November 15, the Democratic Union party was formed, to enunciate the various areas of dissatisfaction with Makarios' leadership, and to support Mr. John Clerides for President. Clerides had the support of AKEL and PEO, the leftist labor federation. On December 13, however, Makarios was elected President: 144,301 to Clerides' 71,753. Dr. Kutchuk was elected Vice-President, without opposition.

The Zurich and London Agreements had foreseen the existence of an independent Cyprus by February 1960. This proved impossible, however, as difficulties arose over the demarcation of the British Sovereign Base Areas. The constitution could not become legal until the basic treaties were signed. Although agreement on the base sites and facilities was substantially reached on March 17, 1960, unresolved details had the effect of delaying independence. On April 18 Makarios threatened to renew the struggle against Britain both by civil disobedience and by EOKA tactics if independence was postponed any further. The Turkish Cypriot leadership threatened that if Greek Cypriots revived the demand for Enosis, Turkish Cypriots would revive the demand for partition. "Relations between the Greeks and Turks were exacerbated by Turkish fears that the collapse of the Agreements was imminent."¹

On July 1, final agreement was reached on the Base Areas, and all necessary legislation was passed by the British Parliament during the month. The first general election on Cyprus took place on July 31. Of the 35 seats allotted to the Greek Cypriots, 30 were won by supporters of the Archbishop, 5 of these, by agreement, being allotted to AKEL, the Cypriot Communist party. All 15 seats allotted to the Turkish Cypriots were won by Kutchuk supporters. The Republic of Cyprus came into being on August 16, 1960, and Cyprus was admitted to the United Nations and to the British Commonwealth shortly afterward.

¹Crawshaw, "The Republic of Cyprus: From the Zurich Agreement to Independence," p. 537.

Though the Turkish Cypriots derived advantages from the new constitution beyond their numerical weight in the population, these advantages were often denied to them in practical terms by the Greek Cypriot majority. Within a year after the Republic of Cyprus came into existence, the Turks were occasionally resorting to obstructionist tactics in return for what they felt was neglect of their legitimate interests. For example, in December 1961 they refused to support the passage of the national budget, and thus upset the projected coordination of taxation policy. In December 1962, Turks and Greeks came into conflict over the issue of municipal boundaries and local government.

The requirement that 30 per cent of the civil-service posts go to Turkish Cypriots (though they numbered only about 20 per cent of the population) was sometimes negated by the difficulty of finding qualified applicants--and sometimes by intent. In the 2,000-man army (to be over-all 60 per cent Greek and 40 per cent Turkish), the Greeks wanted mixed units and the Turks wanted separate units. Using his constitutional veto, Vice-President Kutchuk was able to block legislation creating mixed units. Thus no Cypriot army was created.

By August 1963, President Makarios was calling for constitutional revisions, and in November had drawn up thirteen proposals for change. Among his recommendations were: the elimination of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential vetoes, provision for greater unity in the House of Representatives, some restrictions on the rights of the separate Turkish communities, and reduction of Turkish representation in the police force, army, and civil service.¹ Though some of Makarios' proposals were generally beneficial to all elements, some of them were seen as direct threats to Turkish interests. According to one analyst:

¹James M. Boyd, "Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping," International Organization, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Winter 1966), p. 3.

Nothing at this stage impinged upon the wider interests of Turkey covered by the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance. The Turkish Government, however, immediately rejected the proposals which, as an attempt to amend the permanent basic articles, were seen as a dangerous precedent likely to be followed up by a whole series of changes harmful to Turkish interests. Thus the last opportunity was lost for a negotiated settlement within the framework of the Zurich Agreement with its numerous advantages for the Turks.¹

E. Phase III₂: December 21, 1963 -- March 27, 1964

1. Sub-Phase A: December 21, 1963 -- February 13, 1964. On the night of December 21, 1963, shots were exchanged between Greek Cypriot police in civilian clothes and Turkish Cypriot civilians in Nicosia. Two Turkish Cypriots were killed. On December 22 there was further shooting as Greek Cypriot police made an effort to detain a car driven by Turkish Cypriots.

There were accusations and counter-accusations between the two Cypriot communities as to the source and purpose of the provocation to violence; the Turkish Cypriots fearing a plan for their extermination and the Greek Cypriots fearing a calculated uprising for partition, both communities began to organize for battle. Ever since the Zurich Agreement, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots had been gathering arms against the day when civil order would break down and the two communities would resort to force. (See Section III.)

On December 24 there was heavy fighting in Nicosia, involving both the EOKA and TMT underground organizations; and, in an apparently disorganized way, fighting spread to other Cypriot communities. Several estimates placed the total killed during five days at Christmas at about 300, mostly Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots, outnumbered and inferior in arms, withdrew to their communal areas and erected

¹Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: Collapse of the Zurich Agreement," World Today, Vol. 20, No. 8 (August 1964), p. 340.

barricades against marauding Greek Cypriots. The administrative authority of the Cypriot government, including the regulation of the police, had collapsed. Encouraged by their leadership, Turkish Cypriots were migrating to the north of the island to fortified towns; they were also setting up their own administration, boycotting the Cypriot parliament and government ministries. Subsequently, Turkish warships were reported to be moving southward from the mainland and Turkish jets flew over the island.

On Christmas Eve, the British government suggested that a tripartite British-Greek-Turkish force, under British direction, be established to put an end to the fighting. The suggestion was accepted by the governments of Greece and Turkey, which offered the use of their troops stationed on Cyprus in accordance with the 1959 Agreements. Turkey had 650 soldiers on Cyprus; Greece, 850; Britain, about 3,500, not all available for duty outside the British bases. Turkey reportedly threatened to intervene unilaterally to protect the Turkish Cypriots if the guarantor powers did not take measures jointly to ensure an end to the violence.¹

President Makarios accepted the tripartite force for the purpose of achieving and preserving a cease-fire; but he stipulated that the force be limited to Nicosia and not be expanded beyond the troops already on the island. The Greek and Turkish troops were placed under British command, but they were not involved in the peace-keeping activities. The Greek troops stayed in their barracks; the Turks dug in across the Kyrenia road. According to one source, the Greek and Turkish troops were immobilized and kept from any attack on one another because both Athens and Ankara were anxious to prevent any spread of the violence lest the great powers become involved or an appeal be made to the United Nations, thus removing the matter of

¹Philip Windsor, "NATO and the Cyprus Crisis," Adelphi Paper No. 14 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, November 1964), p. 17.

Cyprus from the hands of the three guarantor powers.¹

On December 26, U.S. President Johnson expressed his support of "any and all actions proposed by the three guarantor powers which offer any reasonable hope of assisting in a peaceful solution,"² and called for an end to violence on Cyprus, without passing any judgment on the claims of the two Cypriot communities.

On December 29, Britain followed up the peacekeeping efforts of its troops on Cyprus with a visit from British Commonwealth Minister Duncan Sandys to Nicosia. Sandys dissuaded President Makarios from his announced intention of unilaterally abrogating the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, and persuaded Makarios and Vice-President Kutuchuk to accept the good offices of Britain, Greece, and Turkey in finding a solution to the tension between the two communities.³ To this end, Makarios and Kutuchuk agreed to attend a conference in London in mid-January with representatives of the three guarantor powers.

On January 2, 1964, the Cypriot representative to the United Nations stated that the Turkish government was threatening an invasion and was violating the Christmas cease-fire by refusing to withdraw certain troops from positions occupied at Christmastime. Britain, Turkey, and Greece subsequently requested the U.N. Secretary-General to dispatch an observer to help diminish tension, and Lieutenant-General P. S. Gyani of India was so designated on January 16.

Some minimal order was restored during the early part of January, before the London Conference, when Greek and Turkish Cypriots agreed to allow freer travel by road, and, especially important to isolated villages, freer transportation of passengers and supplies by bus.

¹Ibid., p. 11.

²U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1282 (January 20, 1964), p. 90.

³Windsor, op. cit., p. 17.

During the London Conference, President Makarios was subject to pressure from three powerful political influences among the Greek Cypriots. One was a small, secret paramilitary group made up of ex-EOKA members, formed after independence to assemble arms and manpower against the day of a possible Turkish Cypriot uprising. There was speculation that this group, under the leadership of Minister of the Interior Yorgadjis, upbraided Makarios for accepting the cease-fire after the Christmas fighting--arguing that six hours more of fighting would have eliminated the Turkish Cypriots as a fighting group.¹ This secret group would presumably be able to reopen the fighting if there were signs that the conferees at London were acting to protect the political and military power of the Turkish Cypriots.

Another group of ex-EOKA men was under Nicos Sampson, a bitter rival of Yorgadjis. Sampson's group included a "town" body-guard of about a half dozen and a private army of approximately 400, trained in the mountains of the Troodos and Kyrenia. This army participated in the Christmas fighting in Nicosia, in combination with the police under Yorgadjis. There was speculation that Sampson had been in touch with Colonel Grivas in Athens, who might "return to renew the campaign for enosis . . . , though the absence of encouragement from Athens has made this a tattered slogan."²

The Communists (with an AKEL membership of 12,000) gave leadership to the third and largest group capable of political pressure on Makarios--drawing from the 40,000 members of the left-wing trade unions. This group was unarmed and unconnected with the communal violence in December, but the longer the upheaval on Cyprus continued, the more political strength tended to accrue to it. It had received about 33 per cent of the total vote in the national elections of 1960 and was thought by 1964 to represent as much as 45 per cent of the Greek electorate.

¹Economist, January 11, 1964, p. 105.

²Ibid.

The Turkish Cypriot delegation to the London Conference included Rauf Denktash, president of the Turkish Communal Chamber, deputy to Kutchuk, but recognized as the "real power in the Turkish community. . . .With Mr. Denktash in London, the danger of pre-emptive Turkish military action is reduced."¹

Prior to the London Conference, Athens' attitude toward Ankara was generally friendly. In Greece, the question of the future of Cyprus was evidently unable to evoke the political passions that it formerly had been able to call up; and though the possibility of unilateral Turkish intervention in Cyprus on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots was feared, domestic politics were generally more absorbing. However, the Greeks were disturbed by rumors that a Turkish invasion had been halted by Soviet influence in Ankara at the request of President Makarios, and by reports that Makarios had announced that he would call for the abrogation of the Cypriot Treaties with the assurance of Soviet support for his effort to achieve greater independence.²

Similarly, the Turkish government, though bitter toward the government of Cyprus for allowing the "barbaric assault" on Turkish Cypriots during Christmas, had a relatively friendly attitude toward Greece. But official opposition continued, applicable perhaps even to the point of war, to the union of Cyprus with Greece, or the domination of Cyprus by Greece. According to one observer, Mr. Inonu's government benefited greatly from the crisis in Cyprus, and was made more secure by the unifying effect of possible national danger.³

Britain, the third guarantor power, was anxious for a settlement of the conflict and for a subsequent release of the British military

¹Ibid., p. 104.

²Ibid., January 4, 1964, p. 10. Soviet diplomacy throughout had been designed to neutralize Cyprus and to arouse anti-NATO feeling.

³Ibid.

power absorbed in the Cyprus peacekeeping operation. In an attempt to head off any future appeal by President Makarios to the United Nations for a change in whatever settlement might be negotiated in London, Britain requested that an observer from the U.N. Secretariat attend the Conference.¹

Makarios went to the Conference with a demand for "real independence," free from the restrictions on sovereignty imposed by the 1959 Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee. He also called for an end to the Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot political partnership that was basic to the structure of the 1959 constitution; the partnership would be replaced with government by majority (Greek Cypriot), including a guarantee of minority rights for Turkish Cypriots. In the light of past positions, there appeared little hope that Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots would agree to any such drastic changes in the privileges of the Turkish Cypriots.

If the chances of political accommodation were slight, the problem remained one of keeping the peace between the two communities on Cyprus. Britain, reportedly anxious to be rid of the peacekeeping burden, encouraged the other participants in the Conference to agree on an international force of some kind. A time limit was apparently implied beyond which British forces would no longer continue in their peacekeeping role, and thus presumably allow the outbreak of new violence and possible outside intervention.² Makarios wanted to put the case before the United Nations, and thus be rid of the particular domination of the three guarantor powers; the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey resisted this idea lest it mark the end of Turkey's right of intervention in Cyprus. In the face of the British time limit, negotiations for agreement were unsuccessful, and Turkey threatened to withdraw from the Conference. According to one source, the Turks in both Ankara and Cyprus would

¹Windsor, op. cit., p. 12.

²Ibid.

have accepted an international force if the 650-man Turkish force stationed (by treaty) on Cyprus were increased. An increased Turkish force in residence would have been able to protect the Turkish Cypriots without the necessity of Turkish troops' intervening from the mainland.¹

On January 29, 1964 (while the London Conference was still in session), the first real threat of Turkish intervention took place as the Turkish fleet gathered off Iskanderun. Greece signalled a public alarm and President Makarios called for help from the Soviet Union. The next day, the United States is reported to have indicated its willingness to join any international peace force that was sent to Cyprus;² subsequently, Turkey agreed to stay at the London negotiations.

Early in February 1964, Britain approached the United States to work out a peacekeeping plan that would not involve the United Nations.³ Shortly thereafter, the governments of both Greece and Turkey (and the Turkish Cypriots) agreed to the plan, which called for troops from NATO countries to keep the peace on Cyprus while a mediator was trying to work out a political settlement. Though the plan did not spell out the status of the NATO troops and the authority under which they would operate, it suggested that 10,000 men were needed for a period of three months. During this period the three guarantor powers would relinquish their treaty rights of intervention. The force would include the British, Turkish, and Greek forces already stationed on the island, as well as a contingent of U.S. troops.

The inclusion of Turkish and Greek troops in the peacekeeping force was one of the factors on which President Makarios based his rejection of the NATO plan; he also demanded that any peacekeeping force should be put in some way under U.N. authority. On Cyprus,

¹Economist, February 1, 1964, p. 386.

²Windsor, op. cit., p. 12.

³According to Duncan Sandys, in the House of Commons, February 17, 1964.

the suggestion that the United States might contribute troops to a peacekeeping force from NATO (and perhaps other) countries engendered an outburst of anti-U.S. violence that was encouraged by the Greek-language press.¹ The demonstrations against U.S. military involvement on Cyprus were related to the conviction that U.S. weight would fall to the side of the Turkish Cypriot minority, because of the close collaboration and military interdependence of Turkey and the United States. The European members of NATO were not united in their support for the Anglo-U.S. plan. West Germany, hesitant from the first, rejected the plan once Makarios had spoken against it; France rejected it when it was first proposed.

The Soviet Union took strong exception to the NATO plan, and warned the United States and the three guarantor powers that any attempt to put Cyprus under NATO military control would threaten world peace. In a message to President Johnson on February 7, 1964, Premier Khrushchev described the proposed plan as having one aim, "actual occupation by NATO armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus which adheres to a policy of nonalignment with military blocs." He also charged:

Everything is being done now just in order not to allow discussion of the Cyprus question in the Security Council . . . that organ which the U.N. Charter charges with guaranteeing international peace and security. . . .[Some powers] prefer to examine the Cyprus question in closed conferences, where substituting arbitrariness for the U.N. Charter they count on shattering the opposition of a small state--the Republic of Cyprus--by means of external pressure.²

According to one observer, the United States did not want to appear to be keeping Cyprus from appealing to the United Nations: "It was anxious to include UN observers in the [NATO peacekeeping]

¹U.S. News and World Report, February 17, 1964, p. 41.

²U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1291 (March 23, 1964), pp. 447-448.

force (just as Britain had been anxious to have UN observers at the London conference)."¹ It was on this point of the presence of U.N. observers that U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball, during a series of consultations in London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia in early February, tried unsuccessfully to persuade President Makarios to accept the proposed plan.²

2. Sub-Phase B: February 13, 1964 -- March 27, 1964. On February 13, 1964, the Turkish quarter in the town of Limassol was bombarded. Beginning in early morning, Greek Cypriot irregulars attacked with machine guns, bazookas, and cannon.³ (See Section III for details.) It was estimated that dozens were killed and scores wounded. The area was surrounded and its inhabitants cut off from food and supplies. The British peacekeeping force had very limited authority, manning street patrols and roadblocks and providing a conciliatory influence wherever fighting might break out. Thus unable to deter the attack, the British force attempted to effect a form of truce. With the new fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, there was a heightened chance that forces from Greece and Turkey would become involved.⁴

On February 15, both Britain and Cyprus requested an early meeting of the U.N. Security Council. The Cyprus government, calling attention to the sailing of the Turkish fleet, charged that there was about to be a Turkish landing on Cyprus and urgently requested an emergency meeting of the Council. On February 17, Secretary-General

¹Windsor, op. cit., p. 13.

²Ibid.

³U.S. News and World Report, February 24, 1964, pp. 77-78.

⁴However, the Economist (February 8, 1964, p. 498) reported a public opinion poll in Athens indicating that only two out of every seven people felt that the Greek army should be used if the Turks landed in Cyprus; three thought the United Nations should be asked to stop the Turks; and two thought that it was NATO's job.

U Thant circulated a memorandum proposing an international peace-keeping force responsible to the U.N. Secretary-General and a representative U.N. advisory committee, to be financed by Britain, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and those states contributing troops.

Cyprus, with Soviet support, demanded a new international guarantee of Cypriot integrity. The British were amenable to such a guarantee as long as reference was made to its being in accordance with the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee and the existing Cypriot constitution; but the Turks expressed fear that any new guarantee might be thought to replace the 1959 guarantee and, with it, Turkey's right to intervene in Cyprus. The Soviet Union held that the Zurich Agreement, with its provision for intervention by guarantor powers, was invalid--forced on Cyprus and in any event made inapplicable by Cyprus' becoming a member of the United Nations.

On March 4 the Security Council adopted unanimously, in agreement with all parties to the crisis in Cyprus, a resolution recommending the creation of a peacekeeping force for Cyprus to restore internal order, and the appointment of an international mediator to try to bring about a political settlement. The peacekeeping force was to be sent to Cyprus for an initial period of three months, to report directly to Secretary-General U Thant rather than to the Security Council.

The resolution also called upon all member states of the United Nations to "refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation" in Cyprus and asked the government of Cyprus "which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order," to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed on Cyprus.

The U.N. peacekeeping force would operate on Cyprus under the limited terms of reference agreed to by the Cypriot government. Almost any use of the U.N. troops would require the prior consent of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The U.N. troops would not be

able to impose a cease-fire or penalize the violation of an existing cease-fire. U.N. troops would be allowed to fire only in self-defense, and then to use only "minimum force."

The U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was officially established on March 27, 1964.

[This analysis ends with the establishment of UNFICYP.]

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

a. The Greek and Turkish populations of Cyprus, like the Greeks and Turks elsewhere in the region, were historic enemies. The Cypriot Turks would be an even smaller minority in a Cyprus united with Greece than they were on Cyprus itself, and an unprivileged minority at that. Religiously the two communities were different, and cultural contact between them was almost nonexistent.

b. The Greek population of Cyprus was overwhelming in favor of Enosis--union with Greece.

c. The Cypriot Greeks felt that the Greek government's public endorsement of their cause was essential. Through the Church and other channels, the Greek Cypriots were able to bring strong pressure on the Greek government.

d. The strategic location of Cyprus had led to successive conquests over the centuries. At the time of the dispute analyzed here, the British regarded it as an essential base for their influence in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors

a. Active measures by successive sovereigns to promote amicable relations; barring such measures, the physical separation of hostile groups by partition or by removing the minority Turkish Cypriots to Turkey.

b. Accommodating this desire, if accompanied by measures mentioned above to prevent mayhem; developing an alternative allegiance to Cyprus for Cypriot Greeks.

c. A more cohesive stronger Greek government, able to resist such internal pressure.

d. Sea-based alternatives to land bases; long-range air-lift capabilities; reassessment of utility of military presence to retaining political and economic influence.

- e. Colonel Grivas and others pressing for the use of force against Britain were persuaded that recent events, particularly in Palestine, which the Cypriots had observed closely, demonstrated that massive civilian unrest and a restricted terrorist campaign would cause the British to yield.
- f. Rivalry for leadership in Cyprus and of the Enosisist movement between Colonel Grivas and Archbishop Makarios led the latter in particular not to wish to appear a weaker champion of the cause.
- g. Grivas and many other Greek Cypriots had played active roles in the Greek wartime resistance and in the Greek Insurgency. They had extensive training and experience in guerrilla and terrorist tactics. Some of them also doubtless missed the excitement and camaraderie of the wartime days and, in any event, were accustomed to thinking in terms of the pursuit of political ends by violent means.
- h. At the time the Cypriot Enosis conflict was developing, world opinion was becoming more deeply committed to the goal of decolonization. This appeared to be particularly true where the inhabitants of the colonies attracted attention to their cause by widespread unrest and disorder.
2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military
- e. Clearer enunciation by Britain of the basic position it was determined to maintain in Cyprus; greater understanding of British character; care that position of accommodation is not interpreted as weakness.
- f. Replacing or isolating more radical leaders; short of this, measures to build prestige of more moderate leaders, including some accommodation to their demands.
- g. Avoiding violence, which appears to spawn a predilection for violence; short of this, extensive re-education and re-indoctrination efforts after hostilities end; creation of alternative outlets for energies and élan left unemployed at war's end.
- h. Promoting more orderly, peaceful decolonization so violence is not deemed a prerequisite to its achievement.
2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Increasing the economic stake of the individual Cypriots in the existing situation.
- b. As with more moderate leaders, enhancing the prestige of more moderate segments of the population which may require accommodating to some of their demands.
- c. Increasing Greek reliance on external support; utilization of the leverage such heavy reliance may produce.

B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Measures to control disposition of arms made surplus when hostilities end; techniques to shorten the effective life of the kinds of small arms referred

a. Cyprus derived economic advantage from the British presence, more than it could hope to have if unified with Greece.

b. While Greek Cypriot opinion endorsed Enosis, not all Greek Cypriots were prepared to resort to violence to achieve it. Some Greek Cypriots were attracted to the political solution being offered by Britain at this point--local autonomy and continued British sovereignty.

c. The Greek government continued to be heavily reliant on the United States and Britain for economic and military support. It was reluctant to take action that might alienate them. Greece preferred to negotiate a settlement directly with the British.

B. PHASE II TO PHASE III₁ : THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

[A military option was injected into the Cyprus dispute--now the Cyprus conflict--by a small group of Greek Cypriots led by Colonel Grivas who created the machinery to organize an active, forceful campaign for Enosis. The numbers involved were very small.]

1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. Large quantities of small arms were available in Greece as a legacy of World War II resistance and the postwar Insurgency. Supporters of the Enosisist cause, in Greece and elsewhere, provided the finances to purchase them. And

the Church on Cyprus was prepared to cooperate in storing them.

- b. With the withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone, British strategic interest in Cyprus increased.
- c. The police forces on Cyprus were too few in number and poorly trained and equipped. Frequently, therefore, regular British armed forces were utilized in support of police operations. This helped to alienate the Greek Cypriot population and increase support for the Grivas program.

832

- d. Domestic pressure on the Greek government to espouse the Enosis cause publicly led finally to Greece's raising the question of Cypriot self-determination under U.N. auspices. The United Nations took no action on the substance of the question, and its failure to act precipitated riots, strikes, and limited communal violence in Cyprus.

- e. Statements by some British officials appeared to rule out any prospect of eventual independence. Whatever support other British

to here; development of improved techniques for detecting and controlling unauthorized shipments of small arms; more effective police and security measures in Greece to these ends.

- b. Measures to reduce reliance on land bases referred to in (1d) of Section A above.
- c. Adequate police forces and riot forces to handle minor outbreaks of domestic unrest.
- d. In the context of this phase of this conflict, Greece's action was destabilizing. This could have been offset by vigorous U.N. action to introduce a presence in Cyprus before the conflict got worse, providing U.N. auspices for private diplomacy, seeking to enunciate the terms of a just settlement that went beyond self-determination to examine the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and British interests.

- e. Clarification of British policy; making certain that public statements of responsible offi-

offers of self-government in the near future and continued talks about Cyprus' eventual future may have had was largely negated by widespread Greek Cypriot conviction that Britain would never willingly grant Enosis.

- f. The view persisted among those advocating violence that a full-scale guerrilla war need not be mounted against the British on Cyprus but that a limited amount of violence would give weight and urgency to the diplomatic efforts of Greece and of Greek Cypriot leaders to obtain British agreement to Enosis.

2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities

- a. On Cyprus the British were overwhelmingly superior militarily. Furthermore the extensive communications system of the island enabled the British to move troops rapidly to the scene of trouble and made large-scale guerrilla warfare difficult, if not impossible.
- b. The Greek government strongly preferred a peaceful settlement with its oldest ally Britain and partners in NATO, Britain and Turkey.
- c. The opposition Labour and Liberal parties in Britain did not favor the government's policy in Cyprus and urged that independence be granted.

cials endorse the same policy line.

- f. Refusal to negotiate until violence ceased; pressure on Greece by Britain and the United States not to espouse Enosis cause until violence halted.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Maintaining a military preponderance of the status quo power [but see (2g) of Section B below]; developing the types of forces, doctrine, and physical requirements for effective internal security.
- b. Accommodation to Greek demands; or clarification of determination not to yield to them.
- c. Strengthening opposition.

- d. The United States urged Greece to settle the conflict through direct talks with Britain.
 - e. The Turkish Cypriots became more apprehensive of their future as agitation for Enosis grew. The government and populace of Turkey reflected this growing concern. Turkey appealed to the United States for support for just treatment of the Turks in Cyprus and, while making no commitment to their cause, the United States conveyed to Greece its appreciation of Turkey's interest in Cyprus.
 - f. Greece offered, in event of Enosis, to guarantee the rights of Turkish Cypriots.
 - g. The evacuation to Cyprus of the troops and commands previously located in the Suez Canal zone further increased the overwhelming British military preponderance in Cyprus.
- C. PHASE III₁ TO PHASE IV₁ : THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES
- [While riots, strikes, general civil disorder, and some communal violence had been occurring on Cyprus for some time, the outbreaks on April 1, 1955, marked the beginning of a sustained campaign of urban terrorism, limited guerrilla operations, organized riots, and
- d. Stronger U.S. pressure on Greece, perhaps related to heavy economic and military assistance.
 - e. Third-party, U.N. or other, guarantees of minority rights; solution of minority problem by separation or emigration [see (1a) of Section A above].
 - f. Devices to ensure security and rights of minorities [see (1a) of Section A and (2e) of Section B above].
 - g. Maintaining military preponderance of status quo power. [In this conflict at this phase, the balance of military power proved somewhat irrelevant, since it was never challenged.]
- C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

demonstrations that was to last for nearly four years. While the hostilities at times waxed and at others waned, and at times involved significant violence and at others not, there were no actual or threatened intensifications of hostilities in terms of geographic extensions, additional parties (except in the potential case of Turkey, which will be mentioned), or level and type of violence. Nevertheless, the hostilities can best be analyzed in terms of two key political events that divide Phase III into three interesting subdivisions.]

SUB-PHASE A: THE ONE-SIDED WAR

[For the first five months of Phase III,¹ the Enosists clearly regarded themselves as engaged in a decisive struggle with Britain over the future of Cyprus. Britain, however, appeared not to regard the course of events as much more than an extension of the previous, frequently violent unrest. In a sense, therefore, the Enosists had "declared war" on Britain, but Britain did not as yet comprehend the different nature of the challenge. British efforts, therefore, while not ignoring events on Cyprus, focused on tripartite Greek-Turkish-British negotiations for a formula that would accommodate the three states' interests.]

1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. The very British misconception of the nature of events on Cyprus helped to delay the types of reaction--either repressive or accommodating--that might have hastened an end to hostilities.
 - b. British efforts to cut off the supply of arms to the Enosists were of very limited success, and small arms continued to be available. The small size of the actual armed force on the Enosist side made the volume of arms and ammunition required very modest and control of its entry, consequently, more difficult.
 - c. Opposition within Britain to a repressive policy increased as the scale of violence rose.
 - d. British-Greek-Turkish negotiations foundered on the issue of where ultimate sovereignty lay. While prepared to compromise on local autonomy and self-government, Britain insisted that the issue of ultimate sovereignty be settled in the future. Turkey was anxious to see British sovereignty retained. Greece wanted Enosis.
- a. Greater understanding of the nature and structure of internal conflicts; better intelligence on the objectives of adversaries.
 - b. Improved techniques to detect and control small arms flows [see (1a) of Section B above].
 - c. Increasing effectiveness of opposition.
 - d. Since Turkish fears and in part British reluctance were based on concern for Turkish Cypriots, measures suggested in (1a) of Section A and (2e) of Section B above, to deal with or remove minorities problem; insofar as British concern was its military base, alternatives to land bases [see (1d) of Section A above].

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Pressure by Greece and Turkey on respective coreligionists in Cyprus to accept a negotiated solution; coupled with measures in (1a) of Section A and (2e) of
- a. The three states that, in addition to the Cypriots, were most directly concerned in the conflict were prepared to seek a negotiated settlement. Although the negotiations failed, Britain indicated its willingness during them

to include the Cypriots in future talks on sovereignty over Cyprus.

- b. The U.N. General Assembly refused to place the question of Cyprus on its agenda. Supporters of this action argued that U.N. involvement would serve only to aggravate an already inflamed situation.

SUB-PHASE B: THE CYPRUS EMERGENCY

[As hostilities continued and efforts to find a negotiated settlement failed, the British Governor of Cyprus declared a state of emergency and began a series of police, military, and judicial efforts to suppress the revolt.]

1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

- a. Britain was generally unsuccessful in its efforts to suppress the revolt. There were numerous arrests and captures, and at times the guerrillas and terrorists were severely harassed. But British efforts never succeeded in so decimating rebel ranks or so cutting them off from supplies as to bring their actions to an end. In fact, resentment caused by British actions alienated some Greek Cypriots who might not otherwise have endorsed terrorist means, even while agreeing with the goal of Enosis.

Section B above to deal with minorities problems; and with measures in (1f) of Section B above to increase pressure on Greece and Turkey to exercise their influence.

- b. Potentially aggravating consequences could have been offset by the types of vigorous U.N. action mentioned in (1d) of Section B above.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. More effective internal security doctrine and capability; more efficient police. [But these need to be built up in advance of the need for them; efforts at this stage to make the police more effective--which the British tried--did not produce effects sufficiently quickly.]

- b. The unity of Greek Cypriots was reinforced by the actions of the terrorists against fellow Greek Cypriots suspected of being pro-British, or left-wing, or not sufficiently active in their support of Enosis. While the cooperation of some Greek Cypriots was thus gained by intimidation, the inability of the British to protect potential allies among the Greek Cypriot population led to their having little expressed support.
- c. Throughout Phase III₁, violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots occurred from time to time. As Phase III₁ lengthened, these communal clashes became more frequent and more serious. This and the hardened opposition of the Turkish Cypriots to any concession to Enosis made the limits of flexibility for British policy very narrow. The problem was compounded because many Greek Cypriots felt that Turkish Cypriot fears were deliberately provoked by the British to provide an excuse for denying Enosis.
- d. Britain saw Makarios as the key to its problems on Cyprus and deported him, thus removing whatever restraining influence he might have been persuaded to exercise and further solidifying Greek Cypriot opinion against Britain.
2. Factors Tending Toward the Termination of Hostilities
- a. Many formulae continued to be offered by the British for a constitution that would accommodate Greek Cypriot aspirations.
- b. Measures to protect potentially friendly population from reprisals, part of effective internal security doctrine.
- c. Solutions to the minorities problem suggested in (1a) of Section A and (2e) of Section B above.
- d. Greater British understanding of the nature of the adversary; greater understanding of the nature of internal conflict.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Improved communication between adversaries and among their chief supporters.

Turkish Cypriot fears, and British needs. Thus even while hostilities continued, communication was frequent between the adversaries and among the third parties closely involved.

- b. The U.N. General Assembly discussed the Cyprus conflict but adopted no substantive resolution. It called for negotiations, although in ambiguous terms that gave rise to later controversy. As on previous occasions, a number of states in the United Nations sufficient to prevent adoption of a resolution on substance felt that this would exacerbate rather than calm the conflict. At a subsequent session, a resolution calling for self-determination failed to get a two-thirds vote.
 - c. The Secretary-General of NATO, of which Greece, Turkey, and Britain were members, offered to conciliate the conflict.
 - d. The Turkish Cypriots began to advocate partition of Cyprus along religious-linguistic lines. For the Greek Cypriots this raised the prospect that the price of Enosis for Greek Cypriots would be a truncated Cyprus.
 - e. Turkey was becoming increasingly apprehensive over the fate of the Turkish Cypriots and the eventual future of the island. The Turkish government gave active support to the stand of the Turkish Cypriots who came to believe that direct intervention by Turkey was a
- b. Care to include unambiguous language in resolutions; see (1d) of Section B above for suggested more vigorous U.N. action; at this stage, a U.N. force could be added to the list. [Makarios also proposed a temporary U.N. "mandate."]
 - c. Unified and vigorous NATO pressure on Greece and Turkey to cooperate in finding a solution.
 - d. Partition is one form of separation of incompatible groups, emigration is another; U.N. or other third-party support for one of these approaches.
 - e. Threatening to intensify hostilities.

distinct possibility.

- f. Tension in Turkey over events in Cyprus led to riots in which Greek communities in Turkish cities were attacked. While the Turkish government took measures to prevent a recurrence, feelings continued to run high.
- g. Opposition to British policy continued high in Britain.
- f. Threatening to create other loci of conflict in the area.
- g. Strengthening the opposition.

SUB-PHASE C: NEGOTIATING THE TERMS

[By early 1957, an impasse had been reached by both sides. The EOKA forces had never sought to challenge the British military directly and, indeed, were in no position to do so. The British measures to quell the hostilities had been unsuccessful. EOKA was unable by force to achieve Enosis; Britain was unwilling by force to root out EOKA definitively. Out of this impasse came a political compromise on independence--far less than Enosis and far more than self-government--with an elaborate system of constitutional safeguards for the minority Turkish Cypriots. Minor violence continued to occur while the details were negotiated.]

- 1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities
 - a. The decision to settle for independence, with a guaranteed voice for the Turkish Cypriots, meant that the goal of Enosis was not only not achieved but probably ruled out for the foreseeable future.
- 1. To Offset These Factors
 - a. Unambiguous acknowledgment of the abandonment of the Enosis goal by Greece.

2. Factors Tending to Terminate Hostilities

- a. The U.N. General Assembly called for negotiations among Britain, Turkey, and Greece for a just solution.

D. PHASE IV₁ TO PHASE III₂ : THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

[Nearly four years elapsed before fighting on a significant scale broke out in Cyprus. During that period, Cyprus became an independent state and a member of the United Nations.]

1. Factors Tending Toward the Resumption of Hostilities

- a. Suspicion and tension between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus continued unabated. Each was deeply distrustful of the other's intentions and each prepared itself to respond forcefully to any hostile move.
- b. This situation prevented any effective cooperation between the two communities in the Cypriot government, the structure of which required the consent of both communities to function at all. In such basic realms as budgets, taxation, and the armed forces, this deadlock prevented the government from acting.
- c. Makarios was under strong pressure from elements within the Greek Cypriot community who were dissatisfied with the terms Makarios had accepted for independence. The followers of Grivas regarded the abandonment of Enosis as a betrayal.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. A direct U.N. role in the negotiations; U.N. good offices; U.N. auspices.

D. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Physical separation of groups unwilling or incapable of living together peacefully [see (1a) of Section A and (2e) of Section B above].
- b. Including in the constitutional structure a provision for neutral arbitration where communal vetoes paralyze governmental function.
- c. Increasing control of Makarios within the Greek Cypriot community.

The Communists agitated for the removal of British bases and Greek and Turkish troops.

- d. The Turkish community, whose position under the independence agreements was stronger than its relative numbers may have warranted, was unwilling to consider any changes in the agreements.

2. Factors Tending Away from the Resumption of Hostilities and/or Toward Settlement

- a. As part of the independence arrangement, the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus was guaranteed by Britain, Turkey, and Greece, each of which had forces stationed on the island (the British on the bases they retained). Both Enosis and partition were specifically forbidden, and each of the guarantors had a right to intervene unilaterally to ensure those restrictions.

E. PHASE III₂ : THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

[The hostilities that broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in December 1963 can be divided into two sub-phases, the second representing an intensification of the hostilities and each distinguished by international peacekeeping forces of quite different characters.]

SUB-PHASE A: SPORADIC FIGHTING AND TRIPARTITE PEACEKEEPING

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Further internationalization of these guarantees; entrusting guarantees to states neutral about the outcome.

E. MEASURES DESIGNED TO MODERATE AND/OR TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

[In December 1963, sporadic fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots broke out. Hostilities were quickly abated and a tripartite peacekeeping force organized.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities

- a. Each community on Cyprus had prepared itself with arms for the attack it was certain the other would launch.
- d. Extremist pressures on Makarios mounted, particularly from ex-EOKA groups which felt themselves strong enough to settle issues with the Turkish Cypriots once and for all.
- c. Although negotiations took place among the guarantor states and leaders of the two Cypriot communities, it quickly became clear that the positions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Turkish government in particular were too inflexible to enable the negotiators to find a compromise solution.

- d. The regime in power in Turkey had been losing political support, and there is some suggestion that it may have welcomed the renewed crisis atmosphere over Cyprus to solidify its domestic position.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate and/or Terminate Hostilities

- a. The hostilities appear to have broken out almost accidentally with neither side in a position to follow them up.

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Measures suggested in (1a) of Section B above to detect and control movement of small arms.
- b. Strengthen position of Makarios in Greek Cypriot community.
- c. Pressures on Cypriots by Greece, others.

- d. Political stability in Turkey.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Better communication between adversaries.

- b. In a major test of strength the Turkish Cypriots were disadvantageded in numbers and weapons.
- c. Turkey threatened unilateral intervention and Turkish naval maneuvers and overflights of Turkish military jets added substance to the threat.
- d. Britain, Turkey, and Greece had troops on Cyprus. These formed a tripartite peace-keeping force, although measures were taken to minimize the chances of clashes between the Greek and Turkish contingents or of their involvement with the operations of their coreligionist Cypriots.
- e. The United States, which had not played an active role in earlier phases of the conflict, said it was prepared to cooperate in any plan that appeared likely to restore peace. U.S. interest had been quickened in part because of the adverse effects on NATO solidarity--raised more sharply than on previous occasions by the bellicose tone of some Turkish statements--and in part because of the possibility that the Soviet Union would gain influence with Makarios. The United States was prepared to participate in a NATO peace-keeping force.
- b. Decreasing the prospects for victory of at least one side, preferably both.
- c. Threatening to intensify hostilities.
- d. Maintaining troops for potential peacekeeping in conflict area, preferably troops neutral to the outcome.
- e. Earlier and more vigorous U.S. policy initiatives. [Note that perceptions by the United States of a gain in Soviet influence were stabilizing; the results could have been destabilizing if the U.S. response had been to seek a similarly increased influence with the Turkish Cypriots. If U.S. perceptions had been of an imminent Soviet take-over, the response might have been an even more sharply destabilizing U.S. intervention in opposition.]

f. Unlike during earlier phases of the conflict, support for Enosis now appeared to be low in Greece.

g. While rejecting the proposed NATO force, Makarios was eager to take the conflict to the United Nations.

SUB-PHASE B: LARGER-SCALE, MORE
ORGANIZED HOSTILITIES AND THE U.N.
PEACEKEEPING FORCE

[In February 1964, hostilities intensified with organized attacks by Greek Cypriots on the fortified positions into which the Turkish Cypriots had gathered during the December outburst.]

1. Factors Tending to Intensify or Continue Hostilities

- a. The authority of the tripartite peacekeeping force was limited and it had no authority to interpose itself between the adversaries.
- b. The danger of direct Turkish intervention increased, and the Turkish fleet maneuvered in the waters between Turkey and Cyprus.
- c. The United States and the Soviet Union were pursuing divergent policies toward the conflict. While the United States urged termination of hostilities and settlements without endorsing the position of either side, the Soviet Union supported Makarios' demands.

2. Factors Tending to Moderate or Terminate Hostilities

- f. Clearly articulated Greek repudiation of Enosis goal.
- g. Vigorous U.N. action [see (1d) of Section B and (2b) of Sub-Phase B, Section C, above].

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Broader and more flexible peacekeeping mandate; interposition of forces between adversaries.
- b. U.S., other pressure on Turkey to refrain from direct intervention.
- c. A common U.S.-Soviet policy toward controlling local conflict as being in their mutual best interest.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

a. Earlier U.N. cognizance and action [see (1d) of Section B and (2b) of Sub-Phase B, Section C, above].

a. Whereas Britain had previously sought to keep the conflict out of the United Nations, both it and Cyprus now sought urgent U.N. action. The Security Council quickly agreed to dispatch a U.N. peacekeeping force to Cyprus for three months.

[This analysis ends arbitrarily with the decision to create UNFICYP--the U.N. Force in Cyprus. The dispatch of UNFICYP did not automatically terminate Phase III; hostilities continued, with some threats of dangerous intensification, for several more months.]

III. WEAPONS ANALYSIS

[The two different aspects of the conflict on Cyprus are analyzed separately in the following section. First to be examined will be the 1955-1959 Enosis conflict; the second, the communal strife. This latter covers a somewhat longer period than the analysis in the previous sections, which ended with the decision in 1964 to dispatch a U.N. force to the island.]

A. The Enosis Struggle: 1955-1959

The pattern used in other weapons analyses in this volume is not completely applicable to the Enosis struggle, particularly to the EOKA side of it. The numbers of men actually engaged in EOKA activities full-time are extremely small, especially when compared with the British forces on Cyprus arrayed against them. And the arms employed by the EOKA were either smuggled in or requisitioned from Cypriots, willingly or otherwise. The following section will describe the organization and tactics of EOKA as they affect and reflect arms availability and use.

1. Arms Available to the EOKA. Arms smuggling into Cyprus for the eventual uprising against the British was organized by Colonel Grivas even before it was clear that other Greek Cypriot leaders, such as Makarios, were prepared to endorse the use of force to compel British acceptance of Enosis--the union of Cyprus with Greece. The first small Greek boat to land on Cyprus with smuggled arms and explosives arrived in March 1954.¹ The funds for these and subsequent purchases were raised among sympathizers with the Enosis cause in the United States and Greece.²

¹Robert Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms (London, Pall Mall Press, 1966), pp. 134, 135.

²British Governor's report, cited in U.S. News and World Report, March 23, 1956, p. 113.

At the outset of the conflict, arms were in extremely short supply. This is evidenced by the fact that British interception of a third smuggled shipment--in March 1955--was sufficient to cause a delay in the planned opening of EOKA's campaign.¹

At the opening of hostilities on April 1, 1955, EOKA had between twelve and twenty men, only two of whom had any experience with weapons. At their disposal were 80 rifles and guns and a couple of hundred hand grenades.²

According to Grivas' own account, the EOKA order of battle by September 1955 amounted to a few units operating in the Pitsillia, Lefka, and Kalogrea areas of Cyprus. These groups were brought into action in July and August of 1955, still inadequately equipped due to the difficulty of smuggling arms from Greece. Yet the arms came in slowly via parcel post (one consignment was found in a shipment of books) or through EOKA couriers.³

Sabotage groups were among the earliest EOKA units formed in the towns and villages of Cyprus. By mid-1955 a sabotage group of two to three men each was operating in each of the following districts: Nicosia, Famagusta, Dhekelia, Larnaca, Limassol, Episkopi, Paphos, Kyrenia, Lapithos, and Pedhoulas-Lefka. Each group was armed with a variety of smuggled pistols, grenades, antipersonnel mines, land mines, dynamite sticks, and homemade bombs.⁴

The second major type of EOKA unit was the guerrilla shock group. By September 1955 there were about ten such groups, consisting of about three men each, operating near the Thrysorochoyiatissa Monastery, and in the Troodos and Kyrenia mountains. For their size these units were

¹Stephens, op. cit., p. 141.

²Foley, op. cit., p. 161; also, by the same author, "The Return of General Grivas," National Review, August 25, 1964, p. 725.

³George Grivas, General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare, English translation (New York, Praeger, 1965), pp. 10, 33; Foley, Legacy of Strife, p. 58.

⁴Grivas, On Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 92, 93.

well-equipped, and the total number of weapons they had available included 4 British .303 Bren LMGs, 8 British 9mm Sten SMGs, 22 rifles (probably bolt-action British .303 Enfields, German sniper 7.92mm Mausers, or Italian 6.5mm Mannlicher-Carcanos), and at least 2 U.S. Thompson .45 cal. SMGs, mostly smuggled in from Greece and taken from captured World War II stocks or from early British and U.S. aid to Greece in the Greek Insurgency. After September 1955, another guerrilla group of eight men, using 1 Bren LMG, 2 Sten SMGs, and 5 rifles, was formed in the Kykko-Stavros area.¹

The third major grouping of EOKA in 1955 was the reserve group, a floating bank of men whose mission was to reinforce the sabotage and guerrilla shock groups. The reserve group could also be re-formed as a guerrilla group. At this time it utilized at least 8 Sten SMGs, 1 Thompson SMG, and 22 bolt-action rifles.² Another 38 to 40 men may have been assigned to the reserve group, bringing EOKA strength by January 1, 1956, to between 58 and 108 men.

Although it cannot be documented with precision, it is likely that, by late 1955, some weapons were getting through to EOKA from Italy. That country had resumed manufacturing the Beretta Model 38 SMG by 1949. The Beretta compared favorably to the Sten, which was only available in limited quantities to EOKA. In 1955, Italy restandardized its military small arms and ammunition along NATO lines, and it is possible that the Beretta 9mm automatic pistol, no longer standard, was available second-hand to EOKA purchasing agents. EOKA had received British Sten SMGs both from Greek sources and from stolen stocks on Cyprus and were using them against British soldiers in December 1955. EOKA was also using in some instances ammunition salvaged from ships sunk off Cyprus in World War II.³ Some of the weapons for the sabotage groups, such as dynamite sticks, were stolen from the local mines.

¹Ibid., pp. 33, 93; George B. Johnson and Hans Bert Lockhoven, International Armament, 2 volumes (Cologne, International Small Arms Publishers, 1965), Vol. I, pp. 322, 350, 403.

²Grivas, On Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 93, 94.

³Ibid., p. 10.

In early 1956, EOKA engaged Britain in a lively competition to collect the private arms, mostly hunting shotguns, owned by Cypriots. Of the total stock of some thousands, it is likely that about 800 fell into EOKA hands, of which some 400 to 600 later proved serviceable and, indeed, vital. One account states that EOKA rounded up all 800 within 24 hours.¹

EOKA forces grew slowly in early 1956. Around January, Grivas added another guerrilla group in the Kykko area, his headquarters at that time, consisting of eight men armed with 2 Bren LMGs, 2 Sten SMGs, and at least 5 bolt-action rifles. Grivas states that he had also added another small unit in the Kakopetria area of the island by this time.² By June 1956, EOKA had added a further guerrilla group of eight to ten men in the Kyrenian mountain area using at least 4 Sten SMGs, 2 Bren LMGs, 2 to 4 rifles (bolt-action), and perhaps 1 Thompson SMG. Another dozen or so men formed another five to six guerrilla groups in the Kykko mountain area, each consisting of four men armed with 1 Bren LMG, 1 Sten SMG, and 1 to 2 bolt-action rifles. One guerrilla group of about eight to ten men was formed in the Paphos area armed with perhaps 1 Bren LMG, 1 Sten SMG, and about 5 to 7 bolt-action rifles.³ Thus, by June 1956, total EOKA strength (sabotage groups, guerrilla groups, and reserve group) is estimated at between 98 and 152 men. (This number was not significantly exceeded in the course of the campaign, if Grivas' account is accurate; and reported estimates of EOKA strength from other sources are even more conservative.)

British campaigns against EOKA in the summer of 1956 were successful in disrupting EOKA operations. After a delay in the campaign during the Suez fighting, the British renewed their offensive, and by February 1957 they had severely reduced the number of EOKA leaders

¹Ibid.; see also Foley, Legacy of Strife, p. 58.

²Grivas, On Guerrilla Warfare, p. 10.

³Ibid., p. 33.

and weapons. Most of the existing guerrilla bands were rounded up, and leading members of an EOKA sabotage group in Nicosia were arrested.¹

Until September 1957 there was relative quiet on the island. EOKA was regrouping and re-arming, most notably shotgun commando groups (OKT), using the weapons that had been requisitioned from private citizens. These groups, the first of which had been formed in July 1956, made up the fourth arm of EOKA military units and operated mostly near cities or towns. Each OKT group consisted of five to six men and, in addition to a shotgun, each carried a hand grenade, mine, or occasionally light automatic pistols.² By early 1958, EOKA was largely reconstituted around the OKT groups.

After the British offensive of December 1956 to February 1957, EOKA might have been effectively disarmed were it not for the shotguns. The 1956 seizure of the shotguns thus provided a significant addition to the EOKA arsenal, even though ammunition for them was getting scarce. It is doubtful whether the conversion to military use of these weapons enhanced their longevity, and their maintainability under such conditions was doubtful. Yet there were enough shotguns seized by EOKA to permit as many as 600 to be utilized at one time or another for the rest of the campaign. It is likely that a maximum of ten OKT groups were formed and that many of the shotguns were also used later on by the guerrilla groups and the reserve groups. The range and accuracy of the shotguns, as Grivas pointed out, were adequate for ambushes where the target was no more than 100 to 200 yards away.³ The guns could be fired by the EOKA volunteer who was not acquainted with more sophisticated equipment. Since so many of these guns were used in peacetime for hunting, it is likely that most of the EOKA had experience in using them.

¹Stephens, op. cit., p. 150.

²Grivas, On Guerrilla Warfare, p. 69.

³Ibid., p. 10.

During the summer of 1958, massive British pursuit of EOKA in the hills forced Grivas to restructure and centralize the EOKA sabotage, guerrilla, and reserve groups, plus the OKT, for lowland operations. The reorganized EOKA consisted of three combat-group corps commands consisting of 22 units distributed as follows: 4 in the Paphos sector, 2 in the Kykko mountains, 1 in the Tylliria sector, 3 in the Pitsillia sector, 3 in the Phasoula-Paramythia sector, 3 in the Spilia sector, 3 in the Larnaca sector, 2 in the Solea sector, and 1 in the area west-northwest of Limassol. Using a reduced unit size of five men, the EOKA force by mid-summer 1958 probably consisted of not more than 110 men with perhaps 400 serviceable shotguns and less than 100 automatic weapons of all types at their disposal.¹

By late 1958, OKT shotgun groups were operating in the Famagusta, Karpassia, Kyrenia, Morphou, Akaki, Dheftera, and Kythrea sectors of Cyprus.² Accepting Grivas' average of five to six men per OKT group, it is likely that the total OKT force strength alone amounted to about 35 men, or about one-third of all EOKA personnel.³

Throughout the Enosis hostilities, and increasingly as it became clear that the Enosis goal would not be achieved, tension and fighting broke out between Greek Cypriots, often involving the EOKA, and Turkish Cypriots. Though the details of that EOKA involvement will not be described here, it might be noted that both Cypriot communities continued to import arms even after the Enosis phase of the conflict had passed.

¹Ibid., p. 34; Foley, "The Return of General Grivas," p. 725.

²Grivas, On Guerrilla Warfare, p. 34.

³The wide difference between the number of shotguns reportedly seized and used in the campaign (400-600) and the numbers of men available to use them can be due to two factors: the weapons turnover may have been quite rapid as new guns were pressed into service to replace older, worn-out guns; Grivas was well aware of the need to have reserve stocks on hand, and a great majority of the shotguns might have been stored away in secret locations.

In August 1959, for example, the British minesweeper HMS Burmaston captured a large motor-powered caique containing 74 cases of British .303 ammunition, each case containing 2,500 rounds of ammunition, destined for Turkish Cypriot groups.¹ The Turkish Cypriot underground also started to hoard shotguns. At the same time, the Grivas faction of EOKA retained its arms, and a few days before the signing of the independence agreement (July 1, 1960), 100 U.S.-made SMGs, perhaps .45 cal. Thompsons, were smuggled into Cyprus for use by Grivas' supporters.²

It is not possible to be precise about the weapons available to EOKA forces. The following tabulation is based on the reported size, organization, and equipment of EOKA units and identified weapons types.

Weapons Available to EOKA from 1955 to 1959

<u>Weapon</u> *	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
hand grenade	hundreds	Greece/Italy
incendiary bomb	hundreds	EOKA
Afxention cocktail bomb	hundreds	EOKA
other crude bombs and explosives		EOKA
shotgun	400-600	seized from private citizens
Mauser Model 98k rifle, 7.92mm	several dozen	Greece
Thompson submachine gun .45 cal.	more than 100	Greece
Sten submachine gun 9mm		Greece
Bren light machine gun	at least 14	Greece

* A number of unidentified small arms may have been acquired from Italy.

¹The British captured only two cases; the other 72 sank when the crew scuttled the ship. On hearing of this, Makarios revealed that in June 1959 another Turkish caique had been intercepted bearing a load of ammunition for Turkish Cypriots, but had also dumped its cargo overboard.

²Foley, Legacy of Strife, pp. 161, 163, 164.

2. The British Military Response to the Enosis Struggle. When EOKA launched its attacks on April 1, 1955, British forces on Cyprus--an army garrison, police, and some RAF units--numbered around 3,500 men, or a ratio of nearly 175:1 of government forces to EOKA. In September, between 1,440 and 1,500 Royal Marine Commandos armed mostly with Sten 9mm SMGs arrived in Cyprus.¹ By mid-October, British force strength swelled to 10,000, in some part due to the continued shift of British strength from Suez and the Middle East.² To hamper EOKA's smuggling efforts, the Royal Navy sent 6 coastal minesweepers to intercept gun-running vessels off Cyprus, and air-sea patrols were aided by Shackleton patrol aircraft assigned from Malta.

By mid-December 1955 the British force level on Cyprus was reported at 12,000 troops including Royal Marine Commandos.³ At this time the British Enfield .38 cal. revolver was the standard side arm for the army, while the island police force generally used the British Webley Mark IV .38 revolver. The famous British Lee Enfield .303 bolt-action rifle was still seeing good use with British Middle East forces. Although officially replaced by the British Sterling 9mm SMG in 1953, replacement was slow and the Sten SMG was still in wide use with Royal Marine Commando detachments and Special Forces on Cyprus. The British Bren .303 LMG was used on armored vehicles and as a standard infantry squad support weapon. The aging but reliable Vickers water-cooled .303 MMG was still standard with British forces throughout the campaign.

¹Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 55, 60; Newsweek, September 19, 1955, p. 52.

²It is impossible to determine to what extent the British build-up on Cyprus represented a response to EOKA; to what extent it was a result of the relocation to Cyprus of the forces and headquarters formerly located in Suez; to what extent it was a response to the generally increased tensions in the Middle East that culminated in the 1956 Suez hostilities; and, particularly in the later stages, to what extent it was a reaction to rising tensions and incidents between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

³Newsweek, December 19, 1955, p. 36.

For patrol and reconnaissance duty, the British were equipped with British-made 10.5-ton Saladin armored patrol cars, mounting a 17-pounder (76.2mm) gun, a 4.1-ton British Ferret Scout car with 1 Bren LMG, and 10-ton British Saracen armored personnel carriers mounting 1 Sten SMG and possibly 1 Bren LMG.¹

By late January 1956 the number of British forces on Cyprus reached 15,000; and by the end of March, 22,000.²

Throughout the first year and a half of the hostilities, British forces were developing techniques and organizations suitable to their attempts to rout the EOKA forces operating in the mountains. For this purpose, in September 1957, the British air force placed into service its first flight of British Bristol Sycamore helicopters, specially modified for patrol and observation work, which acted as flying communications centers for the various British units patrolling in the hills.³

After December 1957 the British were forced to conduct two related campaigns: containment and eventual isolation of EOKA, and suppression of the communal fighting between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The first objective required more man-transportable artillery, such as medium mortars, and increased mobility. Restoring peace in the cities called for more riot-control agents, barbed wire, and additional armored patrol cars.

Between December 1957 and June 1958, the British engaged in their second and largest build-up of the campaign. By January 1958, British forces on Cyprus consisted of about 25,000 troops: ten infantry battalions

¹Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 56, 59, 339, 345, 405; ibid., Vol. II, p. 60; Richard Ogorkiewicz, Armor (New York, Praeger, 1960), pp. 40-41.

²Newsweek, February 6, 1956, p. 34; ibid., April 2, 1956, p. 34.

³William Green, The Observer's World Aircraft Directory (London, Warne, 1961), p. 29.

armed with British Lee Enfield .303 bolt-action rifles, British Sten 9mm and the newer Sterling 7.62mm SMGs,¹ and Bren .303 LMGs; five artillery regiments using British 87.6 mm gun-howitzers and the British Vickers .303 water-cooled MMGs; and at least one armored brigade group consisting of one rifle battalion in Saracen armored personnel carriers, one artillery regiment using the recently adopted U.S. 155mm self-propelled gun, and three armored regiments equipped with over 150 British Centurion 50-ton battle tanks with 17- and 20-pounder guns.² In addition there was a police force of 3,000 men equipped largely with Webley .38 revolvers.³

In the summer of 1958, the most serious communal clashes of the Enosis-struggle period occurred, with 56 Greek Cypriots and 53 Turkish Cypriots killed. Quickly responding to this situation, Britain, in eight days of continuous operations, air-lifted 6,500 troops, including paratroop regiments, another artillery regiment, and another infantry brigade consisting of several rifle battalions. These contingents were deployed at makeshift camps on the island, bringing the British force level to approximately 32,000 troops plus 3,000 in the police force. Ferret scout cars and Saladin armored cars were placed in use for reconnaissance duty in the upcountry village sanctuaries of EOKA and in the cities for riot control, while Saracen APCs were used to transport troops swiftly wherever they were needed.⁴

The Royal Navy's sea quarantine of arms shipments continued, utilizing at its peak 16 coastal minesweepers and 1 minesweeper headquarters ship, and supported by Shackleton M.R.2 long-range patrol aircraft from RAF Air Headquarters Malta.⁵

¹Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 60, 350.

²Equipment estimates based on British armored organization after 1956 cited in Ogorkiewicz, op. cit., p. 63.

³Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 59.

⁴Ibid., Vol. II, p. 215; Ogorkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Newsweek, June 30, 1958, pp. 38, 40.

⁵Brasseys Annual: 1959 (London, Praeger, 1959).

In August 1958, EOKA action began to concentrate increasingly on the British civilian community on Cyprus. This led to the introduction of 5,000 additional troops in infantry, paratroop, and special-forces units to bring the total force level by November 1958 to about 37,000 troops. Simultaneously, the British army began arming qualified British civilians with its second-line Webley Mark IV .38 revolvers, after an applicant could demonstrate on a near-by target range that he or she could hit a life-size target at fifteen feet. On the first day of issue in mid-November 1958, it was reported that some 300 British businessmen, lawyers, civil servants, and a scattering of women queued up to receive these revolvers and instructions in their use.¹

For reasons noted earlier, not all the forces on Cyprus were there in response to the EOKA crisis. The following tabulation lists the types, and where possible estimates of numbers, of weapons available to those British forces actually used in action against EOKA or in maintaining order on the island.

Weapons Available to British Forces on Cyprus from 1955 to 1959

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
Webley .38 cal. revolver	perhaps 3,000	U.K.
Lee Enfield Mark IV sniper rifle	limited	U.K.
.303		
L1A1 automatic rifle	standard	U.K.
Bren .303 light machine gun	about 3,000	U.K.
Vickers medium machine gun	perhaps several hundred	U.K.
4.2" medium mortar		U.K.
87mm howitzer		U.K.
105mm pack howitzer		U.K.
155mm self-propelled gun	a few	U.S.

¹Time, November 10, 1958, p. 39; ibid., November 24, 1958, pp. 31-32; Newsweek, November 24, 1958, p. 58.

WEC-98 III

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Source</u>
Charioteer Mark 6-8 tank destroyer	some	U.K.
Centurion battle tank	about 170	U.K.
Saracen armored personnel carrier	about 100-150	U.K.
Saladin armored car with 17-pounder		U.K.
Ferret scout car		U.K.
Avro Shackleton patrol bomber	a number	U.K.
Canberra bomber	6-8	U.K.
Bristol Sycamore helicopter	one squadron	U.K.
coastal minesweeper	at least 16	U.K.

B. Greek-Turkish Cypriot Struggle: 1963-1965

As was seen in the preceding discussion, fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was a feature of the Enosis struggle, particularly toward its closing months. This fighting flared again in 1963 on a scale that threatened to involve not only the two Cypriot communities but also Greece and Turkey, and potentially Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

The large number of direct and indirect actors in the hostilities that broke out in 1963 makes clear presentation of the armaments picture difficult. The analysis here will focus on the forces and weapons actually used in the hostilities--by the major adversaries, by the supporters of one or another side to demonstrate the seriousness of their support, by third parties to deter intervention by other third parties, and by peacekeeping forces. The following account is further complicated by the high probability that the reliability of information about weapons available or used decreases geometrically as one goes from the superpowers to Greek and Turkish Cypriots facing each other across street barricades. At the last level, information about one adversary usually is supplied by the other--an unreliable source at best and particularly so in a situation in which what one side believes, or wants to have believed, is itself a weapon.

1. Greek and Turkish Cypriot Arms and Military Organization Prior to Hostilities. Which adversary initiated the development of military organization and arms acquisition is a moot point. The Greek Cypriots claim that they acted only after learning in January 1963 that the Turkish Cypriots had a secret army of 2,500 men (TMT) partially armed and trained.¹ In May 1963, according to the Greek Cypriots, they responded by creating a Greek Cypriot army (GCA), building on the base of 150 Greek Cypriot cadets being trained for the stillborn Cyprus army.² In reality both communities had been acquiring arms and preparing for trouble since before the end of the Enosis fighting. By 1963 the extent of preparation was becoming more obvious. By December 1963 the TMT still numbered about 2,500 while the GCA numbered 5,000 fully-trained men, with another 5,000 in reserves at various stages of readiness. The GCA was organized into companies of 100-130 men on constant alert.³

The arms acquired by GCA and TMT came principally from sympathizers, public and private, in Greece and Turkey. In addition, the Greek Cypriot forces had access to arms left over from the Enosis struggle. The types of arms sought by the two Cypriot forces and available to the Greek and Turkish armed forces are listed below, with some indication of the factors making it more likely that one or another particular type was actually transferred to the GCA or TMT. Before looking at those lists, however, it should be recalled that under the Treaty of Guarantee signed at the time of Cyprus' independence,

¹Foley, Legacy of Strife, pp. 161, 167.

²After independence, a small Cypriot army was to have been created, with internal policing functions only, eventually attaining a force size of over 1,200, mostly equipped with ex-British scout cars, SMGs, and pistols. See Laurence L. Ewing and Robert C. Sellers, Reference Handbook of the Armed Forces of the World, 1966 edition (Washington, D.C., Sellers and Assoc., 1966). Disagreement over the relationship between the two communities in the army prevented its actual formation.

³Foley, Legacy of Strife, pp. 167-168.

a Greek contingent of 850 and a Turkish contingent of 650 were stationed on the island. It has been reported that the Turkish forces, when rotated from Cyprus duty, were permitted to leave their arms behind for the Turkish Cypriots.¹ Arms probably got into GCA inventories in a similar manner from the Greek contingent.

a. Small Arms Available in Turkish Forces

Pistols: The U.S. Colt automatic .45 cal. pistol was in reserve status with the Turkish army and was probably available for distribution. The second type of automatic pistol obtainable was the Turkish-made 9mm Kirikkale patterned after the German Walther PP developed in the late 1930s. The Kirikkale was used at the weapons platoon and rifle platoon level in the Turkish army, including its Cyprus contingent, and was also issued to heavy-weapons crews in lieu of rifles. It was probably less available to the Turkish Cypriots than the Colt since it was in first-line service.²

Rifles: After 1947, Turkey received through the U.S. Military Assistance Program a great quantity of the U.S. M1 Garand .30 cal. SLR, which had become the standard rifle in U.S. units early in World War II. These were not placed in first-line service because Turkey preferred the sturdier and more accurate 7.92mm Mauser bolt-action rifle which had been acquired by Turkey from Germany and Belgium in 1890, 1893, 1903, and 1905, from Germany in World War I, and from Czechoslovakia in 1924. Therefore, a large number of U.S. M1 Garand SLRs could have been supplied to the Turkish Cypriots as well as a variety of the Mauser rifles.³

Machine Guns and Automatic Rifles: Turkish army rifle squads were equipped with U.S.-made and -supplied .30 cal. Browning automatic rifles

¹Ibid., p. 167.

²Jac Weller, "The Turkish Infantry," American Rifleman, April 1964, p. 18; Joseph Smith, Small Arms of the World (Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Books, 1966), p. 570.

³Weller, op. cit., p. 18; Smith, op. cit., p. 572.

(BARs), which were in the process of being replaced in the U.S. forces by the M-14. BARs were probably in service with the Turkish contingent on Cyprus and available for distribution to the Turkish Cypriots. The reliable but bulky British-made Vickers .303 HMG reportedly was in the Turkish service in the beginning of the 1960s and was probably supplanted in first-line service by the U.S.-made and -supplied Browning M1919 A4/A6 air-cooled .30 cal. machine gun. Therefore, a number of the Vickers HMGs might have been available to the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish army also used limited quantities of the indigenously-made, French-designed Hotchkiss 7.5mm Model 1924 LMG and the Czech-made ZB LMG, predecessor to the British Bren LMG. It is not known whether some of these might have been supplied to the Turkish Cypriots.¹

Submachine Guns: Both the British-made Sten 9mm SMG and the U.S.-made and -supplied Thompson M1 .45 cal. SMG were reportedly available to the Turkish army in great quantities by 1963. Since these weapons were not standard issue to infantry companies but were limited to armored artillery units and infantry reconnaissance platoons, it is likely that many of both types could have been available for shipment to the Turkish Cypriots from the Turkish mainland. However, given the Turkish army organization, it is not likely that the original Turkish contingent on Cyprus, less than half the size of a standard battle group of some three or four rifle companies, made much use of the Sten or the Thompson SMGs. Whatever quantities of these were used by the Turkish Cypriots were probably shipped directly from the mainland.²

Other Ordnance: The 4.2" and 81mm mortars, 3.5" rocket launchers (bazookas), 75mm recoilless rifles, and jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles,

¹Weller, op. cit., p. 18; Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 405.

²Weller, op. cit., p. 18.

mostly of U.S. make, were part of the equipment of a standard battle group (about 1,500 men). These weapons probably saw service with the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots could rely on a continued supply of ammunition from the mainland, as Turkey was self-dependent in the manufacture of 7.92mm rifle ammunition for the Mausers and shells for the U.S. 105mm howitzer and the U.S.-made and -supplied 155mm gun. Of equal advantage to the Turkish Cypriots was the interchangeability of ammunition between the U.S. Colt .45 automatic pistol and the Thompson SMG, both available in large numbers from Turkey. NATO-standard hand grenades were also available in large quantities.¹

b. Small Arms Available in Greek Forces

Pistols: The most widely used Greek army service revolver was the British-made Enfield .38, supplied by Britain during World War II and the Greek Insurgency. In addition, the Browning 9mm automatic pistol made in Canada from 1943 to 1945 was supplied to the Greek resistance by Britain, and some of these were probably still in use with Greek army forces at the end of 1963. For policing duties, the British Webley .38 cal. revolver Mark IV was purchased from Britain after World War II and probably was in service with the Greek army contingent on Cyprus or the Cypriot police force. The Colt .45 M1911 automatic pistol was widely sold commercially and supplied to Greece by the United States; it probably was available to the Greek Cypriots.²

Rifles: The British Enfield .303 bolt-action rifle, supplied to Greece by Britain during the Insurgency, was in the process of being replaced by the newer U.S. Garand M1 SLR; it is likely that a quantity of these were in reserve status

¹Ibid.; Foley, Legacy of Strife, p. 161; Joseph M. Colby, "Arms for Our Allies," Ordnance, July-August 1955, p. 53.

²Smith, op. cit., p. 451; Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 60.

and available to the Greek Cypriots. The U.S.-supplied M1 and M2 .30 cal. carbines were standardized into the Greek army, but it is not clear whether any were available for distribution outside the regular Greek forces.¹

Machine Guns and Automatic Rifles: Greece, like Turkey; had been a user of British Vickers .303 HMGs, including some supplied to Greek government forces in the Insurgency. With the supply of the U.S.-made .30 cal. BAR, some of the obsolescent Vickers HMGs may have become available to the Greek Cypriots. The late World War II-developed M3 .45 SMG was supplied to Greece in small numbers from the United States for use by armored units, but it is doubtful whether there were sufficient numbers available for use by the Greek Cypriots. The Thompson .45 cal. SMG was in current use by the Greek army and probably available on Cyprus. British-made Bren .303 LMGs, supplied to the Greek underground in World War II and to Greek government forces in the Insurgency, were in limited use in the Greek army as a company support weapon in 1963, and a few may have been available to the Greek Cypriots.²

Other Ordnance: The Greek army used as standard most U.S.-supplied items such as 3.5" rocket launchers, 106mm jeep-mounted recoilless rifles, 81mm mortars, and 105mm howitzers. In addition, British-made 25-pounder field guns supplied during the Insurgency were in its inventory and later supplied to the Greek Cypriots.³

2. The Role Played by Weapons in the Communal Fighting and in Third-Party Activities. The following is a roughly chronological account of the military operations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and of interventions and actions by third parties that involved use or demonstration of military capability.

¹Johnson and Lockhoven, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 113.

²Ibid., p. 78; Smith, op. cit., p. 451.

³Newsweek, August 17, 1964.

Unlike the small-scale guerrilla warfare of the Enosis struggle, the communal fighting that erupted in 1963 was a small-scale conventional war. The street fighting that broke out in Nicosia in December 1963 spread rapidly to other cities in Cyprus. In response to anti-Turkish incidents, three U.S.-supplied F-100C Super-Sabres of the Turkish air force buzzed Nicosia in a show of force on December 24, 1963.¹ On the following day, the Turkish contingent on Cyprus took up defensive positions in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia.

The Greek contingent responded by taking up positions just outside the Turkish quarter,² thus creating the risk of a larger armed confrontation. The threat abated momentarily when the British arranged a truce and persuaded the Greek and Turkish forces to return to their camps. Out of the 10,000 British forces that could have been stationed on Cyprus under the independence agreements, only 3,000 were actually there.³

In contrast to disorganized street fighting, the first set battle occurred in late December in a Nicosia suburb. The 41-man Greek Cypriot force involved in the fighting used U.S.-made machine guns, most likely .45 cal. Thompson Mls. Most of the remainder used British Sten 9mm SMGs, which were not in the Greek army inventory but were probably from post-Enosis stocks on the island. The group was

¹Foley, Legacy of Strife, p. 170.

²U.S. News and World Report, January 6, 1964, p. 6.

³T. Adams and Alvin Cottrell, "The Cyprus Conflict," Orbis, Spring 1964, p. 81. A figure of only 2,700 is reported in Stephens, op. cit., p. 185. Britain still maintained large base facilities on Cyprus. According to one account, the British facilities by December 1963 consisted of "a stockpile for one or more brigade groups, a NATO early warning station, a wireless station that is officially regarded as constituting an essential link in Britain's global radio network, accommodation for the three infantry battalions and their supporting units [and the Akrotiri air base] at which some tactical aircraft were permanently located [attached to the RAF Near East Air Force HQ] and which is used periodically by transport planes and V-bombers." Neville Brown, Strategic Mobility (New York, Praeger, 1964), p. 29. The RAF had also based Shackleton long-range patrol aircraft at Akrotiri by the end of 1963. The Military Balance: 1963-64 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1963), p. 31.

also equipped with hand grenades, some of NATO-type captured from the Turkish Cypriots.¹

The Turkish air force's flights over Nicosia led to rumors of impending Turkish invasions. Despite the nearness of Turkey to Cyprus, however, the lack of adequate landing craft would have made any major Turkish invasion difficult if not impossible. In response to Turkish air maneuvers and Greek-Turkish Cypriot fighting, the Greek navy was placed on a four-hour alert late in December 1963. The possibility of war between two NATO members and the consequent weakening of NATO's eastern flank led to the positioning of units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet off Cyprus in late December and early January 1964, including the nuclear carrier USS Enterprise.²

Arms smuggling to both Cypriot communities continued on an increased scale. For example, in early January 1964, sixteen tons of various types of small arms for the Turkish Cypriots were reportedly smuggled in from Turkey in suspiciously large crates labelled "drugs and bandages." About the same time the Greek Cypriots imported another consignment of weapons in boxes marked "printing machinery" destined for the offices of the newspaper Combat, owned by a Greek Cypriot unit leader. The contents were discovered when the cases of "machinery" were accidentally broken open at the docks in the southern port city of Limassol.³

In the first few months of 1964, the Greek Cypriot forces nearly doubled in size to around 20,000, which probably consisted of 10,000 full-time and 10,000 reserve or part-time members. These forces, again probably equipped with SMGs of the Sten or Thompson variety, attacked the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Limassol in mid-February

¹Foley, The Legacy of Strife, p. 169.

²Ibid., pp. 172, 174, 182.

³Ibid., p. 177.

1964, using homemade armored bulldozers fashioned from welded steel plates in Nicosia garages to remove Turkish Cypriot roadblocks and fortifications at the edge of the quarter. These were also used in March 1964 to remove Turkish Cypriot roadblocks on the main road to Xeros.¹

By March 1964 the British had reinforced their garrison to 7,500,² and had moved either six antitank guns or Charioteer 28-ton tank destroyers into the Trakhonas area of the island and positioned them opposite Greek Cypriot forces. But at the same time, the Greek Cypriots demonstrated that they had acquired weapons of heavier firepower than they had used previously. In an attack on the Turkish village of Ktima, the Greek Cypriot force used U.S.-made 3.5" rocket launchers, 81mm mortars, Browning .30 cal. HMGs, and hand grenades--all but the last being in the current Greek army inventory, either on Cyprus or the mainland.³

The worsening situation on Cyprus led to the creation of a U.N. force. On March 14, 1964, the first contingent--the Canadian Royal 22nd Regiment--was air-lifted to Cyprus. The 1,000-man Canadian contingent was followed by a 1,000-man Swedish contingent, a 675-man Danish contingent, and a 650-man Irish contingent. These, plus 2,400 British troops assigned to the United Nations from Britain's 7,500-man Cyprus force, formed the new U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) of 5,725 men, which officially assumed peacekeeping responsibilities on the island on March 27, 1964.

Despite the presence of UNFICYP, both Cypriot communities continued to build up their force levels and arms stockpiles. In May 1964 the Greek Cypriots made plans to organize and train the Cyprus National Guard. President Makarios called up all youths between the

¹Ibid.; Newsweek, February 24, 1964, p. 39; ibid., March 30, 1964, p. 25.

²Adams and Cottrell, op. cit., p. 81.

³Newsweek, March 23, 1964, pp. 36-37; Time, March 20, 1964, p. 31.

ages of 19 and 21 for military service and threatened publicly to import heavy weapons, reportedly from the Soviet Union or the UAR. In order to supervise the formation of the Guard, former EOKA leader Grivas returned to Cyprus from Athens in mid-June 1964.¹

At this time, the Greek Cypriots, openly backed by the Cyprus government, were engaged in their most massive build-up, which increasingly took the form of externally-supplied weapons and volunteers. A sudden influx of these volunteers, many of them from the regular Greek army on the mainland, was variously estimated at between 2,000 and 5,000 men, thus bringing total estimated Greek Cypriot strength to between 22,000 and 25,000 by the end of June 1964. Men and arms reportedly poured in from Greece and were rushed from the ports to the mountains in secret night truck convoys. At the same time the Greek Cypriots refused UNFICYP access to their base areas.²

The Turkish response to the Greek Cypriot build-up was predictable. In mid-June 1964 it was reported that 500 Turkish volunteers, perhaps from the Turkish army on the mainland, had landed secretly on the northwest coast of Cyprus and had established a beachhead and defense perimeter.³ This beachhead near the small Turkish enclave of Kokkina, became the main entry point for Turkish personnel, weapons, and ammunition and a focal point in the second phase of the conflict.

The build-up of men and weapons continued through the summer of 1964, with the Turkish Cypriot and volunteer forces augmenting the Kokkina beachhead while their adversaries readied

¹Stephens, op. cit., p. 195; Time, June 12, 1964, p. 43.

²Stephens, op. cit., p. 195.

³Ibid.

themselves to assault it. The heaviest guns yet were introduced into the Greek Cypriot inventory in early August 1964: several U.S.-made 150mm howitzers formerly supplied to the Greek army were reportedly unloaded under blackout conditions at Limassol. It is likely that around this time, perhaps accompanying this shipment, the Greek Cypriots acquired more heavy artillery including British-made 25-pounder field guns, supplied Greece by Britain during the Greek Insurgency. All types were quickly sent to the front near Kokkina. Swedish-made Bofors 40mm antiaircraft guns were also being emplaced around Nicosia and Limassol to guard against Turkish air raids.¹

The assault on Kokkina began on August 6, 1964. The Greek-supplied 25-pounders, U.S.-made 81mm mortars, and U.S.-made 3.5" rocket launchers were all used in quantity, plus some HMGs (probably the U.S.-made and -supplied Browning .30 cal. M1919 A4/A6 used by the Greek army). The National Guard also used a quantity of small patrol boats of uncertain origin to hamper Turkish reinforcements by sea at Kokkina. The Turkish Cypriots were driven back into a smaller perimeter, sustaining heavy losses, and seemingly were not so well-equipped as the Greek Cypriots.²

The assault on Kokkina brought the direct intervention of the Turkish air force. In two raids on August 8, at least 64 Sabrejets were used. (The Turkish air force had three types of Sabrejets at this time: U.S.-made and -supplied F-86 Sabres; the all-weather variant F-86K made in Italy under U.S. license and acquired from the Netherlands air force; the older Sabre day fighters built in Canada under U.S. license and supplied to Turkey by Canada after 1954. It is not clear from accounts which of these participated in the attack.) The jets, carrying varied stores of 100/500 or 1,000-pound bombs, 750-pound

¹Ibid., p. 196; Newsweek, August 17, 1964, p. 38; U.S. News and World Report, August 24, 1964, p. 30.

²Time, August 14, 1964, p. 20; Newsweek, August 17, 1964, p. 38.

napalm tanks, and 5" rockets plus .50 cal. Browning machine guns, bombed and strafed Greek Cypriot positions around Kokkina.¹ Despite ominous counter-warnings, the situation stabilized after the Kokkina raids. The Turkish air attacks were a clear indication to the Greek Cypriots that continued attacks on Kokkina and on Turkish Cypriots generally would create a high risk of even greater direct Turkish involvement. And while the Greek Cypriot forces were no match for the combined Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces, an offensive by the latter combined forces would have risked direct Greek involvement, which Makarios was reportedly promised.²

This balance prevailed through the remainder of 1964 and the spring of 1965. But the Greek Cypriots were seeking the means to alter the balance in their favor, by acquisition of new arms or involvement of other state's forces. Details are scarce on what was sought and what obtained. One source³ says that Makarios obtained Nasser's permission for Greek and Soviet jets to use UAR airfields to interdict a Turkish invasion. Makarios also made overtures to the Soviet Union for further arms aid, particularly for more sophisticated anti-aircraft systems.⁴

¹William Green, The World's Fighting Planes, 4th edition (New York, Doubleday, 1965), pp. 7, 206; U.S. News and World Report, August 24, 1964, p. 30.

²Stephens, op. cit., pp. 197, 200.

³Time, September 4, 1964, p. 39.

⁴This may have been a specific request for Guideline SAMs of the sort made available by the Soviet Union to the Warsaw Pact countries, the UAR, Cuba, and Indonesia. Whether or not any SAMs were requested, none reached Cyprus. One source (Time, April 9, 1965, p. 30) reports the following unsuccessful effort to deliver them. After being shipped by the Soviet Union to Alexandria late in 1964, the SAMs lay idle while Greek Cypriot missile crews, headed by Greek "volunteers" experienced with the NATO-supplied Nike Ajax/Hercules systems, were trained in the UAR. At the beginning of April 1965 the SAMs were loaded onto a freighter at Alexandria. Either the freighter was turned back by units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet patrolling in Cyprus waters or actually docked at Boghaz but, due to U.S. intervention with the Cyprus government, did not unload its cargo and returned to Alexandria.

In September 1964 a commercial agreement between Cyprus and the Soviet Union was signed in Moscow for \$28 million worth of Soviet weapons to be sent to Cyprus. Half of this amount was a gift by the Soviet government, and the \$14 million balance was a credit to be repaid in annual installments over the next fifteen years.¹

The first reported Soviet and Egyptian arms shipment to Cyprus was made in February 1965 when 5 torpedo boats of Soviet make, probably "Komar" class and used by the UAR navy, were unloaded at Boghaz by "an Egyptian freighter with its name and home-port covered with burlap."² The Cypriot build-up continued in early March 1965 when 32 Soviet-made T34 32-ton battle tanks with an 85mm gun were unloaded at Boghaz. These may have been taken from the 400 T-34s reported in the UAR army inventory during 1964 originally supplied to Egypt by the Soviet Union beginning in 1956.³

All the forces on Cyprus, those playing peacekeeping roles as well as those with belligerent roles, continued to grow. By the end of March 1965 there were reported to be 12,000 Turkish Cypriot and Turkish volunteer forces.⁴ Greek Cypriot forces at this time, including volunteers, numbered 28,000 to 34,000, of whom 14,000 were a fully-trained and well-equipped basis. UNFICYP had grown to 6,000.⁵

The stalemate has continued since then with no further significant increases in the men or material supplied to either the National Guard or the Turkish Cypriots. Total Guard strength by

¹Times (London), October 18, 1965.

²Time, March 26, 1965, p. 27.

³von Senger und Etterlin, The World's Armoured Fighting Vehicles, English translation (New York, Doubleday, 1962), p. 113; The Military Balance: 1964-65 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), p. 34.

⁴Time, March 26, 1965, p. 27.


⁵Newsweek, March 29, 1965, p. 36.

October 1965 was reported at 15,000 full-time troops plus volunteers estimated by the United Nations to number 10,000. No appreciable increases in the reserves were reported to have occurred since March 1965; therefore the total available strength, full- and part-time, of the Greek Cypriots, including the National Guard and volunteer units, ranged between 39,000 and 45,000 by October 1965. In addition, the Greek Cypriot police force was at a reported strength of 5,000 plus volunteer village-militia units in the summer of 1965.¹

¹Times (London), October 18, 1965; Stephens, op. cit., p. 200.

WEC-98 III
COMPARATIVE FORCE LEVELS
CYPRUS: ENOSIS
1955-1960

(Figures for police in parentheses)



COMPARATIVE FORCE LEVELS: GREEK CYPRIOT-TURKISH CYPRIOT CONFLICT
1963-1965

Greek "Volunteers"	Greek Cypriots/Cyprus Nat'l Guard		Total	Year	Total	Turkish Cypriots	Turkish "Volunteers"
	Active	Reserve					
	150		150	1963	over 2,500	over 2,500	
		5,000	10,000	1964			
	10,000	10,000	20,000				
2,000-5,000	10,000	10,000	22,000 to 25,000		6,000	5,500	about 500
5,000	14,000	23,000	42,000				
				1965			
5,000	23,000 to 29,000	14,000 to 20,000	42,000 to 54,000		12,000	about 10,000	about 2,000
10,000	15,000	14,000 to 20,000 plus 5,000 police	44,000 to 50,000	1966	over 12,000	over 10,000	over 2,000

IV. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL"Controlling" the Conflict

Conflict control meant in the several stages of conflict in Cyprus: ending British colonial rule before strife ensued; promoting harmony between the intractably hostile Greek and Turkish populations of Cyprus; preventing the Enosis agitation from leading to bloodshed; keeping Greece and Turkey from intervention and direct war; using U.N., NATO, British, U.S., and Soviet constructive action in defusing the conflict; and finding new constitutional and human arrangements so the dispute might have been settled.

Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. Hostility to British rule represented the first of the Cyprus conflict situations (the other being the Greek-Turkish Cypriot quarrel). Stemming as it did from traditional British strategic policy toward the Middle East, the colonial conflict might have been avoided if Britain had accepted the consequences in a timely fashion of the end of its imperial role, of the changed realities of the former colonial world, and of the military innovations suited to altered political circumstances. Both the United States and Britain eventually developed a longer strategic reach in the form of sea-based power, long-range air-lift capabilities, and mobile ground forces--but only after suffering important political and economic losses by clinging to obsolete land bases in resentful countries. (The Suez fiasco of 1956, by the way, might have been averted if Britain had not clung to the Cyprus base from which the British-French attack was launched.)

2. If the British were not prepared to avert conflict by far-seeing policies, the only other route to the prevention of conflict was suppression in advance. This usually requires a detering threat, well understood and adequately communicated. But even Moscow's signals to

Eastern Europe in 1955 and 1956 were ambiguous to the point where Hungarian patriots thought freedom was a real option. A fortiori, Western societies cannot depend on conveying--and meaning--single-minded ruthlessness unless their own physical security and national survival are clearly at stake--and even then the voices in a free society will convey a cacaphonous sound (as they did when Britain did try, without great credibility, to convey a moderate policy tone).

3. As for carrots, colonial powers might hold on longer by increasing the economic stake of the indigenes in the status quo, and perhaps even more by a policy of genuine equality (as Portugal does with a small number of its wards). If these had been combined with skillful police (not military) civil control, British rule might have fared better. But all experience implies that concessions breed increased discontent in colonial situations. On balance, no realistic conflict-prevention policy exists for colonial situations other than to prepare the people for independence and give it to them when they think they are ready, at the same time making it unmistakably clear that such is the official policy.

4. As for the other, continuing quarrel between the indigenous population of Cyprus, given its passionate nature--ethnic, religious, a small-scale version of the historic hatreds between Greeks and Turks--the only short-term way to prevent it from becoming an internal conflict on Cyprus would have been physically to separate the two hostile factions. The means could have included partition of the island, or return of the Turkish Cypriot minority to Turkey. A lesser measure might have been firm third-party guarantees of minority rights. As with the Arabs and Israelis in the Palestine conflict, so in Cyprus gradual improvement in relations is the obvious longer-term objective; but it should not beguile the peacemaker from the practical shorter-term remedial steps on which the peace in fact depends. At the same time, habitual turning to violence (the style of some political groups in both the Palestine and Cyprus

conflicts) might be mitigated by policies of re-educating professional warriors and creating constructive outlets for their peacetime energies.

5. Even if the desire of the Greek Cypriot majority for Enosis had been satisfied, the Turkish minority problem would have remained to generate local conflict. Only a stronger and more cohesive Greek government with better security and police measures could in any case have taken a statesmanlike posture in the face of Greek Cypriot pressures. Herein lay the virtue of Greece's high dependence on U.S. and British support, which the latter manipulated to restrain drastic Greek responses to Cypriot appeals. Only a policy of favoring and helping the moderate local elements can take the initiative away from the more radical. (Failure to recognize this is part of the tragedy of South African policy toward its black population.)

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

6. As in Indonesia, so in Greece after World War II many surplus arms were available for the taking. Unfortunately, small arms have an extraordinarily long life. Short of finding technical means of giving them a more rapid obsolescence (perhaps benefiting from the advice of American auto manufacturers), policy measures are desirable to detect and control their traffic.

7. U.N. intervention may not have, as the colonial powers used to claim, an incendiary effect. But U.N. cognizance of Cyprus on the basis of the Greek-sponsored appeal for self-determination was likely simply to unleash powerful local forces unless it was accompanied by vigorous U.N. measures to handle the matter creatively: for instance, an early U.N. presence on the ground while diplomatic solutions responsive to the interests of all parties were being pressed. (Such a combination of U.N. activities was not brought into being for another decade.)

8. The rebels in Cyprus believed that a limited amount of violence would bring Britain to terms. To counter this estimate, it would

have had to be made clear to both Athens and the Greek Cypriots that London would not be forced into negotiations, even while meeting legitimate demands peacefully made. The essential accompaniment of such a line would have been an obvious and effective internal security and police capability, both to deter hostilities and to end them quickly if they broke out.

Terminating Hostilities

9. It is astonishing how differently two sides can perceive the identical conflict. Vietnam today to the United States is a costly but fairly remote police action aimed at discouraging take-over by Hanoi; but the latter is reported to see it as an all-out U.S. war of conquest. In 1955, if London had had better intelligence (in both senses) as to the totality of the war declared by the Greek Cypriots, a change in British policies might have shortened the first round of fighting.

10. Repressive policies aimed at one troublemaking faction can ultimately alienate other segments of the population. The Mau Mau in Kenya drove moderate whites to racism; the apartheid-seekers in Africa have done the same with moderate blacks. U.S. action in South Vietnam undoubtedly creates anti-Americanism among innocent bystanders who get hurt. British suppression policy in Cyprus left friendly Cypriots open to reprisal, which diminished the effectiveness of their support for early British success. In general, it does not seem useful to recommend measures for short-term suppression of colonial peoples, because the total ultimate amount of violence involved will inevitably be the greater.

11. The world is ruled in many places today by statesmen who were once deported or jailed by British or French rulers--and remember it well. Perhaps the violent phases of some internal conflicts would have been more quickly terminated if key responsible leaders were handled differently. At a minimum, better communication with such leaders might minimize conflict. At best, local leaders should be made allies in the process of peaceful change.

12. Cyprus from 1955 to 1957 was no exception to the rule that a neutral multilateral presence on the ground can, whatever its effect on settlement, powerfully influence the termination of actual hostilities, particularly if accompanied by vigorous good-offices diplomacy. Similarly, regional or alliance organizations (in this case NATO) should act vigorously and unifiedly to end local fighting and find solutions.

13. In the sense that the chief focus of conflict was Greek Cypriot agitation for Enosis and its accompanying support from Athens, the main countervailing force was of course Turkey's encouragement of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish threats probably sobered the agitators, but, once again, if deterrence failed, a larger war might have resulted with dangers to regional and world peace.

Preventing Resumed Hostilities

14. By 1963, when the Cypriot conflict was communal only, the measures of population transfer discussed earlier were still not taken. The only viable non-conflict policy was then one of cooperation. If this were not possible, violence could have been avoided only by effective suppression of the minority. This would have required a cohesive and effective regime. Such a regime might have been more plausible if the constitution, like the League of Nations Covenant, had not been paralyzed by its requirement for unanimity. Finally, international guarantees against Enosis and partition might have effectively deterred conflict if they had been more solid and more widely underwritten.

Terminating Resumed Hostilities

15. Measures that might have helped (or did help) toward this end would have been along lines outlined earlier: detection and control of transfer and storage of arms; better communication among adversaries; comprehensive external pressures on all parties to negotiate reasonably; internal stability in Greece and Turkey; (unexecuted) Turkish threats to

intensify hostilities; neutral peacekeeping force with an adequate mandate, plus vigorous U.N. diplomacy; U.S. willingness to intervene.
 For the last, the key catalyst was a modest Soviet threat sufficient to interest the United States urgently in a settlement--which was helpful--but not enough to trigger destabilizing direct intervention. Far more desirable would have been a common U.S.-Soviet conflict-control policy.

16. In sum, desirable policy measures were:

KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Enlightened colonial liquidation policy

Technical military means toward same,* including:

Improved sea-based power

Long-range air-lift capabilities

Mobile ground forces

or

Successful suppression (sic)

requiring

Deterrent threat, well understood, adequately communicated

Increased local economic stake

Equality

Competent police for civil control

Physical separation of incompatible factions

Partition

Return of minority to homeland

or

Third-party guarantees of minority rights

Re-education of professional warriors

Constructive outlets for warlike energies

Strong and cohesive local government

Dependence on external support

Assistance to moderate local elements

WEC-98 III

PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Shorter effective life for small arms

Small-arms detection and control

U.N. presence and good offices

U.N. pressure for solutions responsive to interest
of parties

Refusal to negotiate under duress

combined with

Meeting of legitimate demands

Effective internal security doctrine and capability

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Better intelligence

Efforts to make leaders allies in process of peaceful
change

Better communication among adversaries

Neutral peacekeeping force

Threats to intensify hostilities (sic)*

PREVENTING RESUMED HOSTILITIES

Population transfer

or

Effective suppression (sic)

Cohesive and effective regime

International guarantees

TERMINATING RESUMED HOSTILITIES

Detection and control of transfer and storage of arms*

Better communications

Pressures on parties to negotiate*

Internal stability in external countries

Threats to intensify hostilities*

Peacekeeping force*

Vigorous U.N. diplomacy*

U.S. willingness to intervene

Soviet threat sufficient to activate U.S. interest in
settlement (sic)

*measure actually taken